From: Boris Ostrovsky Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 16:07:01 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl Message-Id: List-Id: References: <20190404151217.GA22334@kadam> In-Reply-To: <20190404151217.GA22334@kadam> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Dan Carpenter Cc: Juergen Gross , Stefano Stabellini , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86@kernel.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, stable On 4/4/19 11:12 AM, Dan Carpenter wrote: > The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). > It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) > elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of > bounds access. > > Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller") > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky I am also adding stable@vger.kernel.org -boris > --- > arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 3 +++ > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h > index de6f0d59a24f..2863c2026655 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h > @@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call, > __HYPERCALL_DECLS; > __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); > > + if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0])) > + return -EINVAL; > + > asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC > : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM > : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])