Received: from jazzswing.ncsc.mil (jazzswing.ncsc.mil [144.51.68.65]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA04430 for ; Tue, 28 May 2002 13:35:20 -0400 (EDT) Received: from jazzswing.ncsc.mil (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by jazzswing.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id RAA24613 for ; Tue, 28 May 2002 17:35:13 GMT Received: from e1.ny.us.ibm.com (e1.ny.us.ibm.com [32.97.182.101]) by jazzswing.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id RAA24607 for ; Tue, 28 May 2002 17:35:13 GMT Subject: RE: Policy creation RFC To: Stephen Smalley Cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Message-ID: From: "Trent Jaeger" Date: Tue, 28 May 2002 13:35:01 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/alternative; Boundary="0__=0ABBE154DFF39E218f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBE154DFF39E21" Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov --0__=0ABBE154DFF39E218f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBE154DFF39E21 Content-type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII By simpler model, I mean (abstractly) one that uses fewer, simpler, or more domain-specific concepts than SELinux RBAC+TE+Identity model. What those concepts are and for what circumstances are they sufficient is what I am working towards now. Unfortunately, I do not have a specific case or recommendation at this point. Hope to have some ideas soon. On the other hand, I do expect that such policies will have to be transformed into a SELinux policy for enforcement (i.e., I do not believe that any new things that we really need to enforce cannot be represented by the RBAC+TE+Identity model at present). Also, fixed policies should be expressed in the SELinux model. Regards, Trent. ---------------------------------- Trent Jaeger IBM T.J. Watson Research Center 19 Skyline Drive Hawthorne, NY 10532 jaegert@watson.ibm.com (914) 784-7225, FAX (914) 784-7595 Stephen Smalley on 05/28/2002 11:24:57 AM To: Trent Jaeger/Watson/IBM@IBMUS cc: Frank Mayer , , Ian Sollars Subject: RE: Policy creation RFC On Tue, 21 May 2002, Trent Jaeger wrote: > --- Default versus "operational dynamic" policy -- My opinion is that any > legitimately modifiable policy needs a simpler model (not just interface) > than the SELinux model. As Tom pointed out, the level of expertise of the > folks making changes is less than those who established the original > policy. Policies that are likely to be changed by folks with less > expertise require a simpler model (simpler policies will result). Can you clarify what you mean by a simpler model? By "SELinux model", are you referring to the combined RBAC+TE+Identity security model implemented by the example security server (described in the new policy technical report)? Are you suggesting a simpler model (e.g. Biba rather than TE) or just a fixed base TE configuration? -- Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs ssmalley@nai.com --0__=0ABBE154DFF39E218f9e8a93df938690918c0ABBE154DFF39E21 Content-type: text/html; charset=US-ASCII Content-Disposition: inline

By simpler model, I mean (abstractly) one that uses fewer, simpler, or more domain-specific concepts than SELinux RBAC+TE+Identity model. What those concepts are and for what circumstances are they sufficient is what I am working towards now.

Unfortunately, I do not have a specific case or recommendation at this point. Hope to have some ideas soon.

On the other hand, I do expect that such policies will have to be transformed into a SELinux policy for enforcement (i.e., I do not believe that any new things that we really need to enforce cannot be represented by the RBAC+TE+Identity model at present). Also, fixed policies should be expressed in the SELinux model.

Regards,
Trent.
----------------------------------
Trent Jaeger
IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
19 Skyline Drive
Hawthorne, NY 10532
jaegert@watson.ibm.com
(914) 784-7225, FAX (914) 784-7595


To: Trent Jaeger/Watson/IBM@IBMUS
cc: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>, <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>, Ian Sollars <ian.sollars@gmx.net>
Subject: RE: Policy creation RFC




On Tue, 21 May 2002, Trent Jaeger wrote:

> --- Default versus "operational dynamic" policy -- My opinion is that any
> legitimately modifiable policy needs a simpler model (not just interface)
> than the SELinux model.  As Tom pointed out, the level of expertise of the
> folks making changes is less than those who established the original
> policy.   Policies that are likely to be changed by folks with less
> expertise require a simpler model (simpler policies will result).

Can you clarify what you mean by a simpler model?  By "SELinux model", are
you referring to the combined RBAC+TE+Identity security model implemented
by the example security server (described in the new policy technical
report)?  Are you suggesting a simpler model (e.g. Biba rather than TE) or
just a fixed base TE configuration?

--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
ssmalley@nai.com




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