From: "cron2 (Code Review)" Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2025 21:26:01 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: gert@...1296..., arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641..., max@...2606... Message-ID: <8f3822baac0b4bfb5a2f3c918fc579a66a4eb410-HTML@...2715...> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="vavCZzfjejk="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [S] Change in openvpn[master]: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: plaisthos Cc: MaxF , flichtenheld , openvpn-devel --vavCZzfjejk= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable cron2 has submitted this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/84= 3?usp=3Demail ) Change subject: Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 faile= d decryptions ...................................................................... Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore after 2**36 failed decryptions To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-Poly1305) we do not allow decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifications. After 2**35, we trigger a renegotiation (to avoid that situation). For the theoretical background, see - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/ - RFC 9147 (DTLS 1.3) section 4.5.3 "AEAD limits" - https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/051.pdf Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe Acked-by: MaxF Message-Id: <20250109174928.17862-1-gert@...1296...> URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg30= 387.html Signed-off-by: Gert Doering --- M src/openvpn/crypto.c M src/openvpn/crypto.h M src/openvpn/ssl.c 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c @@ -405,7 +405,13 @@ { static const char error_prefix[] =3D "AEAD Decrypt error"; struct packet_id_net pin =3D { 0 }; - const struct key_ctx *ctx =3D &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt; + struct key_ctx *ctx =3D &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt; + + if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx)) + { + CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reached."); + } + int outlen; struct gc_arena gc; @@ -511,6 +517,7 @@ if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen, &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size)) { + ctx->failed_verifications++; CRYPT_DROP("packet tag authentication failed"); } ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen)); diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h index 3ad31c5..fe81c7f 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h @@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used for * AEAD ciphers) */ uint64_t plaintext_blocks; + /** number of failed verification using this cipher */ + uint64_t failed_verifications; }; #define KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */ @@ -661,6 +663,32 @@ cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername); /** + * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the acceptable limit. + */ +static inline bool +cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx) +{ + /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guarantees + * the security margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes) + * but we accept slightly lower security bound for the edge + * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k are + * extremely rarely used */ + return ctx->failed_verifications > (1ull << 36); +} + +/** + * Check if the number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we + * should try to move to a new key + */ +static inline bool +cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(const struct key_ctx *ctx) +{ + /* Use 2**35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */ + return ctx->failed_verifications > (1ull << 35); +} + + +/** * Blocksize used for the AEAD limit caluclation * * Since cipher_ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index cf7f34f..e4a7b57 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@ return true; } + if (cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt)) + { + return true; + } + return false; } /* -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/843?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190 Gerrit-Change-Number: 843 Gerrit-PatchSet: 6 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-MessageType: merged --vavCZzfjejk= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

cron2 submitted this change.

View Change

Do not attempt to decrypt packets anymore afte=
r 2**36 failed decryptions

To avoid attacks (especially on Chacha20-= Poly1305) we do not allow
decryption anymore after 2**36 failed verifica= tions.

After 2**35, we trigger a renegotiation (to avoid that situat= ion).

For the theoretical background, see

- https://datatr= acker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-limits/
- RFC 9147 (DTLS 1.3)= section 4.5.3 "AEAD limits"
- https://eprint.iacr.org/2024= /051.pdf

Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e5ddfe03a8c190
Sig= ned-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@...1227...>
Acked-by: MaxF <max@= ...2606...>
Message-Id: <20250109174928.17862-1-gert@...1296...>= ;
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/= msg30387.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@...1296...>
---=
M src/openvpn/crypto.c
M src/openvpn/crypto.h
M src/openvpn/ssl.c=
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
index df38cdd..ee9b0c6 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c
@@ -405,7 +405,13= @@
{
static const char error_prefix[= ] =3D "AEAD Decrypt error";
struct packet_id= _net pin =3D { 0 };
- = const struct key_ctx *ctx =3D &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
= + struct key_ctx *ctx =3D &a= mp;opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
+
+ if (= cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_exceeded(ctx))
+ {
+ CRYPT_DROP("Decryption failed verification limit reach= ed.");
+ }
+
= int outlen;
struct gc_arena gc;

@@ -511,6 +517,7 @@
if (!cipher_ctx_final_= check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
= &outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
{

+ c= tx->failed_verifications++;
CRYPT_DROP("pa= cket tag authentication failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));

diff --git = a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h
index 3ad31c5= ..fe81c7f 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h

@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@
<= span> * with the current key in number of 128 bit blocks (only used fo= r
* AEAD ciphers) */
uint64_t pl= aintext_blocks;
+ = /** number of failed verification using this cipher */
+ uint64_t failed_verifications;

};

#define KEY_DIRECTION_BID= IRECTIONAL 0 /* same keys for both directions */
@@ -661,6 = +663,32 @@
cipher_get_aead_limits(const char *ciphername);=

/**
+ * Check if the number of failed decryption is over the= acceptable limit.
+ = */
+static inline boo= l
+cipher_decrypt_ver= ify_fail_exceeded(const struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ /* Use 2**36, same as DTLS 1.3. Strictly speaking this only guar= antees
+ * the se= curity margin for packets up to 2^10 blocks (16384 bytes)
+ * but we accept slightly lower s= ecurity bound for the edge
+ * of Chacha20-Poly1305 and packets over 16k as MTUs over 16k ar= e
+ * extremely r= arely used */
+ re= turn ctx->failed_verifications > (1ull << 36);
+}
+
+ * Check if t= he number of failed decryption is approaching the limit and we
+ * should try to move to a new k= ey
+ */
+static inline bool
+cipher_decrypt_verify_fail_warn(co= nst struct key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ /* Use 2*= *35, half the amount after which we refuse to decrypt */
+ return ctx->failed_verification= s > (1ull << 35);
+}
++
+/**
* Blocksize used for the A= EAD limit caluclation
*
* Since cipher_= ctx_block_size() is not reliable and will return 1 in many
= diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
index cf= 7f34f..e4a7b57 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
@@ -3005,6 +3005,11 @@ return true;
}

+ if (cipher_decrypt_ve= rify_fail_warn(&key_ctx_bi->decrypt))
+ {
+ return true;
+ }
+
return false;
}
/*

To view, visit change 843. To unsubscribe, or = for help writing mail filters, visit settings.

Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I81440ac28a1ad553652e201234e= 5ddfe03a8c190
Gerrit-Change-Number: 843
Gerrit-PatchSet: 6
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <max@...2606...> <= /div>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@...2716...= 1...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@...1484...= ts.sourceforge.net>
Gerrit-MessageType: merged
--vavCZzfjejk=--