From: "plaisthos (Code Review)" Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2025 11:51:23 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="xyxdlnl/FBo="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: flichtenheld Cc: openvpn-devel --xyxdlnl/FBo= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos. Hello flichtenheld, I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail to look at the new patch set (#4). The following approvals got outdated and were removed: Code-Review-1 by flichtenheld Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie = checks ...................................................................... Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances: To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to - starts on IP A - successfully floats to IP B by data packet - then has a control packet from IP A before any data packet can trigger the float back to IP A and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time that hmac cookie is valid in the default configuration. In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid. This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet. This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like: Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID instead. Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl. Reported-By: Walter Doekes Tested-By: Walter Doekes Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe --- M src/openvpn/mudp.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c 4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/4 diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c index 93e65e0..9cd667c 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c +++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset= challenge"); } - /* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m, @@ -155,7 +154,8 @@ * need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new(); - bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow); + bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow, = pkt_is_ack); const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc= ); uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR( &m->top.c2.buf); @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from= peer (%s), " "accepting new connection.", packet_opcode_name(op), peer); } + gc_free(&gc); return ret; diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c index bfd405f..0bbc465 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } + /* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming @@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) { @@ -545,6 +547,36 @@ return false; } + /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */ + for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++) + { + /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the + * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid + * for the session */ + if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + if (!pkt_is_ack) + { + packet_id_type message_id; + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)) + { + return false; + } + + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the + * three-way handshake */ + if (message_id > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + /* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h index 98a39d3..1b6bcc0 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h @@ -180,17 +180,24 @@ /** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * + * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher + * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are + * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should + * not create a new connection. + * * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time + * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow); + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack); /* * Write a control channel authentication record. diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c index ebffabe..f771a10 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -170,6 +170,27 @@ 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x28, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x20, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 +}; + + struct tls_auth_standalone init_tas_auth(int key_direction) { @@ -290,12 +311,10 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it * again should have the same result */ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* and buf memory should be equal */ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(clien= t_reset_v2_tls_auth)); @@ -313,7 +332,6 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate = */ free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi); free_tas(&tas); @@ -353,15 +371,12 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none= )); verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - /* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */ buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_au= th_randomid)); @@ -439,7 +454,7 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); /* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMA= C id*/ - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, fal= se); assert_false(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -470,7 +485,7 @@ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); assert_true(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -479,6 +494,51 @@ hmac_ctx_free(hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state) +{ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(); + + struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET; + + struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 }; + struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 }; + + struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024); + enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE; + + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_n= one_random_id)); + + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + + /* should fail because it acks 2 */ + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); + assert_false(valid); + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + + /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_n= one_random_id)); + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); + + /* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true); + assert_false(valid); + + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + free_buf(&buf); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac); + hmac_ctx_free(hmac); +} + static hmac_ctx_t * init_static_hmac(void) { @@ -667,6 +727,7 @@ cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain), cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 4 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset --xyxdlnl/FBo= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

plaisthos uploaded patch set #4 to this change.

<= a href=3D"http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail">View Chan= ge

The following approvals got outdated and were removed: Code-Review-1 by flichtenheld

Check message id/acked ids too when doing ses=
sionid cookie checks

This fixes that control packets on a floating c= lient can trigger
creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to

- starts on IP = A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control p= acket from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to I= P A

and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac coo= kie is valid in the default
configuration.

In this scenario we wo= uld trigger a new connection as the HMAC
session id would be valid.
<= br>This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to
disc= ern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these
ids 0 or 1 f= rom any later packet.

This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a = messaged like:

Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID
<= br>instead.

Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state = in test_ssl.

Reported-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2899...= .>
Tested-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>

= Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Signed-off-by: Arne= Schwabe <arne@...1227...>
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/op= envpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/te= st_pkt.c
4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

g=
it pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/4
=
diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
ind= ex 93e65e0..9cd667c 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c<= br>+++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@<= br> msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Reset packet from client, sending HM= AC based reset challenge");
}

-
/* Return= s true if this packet should create a new session */
stati= c bool
do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
@@ -155,7 +154,8 @@
* need to contain = the peer id */
struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();

- = bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow);=
+ bool pkt_is_ack = =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
+ bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, fr= om, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);

= const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &a= mp;gc);
uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR( &m-&g= t;top.c2.buf);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@
= msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from pe= er (%s), "
"accepting new connec= tion.", packet_opcode_name(op), peer);
}
+
= gc_free(&gc);

return ret;<= /span>
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c<= /span>
index bfd405f..0bbc465 100644
--- a/src/ope= nvpn/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
= @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@
}
}

+
/*

* This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, exce= pt it is called
* when we are in server mode and receive = an initial incoming
@@ -530,7 +531,8 @@
ch= eck_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
= const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
= hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
- int handwindow)
+ int handwindow,
+ = bool pkt_is_ack)
{
if (!from)=
{
@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@
= return false;
}

+ /* Check if the packet ID of the= packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */
+ for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++)
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ {

+ /* This packet ACKs a packet that has= a higher packet id than the
+ * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it a= s invalid
+ *= for the session */
+= if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
= + if (!pkt_is_ack)+ {
+ packet_id_type message_id;=
+ /* Extract the pac= ket ID from the packet */
+ if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id))<= /span>
+ {
= + return false;
+ }
+

+ /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is n= ot considered part of the
+ * three-way handshake */
+ if (message_id > 1)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
/* check adjacent timestamps too */

for (int off= set =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++)
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h

index 98a39d3..1b6bcc0 100644

--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt= .h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
@@ -180,17 += 180,24 @@
/**
* Checks if a control pack= et has a correct HMAC server session id
*
+ * This will also consider packets = that have a packet id higher

+ * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are
+ * not part of the in= itial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should
+ * not create a new connection.
+ *

* @param state= session information
* @param from link_= socket from the client
* @param hmac the hmac co= ntext to use for the calculation
* @param handwindow t= he quantisation of the current time
+ * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK= _V1
* @return the expected server session id=
*/
bool
check_session_= id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
= const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
= hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
- int handwindow);
+ int handwindow,
+ bool pkt_i= s_ack);


/*
* Write a c= ontrol channel authentication record.
diff --git a/tests/un= it_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.cindex ebffabe..f771a10 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests= /openvpn/test_pkt.c
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt= .c
@@ -170,6 +170,27 @@
0x85, 0xdb, 0x= 53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e
};

= +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks= 0,1, and 2 */
+const= uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D {
+ 0x28,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,=
+ 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,<= /span>
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00= , 0x02,
+ 0xdd, 0x= 85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e
+};
+
+/* no tls-auth, P= _CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */
+const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D {
= + 0x20,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, = 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x01= ,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x= 00, 0x00,
+ 0x02
+};
+
+
struct tls_auth_standalone
init_tas_auth(int key_direction)

{
@@= -290,12 +311,10 @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_= VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state= );

- = free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
/* The pre = decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it
* again should have the same result */

verdict= =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state= (&state);

/* and buf memory shou= ld be equal */
assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), cli= ent_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(client_reset_v2_tls_auth));
@= @ -313,7 +332,6 @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_I= NVALID);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_= tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
/* Wrong key direct= ion gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate */
= free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi);
fre= e_tas(&tas);
@@ -353,15 +371,12 @@
= assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
fr= ee_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state= );
buf_reset_len(&buf);
buf_w= rite(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none));
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &= amp;from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT= _VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&stat= e);

-= free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
-
/* This is not a reset packet a= nd should trigger the other response */
buf_reset_len(= &buf);
buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_ran= domid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_auth_randomid));
@@ -439,7 +45= 4,7 @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL= _V1);

/* This is a valid packet but = containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/
- bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&stat= e, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.de= st, hmac, 30, false);
assert_false(valid);
<= span>

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);<= br>@@ -470,7 +485,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decry= pt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
as= sert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);

= - bool valid =3D check_session= _id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&s= tate, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
assert_true(val= id);

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&= ;state);
@@ -479,6 +494,51 @@
hmac_ctx= _free(hmac);
}

+static void
+test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_stat= e)
+{
+ hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id= _hmac_init();

+
+ struct link_socket_ac= tual from =3D { 0 };
= + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET;
+
+ struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 };
+ struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state = =3D { 0 };
++ struct buffer buf =3D al= loc_buf(1024);
+ e= num first_packet_verdict verdict;
+
+ t= as.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE;
+
+ = buf_reset_len(&buf);
+ buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_= ack_123_none_random_id));
+
+
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_= lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);

+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_AC= K_V1);
+
+ /* should fail because it ac= ks 2 */

+ bool val= id =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(vali= d);
+ free_tls_pre= _decrypt_state(&state);
+
+ /* Try = test with the control with a too high message id now */
+ buf_reset_len(&buf);
= + buf_write(&buf, client= _control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_none_random_id));
= +
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &a= mp;state, &from, &buf);
+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);=
+
+ /* should fail because it has message id = 2 */
+ valid =3D c= heck_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);+ assert_false(valid);
+
+ free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state= );
+ free_buf(&= ;buf);
+ hmac_ctx_= cleanup(hmac);
+ h= mac_ctx_free(hmac);
+= }
+
= static hmac_ctx_t *
init_static_hmac(void)
{

@@ -667,6 +727,7 @@
cmocka_uni= t_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),
cmocka_u= nit_test(test_verify_hmac_none),
cmocka_unit_test(= test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack),
cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),=
cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_a= uth),
cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_messag= e)

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b43936647= 9e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 4
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@...2716...= 1...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@...1484...= ts.sourceforge.net>
Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...220...= ..1227...>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <frank@...2375...= 41...>
Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset
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