Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, NICE_REPLY_A,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D24EC433E7 for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AF4F42520B for ; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:50 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=suse.com header.i=@suse.com header.b="nqKFjCvu" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AF4F42520B Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from list by lists.xenproject.org with outflank-mailman.6304.16802 (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kSMaQ-00025U-K3; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:38 +0000 X-Outflank-Mailman: Message body and most headers restored to incoming version Received: by outflank-mailman (output) from mailman id 6304.16802; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:38 +0000 X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kSMaQ-00025N-Gx; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:38 +0000 Received: by outflank-mailman (input) for mailman id 6304; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:36 +0000 Received: from us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com ([172.99.69.81]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kSMaO-00025I-E2 for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:36 +0000 Received: from mx2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.15]) by us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 3a4d8b98-a51b-41db-8046-95cfce1ea284; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2FB3AAB2; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com ([172.99.69.81]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1kSMaO-00025I-E2 for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:36 +0000 X-Inumbo-ID: 3a4d8b98-a51b-41db-8046-95cfce1ea284 Received: from mx2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.15]) by us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id 3a4d8b98-a51b-41db-8046-95cfce1ea284; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1602604294; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=vytuRpDje9ZD49Qmz7nTj2lJFZPkcVg367sRD5G5lm4=; b=nqKFjCvuksYsuqacn2mahUNSmaqt0QfO3Kve2ioeuME3+0b0o+N2quzDB4ZQIzwLRCTHRs ylXsBMvGa3/FGZ6pYN8Yj9OYthxmpNwvsGNS863olmdPgIudo+g532th9PnybshmNP8trI gV710Ea+r2awu/eORBYlfe+KjH3NU/8= Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id C2FB3AAB2; Tue, 13 Oct 2020 15:51:34 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/traps: 'Fix' safety of read_registers() in #DF path To: Andrew Cooper Cc: Xen-devel , =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=c3=a9?= , Wei Liu , Julien Grall References: <20201012134908.27497-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> From: Jan Beulich Message-ID: Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 17:51:31 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.12.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20201012134908.27497-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 12.10.2020 15:49, Andrew Cooper wrote: > All interrupts and exceptions pass a struct cpu_user_regs up into C. This > contains the legacy vm86 fields from 32bit days, which are beyond the > hardware-pushed frame. > > Accessing these fields is generally illegal, as they are logically out of > bounds for anything other than an interrupt/exception hitting ring1/3 code. > > Unfortunately, the #DF handler uses these fields as part of preparing the > state dump, and being IST, accesses the adjacent stack frame. > > This has been broken forever, but c/s 6001660473 "x86/shstk: Rework the stack > layout to support shadow stacks" repositioned the #DF stack to be adjacent to > the guard page, which turns this OoB write into a fatal pagefault: > > (XEN) *** DOUBLE FAULT *** > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.15-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]---- > (XEN) CPU: 4 > (XEN) RIP: e008:[] traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 > (XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000050086 CONTEXT: hypervisor (d1v0) > ... > (XEN) Xen call trace: > (XEN) [] R traps.c#read_registers+0x29/0xc1 > (XEN) [] F do_double_fault+0x3d/0x7e > (XEN) [] F double_fault+0x107/0x110 > (XEN) > (XEN) Pagetable walk from ffff830236f6d008: > (XEN) L4[0x106] = 80000000bfa9b063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L3[0x008] = 0000000236ffd063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L2[0x1b7] = 0000000236ffc063 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) L1[0x16d] = 8000000236f6d161 ffffffffffffffff > (XEN) > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) Panic on CPU 4: > (XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT > (XEN) [error_code=0003] > (XEN) Faulting linear address: ffff830236f6d008 > (XEN) **************************************** > (XEN) > > and rendering the main #DF analysis broken. > > The proper fix is to delete cpu_user_regs.es and later, so no > interrupt/exception path can access OoB, but this needs disentangling from the > PV ABI first. > > Not-really-fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks") > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Is it perhaps worth also saying explicitly that the other IST stacks don't suffer the same problem because show_registers() makes an local copy of the passed in struct? (Doing so also for #DF would apparently be an alternative solution.) Jan