Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60F2EC433EF for ; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 19:36:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S237895AbiCITh2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Mar 2022 14:37:28 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:42304 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237694AbiCITh1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Mar 2022 14:37:27 -0500 Received: from mail.skyhub.de (mail.skyhub.de [5.9.137.197]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B3AB5B04 for ; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 11:36:27 -0800 (PST) Received: from zn.tnic (p200300ea971938593bb3add11194ca93.dip0.t-ipconnect.de [IPv6:2003:ea:9719:3859:3bb3:add1:1194:ca93]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.skyhub.de (SuperMail on ZX Spectrum 128k) with ESMTPSA id 5C01F1EC0432; Wed, 9 Mar 2022 20:36:22 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=alien8.de; s=dkim; t=1646854582; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to:in-reply-to: references:references; bh=+yzUzFMLQmIuXdm9Z7vxBma0D1hAg2HTGRmnU6cshoo=; b=p4vVmsNSlX8hIbzfepvmPcxcfroRiLo142ykRc66P/MXlMoswQwydHOuL9ozwJgcZgZ7kP H+kRNOL4mJZrKohThvmUy02mK+qewxFIJv0NrsYV8EoLn+dX9joQlmGpUc6qQisxZbWWyR 6oHEvkPr9qf8ZDvO4Z6UaLXw8i9ARDc= Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 20:36:28 +0100 From: Borislav Petkov To: Dave Hansen Cc: Thomas Gleixner , Cathy Zhang , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 00/11] Support microcode updates affecting SGX Message-ID: References: <20220309104050.18207-1-cathy.zhang@intel.com> <87v8wnhrvg.ffs@tglx> <1742be9e-c18e-28c9-75c8-144bf1f6a311@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1742be9e-c18e-28c9-75c8-144bf1f6a311@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 11:14:22AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote: > Let's imagine an extreme (thankfully imaginary) case: SGX has been > totally broken by some attack. All running enclaves might have been > compromised. A magical microcode update comes and saves the day and > mitigates the attack. > > From the hardware perspective, at the time of the microcode update, the > (presumably compromised) enclaves *can* still run. Here's where you lost me: the enclaves are presumably compromised and yet you wanna leave them running?! Isn't the strategy to kill them to limit the spread of whatever has compromised them? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette