Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F3351C5519F for ; Fri, 20 Nov 2020 07:31:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9209022253 for ; Fri, 20 Nov 2020 07:31:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="tbNFkWKz" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1725858AbgKTHbV (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Nov 2020 02:31:21 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:38720 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726544AbgKTHbV (ORCPT ); Fri, 20 Nov 2020 02:31:21 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-74-64.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.74.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 897332158C; Fri, 20 Nov 2020 07:31:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1605857479; bh=radc542TN6um7EFPCh8nJ/Ba0D/UvKiUwI3mWZuMOdY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=tbNFkWKzEQPKzlhL/I3Fcce3vtLEVSTloVGvMIvC+ppoHWhXW2oo0eW7ec0r7VjEJ 8iUHTuavBE0OVTkkHKFV95WRVAaxkKAAjSznnBsfxwEFxGTNl4JZlF2PhizO5Oumgk i9RKpYWtrEihDXBejm7+M6cxx0+iXEjbGWhxPmyI= Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 08:32:01 +0100 From: Greg KH To: Daniel Axtens Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.9 0/5] CVE-2020-4788: Speculation on incompletely validated data on IBM Power9 Message-ID: References: <20201119232250.365304-1-dja@axtens.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201119232250.365304-1-dja@axtens.net> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Nov 20, 2020 at 10:22:45AM +1100, Daniel Axtens wrote: > IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 > cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction > mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the > contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these > systems implement a combination of hardware and software security > measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked. > > However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker > induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions > using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to > speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as > discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This > is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be > used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the > privileged code to construct an attack. > > This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege > boundaries of concern. This series flushes the cache on kernel entry and > after kernel user accesses. > > Thanks to Nick Piggin, Russell Currey, Christopher M. Riedl, Michael > Ellerman and Spoorthy S for their work in developing, optimising, > testing and backporting these fixes, and to the many others who helped > behind the scenes. All of these for all branches are now queued up, thanks for making them so easy to apply! greg k-h