From: "plaisthos (Code Review)" Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 13:58:49 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641..., max@...2606... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="iJpLicr0gn4="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: flichtenheld Cc: openvpn-devel , MaxF --iJpLicr0gn4= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos. Hello flichtenheld, I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail to look at the new patch set (#6). Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie = checks ...................................................................... Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances: To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to - starts on IP A - successfully floats to IP B by data packet - then has a control packet from IP A before any data packet can trigger the float back to IP A and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time that hmac cookie is valid in the default configuration. In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid. This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet. This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like: Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID instead. Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl. Reported-By: Walter Doekes Tested-By: Walter Doekes Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe --- M src/openvpn/mudp.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c 4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/6 diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c index 7259a4b..31134be 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c +++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ * need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new(); - bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow); + bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, hand= window, pkt_is_ack); const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc= ); uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf); @@ -159,7 +160,8 @@ if (!ret) { - msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID f= rom %s", + msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID f= rom" + " %s or wrong packet id", packet_opcode_name(op), peer); } else diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c index b901f87..6ec05a7 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c @@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ } bool -check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct op= envpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) { @@ -512,6 +515,36 @@ return false; } + /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */ + for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++) + { + /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the + * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid + * for the session */ + if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + if (!pkt_is_ack) + { + packet_id_type message_id; + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)) + { + return false; + } + + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the + * three-way handshake */ + if (message_id > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + /* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h index 8fe4880..96cdd68 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h @@ -178,14 +178,20 @@ /** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * + * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher + * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are + * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should + * not create a new connection. + * * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time + * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const stru= ct openvpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, co= nst struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool = pkt_is_ack); /* * Write a control channel authentication record. diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c index 65b31e7..5122766 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -139,6 +139,27 @@ 0xc8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00= , 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0= , 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x28, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x20, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 +}; + + struct tls_auth_standalone init_tas_auth(int key_direction) { @@ -256,12 +277,10 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it * again should have the same result */ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* and buf memory should be equal */ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(clien= t_reset_v2_tls_auth)); @@ -279,7 +298,6 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate = */ free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi); free_tas(&tas); @@ -319,15 +337,12 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none= )); verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - /* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */ buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_au= th_randomid)); @@ -405,7 +420,7 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); /* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMA= C id*/ - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, false); assert_false(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -436,7 +451,7 @@ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, true); assert_true(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -445,6 +460,51 @@ hmac_ctx_free(hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state) +{ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(); + + struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET; + + struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 }; + struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 }; + + struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024); + enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE; + + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_n= one_random_id)); + + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + + /* should fail because it acks 2 */ + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, true); + assert_false(valid); + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + + /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_n= one_random_id)); + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); + + /* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, = true); + assert_false(valid); + + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + free_buf(&buf); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac); + hmac_ctx_free(hmac); +} + static hmac_ctx_t * init_static_hmac(void) { @@ -634,16 +694,20 @@ main(void) { openvpn_unit_test_setup(); - const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decryp= t_lite_none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_crypt), - cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), - cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session= _id_hmac_static), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_plain), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_cont= rol_message) }; + + const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt), + cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) + }; #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 6 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: MaxF Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset --iJpLicr0gn4= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

plaisthos uploaded patch set #6 to this change.

<= a href=3D"http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail">View Chan= ge

Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger
cr= eating a new session in special circumstances:

To trigger this circu= mstance a connection needs to

- starts on IP A
- successfully flo= ats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before = any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A

and all of t= his needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the def= ault
configuration.

In this scenario we would trigger a new conne= ction as the HMAC
session id would be valid.

This patch adds chec= king also of the message-id and acked ids to
discern packet from the ini= tial three-way handshake where these
ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:

= Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID

instead.

Also= remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.

Rep= orted-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>
Tested-By: Wal= ter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>

Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff= 3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@...1711...= 27...>
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M sr= c/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files cha= nged, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.op=
envpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/6
diff --git a/src/ope=
nvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
index 7259a4b..31134be 100= 644
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c
+++ b/src/open= vpn/mudp.c
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@
* = need to contain the peer id */
struct gc_arena gc = =3D gc_new();

- bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, han= dwindow);
+ bo= ol pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
+ bool ret =3D check_session_hma= c_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);
<= /span>
const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&= ;m->top.c2.from, &gc);
uint8_t pkt_firstbyt= e =3D *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -159,7 +160,8 @@

if (!ret)
= {
- msg(D_MU= LTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from %s",
+ msg(D_MULT= I_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID from"+ = " %s or wrong packet id",
pa= cket_opcode_name(op), peer);
}
= else
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn= /ssl_pkt.c
index b901f87..6ec05a7 100644
--= - a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@
}
=
bool
-check_= session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_s= ockaddr *from,
- = hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow)
+check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_d= ecrypt_state *state,
= + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,<= br>+ = hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
= + int handwindow,
+ bool pkt_is_ack)
{
if (!from)
{
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@
return false;
}

+ /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED pa= cket is <=3D 1 */
+ for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++)
+ {
+ /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id= than the
+ *= ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid+ * for the session */=
+ if (ack.pac= ket_id[i] > 1)
+ = {
+ = return false;
+ = }
+ }
= +
+ if (!pkt_is_ack)
+ {
+ packet_id_type message_id;
+ /* Extract the packet ID from the packe= t */
+ if (!re= liable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
= + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the
+ * thre= e-way handshake */
+ = if (message_id > 1)
+ {
+= return false;
+ }
+ = }
+
+
/* check adjace= nt timestamps too */
for (int offset =3D -2; offset &l= t;=3D 1; offset++)
{
diff --git a/src/= openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
index 8fe4880..96= cdd68 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
++= + b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@
<= span> /**

* Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC= server session id
*
+ * This will also consider packets that have a packet id= higher
+ * than 1 or= ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are
+ * not part of the initial three way hand= shake of OpenVPN and should
+ * not create a new connection.
+ *
* @param state session inf= ormation
* @param from link_socket from the clie= nt
* @param hmac the hmac context to use for the= calculation
* @param handwindow the quantisation of t= he current time
+ * @= param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1
= * @return the expected server session id
*= /
-bool check_session_i= d_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *= from,
- = hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow);
+bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre= _decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
+ = hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);


/*
* Write a control channel authentication r= ecord.
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/t= ests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
index 65b31e7..5122766 1= 00644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
<= span>+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c

@@ -139,6 +1= 39,27 @@
0xc= 8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85,
= 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e };

+/* no = tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */
+const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D {
+ 0x28,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, = 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,

+ = 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x= 00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ = 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e
+};

+
+/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */
+const uint8_t client_control_none_rand= om_id[] =3D {
+ 0x= 20,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, = 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x02
+
+

struct tls_auth= _standalone
init_tas_auth(int key_direction)
{

@@ -256,12 +277,10 @@
assert_int= _equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_= decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so c= alling it
* again should have the same result */
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &am= p;from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_V= ALID_RESET_V2);
- fr= ee_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

= /* and buf memory should be equal */
assert_memory_e= qual(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(client_reset_v2_tls_a= uth));
@@ -279,7 +298,6 @@
assert_int_= equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_= state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
= /* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate = */
free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi);<= /span>
free_tas(&tas);
@@ -319,15 +337,12= @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);=
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_= decrypt_state(&state);
buf_reset_len(&buf);
buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(cl= ient_reset_v2_none));
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite= (&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_in= t_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre= _decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);<= br>-
/* This= is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */
<= span> buf_reset_len(&buf);

buf_write(&buf,= client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_auth_randomid));
@@ -405,7 +420,7 @@
assert_int_equal(verdic= t, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);

/* Thi= s is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/
- bool valid =3D check_s= ession_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and= _pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, false);
= assert_false(valid);

free_tls_pre_de= crypt_state(&state);
@@ -436,7 +451,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &a= mp;buf);

assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V= 1);

-= bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, = 30);
+ bool valid = =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e);
assert_true(valid);

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

@@ -445,6 = +460,51 @@
hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
}

+stati= c void
+test_verify_h= mac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state)
+{
+ hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init();
+
+ struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };
+ from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family = =3D AF_INET;

+=
+ struct tls_auth_standa= lone tas =3D { 0 };
+= struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 };
+
+ struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024);
+ enum first_packet_verdict verdict;
+
+ tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE;<= /span>
+
+ buf_reset_len(&buf);
= + buf_write(&buf, client= _ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_none_random_id));
= +
+
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from= , &buf);
+ ass= ert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
+
+ /* should fail because it acks 2 */
+ bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id= (&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid);
+ free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);<= /span>
+
+ /* Try test with the control with a= too high message id now */
+ buf_reset_len(&buf);
+ buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, siz= eof(client_control_none_random_id));
+
+ = verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &bu= f);
+ assert_int_e= qual(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);
+
+ /* should fail because it has message id 2 */
+ valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_= id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid);
+
+ free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
+ free_buf(&buf);
+ hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);
+ hmac_ctx_free(hmac);=
+}
+
static hmac_ctx_t *=
init_static_hmac(void)
{
@@ -634,16 +694,20 @@

main(void)
{
openvpn_unit_test_setup();
- const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { cmocka_unit_= test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none),
- cmocka_unit_test(test_t= ls_decrypt_lite_auth),
= - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_crypt),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack),
= - = cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none),

- cmocka_unit_t= est(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
- cmocka_unit_test(test_gen= erate_reset_packet_plain),
- cmocka_unit_test(test_generate= _reset_packet_tls_auth),
+
+ const struct CMUn= itTest tests[] =3D {
= + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decryp= t_lite_auth),
+ = cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack),
+ cmocka_unit_test= (test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none),
= + cmocka_unit_test(test_= verify_hmac_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(t= est_generate_reset_packet_plain),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth)= ,
+ cmocka_uni= t_test(test_extract_control_message)
+ };

#if defined(ENAB= LE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b43936647= 9e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 6
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
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