Received: from mx1.secunet.com (mx1.secunet.com [62.96.220.36]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 913B5430789 for ; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:33:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=62.96.220.36 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787225602; cv=none; b=RYTshgWzaT1wxUraBtQKoFhLvVa/GNahBhlWs9eWGjnINNBO6yPS5Sjw3rwJ/VeYnWZpeJ4ZgkCiHqxEad6ZdRxBKiWsYOCKmsvt8k20pjNou+3vYqVtDNU+GVxRnVezasLnl9x/slgqzuB4V9vr4DV4g8oVYj1BDIf+aXx3lDQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787225602; c=relaxed/simple; bh=W0+OJI7ppOypICFEJArgpOoJ8yYBiIv18hDuy0O7fnQ=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=FiGad7mJuGEaNA/FjxVWgiypZla7UjQOhNkxXEs4iAuRAj9SBMbe/hSS6F41ja8OATDUTuApErCSgccOlpxwsonq+XbaY3j27RVipYiuqTSy/AIyTS3+QevequXCaqDKHX/3pOWxZp36EFRDIrZLgltxk57PuLsbp7i/yMhvOKs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=secunet.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=secunet.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=secunet.com header.i=@secunet.com header.b=DH7aI8Ry; arc=none smtp.client-ip=62.96.220.36 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=secunet.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=secunet.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=secunet.com header.i=@secunet.com header.b="DH7aI8Ry" Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx1.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D3981207C6; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:33:10 +0200 (CEST) X-Virus-Scanned: by secunet Received: from mx1.secunet.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx1.secunet.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 45eIizjeY0Rt; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:33:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: from EXCH-01.secunet.de (rl1.secunet.de [10.32.0.231]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5CEA2067A; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:33:09 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.secunet.com E5CEA2067A DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=secunet.com; s=202301; t=1787225589; bh=bkVTcJiVgNeFpumVVV6MbBHxgoDpwm2ig6kIcDpsjYc=; h=Date:From:To:CC:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=DH7aI8RyVKBBL/2cLSNzWhN9VHs/AfW968DqXudS77r6vYCqjP6JxP7U+MZInf/gT LsVyXmtaN6ylby/e6c8LbUa6pcci0JGoGaaWFhrwoWDeV7TsU003g1+oMcORI1jgm6 BbcnJjTRXyZ09kXN8Q7yVkMsDEi42OB/jzFV2BPjx8xCKxxN8+no9HbCAE/nZnlZXN URRIo8qw4zcmdcQ04huY0M89mYwXGXn8IcSNQd+kn/5bGrCkl3F9A4tjQ1dKYBoz/m U0mmw1FNusaKC0J3bqn7C/fGifqFGyAqxr7RQHItOIKODdro1Gk+5HFAfNHD211Qf/ Pds4MEfMBy7vA== Received: from secunet.com (10.182.7.193) by EXCH-01.secunet.de (10.32.0.171) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.2562.37; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:33:09 +0200 Received: (nullmailer pid 1851110 invoked by uid 1000); Thu, 20 Aug 2026 11:33:08 -0000 Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 13:33:08 +0200 From: Steffen Klassert To: Paolo Abeni CC: David Miller , Jakub Kicinski , Herbert Xu , Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/10] pull request (net): ipsec 2026-08-18 Message-ID: References: <20260818092920.653034-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com> <7c5a9d55-a15b-4235-a308-cc6f65ce2de9@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <7c5a9d55-a15b-4235-a308-cc6f65ce2de9@redhat.com> X-ClientProxiedBy: EXCH-01.secunet.de (10.32.0.171) To EXCH-01.secunet.de (10.32.0.171) Hi Paolo, On Thu, Aug 20, 2026 at 01:19:19PM +0200, Paolo Abeni wrote: > Hi Steffen! > > On 8/18/26 11:28 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote: > > 1) xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full > > Tighten the secpath-depth check so a full chain can't write > > past xvec[]. > > > > 2) Add and revert "esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()" > > The patch does not fully fully resolve the issue, a corrected version > > will follow. > > > > 3) xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close > > Synchronize espintcp close with the xfrm_trans_reinject work > > queue so the freed socket message isn't dereferenced again. > > > > 4) xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device > > Drop queued ESP-in-TCP records whose saved ingress device has > > gone away, avoiding a NULL device deref in the XFRM input path. > > > > 5) xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work > > Split the NAT keepalive walk into a reference-collection phase > > and a per-state lock phase to break the AB-BA with state removal. > > This patch has some issues that are fixed with a followup patch. > > > > 6) xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output() > > Stop freeing the skb unconditionally in xfrm_dev_direct_output(), > > letting local_out()'s result indicate when ownership has moved on. > > > > 7) xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left > > Validate the segments_left/hdrlen invariant before rearranging > > the routing-header addresses, avoiding an OOB memmove on > > malformed HDRINCL packets. > > > > 8) xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak > > Detect an already-attached auth-trunc allocation by the pointer > > rather than inferring it from the algorithm id, so a prior > > attach isn't overwritten and lost. > > > > 9) xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection > > Replace the per-state allocation in the NAT keepalive walk > > with a fixed-size batch that drains under BH-disabled locking > > and resumes from the cursor, bounding the worker's memory. > > > > Please pull or let me know if there are problems. > Sashiko has a few comments: > > https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260818092920.653034-1-steffen.klassert%40secunet.com > > do you think they deserve a v2 or could be handled as follow-ups? These are already addressed in the pull request. Patch 2 is reverted and patch 5 has a followup fix (patch 10). > > Also the fixes tag in patch 10/10 looks invalid. Possibly a rebase > would be needed? The fixes tag referes to a commit in the ipsec tee (patch 5), so I think it is valid. Steffen