Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54A2AC433C1 for ; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:07:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0B536619B6 for ; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:07:23 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0B536619B6 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from list by lists.xenproject.org with outflank-mailman.101392.193901 (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lPOlL-00016L-Ib; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:55 +0000 X-Outflank-Mailman: Message body and most headers restored to incoming version Received: by outflank-mailman (output) from mailman id 101392.193901; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:55 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lPOlL-00016C-AX; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:55 +0000 Received: by outflank-mailman (input) for mailman id 101392; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:53 +0000 Received: from all-amaz-eas1.inumbo.com ([34.197.232.57] helo=us1-amaz-eas2.inumbo.com) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1lPOlJ-000167-Rb for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:53 +0000 Received: from mga04.intel.com (unknown [192.55.52.120]) by us1-amaz-eas2.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 3ebd607b-5abd-4338-93b1-fd2f7fb09ebf; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 12:06:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Mar 2021 05:06:49 -0700 Received: from smile.fi.intel.com (HELO smile) ([10.237.68.40]) by fmsmga004-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 25 Mar 2021 05:06:46 -0700 Received: from andy by smile with local (Exim 4.94) (envelope-from ) id 1lPOl9-00G2C7-Nk; Thu, 25 Mar 2021 14:06:43 +0200 X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: 3ebd607b-5abd-4338-93b1-fd2f7fb09ebf IronPort-SDR: g3InKXdDzu9WXIUYj8FVOJ9A2WAZqsOO2P4Yd6+1/lMb5f6kK4W3jGQ6KsSgWSJJZ4c366zd/I Gvg0N8awAXBQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9933"; a="188616643" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,277,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="188616643" IronPort-SDR: nXQRT8F2j/iOtbKgmkvi3bw9pPw6+AvGS9dShY8ox4/rl8Xhc1dwyVW2A5twvUdrvugohHK+tI GYJ6k1bpX1lw== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.81,277,1610438400"; d="scan'208";a="436437388" Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 14:06:43 +0200 From: Andy Shevchenko To: Roger Pau =?iso-8859-1?Q?Monn=E9?= Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Mika Westerberg , Linus Walleij , linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] intel/pinctrl: check capability offset is between MMIO region Message-ID: References: <20210324123118.58865-1-roger.pau@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo On Thu, Mar 25, 2021 at 09:46:46AM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 06:57:12PM +0200, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 04:13:59PM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 04:22:44PM +0200, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > > > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 02:55:15PM +0100, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > > > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 02:58:07PM +0200, Andy Shevchenko wrote: ... > > > > Unfortunately it does not expose PCI configuration space. > > > > > > Are those regions supposed to be marked as reserved in the memory map, > > > or that's left to the discretion of the hardware vendor? > > > > I didn't get. The OS doesn't see them and an internal backbone simply drops any > > IO access to that region. > > I'm not sure I understand the above reply. My question was whether the > MMIO regions used by the pinctrl device (as fetched from the ACPI DSDT > table) are supposed belong to regions marked as RESERVED in the > firmware memory map (ie: either the e820 or the EFI one). I don't actually know. I guess it should be done in order to have ACPI device a possibility to claim the resource. > > > > > Doing something like pci_device_is_present would require a register > > > > > that we know will never return ~0 unless the device is not present. As > > > > > said above, maybe we could use REVID to that end? > > > > > > > > Yes, that's good, see above. > > > > > > > > WRT capabilities, if we crash we will see the report immediately on the > > > > hardware which has such an issue. (It's quite unlikely we will ever have one, > > > > that's why I consider it's not critical) > > > > > > I would rather prefer to not crash, because I think the kernel should > > > only resort to crashing when there's no alternative, and here it's > > > perfectly fine to just print an error message and don't load the > > > driver. > > > > Are we speaking about real hardware that has an issue? I eagerly want to know > > what is that beast. > > OK, I'm not going to resend this anymore. I'm happy with just getting > the first patch in. > > I think you trust the hardware more that I would do, and I also think > the check added here is very minimal an unintrusive and serves as a > way to sanitize the data fetched from the hardware in order to prevent > a kernel page fault if such data turns out to be wrong. > > Taking a reactive approach of requiring a broken piece of hardware to > exist in order to sanitize a fetched value seems too risky. I could > add a WARN_ON or similar if you want some kind of splat that's very > noticeable when this goes wrong but that doesn't end up in a fatal > kernel page fault. You found the issue anyway as long as you had a crash, so current code already proved that it does it work perfectly. Since I know what hardware this driver is for, I can assure you, that it will be quite unlikely to have wrong data in the capability register. The data sheet is crystal clear about the register's contents: on real hardware it must be present and be set to a sane value. -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko