Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 460CBC4452B for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:59:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wm7F6-0000qh-GU; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:58:28 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wm7F4-0000pJ-Lx for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:58:26 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wm7F2-0005lx-3D for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:58:26 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1784627902; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=mMi2+m+BXISsqNhqI/nZQXyE60UYA6Y5IVIEbSUTMrc=; b=TQQgI4xKNOTD2yS+jiWLCe4EejXU9glR8TAApJQKLRo/Oh6QCkeOXwmM9+GC1ypyTPOZrb 0g76uzX1pTUq9yIwEmC9I0nGn+8syNoxuxnAFGtrMxTOD7tsBdmUk9mjhT0US7n6MOUJ/4 aDaABXGLec5fmIYbn5dycE6rPfd3UwE= Received: from mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-457-xiCSWs_ONR-QVXzRiIWKVw-1; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 05:58:18 -0400 X-MC-Unique: xiCSWs_ONR-QVXzRiIWKVw-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: xiCSWs_ONR-QVXzRiIWKVw_1784627897 Received: from mx-prod-int-05.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-05.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.17]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9FEEB195F15F; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:58:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (unknown [10.44.49.229]) by mx-prod-int-05.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A10821954235; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:58:15 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 10:58:12 +0100 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: Fabiano Rosas Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Peter Xu , Pierrick Bouvier Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: Add security considerations for migration Message-ID: References: <20260720182750.3029289-1-farosas@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20260720182750.3029289-1-farosas@suse.de> User-Agent: Mutt/2.4.0 (2026-06-19) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.17 Received-SPF: permerror client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: 12 X-Spam_score: 1.2 X-Spam_bar: + X-Spam_report: (1.2 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.01, RCVD_IN_SBL_CSS=3.335, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 03:27:50PM -0300, Fabiano Rosas wrote: > Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that > do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are > better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that > section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network > also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests. > > Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas > --- > docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/docs/system/security.rst b/docs/system/security.rst > index 52bbf0cc7a2..26c686718cf 100644 > --- a/docs/system/security.rst > +++ b/docs/system/security.rst > @@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug. > that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be > fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time. > > +* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load > + failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the > + source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still > + functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot > + destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The > + migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design > + principles described in the Architecture section are held, in > + which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as > + an attack vector. > + > * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which > are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will > usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment > @@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the > guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the > QEMU process on the host. > > -Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A > -malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data. > -Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless > -explicitly shared between them by the user. > +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. > +A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access > +their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected > +from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with > +them by the user. > > Principle of Least Privilege > '''''''''''''''''''''''''''' > @@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. > system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel > attack surface. > > +- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure hypervisor > + authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection. I'd be a bit stronger - Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol should be used to ensure hypervisor authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection where the network is untrusted. None the less, Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|