Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=192.55.52.120; helo=mga04.intel.com; envelope-from=aleksandr.v.tereschenko@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga04.intel.com (mga04.intel.com [192.55.52.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 491rWJ4GW2zDqmT for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 02:27:54 +1000 (AEST) IronPort-SDR: nCWPp5rGo2d0qvuezjC7Jzk6qTGBTH0eel7iFjYa2JMfwQ1e7GqU2IaghqGaDpWyPxZSloiZVD CrsW0hVd5eaQ== X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga007.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.52]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 14 Apr 2020 09:27:51 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 6u7dQoypmZoWwlqj2ExgJk+d69yyICVIyFLYkQDRkYJ1Hn5oX+iNbCrfFTR/HpVWBRrOTAn/zb 7RA/mkN9SJKQ== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.72,383,1580803200"; d="scan'208";a="243857864" Received: from avteresc-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.249.141.117]) ([10.249.141.117]) by fmsmga007.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 14 Apr 2020 09:27:50 -0700 From: Alexander Tereschenko Subject: Re: ipmi password storage To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org References: <20200413230015.GB9295@mauery.jf.intel.com> Message-ID: Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 18:27:49 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200413230015.GB9295@mauery.jf.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Language: en-US X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 16:27:57 -0000 To be more specific, I'm considering two attack scenarios in the below comments: 1) The attacker gets into BMC and is able to copy off the data files, including ipmi_pass. This IMHO is a more realistic scenario in this case. 2) The attacker gets ipmi_pass file/contents only, without being able to retrieve anything else. Which ones do *you* have in mind? For the sake of discussion, it would be helpful to specify them all and see how potential solutions address them. On 14-Apr-20 01:00, Vernon Mauery wrote: > Possible Solution > ================= > Migrate to a solution that uses a key that is longer that does not get > written directly to the flash > 1) S is now computed instead of hard-coded. S=HMAC(MachineId, AppID) I like the direction and the guiding principle, however from "proper" cryptography standpoint, for producing keys, this is not noticeably better than the previous solution. The key material is still readily available on the filesystem (making points #3 and #4 irrelevant for attack scenario #1), so chances are that the adversary who can pull /etc/ipmi_pass file, can also pull /etc/machine-id one. In addition (but that's really a nitpick in this case with all these much bigger problems + easy to fix), plain HMAC is not a proper and recommended key derivation function, an HKDF or one of the NIST constructs from SP800-108 should be used instead. > 2) S is longer (32 bytes instead of 8) This (and #4) only helps the attack scenario #2, where attacker has to brute-force all possible values for S - and I believe that scenario is less realictic. But yes, case #2 gets a bit better than before, if we disregard the fact that HMAC is not a proper KDF and that MachineID is not a proper cryptographic key material [1, last paragraph in Description suggests that], which may provide additional advantage to the attacker. BTW, machine-id has at most 128 bits of entropy (if produced by a proper CSRNG, which I'm not sure about - e.g. I see they do some formatting), so practically it's not 32 bytes, but 16 [at most]. So while this new approach does provide some advantage for scenario #2, it doesn't address a more important case of #1 and to me it still looks like low security. The proper way here is indeed to get some capability for storing the keys securely, but I see how this is hard to impossible on AST2500 (if that's what we're talking about here), without TrustZone or anything similar, or some sort of ROM/bootloader-accessible-only part-unique secret, so OTMH I can't propose any viable alternatives for a given context (brownfield deployment, backward compatibility), but I'll think more about that. [1] https://www.freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/machine-id.html