From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 08/10] parisc/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 08:17:46 +1100 (AEDT) Message-ID: References: <74d524ab-ac11-a7b8-1052-eba10f117e09@linux.intel.com> <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <17be72ff-dc52-72ef-fbcc-0e9ec8b61604@linux.intel.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=m.gmane-mx.org@lists.infradead.org To: Alexey Budankov Cc: Song Liu , Peter Zijlstra , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Alexei Starovoitov , Lionel Landwerlin , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Paul Mackerras , Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Michael Ellerman , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Ingo Molnar , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Serge Hallyn , Robert Richter , Will Deacon , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Stephane Eranian List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org On Tue, 28 Jan 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. > Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the > rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the > credentials and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 principle > of least privilege: A security design principle that states that a process > or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., capabilities) necessary > to accomplish its legitimate function, and only for the time that such > privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to the monitoring remains open > for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure > monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov > --- > arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > index 676683641d00..c4208d027794 100644 > --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/perf.c > @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static ssize_t perf_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > else > return -EFAULT; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EACCES; > > if (count != sizeof(uint32_t)) > Acked-by: James Morris -- James Morris