Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 450D2C433DF for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 12:15:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F219206E6 for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 12:15:34 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 0F219206E6 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=eik.bme.hu Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:60754 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jgomT-0001KJ-3v for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 08:15:33 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:49100) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jgolr-0000lN-BP for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 08:14:55 -0400 Received: from zero.eik.bme.hu ([2001:738:2001:2001::2001]:63893) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jgoln-0003iB-TD for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 08:14:54 -0400 Received: from zero.eik.bme.hu (blah.eik.bme.hu [152.66.115.182]) by localhost (Postfix) with SMTP id 22E0974594E; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:14:47 +0200 (CEST) Received: by zero.eik.bme.hu (Postfix, from userid 432) id D47E0745712; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:14:46 +0200 (CEST) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zero.eik.bme.hu (Postfix) with ESMTP id D2E00745702; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:14:46 +0200 (CEST) Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2020 14:14:46 +0200 (CEST) From: BALATON Zoltan To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] pci: ensure configuration access is within bounds In-Reply-To: <20200604075613-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> Message-ID: References: <20200603202251.1199170-1-ppandit@redhat.com> <20200603202251.1199170-3-ppandit@redhat.com> <20200604054043-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20200604073753-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> <20200604075613-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> User-Agent: Alpine 2.22 (BSF 395 2020-01-19) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="3866299591-1574175831-1591272886=:54170" Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2001:738:2001:2001::2001; envelope-from=balaton@eik.bme.hu; helo=zero.eik.bme.hu X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: No matching host in p0f cache. That's all we know. X-Spam_score_int: -18 X-Spam_score: -1.9 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.9 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Daniel_P_=2E_Berrang=E9?= , Prasad J Pandit , Yi Ren , QEMU Developers , P J P , Gerd Hoffmann , Ren Ding , =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Philippe_Mathieu-Daud=E9?= , Hanqing Zhao Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" This message is in MIME format. The first part should be readable text, while the remaining parts are likely unreadable without MIME-aware tools. --3866299591-1574175831-1591272886=:54170 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 01:49:53PM +0200, BALATON Zoltan wrote: >> On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >>> On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 01:37:13PM +0200, BALATON Zoltan wrote: >>>> On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: >>>>> On Thu, Jun 04, 2020 at 08:07:52AM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote: >>>>>> On 6/4/20 12:13 AM, BALATON Zoltan wrote: >>>>>>> On Thu, 4 Jun 2020, P J P wrote: >>>>>>>> From: Prasad J Pandit >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> While reading PCI configuration bytes, a guest may send an >>>>>>>> address towards the end of the configuration space. It may lead >>>>>>>> to an OOB access issue. Assert that 'address + len' is within >>>>>>>> PCI configuration space. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Suggested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé >>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit >>>>>>>> --- >>>>>>>> hw/pci/pci.c | 2 ++ >>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Update v2: assert PCI configuration access is within bounds >>>>>>>>  -> https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2020-06/msg00711.html >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> diff --git a/hw/pci/pci.c b/hw/pci/pci.c >>>>>>>> index 70c66965f5..173bec4fd5 100644 >>>>>>>> --- a/hw/pci/pci.c >>>>>>>> +++ b/hw/pci/pci.c >>>>>>>> @@ -1381,6 +1381,8 @@ uint32_t pci_default_read_config(PCIDevice *d, >>>>>>>> { >>>>>>>>     uint32_t val = 0; >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> +    assert(address + len <= pci_config_size(d)); >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Does this allow guest now to crash QEMU? I think it was suggested that >>>>>>> assert should only be used for cases that can only arise from a >>>>>>> programming error and not from values set by the guest. If this is >>>>>>> considered to be an error now to call this function with wrong >>>>>>> parameters did you check other callers? I've found a few such as: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> hw/scsi/esp-pci.c >>>>>>> hw/watchdog/wdt_i6300esb.c >>>>>>> hw/ide/cmd646.c >>>>>>> hw/vfio/pci.c >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and maybe others. Would it be better to not crash just log invalid >>>>>>> access and either fix up parameters or return some garbage like 0? >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, maybe I was not clear while reviewing v1, we need to audit the >>>>>> callers and fix them first, then we can safely add the assert here. >>>>> >>>>> We can add assert here regardless of auditing callers. Doing that >>>>> will also make fuzzying easier. But the assert is unrelated to CVE imho. >>>> >>>> I wonder why isn't the check added to pci_default_read_config() right away? >>>> If we have an assert there the overhead is the same and adding the check >>>> there would make it unnecessary to patch all callers so it's just one patch >>>> instead of a whole series. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> BALATON Zoltan >>> >>> We need to return something, and we can't be sure that callers will >>> handle returning random stuff correctly. Callers know what >>> to do on errors, we don't. >> >> This is an invalid case where behaviour will be undefined anyway so >> returning anything such as 0 or -1 is probably OK (what do most hardware >> return in this case?). > > This is an internal detail of the API. It's not about what hardware > returns. Look at the ati as an example. Considering that this function implements reading PCI config space its API should aligh with what happens on hardware normally. You could make it unrelated but that does not make much sense other than causing trouble for callers. >> If callers need better error handling they can do a >> check before calling the function but for other (most) callers which will >> just return the same random value you would return from >> pci_default_read_config() having an assert instead makes it necessary to >> modify all of them one by one and doubles the check overhead by >> unnecessarily double checking. So I think having a default check and error >> handling in pci_default_read_config() would be better so callers who don't >> care would work and those few who might care could check before calling or >> actually implement their own callback (which I expect they already do as >> this is just the default implementation of this callback). > > > Basically if you look at the specific example, you will see that it > triggers because of a misaligned access which device code never > expected. Which memory core should not allow at all. > It will likely trigger other bugs, some of them could be > security related. assert is a reasonable way to help us catch them in > fuzzying. The specific example (ati-vga) does expect and should support unaligned access. Not for all regs but for most registers, there's a table in docs which says for PCI POS registers (whatever those are) unalligned access is supported. This works now, if it should not work witout .impl.unaligned or some other value set somewhere that should be patched instead. Regards, BALATON Zoltan --3866299591-1574175831-1591272886=:54170--