References: <20200729113835.2415-1-arne@...1227...> <25639937-df97-2535-bbda-2dea00751fa7@...1856...> From: tincanteksup Message-ID: Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2020 21:59:20 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <25639937-df97-2535-bbda-2dea00751fa7@...1856...> Content-Language: en-GB Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2] Rework NCP compability logic and drop BF-CBC support by default List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net On 05/08/2020 21:25, Steffan Karger wrote: > Hi, > > No full review yet, but this version does seem to address my previous > comments. Some minor nits I noticed on my first run through v2: > > On 29-07-2020 13:38, Arne Schwabe wrote: >> This reworks the NCP logic to be more strict about what is >> considered an acceptable result of an NCP negotiation. It also >> us to finally drop BF-CBC support by default. >> >> All new behaviour is currently limited to server/client >> mode with pull enabled. P2p mode without pull does not change. >> >> New Server behaviour: >> - when a client announces its supported ciphers through either >> OCC or IV_CIPHER/IV_NCP we reject the client with a >> AUTH_FAILED message if we have no common cipher. >> >> - When a client does not announce any cipher in either >> OCC or NCP we by reject it unless fallback-cipher is >> specified in either ccd or config. >> >> New client behaviour: >> - When no cipher is pushed (or a cipher we refused to support) >> and we also cannot support the server's server announced in >> OCC we fail the connection and log why >> >> - If fallback-cipher is specified we will in the case that >> cipher is missing from occ use the fallback cipher instead >> of failing the connection >> >> Both client and server behaviour: >> - We only announce --cipher xyz in occ if we are willing >> to support that cipher. >> >> It means that we only announce the fallback-cipher if >> it is also contained in --data-ciphers >> >> Compatiblity behaviour: Compatiblity -> Compatibility >> >> In 2.5 both client and server will automatically set >> fallback-cipher xyz if --cipher xyz is in the config and >> also add append the cipher to the end of data-ciphers. >> >> We log a warn user about this and point to --data-ciphers and >> --fallback-cipher. This also happens if the configuration >> contains an explicit --cipher BF-CBC. >> >> If --cipher is not set, we only warn that previous versions >> allowed BF-CBC and point how to reenable BF-CBC. This might >> break very few config where someone connects a very old >> client to a 2.5 server but at some point we need to drop >> the BF-CBC and those affected use will already have a the >> scary SWEET32 warning in their logs. >> >> In short: If --cipher is explicitly set 2.6 will work the same as >> 2.4 did. When --cipher is not set, BF-CBC support is dropped and >> we warn about it. >> >> Examples how breaking the default BF-CBC will be logged: >> >> Client side: >> - Client connecting to server that does not push cipher but >> has --cipher in OCC >> >> OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate cipher with server. Add the server's cipher ('BF-CBC') to --data-ciphers (currently 'AES-256-GCM:AES-128-CBC') if you want to connect to this server. >> >> - Client connecting to a server that does not support OCC: >> >> OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotioate cipher with server. Configure --fallback-cipher if you want connect to this server. negotioate -> *-) >> >> Server Side: >> >> - Server has a client only supporting BF-CBC connecting: >> >> styx/IP PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. Server data-ciphers: 'CHACHA20-POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:AES-256-GCM:AES-256-CBC:AES-128-CBC', client supports cipher 'BF-CBC'. >> >> - Client without OCC: >> >> styx/IP PUSH:No NCP or OCC cipher data received from peer. >> styx/IP Use --fallback-cipher with the cipher the client is using if you want to allow the client to connect >> >> In all reject cases on the client: >> >> AUTH: Received control message: AUTH_FAILED,Data channel cipher negotiation failed (no shared cipher) >> >> Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe >> >> Patch V2: rename fallback-cipher to data-ciphers-fallback >> add all corrections from Steffan >> Ignore occ cipher for clients sending IV_CIPHERS >> move client side ncp in its own function >> do not print INSECURE cipher warning if BF-CBC is not allowed >> >> Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe >> --- >> doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 22 ++++- >> src/openvpn/crypto.c | 4 +- >> src/openvpn/init.c | 18 ++-- >> src/openvpn/multi.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++---------- >> src/openvpn/options.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++----- >> src/openvpn/options.h | 2 + >> src/openvpn/ssl.c | 17 ++-- >> src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 82 +++++++++++++--- >> src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h | 18 ++-- >> tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c | 26 +++-- >> 10 files changed, 311 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) No other spelling or grammar to worry about. >> >> diff --git a/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst b/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst >> index 051f1d32..69d3bc67 100644 >> --- a/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst >> +++ b/doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst >> @@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. >> http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/hmac.html >> >> --cipher alg >> + This option is deprecated for server-client mode and ``--data-ciphers`` >> + or rarely `--data-ciphers-fallback`` should be used instead. >> + >> Encrypt data channel packets with cipher algorithm ``alg``. >> >> The default is :code:`BF-CBC`, an abbreviation for Blowfish in Cipher >> @@ -183,8 +186,9 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. >> ``--server`` ), or if ``--pull`` is specified (client-side, implied by >> setting --client). >> >> - If both peers support and do not disable NCP, the negotiated cipher will >> - override the cipher specified by ``--cipher``. >> + If no common cipher is found during cipher negotiation, the connection >> + is terminated. To support old clients/server that do not provide any cipher >> + negotiation support see ``data-ciphers-fallback``. >> >> Additionally, to allow for more smooth transition, if NCP is enabled, >> OpenVPN will inherit the cipher of the peer if that cipher is different >> @@ -201,8 +205,18 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. >> This list is restricted to be 127 chars long after conversion to OpenVPN >> ciphers. >> >> - This option was called ``ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed >> - to ``data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. >> + This option was called ``--ncp-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.4 but has been renamed >> + to ``--data-ciphers`` in OpenVPN 2.5 to more accurately reflect its meaning. >> + >> +--data-ciphers-fallback alg >> + >> + Configure a cipher that is used to fall back to if we could not determine >> + which cipher the peer is willing to use. >> + >> + This option should only be needed to >> + connect to peers that are running OpenVPN 2.3 and older version, and >> + have been configured with `--enable-small` >> + (typically used on routers or other embedded devices). >> >> --ncp-disable >> Disable "Negotiable Crypto Parameters". This completely disables cipher >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c >> index e92a0dc1..3a0bfbec 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c >> @@ -727,7 +727,9 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) >> { >> msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: INSECURE cipher (%s) with block size less than 128" >> " bit (%d bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by " >> - "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC).", >> + "using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC). " >> + "Support for these insecure ciphers will be removed in " >> + "OpenVPN 2.6.", >> ciphername, cipher_kt_block_size(cipher)*8); >> } >> } >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c >> index 1ea4735d..402d2652 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/init.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/init.c >> @@ -2365,16 +2365,9 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) >> /* process (potentially pushed) crypto options */ >> if (c->options.pull) >> { >> - struct tls_session *session = &c->c2.tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; >> - if (found & OPT_P_NCP) >> - { >> - msg(D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: data channel crypto options modified"); >> - } >> - else if (c->options.ncp_enabled) >> + if (!check_pull_client_ncp(c, found)) >> { >> - /* If the server did not push a --cipher, we will switch to the >> - * remote cipher if it is in our ncp-ciphers list */ >> - tls_poor_mans_ncp(&c->options, c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); >> + return false; >> } >> struct frame *frame_fragment = NULL; >> #ifdef ENABLE_FRAGMENT >> @@ -2384,6 +2377,7 @@ do_deferred_options(struct context *c, const unsigned int found) >> } >> #endif >> >> + struct tls_session *session = &c->c2.tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; >> if (!tls_session_update_crypto_params(session, &c->options, &c->c2.frame, >> frame_fragment)) >> { >> @@ -2757,9 +2751,13 @@ do_init_crypto_tls_c1(struct context *c) >> #endif /* if P2MP */ >> } >> >> + /* Do not warn if only have BF-CBC in options->ciphername >> + * because it is still the default cipher */ >> + bool warn = !streq(options->ciphername, "BF-CBC") >> + || options->enable_ncp_fallback; >> /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ >> init_key_type(&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, options->authname, >> - options->keysize, true, true); >> + options->keysize, true, warn); >> >> /* Initialize PRNG with config-specified digest */ >> prng_init(options->prng_hash, options->prng_nonce_secret_len); >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/multi.c b/src/openvpn/multi.c >> index 0f9c586b..79b5c0c3 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/multi.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/multi.c >> @@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ multi_client_connect_setenv(struct multi_context *m, >> * - choosen cipher >> * - peer id >> */ >> -static void >> +static bool >> multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) >> { >> >> @@ -1807,56 +1807,85 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) >> } >> >> /* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ >> - if (o->ncp_enabled) >> + if (!o->ncp_enabled) >> { >> - /* if we have already created our key, we cannot *change* our own >> - * cipher -> so log the fact and push the "what we have now" cipher >> - * (so the client is always told what we expect it to use) >> - */ >> - const struct tls_session *session = &tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; >> - if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY].crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) >> + return true; >> + } >> + >> + /* if we have already created our key, we cannot *change* our own >> + * cipher -> so log the fact and push the "what we have now" cipher >> + * (so the client is always told what we expect it to use) >> + */ >> + const struct tls_session *session = &tls_multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]; >> + if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY].crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized) >> + { >> + msg( M_INFO, "PUSH: client wants to negotiate cipher (NCP), but " > > No space after ( . > >> + "server has already generated data channel keys, " >> + "re-sending previously negotiated cipher '%s'", >> + o->ciphername ); >> + return true; >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that >> + * the client announces to be supporting. >> + */ >> + char *push_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(o->ncp_ciphers, peer_info, >> + tls_multi->remote_ciphername, >> + &o->gc); >> + >> + if (push_cipher) >> + { >> + o->ciphername = push_cipher; >> + return true; >> + } >> + >> + /* NCP cipher negotiation failed. Try to figure out why exactly it >> + * failed and give good error messages and potentially do a fallback >> + * for non NCP clients */ >> + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); >> + bool ret = false; >> + >> + const char *peer_ciphers = tls_peer_ncp_list(peer_info, &gc); >> + /* If we are in a situation where we know the client ciphers, there is no >> + * reason to fall back to a cipher that will not be accepted by the other >> + * side, in this situation we fail the auth*/ >> + if (strlen(peer_ciphers) > 0) >> + { >> + msg(M_INFO, "PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " >> + "Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'", >> + o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); >> + } >> + else if (tls_multi->remote_ciphername) >> + { >> + msg(M_INFO, "PUSH: No common cipher between server and client. " >> + "Server data-ciphers: '%s', client supports cipher '%s'", >> + o->ncp_ciphers, tls_multi->remote_ciphername); >> + } >> + else >> + { >> + msg(M_INFO, "PUSH: No NCP or OCC cipher data received from peer."); >> + >> + if (o->enable_ncp_fallback && !tls_multi->remote_ciphername) >> { >> - msg( M_INFO, "PUSH: client wants to negotiate cipher (NCP), but " >> - "server has already generated data channel keys, " >> - "re-sending previously negotiated cipher '%s'", >> - o->ciphername ); >> + msg(M_INFO, "Using data channel cipher '%s' since " >> + "--data-ciphers-fallback is set.", o->ciphername); >> + ret = true; >> } >> else >> { >> - /* >> - * Push the first cipher from --data-ciphers to the client that >> - * the client announces to be supporting. >> - */ >> - char *push_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername, >> - peer_info, >> - tls_multi->remote_ciphername, >> - &o->gc); >> - >> - if (push_cipher) >> - { >> - o->ciphername = push_cipher; >> - } >> - else >> - { >> - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); >> - const char *peer_ciphers = tls_peer_ncp_list(peer_info, &gc); >> - if (strlen(peer_ciphers) > 0) >> - { >> - msg(M_INFO, "PUSH: No common cipher between server and " >> - "client. Expect this connection not to work. Server " >> - "data-ciphers: '%s', client supported ciphers '%s'", >> - o->ncp_ciphers, peer_ciphers); >> - } >> - else >> - { >> - msg(M_INFO, "No NCP data received from peer, falling back " >> - "to --cipher '%s'. Peer reports in OCC --cipher '%s'", >> - o->ciphername, np(tls_multi->remote_ciphername)); >> - } >> - gc_free(&gc); >> - } >> + msg(M_INFO, "Use --data-ciphers-fallback with the cipher the " >> + "client is using if you want to allow the client to connect"); >> } >> } >> + if (!ret) >> + { >> + auth_set_client_reason(tls_multi, "Data channel cipher negotiation " >> + "failed (no shared cipher)"); >> + } >> + >> + gc_free(&gc); >> + return ret; >> } >> >> /** >> @@ -2322,7 +2351,7 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, >> if (!mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_defined) >> { >> msg(D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: no dynamic or static remote" >> - "--ifconfig address is available for %s", >> + "--ifconfig address is available for %s", >> multi_instance_string(mi, false, &gc)); >> } >> >> @@ -2338,7 +2367,7 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, >> >> /* JYFIXME -- this should cause the connection to fail */ >> msg(D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI ERROR: primary virtual IP for %s (%s)" >> - "violates tunnel network/netmask constraint (%s/%s)", >> + "violates tunnel network/netmask constraint (%s/%s)", >> multi_instance_string(mi, false, &gc), >> print_in_addr_t(mi->context.c2.push_ifconfig_local, 0, &gc), >> ifconfig_constraint_network, ifconfig_constraint_netmask); >> @@ -2387,7 +2416,7 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, >> else if (mi->context.options.iroutes) >> { >> msg(D_MULTI_ERRORS, "MULTI: --iroute options rejected for %s -- iroute" >> - "only works with tun-style tunnels", >> + "only works with tun-style tunnels", >> multi_instance_string(mi, false, &gc)); >> } >> >> @@ -2399,11 +2428,15 @@ multi_client_connect_late_setup(struct multi_context *m, >> mi->context.c2.context_auth = CAS_SUCCEEDED; >> >> /* authentication complete, calculate dynamic client specific options */ >> - multi_client_set_protocol_options(&mi->context); >> - >> - /* Generate data channel keys */ >> - if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys(&mi->context)) >> + if (!multi_client_set_protocol_options(&mi->context)) >> + { >> + mi->context.c2.context_auth = CAS_FAILED; >> + } >> + /* Generate data channel keys only if setting protocol options >> + * has not failed */ >> + else if (!multi_client_generate_tls_keys(&mi->context)) >> { >> + >> mi->context.c2.context_auth = CAS_FAILED; >> } >> >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c >> index bc256b18..c53ef7f9 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/options.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c >> @@ -855,7 +855,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc) >> #if P2MP >> o->scheduled_exit_interval = 5; >> #endif >> - o->ciphername = "BF-CBC"; >> o->ncp_enabled = true; >> o->ncp_ciphers = "AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM"; >> o->authname = "SHA1"; >> @@ -2053,7 +2052,7 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, const struct connec >> if (options->inetd) >> { >> msg(M_WARN, "DEPRECATED OPTION: --inetd mode is deprecated " >> - "and will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); >> + "and will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); >> } >> >> if (options->lladdr && dev != DEV_TYPE_TAP) >> @@ -3046,6 +3045,67 @@ options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) >> } >> } >> >> +static void >> +options_postprocess_cipher(struct options *o) >> +{ >> + if (!o->pull && !(o->mode == MODE_SERVER)) >> + { >> + /* we are in the classic P2P mode */ >> + o->ncp_enabled = false; >> + msg( M_WARN, "Cipher negotiation is disabled since neither " >> + "P2MP client nor server mode is enabled"); >> + >> + /* If the cipher is not set, use the old default ofo BF-CBC. We will >> + * warn that this is deprecated on cipher initialisation, no need >> + * to warn here as well */ >> + if (!o->ciphername) >> + { >> + o->ciphername = "BF-CBC"; >> + } >> + return; >> + } >> + >> + /* pull or P2MP mode */ >> + if (!o->ciphername) >> + { >> + if (!o->ncp_enabled) >> + { >> + msg(M_USAGE, "--ncp-disable needs an explicit --cipher or " >> + "--data-ciphers-fallback config option"); >> + } >> + >> + msg(M_WARN, "--cipher is not set. Previous OpenVPN version defaulted to " >> + "BF-CBC as fallback when cipher negotiation failed in this case. " >> + "If you need this fallback please add '--data-ciphers-fallback " >> + "BF-CBC' to your configuration and/or add BF-CBC to " >> + "--data-ciphers."); >> + >> + /* We still need to set the ciphername to BF-CBC since various other >> + * parts of OpenVPN assert that the ciphername is set */ >> + o->ciphername = "BF-CBC"; >> + } >> + else if (!o->enable_ncp_fallback >> + && !tls_item_in_cipher_list(o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) >> + { >> + msg(M_WARN, "DEPRECATED OPTION: --cipher set to '%s' but missing in" >> + " --data-ciphers (%s). Future OpenVPN version will " >> + "ignore --cipher for cipher negotiations. " >> + "Add '%s' to --data-ciphers or change --cipher '%s' to " >> + "--data-ciphers-fallback '%s' to silence this warning.", >> + o->ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers, o->ciphername, >> + o->ciphername, o->ciphername); >> + o->enable_ncp_fallback = true; >> + >> + /* Append the --cipher to ncp_ciphers to allow it in NCP */ >> + size_t newlen = strlen(o->ncp_ciphers) + 1 + strlen(o->ciphername) +1; > > Missing space after the last + . > >> + char *ncp_ciphers = gc_malloc(newlen, false, &o->gc); >> + >> + ASSERT(openvpn_snprintf(ncp_ciphers, newlen, "%s:%s", o->ncp_ciphers, >> + o->ciphername)); >> + o->ncp_ciphers = ncp_ciphers; >> + } >> +} >> + >> static void >> options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o) >> { >> @@ -3058,6 +3118,7 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o) >> helper_keepalive(o); >> helper_tcp_nodelay(o); >> >> + options_postprocess_cipher(o); >> options_postprocess_mutate_invariant(o); >> >> if (o->ncp_enabled) >> @@ -3118,16 +3179,6 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o) >> "include this in your server configuration"); >> o->dh_file = NULL; >> } >> - >> - /* cipher negotiation (NCP) currently assumes --pull or --mode server */ >> - if (o->ncp_enabled >> - && !(o->pull || o->mode == MODE_SERVER) ) >> - { >> - msg( M_WARN, "disabling NCP mode (--ncp-disable) because not " >> - "in P2MP client or server mode" ); >> - o->ncp_enabled = false; >> - } >> - >> #if ENABLE_MANAGEMENT >> if (o->http_proxy_override) >> { >> @@ -3663,14 +3714,21 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, >> */ >> >> buf_printf(&out, ",dev-type %s", dev_type_string(o->dev, o->dev_type)); >> - buf_printf(&out, ",link-mtu %u", (unsigned int) calc_options_string_link_mtu(o, frame)); >> + /* the link-mtu that we send has only a meaning if have a fixed >> + * cipher (p2p) or have a fallback cipher configured for older non >> + * ncp clients. But not sending it, will make even 2.4 complain >> + * about it missing. So still send it. */ >> + buf_printf(&out, ",link-mtu %u", >> + (unsigned int) calc_options_string_link_mtu(o, frame)); >> + >> buf_printf(&out, ",tun-mtu %d", PAYLOAD_SIZE(frame)); >> buf_printf(&out, ",proto %s", proto_remote(o->ce.proto, remote)); >> >> + bool p2p_nopull = o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED(o); >> /* send tun_ipv6 only in peer2peer mode - in client/server mode, it >> * is usually pushed by the server, triggering a non-helpful warning >> */ >> - if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED(o)) >> + if (o->ifconfig_ipv6_local && p2p_nopull) >> { >> buf_printf(&out, ",tun-ipv6"); >> } >> @@ -3700,7 +3758,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, >> } >> } >> >> - if (tt && o->mode == MODE_POINT_TO_POINT && !PULL_DEFINED(o)) >> + if (tt && p2p_nopull) >> { >> const char *ios = ifconfig_options_string(tt, remote, o->ifconfig_nowarn, gc); >> if (ios && strlen(ios)) >> @@ -3756,8 +3814,14 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, >> >> init_key_type(&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, >> false); >> - >> - buf_printf(&out, ",cipher %s", cipher_kt_name(kt.cipher)); >> + /* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to >> + * support it */ >> + const char *ciphername = cipher_kt_name(kt.cipher); >> + if (p2p_nopull || !o->ncp_enabled >> + || tls_item_in_cipher_list(ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) >> + { >> + buf_printf(&out, ",cipher %s", ciphername); >> + } >> buf_printf(&out, ",auth %s", md_kt_name(kt.digest)); >> buf_printf(&out, ",keysize %d", kt.cipher_length * 8); >> if (o->shared_secret_file) >> @@ -3875,7 +3939,8 @@ options_warning_safe_scan2(const int msglevel, >> || strprefix(p1, "keydir ") >> || strprefix(p1, "proto ") >> || strprefix(p1, "tls-auth ") >> - || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6")) >> + || strprefix(p1, "tun-ipv6") >> + || strprefix(p1, "cipher ")) >> { >> return; >> } >> @@ -7863,14 +7928,20 @@ add_option(struct options *options, >> VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_NCP|OPT_P_INSTANCE); >> options->ciphername = p[1]; >> } >> + else if (streq(p[0], "data-ciphers-fallback") && p[1] && !p[2]) >> + { >> + VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_INSTANCE); >> + options->ciphername = p[1]; >> + options->enable_ncp_fallback = true; >> + } >> else if ((streq(p[0], "data-ciphers") || streq(p[0], "ncp-ciphers")) >> - && p[1] && !p[2]) >> + && p[1] && !p[2]) >> { >> VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_INSTANCE); >> if (streq(p[0], "ncp-ciphers")) >> { >> msg(M_INFO, "Note: Treating option '--ncp-ciphers' as " >> - " '--data-ciphers' (renamed in OpenVPN 2.5)."); >> + " '--data-ciphers' (renamed in OpenVPN 2.5)."); >> } >> options->ncp_ciphers = p[1]; >> } >> @@ -7878,9 +7949,9 @@ add_option(struct options *options, >> { >> VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL|OPT_P_INSTANCE); >> options->ncp_enabled = false; >> - msg(M_WARN, "DEPRECATED OPTION: ncp-disable. Disabling dynamic " >> - "cipher negotiation is a deprecated debug feature that " >> - "will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); >> + msg(M_WARN, "DEPRECATED OPTION: ncp-disable. Disabling " >> + "cipher negotiation is a deprecated debug feature that " >> + "will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); >> } >> else if (streq(p[0], "prng") && p[1] && !p[3]) >> { >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.h b/src/openvpn/options.h >> index c5df2d18..877e9396 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/options.h >> +++ b/src/openvpn/options.h >> @@ -503,6 +503,8 @@ struct options >> bool shared_secret_file_inline; >> int key_direction; >> const char *ciphername; >> + bool enable_ncp_fallback; /**< If defined fall back to >> + * ciphername if NCP fails */ >> bool ncp_enabled; >> const char *ncp_ciphers; >> const char *authname; >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c >> index 91ab3bf6..06dc9f8f 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c >> @@ -1932,13 +1932,14 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, >> return true; >> } >> >> - if (!session->opt->server >> - && 0 != strcmp(options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername) >> + bool cipher_allowed_as_fallback = options->enable_ncp_fallback >> + && streq(options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername); >> + >> + if (!session->opt->server && !cipher_allowed_as_fallback >> && !tls_item_in_cipher_list(options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers)) >> { >> - msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s or %s", >> - options->ciphername, session->opt->config_ciphername, >> - options->ncp_ciphers); >> + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Error: pushed cipher not allowed - %s not in %s", >> + options->ciphername, options->ncp_ciphers); >> /* undo cipher push, abort connection setup */ >> options->ciphername = session->opt->config_ciphername; >> return false; >> @@ -1956,9 +1957,9 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, >> } >> else >> { >> - /* Very hacky workaround and quick fix for frame calculation >> - * different when adjusting frame size when the original and new cipher >> - * are identical to avoid a regression with client without NCP */ >> + /* Very hacky workaround and quick fix for frame calculation >> + * different when adjusting frame size when the original and new cipher >> + * are identical to avoid a regression with client without NCP */ >> return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(session); >> } >> >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c >> index 8e432fb7..2d3983c2 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c >> @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ >> #include "common.h" >> >> #include "ssl_ncp.h" >> +#include "openvpn.h" >> >> /** >> * Return the Negotiable Crypto Parameters version advertised in the peer info >> @@ -211,9 +212,8 @@ tls_peer_ncp_list(const char *peer_info, struct gc_arena *gc) >> } >> >> char * >> -ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, >> - const char *peer_info, const char *remote_cipher, >> - struct gc_arena *gc) >> +ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *peer_info, >> + const char *remote_cipher, struct gc_arena *gc) >> { >> /* >> * The gc of the parameter is tied to the VPN session, create a >> @@ -226,7 +226,9 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, >> const char *peer_ncp_list = tls_peer_ncp_list(peer_info, &gc_tmp); >> >> /* non-NCP client without OCC? "assume nothing" */ >> - if (remote_cipher == NULL) >> + /* For client doing the newer version of NCP (that send IV_CIPHER) >> + * we cannot assume that they will accept remote_cipher */ >> + if (remote_cipher == NULL || strstr(peer_info, "IV_CIPHERS=")) > > Just noting the missing NULL check that Gert found with testing. Can you > add a regression test while at it? > >> { >> remote_cipher = ""; >> } >> @@ -242,15 +244,6 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, >> break; >> } >> } >> - /* We have not found a common cipher, as a last resort check if the >> - * server cipher can be used >> - */ >> - if (token == NULL >> - && (tls_item_in_cipher_list(server_cipher, peer_ncp_list) >> - || streq(server_cipher, remote_cipher))) >> - { >> - token = server_cipher; >> - } >> >> char *ret = NULL; >> if (token != NULL) >> @@ -262,16 +255,75 @@ ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, >> return ret; >> } >> >> -void >> +/** >> + * "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher. >> + * Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. >> + * >> + * Returns true if we switched to the peer's cipher >> + * >> + * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this >> + * function. >> + */ >> +static bool >> tls_poor_mans_ncp(struct options *o, const char *remote_ciphername) >> { >> - if (o->ncp_enabled && remote_ciphername >> + if (remote_ciphername >> && 0 != strcmp(o->ciphername, remote_ciphername)) >> { >> if (tls_item_in_cipher_list(remote_ciphername, o->ncp_ciphers)) >> { >> o->ciphername = string_alloc(remote_ciphername, &o->gc); >> msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "Using peer cipher '%s'", o->ciphername); >> + return true; >> } >> } >> + return false; >> } >> + >> +bool >> +check_pull_client_ncp(struct context *c, const int found) >> +{ >> + if (found & OPT_P_NCP) >> + { >> + msg(D_PUSH, "OPTIONS IMPORT: data channel crypto options modified"); >> + return true; >> + } >> + >> + if (!c->options.ncp_enabled) >> + { >> + return true; >> + } >> + /* If the server did not push a --cipher, we will switch to the >> + * remote cipher if it is in our ncp-ciphers list */ >> + bool useremotecipher = tls_poor_mans_ncp(&c->options, >> + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername); >> + >> + >> + /* We could not figure out the peer's cipher but we have fallback >> + * enable */ > > enableD. > >> + if (!useremotecipher && c->options.enable_ncp_fallback) >> + { >> + return true; >> + } >> + >> + /* We failed negotiation, give appropiate error message */ >> + if (c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername) >> + { >> + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate " >> + "cipher with server. Add the server's " >> + "cipher ('%s') to --data-ciphers (currently '%s') if " >> + "you want to connect to this server.", >> + c->c2.tls_multi->remote_ciphername, >> + c->options.ncp_ciphers); >> + return false; >> + >> + } >> + else >> + { >> + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "OPTIONS ERROR: failed to negotiate " >> + "cipher with server. Configure " >> + "--data-ciphers-fallback if you want to connect " >> + "to this server."); >> + return false; >> + } >> +} >> \ No newline at end of file >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h >> index d00c222d..39158a56 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h >> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.h >> @@ -40,14 +40,17 @@ >> bool >> tls_peer_supports_ncp(const char *peer_info); >> >> +/* forward declaration to break include dependency loop */ >> +struct context; >> + >> /** >> - * "Poor man's NCP": Use peer cipher if it is an allowed (NCP) cipher. >> - * Allows non-NCP peers to upgrade their cipher individually. >> + * Checks whether the cipher negotiation is in an acceptable state >> + * and we continue to connect or should abort. >> * >> - * Make sure to call tls_session_update_crypto_params() after calling this >> - * function. >> + * @return Wether the client NCP process suceeded or failed >> */ >> -void tls_poor_mans_ncp(struct options *o, const char *remote_ciphername); >> +bool >> +check_pull_client_ncp(struct context *c, int found); >> >> /** >> * Iterates through the ciphers in server_list and return the first >> @@ -67,9 +70,8 @@ void tls_poor_mans_ncp(struct options *o, const char *remote_ciphername); >> * cipher >> */ >> char * >> -ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *server_cipher, >> - const char *peer_info, const char *remote_cipher, >> - struct gc_arena *gc); >> +ncp_get_best_cipher(const char *server_list, const char *peer_info, >> + const char *remote_cipher, struct gc_arena *gc); >> >> >> /** >> diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c >> index 19432410..ea950030 100644 >> --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c >> +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c >> @@ -139,21 +139,29 @@ test_poor_man(void **state) >> char *best_cipher; >> >> const char *serverlist = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM"; >> + const char *serverlistbfcbc = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:BF-CBC"; >> >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, >> + "IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_BAR=7", >> + "BF-CBC", &gc); >> + >> + assert_ptr_equal(best_cipher, NULL); >> + >> + >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlistbfcbc, >> "IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_BAR=7", >> "BF-CBC", &gc); >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "BF-CBC"); >> >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> + >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, >> "IV_NCP=1\nIV_BAR=7", >> "AES-128-GCM", &gc); >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "AES-128-GCM"); >> >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> - NULL, >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, NULL, >> "AES-128-GCM", &gc); >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "AES-128-GCM"); >> @@ -170,29 +178,27 @@ test_ncp_best(void **state) >> >> const char *serverlist = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:AES-256-GCM"; >> >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, >> "IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7", >> "BF-CBC", &gc); >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "AES-128-GCM"); >> >> /* Best cipher is in --cipher of client */ >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> - "IV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7", >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "IV_NCP=2\nIV_BAR=7", >> "CHACHA20_POLY1305", &gc); >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "CHACHA20_POLY1305"); >> >> /* Best cipher is in --cipher of client */ >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> - "IV_CIPHERS=AES-128-GCM", >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "IV_CIPHERS=AES-128-GCM", >> "AES-256-CBC", &gc); >> >> >> assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "AES-128-GCM"); >> >> /* IV_NCP=2 should be ignored if IV_CIPHERS is sent */ >> - best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, "BF-CBC", >> + best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, >> "IV_FOO=7\nIV_CIPHERS=AES-256-GCM\nIV_NCP=2", >> "AES-256-CBC", &gc); >> >> > > I still try to find time to do more review and testing, but don't wait > for me if someone else has taken a good look and/or given this patch a > good beating. > > -Steffan > > > _______________________________________________ > Openvpn-devel mailing list > Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel >