Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 44NK7h4qqgzDqL4 for ; Tue, 19 Mar 2019 01:58:40 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098404.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x2IEu7FY025591 for ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:58:38 -0400 Received: from e36.co.us.ibm.com (e36.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.154]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2racc3kv5t-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 10:58:37 -0400 Received: from localhost by e36.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:35 -0000 Received: from b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.16) by e36.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.136) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:33 -0000 Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.235]) by b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x2IEwY3W29032586 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:34 GMT Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2261C7805E; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF0EF78060; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:29 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b03ledav004.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:28 +0000 (GMT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 09:58:33 -0500 From: Joseph Reynolds To: Brad Bishop Cc: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org, openbmc Subject: Re: API authentication In-Reply-To: <20190318103504.zcfgdmgqfhi63jte@thinkpad> References: <20190318103504.zcfgdmgqfhi63jte@thinkpad> X-Sender: jrey@linux.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19031814-0020-0000-0000-00000ECA2F65 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00010780; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000281; SDB=6.01176168; UDB=6.00615173; IPR=6.00956852; MB=3.00026033; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-03-18 14:58:35 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19031814-0021-0000-0000-00006521B0E9 Message-Id: <91edbcb6aa1390130fb15b11f35e48bd@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-03-18_10:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=543 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1903180111 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 14:58:41 -0000 On 2019-03-18 05:35, Brad Bishop wrote: > I am looking for ideas on how to implement a mechanism to restrict > access to > specific methods of a service/API (e.g. Redfish). > > This would be orthogonal to role-based authorization - e.g. the > authorization > would be provided by someone other than the system administrator - e.g. > the > system manufacturer. Is this a followup to the March 4 OpenBMC Community call? https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Weekly-Community-Telecon My understanding is that we would design and code the BMC with functions for things like manufacturing test and specialized diagnostics ... functions which could harm the device, etc. So we want the functions to be present for manufacturing test and service calls, but locked out for all other users. Is that what this mechanism is for? - Joseph > I think I want OAuth for this with these definitions: > > resource owner: system manufacturer > client: any user of the API (could be application specific but not > required) > resource: data flowing over the API being authorized > > Could the system manufacturer authorize clients on non-internet > connected BMCs? > > Is there a better way to go about this? > > Does anyone have any experience with something like this? I would love > to be > pointed to further reading, code, or just your thoughts in general. > > thx - Brad