Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3E7C124A064; Tue, 6 May 2025 12:35:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.133 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1746534931; cv=none; b=Wu6F04T498ZBhbOHXkIk/Ji7wuO2btDWTi7JENorZack/lAImAaSk6e+dPdIrBDIakrPOrAJKJQDnhVb74ogugOm0tvYwOjPyB8b2imtw5Nqp95sQ6b5N5IPY0yFZzlK6enEUVI1gcgsQ5pdaFPrYWliToJdDLB7gRVbJg1Qt28= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1746534931; c=relaxed/simple; bh=+fhwOP/3/B2wsnbOVQ1c4FIhhI42+6jd5j5i6FRtfqc=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=ju58W8oxaiwEZi6jVwojplQZnXXxKAhpG+4HfUsVn0eitNbo7eKpxiqB+u+7CHt3Zqhucf5dj3Xljw7ft+Nqd1rnCUGy55D6AhjJ/pQdT1QLsRbJdK1U8pSRz8nVw7Y7hgs6WYcaiD9ONXf3Jd/dbbOFpCpsYbSB4hzp69JLKzY= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=bombadil.srs.infradead.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b=Q+h8M64j; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.137.202.133 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=bombadil.srs.infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="Q+h8M64j" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=bombadil.20210309; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version :References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=bOPiUlyrhnx8kdBc4QcgN2Kg8jvl0sf6Xkm8mhk+a6s=; b=Q+h8M64jqwdaeKk/O/6FV2IigZ 346w80zwtwJLWCGGsy6ryxa4fZxTGUnyXLwibFKl5yKHW2qMYmDd9vldF2dBS4+nIFQCq5wlSKwuC UAT/RtrjffK6v5+9VBZJbDi0h//7ka+hbZuz6CrC7ccuQ/Vt9Vsabglm9VS5w5SoltJ1xPltETdZu rvpJdHzAildYkHSO9O34Lti398Y9d9LIIOTuoQULjm9iQODUGrxFgai8rBjC1JMqc5fqDoU+Zb/Gk Gn3t6ug3hpmArqktiNNrFVgXGB2kiIKL5E5HLCE2ipwSeX18Pmt5wmPJWJusAhdYNi5F54llmGSPc PHX4ls6A==; Received: from hch by bombadil.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.98.2 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1uCHWC-0000000BwJu-1g9F; Tue, 06 May 2025 12:35:28 +0000 Date: Tue, 6 May 2025 05:35:28 -0700 From: Christoph Hellwig To: Chuck Lever Cc: kernel-tls-handshake , Linux NFS Mailing List , linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org Subject: kernel TLS configuration, was: Re: [ANNOUNCE] ktls-utils 1.0.0 Message-ID: References: <32e4bd99-a85f-4f53-94bd-b8c3ecf2c66f@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <32e4bd99-a85f-4f53-94bd-b8c3ecf2c66f@oracle.com> X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by bombadil.infradead.org. See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html Hi Chuck, let me use this as a vehicle to rant^H^H^H^Hprovide constructive feedback about configuration of the tls upcalls now that I finally got around playing with both NVMe and TCP over TLS. For modular systems configuations the amount of monolithic state in tlshd.conf is a bit unfortunate. For NVMe it isn't all that bad, but having to hardcode the .nvme keyring still means that: - we need userspace configuration past just enabling tlshd to enable any kernel subsystem using TLS upcalls. - hard code the keyring used in the userspace configuration Can't we ensure the upcall passes the keyring to use and avoid this issue entirely? For NFS hardcoding the keys and certs in tlshd.conf is even more anoying, because it limits to a single client key and cert for the entire system. I have a hacky little patch for the NFS client to pass keyids for the client key and the certificate as mount options, which seems to work nicely, but it still requires adding another keyring (see above) or giving the user read permissions for the keys while it would prefer that it would just work and we would not need to give any root login session a way to read the keys.