Received: from mailman by lists.gnu.org with tmda-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1NSNkH-0000CP-9s for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 05 Jan 2010 23:43:45 -0500 Received: from exim by lists.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.43) id 1NSNkB-00008O-IC for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 05 Jan 2010 23:43:43 -0500 Received: from [199.232.76.173] (port=60170 helo=monty-python.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1NSNkB-00008F-EK for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 05 Jan 2010 23:43:39 -0500 Received: from sj-iport-4.cisco.com ([171.68.10.86]:39373) by monty-python.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS-1.0:RSA_ARCFOUR_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.60) (envelope-from ) id 1NSNkA-0007bR-Sz for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 05 Jan 2010 23:43:39 -0500 From: Roland Dreier References: <4B2AB1F2.3060507@codemonkey.ws> Date: Tue, 05 Jan 2010 20:43:34 -0800 In-Reply-To: <4B2AB1F2.3060507@codemonkey.ws> (Anthony Liguori's message of "Thu, 17 Dec 2009 16:34:26 -0600") Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH resend] vmware_vga: Check cursor dimensions passed from guest to avoid buffer overflow List-Id: qemu-devel.nongnu.org List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Anthony Liguori Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Check that the cursor dimensions passed from the guest for the DEFINE_CURSOR command don't overflow the available space in the cursor.image[] or cursor.mask[] arrays before copying data from the guest into those arrays. Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier --- Hi Anthony, as far as I can tell this seems to have slipped through the cracks. I think this is fairly important: it is a guest-triggerable stack smashing attack in the worst case. Thanks, Roland hw/vmware_vga.c | 7 +++++++ 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/vmware_vga.c b/hw/vmware_vga.c index 7ab1c79..5e969ae 100644 --- a/hw/vmware_vga.c +++ b/hw/vmware_vga.c @@ -562,6 +562,13 @@ static void vmsvga_fifo_run(struct vmsvga_state_s *s) cursor.height = y = vmsvga_fifo_read(s); vmsvga_fifo_read(s); cursor.bpp = vmsvga_fifo_read(s); + + if (SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) > sizeof cursor.mask || + SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp) > sizeof cursor.image) { + args = SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y) + SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp); + goto badcmd; + } + for (args = 0; args < SVGA_BITMAP_SIZE(x, y); args ++) cursor.mask[args] = vmsvga_fifo_read_raw(s); for (args = 0; args < SVGA_PIXMAP_SIZE(x, y, cursor.bpp); args ++)