Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 11:23:15 +0200 (CEST) From: Thomas Gleixner In-Reply-To: <51634935.9010905@zytor.com> Message-ID: References: <20130408224328.GA17641@www.outflux.net> <51634935.9010905@zytor.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only To: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Kees Cook , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Jeremy Fitzhardinge , Marcelo Tosatti , Alex Shi , Borislav Petkov , Alexander Duyck , Frederic Weisbecker , Steven Rostedt , "Paul E. McKenney" , xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Dan Rosenberg , Julien Tinnes , Will Drewry , Eric Northup List-ID: On Mon, 8 Apr 2013, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > > This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes > > the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has > > an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the > > kernel base offset, if it has been relocated. > > > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > > Cc: Eric Northup > > Also, tglx: does this interfere with your per-cpu IDT efforts? I don't think so. And it's on the backburner at the moment. Thanks, tglx