Received: from out0.migadu.com (out0.migadu.com [94.23.1.103]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C6F1D517 for ; Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:40:55 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:40:48 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.dev; s=key1; t=1668620453; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=UeHzaO43ieDLq7wwhIBNc0s+wJATCXogm0raxMCfGWE=; b=pqyd2RsnfABs06vS5s5WxiQGhS1jRoM4fH9iQsAOtiiS8O6XHYiigIlXxmCrSjoF4nMzly pY5mZkvWrJSuVRNxiqWNrnZenDNsvOeGKDMFOO0zdxlmTp4wH0/E5dYOxICw9PktqrNXG/ 6DZliVD5ffi7Gn6qCuvX0xTylIrybgY= X-Report-Abuse: Please report any abuse attempt to abuse@migadu.com and include these headers. From: Oliver Upton To: Quentin Perret Cc: Marc Zyngier , James Morse , Alexandru Elisei , Suzuki K Poulose , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Sudeep Holla , Andrew Walbran , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@android.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host Message-ID: References: <20221116170335.2341003-1-qperret@google.com> <20221116170335.2341003-4-qperret@google.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20221116170335.2341003-4-qperret@google.com> X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT Message-ID: <20221116174048.iRRKNAtGlRduBEKrCe11fIJ51nD6v5SWCZCZHg_syKM@z> On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 05:03:26PM +0000, Quentin Perret wrote: > From: Will Deacon > > When KVM is initialised in protected mode, we must take care to filter > certain FFA calls from the host kernel so that the integrity of guest > and hypervisor memory is maintained and is not made available to the > secure world. > > As a first step, intercept and block all memory-related FF-A SMC calls > from the host to EL3. This puts the framework in place for handling them > properly. Shouldn't FFA_FEATURES interception actually precede this patch? At this point in the series we're outright lying about the supported features to the host. -- Thanks, Oliver