From: Alexey Budankov Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Date: Thu, 9 Jan 2020 14:36:50 +0300 Message-ID: References: <20200108160713.GI2844@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20200108160713.GI2844@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Language: en-US Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , Alexei Starovoitov , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Casey Schaufler , Robert Richter , Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org On 08.01.2020 19:07, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:25:35PM +0300, Alexey Budankov wrote: >> >> Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged >> processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events >> subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged >> with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov >> --- >> include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++--- >> kernel/events/core.c | 6 +++--- >> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h >> index 34c7c6910026..f46acd69425f 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h >> +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h >> @@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void) >> >> static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) >> { >> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable()) >> return -EACCES; >> >> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); >> @@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) >> >> static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) >> { >> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable()) >> return -EACCES; >> >> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); >> @@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) >> >> static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) >> { >> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable()) >> return -EPERM; >> >> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT); > > These are OK I suppose. > >> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c >> index 059ee7116008..d9db414f2197 100644 >> --- a/kernel/events/core.c >> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c >> @@ -9056,7 +9056,7 @@ static int perf_kprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) >> if (event->attr.type != perf_kprobe.type) >> return -ENOENT; >> >> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (!perfmon_capable()) >> return -EACCES; >> >> /* > > This one only allows attaching to already extant kprobes, right? It does > not allow creation of kprobes. This unblocks creation of local trace kprobes and uprobes by CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process, exactly the same as for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process. > >> @@ -9116,7 +9116,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) >> if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type) >> return -ENOENT; >> >> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (!perfmon_capable()) >> return -EACCES; >> >> /* > > Idem, I presume. > >> @@ -11157,7 +11157,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, >> } >> >> if (attr.namespaces) { >> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> + if (!perfmon_capable()) >> return -EACCES; >> } > > And given we basically make the entire kernel observable with this CAP, > busting namespaces shoulnd't be a problem either. > > So yeah, I suppose that works. >