From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 03/10] perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:16:40 +1100 (AEDT) Message-ID: References: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com> <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <6cdc10f2-31e5-6d71-7d71-c6b5250b74f1@linux.intel.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=m.gmane-mx.org@lists.infradead.org To: Alexey Budankov Cc: Song Liu , Peter Zijlstra , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Alexei Starovoitov , Lionel Landwerlin , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Paul Mackerras , Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Michael Ellerman , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Ingo Molnar , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn , Robert Richter , Will Deacon , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Stephane Eranian List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring via kprobes and uprobes and eBPF tracing for > CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON > capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes > chances to misuse the credentials and makes operation more secure. > > perf kprobes and uprobes are used by ftrace and eBPF. perf probe uses > ftrace to define new kprobe events, and those events are treated as > tracepoint events. eBPF defines new probes via perf_event_open interface > and then the probes are used in eBPF tracing. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle > of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process or > program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary to > accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such privileges > are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains > open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for > secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON > capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov > --- > kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) Acked-by: James Morris -- James Morris