References: <20220329192934.1415-1-timo@...2669...> <20220330205536.139-1-timo@...2669...> From: Jan Just Keijser Message-ID: <9564ba11-d626-4e60-fa2f-979c114b95c2@...277...> Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 08:53:02 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20220330205536.139-1-timo@...2669...> Content-Language: en-US Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2] Retain CAP_NET_ADMIN when dropping privileges List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Hi, On 30/03/22 22:55, Timo Rothenpieler wrote: > --- > Using libcap-ng now sorry to butt in late, but I've got a nasty feeling about this... the whole purpose of using   --user is, according to the man page        --user user               Change the user ID of the OpenVPN process to user after  initialization,  dropping  privileges  in  the               process.  This  option is useful to protect the system in the event that some hostile party was able to               gain control of an OpenVPN session. Though OpenVPN's security features make this unlikely, it  is  pro‐               vided as a second line of defense.               By  setting  user  to  nobody or somebody similarly unprivileged, the hostile party would be limited in               what damage they could cause. Of course once you take away privileges, you cannot  return  them  to an               OpenVPN  session.  This  means, for example, that if you want to reset an OpenVPN daemon with a SIGUSR1               signal (for example in response to a DHCP reset), you should make use of one or more of  the  --persist               options  to  ensure  that OpenVPN doesn't need to execute any privileged operations in order to restart               (such as re-reading key files or running ifconfig on the TUN device). yet with this patch, the openvpn process remains capable of        CAP_NET_ADMIN               Perform various network-related operations:               * interface configuration;               * administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and                 accounting;               * modify routing tables;               * bind to any address for transparent proxying;               * set type-of-service (TOS);               * clear driver statistics;               * set promiscuous mode;               * enabling multicasting;               * use setsockopt(2) to set the following socket options:                 SO_DEBUG, SO_MARK, SO_PRIORITY (for a priority outside                 the range 0 to 6), SO_RCVBUFFORCE, and SO_SNDBUFFORCE. so this "second line of defense" it getting *VERY* leaky in my opinion (and warrants a manpage update, at the very least). The proper solution would be to have openvpn fork on itself, keep a "barebones" process running as root, but with the actual control and data channels running in the forked process using truly minimal privileges. JM2CW, JJK > > configure.ac | 19 +++++ > distro/systemd/openvpn-client@...2221... | 2 +- > distro/systemd/openvpn-server@...2221... | 2 +- > src/openvpn/init.c | 25 ++++++- > src/openvpn/platform.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++ > src/openvpn/platform.h | 5 ++ > 6 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac > index 7199483a..168360d4 100644 > --- a/configure.ac > +++ b/configure.ac > @@ -794,6 +794,25 @@ dnl > esac > fi > > +dnl > +dnl Depend on libcap-ng on Linux > +dnl > +case "$host" in > + *-*-linux*) > + PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBCAPNG], > + [libcap-ng], > + [have_libcapng="yes"], > + [AC_MSG_ERROR([libcap-ng package not found. Is the development package and pkg-config installed?])] > + ) > + AC_CHECK_HEADER([sys/prctl.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([sys/prctl.h not found!])]) > + > + CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${LIBCAPNG_CFALGS}" > + LIBS="${LIBS} ${LIBCAPNG_LIBS}" > + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCAPNG, 1, [Enable libcap-ng support]) > + ;; > +esac > + > + > if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then > AC_ARG_VAR([OPENSSL_CFLAGS], [C compiler flags for OpenSSL]) > AC_ARG_VAR([OPENSSL_LIBS], [linker flags for OpenSSL]) > diff --git a/distro/systemd/openvpn-client@...2221... b/distro/systemd/openvpn-client@...2221... > index cbcef653..159fb4dc 100644 > --- a/distro/systemd/openvpn-client@...2221... > +++ b/distro/systemd/openvpn-client@...2221... > @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Type=notify > PrivateTmp=true > WorkingDirectory=/etc/openvpn/client > ExecStart=@sbindir@/openvpn --suppress-timestamps --nobind --config %i.conf > -CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_IPC_LOCK CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE > +CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_IPC_LOCK CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SETPCAP CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE > LimitNPROC=10 > DeviceAllow=/dev/null rw > DeviceAllow=/dev/net/tun rw > diff --git a/distro/systemd/openvpn-server@...2221... b/distro/systemd/openvpn-server@...2221... > index d1cc72cb..6e8e7d94 100644 > --- a/distro/systemd/openvpn-server@...2221... > +++ b/distro/systemd/openvpn-server@...2221... > @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Type=notify > PrivateTmp=true > WorkingDirectory=/etc/openvpn/server > ExecStart=@sbindir@/openvpn --status %t/openvpn-server/status-%i.log --status-version 2 --suppress-timestamps --config %i.conf > -CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_IPC_LOCK CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_AUDIT_WRITE > +CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_IPC_LOCK CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_NET_RAW CAP_SETGID CAP_SETUID CAP_SETPCAP CAP_SYS_CHROOT CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_AUDIT_WRITE > LimitNPROC=10 > DeviceAllow=/dev/null rw > DeviceAllow=/dev/net/tun rw > diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c > index 8818ba6f..705eb92e 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/init.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/init.c > @@ -1138,6 +1138,25 @@ possibly_become_daemon(const struct options *options) > return ret; > } > > +/* > + * Determine if we need to retain process capabilities. DCO and SITNL need it. > + * Enforce it for DCO, but only try and soft-fail for SITNL to keep backwards compat. > + */ > +static int > +get_need_keep_caps(struct context *c) > +{ > + if (dco_enabled(&c->options)) > + { > + return 1; > + } > + > +#ifdef ENABLE_SITNL > + return -1; > +#else > + return 0; > +#endif > +} > + > /* > * Actually do UID/GID downgrade, chroot and SELinux context switching, if requested. > */ > @@ -1167,8 +1186,10 @@ do_uid_gid_chroot(struct context *c, bool no_delay) > { > if (no_delay) > { > - platform_group_set(&c0->platform_state_group); > - platform_user_set(&c0->platform_state_user); > + int keep_caps = get_need_keep_caps(c); > + platform_user_group_set(&c0->platform_state_user, > + &c0->platform_state_group, > + keep_caps); > } > else if (c->first_time) > { > diff --git a/src/openvpn/platform.c b/src/openvpn/platform.c > index 450f28ba..4fce5a83 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/platform.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/platform.c > @@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ > #include > #endif > > +#ifdef HAVE_LIBCAPNG > +#include > +#include > +#endif > + > /* Redefine the top level directory of the filesystem > * to restrict access to files for security */ > void > @@ -155,6 +160,92 @@ platform_group_set(const struct platform_state_group *state) > #endif > } > > +void platform_user_group_set(const struct platform_state_user *user_state, > + const struct platform_state_group *group_state, > + int keep_caps) > +{ > + unsigned int err_flags = (keep_caps > 0) ? M_FATAL : M_NONFATAL; > +#ifdef HAVE_LIBCAPNG > + int new_gid = -1, new_uid = -1; > + int res; > + > + if (keep_caps == 0) > + { > + goto fallback; > + } > + > + /* > + * new_uid/new_gid defaults to -1, which will not make > + * libcap-ng change the UID/GID unless configured > + */ > + if (group_state->groupname && group_state->gr) > + { > + new_gid = group_state->gr->gr_gid; > + } > + if (user_state->username && user_state->pw) > + { > + new_uid = user_state->pw->pw_uid; > + } > + > + /* Prepare capabilities before dropping UID/GID */ > + capng_clear(CAPNG_SELECT_BOTH); > + res = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE | CAPNG_PERMITTED, CAP_NET_ADMIN); > + if (res < 0) > + { > + msg(err_flags, "capng_update(CAP_NET_ADMIN) failed: %d", res); > + goto fallback; > + } > + > + /* Change to new UID/GID. > + * capng_change_id() internally calls capng_apply() to apply prepared capabilities. > + */ > + res = capng_change_id(new_uid, new_gid, CAPNG_DROP_SUPP_GRP | CAPNG_CLEAR_BOUNDING); > + if (res == -4 || res == -6) > + { > + msg(M_ERR, "capng_change_id('%s','%s') failed: %d", > + user_state->username, group_state->groupname, res); > + } > + else if (res < 0) > + { > + if (res == -3) > + { > + msg(M_NONFATAL, "Following error likely due to missing capability CAP_SETPCAP."); > + } > + msg(err_flags | M_ERRNO, "capng_change_id('%s','%s') failed retaining capabilities: %d", > + user_state->username, group_state->groupname, res); > + goto fallback; > + } > + > + if (new_uid >= 0) > + { > + msg(M_INFO, "UID set to %s", user_state->username); > + } > + if (new_gid >= 0) > + { > + msg(M_INFO, "GID set to %s", group_state->groupname); > + } > + > + msg(M_INFO, "Capabilities retained: CAP_NET_ADMIN"); > + > + return; > +fallback: > + /* capng_change_id() can leave this flag clobbered on failure */ > + if (prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS) && prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 0) < 0) > + { > + msg(M_ERR, "Clearing KEEPCAPS flag failed"); > + } > +#endif /* HAVE_LIBCAPNG */ > + if (keep_caps) > + { > + msg(err_flags, "Unable to retain capabilities"); > + } > + > + platform_group_set(group_state); > + platform_user_set(user_state); > +} > + > + > + > /* Change process priority */ > void > platform_nice(int niceval) > diff --git a/src/openvpn/platform.h b/src/openvpn/platform.h > index a3eec298..b163f093 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/platform.h > +++ b/src/openvpn/platform.h > @@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ bool platform_group_get(const char *groupname, struct platform_state_group *stat > > void platform_group_set(const struct platform_state_group *state); > > +void platform_user_group_set(const struct platform_state_user *user_state, > + const struct platform_state_group *group_state, > + int keep_caps); > + > + > /* > * Extract UID or GID > */