From: "plaisthos (Code Review)" Date: Wed, 6 Aug 2025 12:23:17 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641... Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="zDnaJ3v2NzE="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: flichtenheld Cc: openvpn-devel --zDnaJ3v2NzE= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos. Hello flichtenheld, I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail to look at the new patch set (#5). Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie = checks ...................................................................... Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances: To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to - starts on IP A - successfully floats to IP B by data packet - then has a control packet from IP A before any data packet can trigger the float back to IP A and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time that hmac cookie is valid in the default configuration. In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid. This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet. This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like: Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID instead. Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl. Reported-By: Walter Doekes Tested-By: Walter Doekes Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe --- M src/openvpn/mudp.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c 4 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/5 diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c index 7259a4b..0f22821 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c +++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ * need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new(); - bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow); + bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow, = pkt_is_ack); const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc= ); uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf); diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c index b901f87..ddb3a15 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c @@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ } bool -check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct op= envpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow) +check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) { @@ -512,6 +515,36 @@ return false; } + /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */ + for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++) + { + /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the + * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid + * for the session */ + if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + if (!pkt_is_ack) + { + packet_id_type message_id; + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)) + { + return false; + } + + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the + * three-way handshake */ + if (message_id > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + /* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h index 8fe4880..2933109 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h @@ -178,14 +178,20 @@ /** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * + * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher + * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are + * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should + * not create a new connection. + * * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time + * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const stru= ct openvpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow); + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_a= ck); /* * Write a control channel authentication record. diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c index 65b31e7..a58e121 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -139,6 +139,27 @@ 0xc8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00= , 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0= , 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x28, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x20, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 +}; + + struct tls_auth_standalone init_tas_auth(int key_direction) { @@ -256,12 +277,10 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it * again should have the same result */ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* and buf memory should be equal */ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(clien= t_reset_v2_tls_auth)); @@ -279,7 +298,6 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate = */ free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi); free_tas(&tas); @@ -319,15 +337,12 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none= )); verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - /* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */ buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_au= th_randomid)); @@ -405,7 +420,7 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); =20 /* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMA= C id*/ - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, fal= se); assert_false(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -436,7 +451,7 @@ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); =20 - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); assert_true(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -445,6 +460,51 @@ hmac_ctx_free(hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state) +{ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(); + + struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET; + + struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 }; + struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 }; + + struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024); + enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE; + + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_n= one_random_id)); + + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + + /* should fail because it acks 2 */ + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); + assert_false(valid); + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + + /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_n= one_random_id)); + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); + + /* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true); + assert_false(valid); + + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + free_buf(&buf); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac); + hmac_ctx_free(hmac); +} + static hmac_ctx_t * init_static_hmac(void) { @@ -634,16 +694,20 @@ main(void) { openvpn_unit_test_setup(); - const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decryp= t_lite_none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_crypt), - cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), - cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session= _id_hmac_static), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_plain), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_cont= rol_message) }; + + const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt), + cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) + }; #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 5 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-Attention: plaisthos Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset --zDnaJ3v2NzE= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld, plaisthos.

plaisthos uploaded patch set #5 to this change.

<= a href=3D"http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail">View Chan= ge

Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger
cr= eating a new session in special circumstances:

To trigger this circu= mstance a connection needs to

- starts on IP A
- successfully flo= ats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before = any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A

and all of t= his needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the def= ault
configuration.

In this scenario we would trigger a new conne= ction as the HMAC
session id would be valid.

This patch adds chec= king also of the message-id and acked ids to
discern packet from the ini= tial three-way handshake where these
ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:

= Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID

instead.

Also= remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl.

Rep= orted-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>
Tested-By: Wal= ter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>

Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff= 3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@...1711...= 27...>
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M sr= c/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files cha= nged, 126 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.op=
envpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/5
diff --git a/src/ope=
nvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
index 7259a4b..0f22821 100= 644
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c
+++ b/src/open= vpn/mudp.c
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@
* = need to contain the peer id */
struct gc_arena gc = =3D gc_new();

- bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, han= dwindow);
+ bo= ol pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
+ bool ret =3D check_session_id_= hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_ack);
const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->t= op.c2.from, &gc);
uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *B= PTR(&m->top.c2.buf);
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pk= t.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
index b901f87..ddb3a15 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/openvp= n/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@
}<= br>
bool
-check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const= struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow)+check_session_id_hmac(struct = tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
+ const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,=
+ hmac= _ctx_t *hmac,
+ = int handwindow,
+ bool pkt_is_ack)
{
if (!from)
{
@@ -512,6= +515,36 @@
return false;
}

+ = /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */
+ for (int i =3D 0;= i < ack.len; i++)
+ {
+ /* T= his packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the
+ * ones expected in the t= hree-way handshake, consider it as invalid

+ * for the session */
+ if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!pkt_is_ack)
+ {
+ p= acket_id_type message_id;
+ /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */
+ if (!reliable_ack_read_packet= _id(&buf, &message_id))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* similar ch= eck. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the
+ * three-way handshake */
+ if (message_id = > 1)
+ {
+ return fal= se;
+ }=
+ }
+
+
/* check adjacent timestamps too */
for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++)
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/sr= c/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
index 8fe4880..2933109 100644--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pk= t.h
@@ -178,14 +178,20 @@
/**
* Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id
*
+ * = This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher
+ * than 1 or ack packets higher th= an 1 to be invalid as they are

+ * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and sh= ould
+ * not create a= new connection.
+ *<= /span>
* @param state session information
* @param from link_socket from the client

* = @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation
= * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time<= br>+ * @param pkt_is_ack the= packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1
* @return = the expected server session id
*/
bool= check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct op= envpn_sockaddr *from,
-= hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow);
+ hmac_c= tx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);


<= span> /*

* Write a control channel authentication record.=
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/u= nit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
index 65b31e7..a58e121 100644<= /span>
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
+= ++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
@@ -139,6 +139,27 = @@
0xc8, 0x0= 1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85,
= 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e };
=
+/* no tls-au= th, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */
+const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D {
= + 0x28,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, = 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x03= ,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x= 00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, = 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ = 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e
+};
+
= +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */
+const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[= ] =3D {
+ 0x20,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, = 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x01,
+= 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x02
+};<= /span>
+
+
struct tls_auth_stand= alone
init_tas_auth(int key_direction)
{<= /span>
@@ -256,12 +277,10 @@
assert_int_equal= (verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decryp= t_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
/* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling= it

* again should have the same result */
= verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from= , &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_R= ESET_V2);
- free_tls= _pre_decrypt_state(&state);

/* a= nd buf memory should be equal */
assert_memory_equal(B= PTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(client_reset_v2_tls_auth));=
@@ -279,7 +298,6 @@
assert_int_equal(= verdict, VERDICT_INVALID);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(= &state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
/= * Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate */
free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi);=
free_tas(&tas);
@@ -319,15 +337,12 @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decryp= t_state(&state);
buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_r= eset_v2_none));
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&= tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equa= l(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decry= pt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
-

/* This is no= t a reset packet and should trigger the other response */
= buf_reset_len(&buf);
buf_write(&buf, clien= t_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_auth_randomid));
<= span>@@ -405,7 +420,7 @@

assert_int_equal(verdict, VER= DICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);

/* This is a= valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMAC id*/
= - bool valid =3D check_session= _id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&s= tate, &from.dest, hmac, 30, false);
assert_false(v= alid);

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&a= mp;state);
@@ -436,7 +451,7 @@
verdict= =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
=
- bool valid= =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30);+ bool valid =3D check_sess= ion_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
= assert_true(valid);

free_tls_pre_= decrypt_state(&state);
@@ -445,6 +460,51 @@
<= span> hmac_ctx_free(hmac);

}
<= br>+static void
+test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_= ack(void **ut_state)

= +{
+ hmac_ctx_t *h= mac =3D session_id_hmac_init();
+
+ str= uct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 };
+ from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET;
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+

+ struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 };
+ struct tls_pre_decry= pt_state state =3D { 0 };
+
+ struct bu= ffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024);
+ enum first_packet_verdict verdict;
+
+ tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE;
+
+ buf_reset_len(&buf);
+ buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id,= sizeof(client_ack_123_none_random_id));
+
+
+ verdict =3D t= ls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ assert_int_equal(verdict, V= ERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);

+
+ /* should fai= l because it acks 2 */
+ as= sert_false(valid);
+ = free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
+
+ /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */
+ buf_reset_len(&b= uf);
+ buf_write(&= amp;buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_none_random_i= d));
+
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_li= te(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);

+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONT= ROL_V1);
+
= + /* should fail because it = has message id 2 */
+= valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, t= rue);
+ assert_fal= se(valid);
++ free_tls_pre_decrypt_sta= te(&state);
+ = free_buf(&buf);
+= hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);
+ hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
+}
+
static hmac_ctx_t *
init_static_hmac(void)
{
@@ -634,16 +694,20 @@
mai= n(void)
{
openvpn_unit_test_setup();<= /span>
- const struct CMUni= tTest tests[] =3D { cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none),- = cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth),
- cm= ocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt),
- cmocka_unit_= test(test_parse_ack),
-= cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_= id_hmac_static),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none),=
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(0, 100%, 40%);">- = cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),

- = cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) };
+
+ const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D {
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt= _lite_none),
+ = cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_c= rypt),
+ cmock= a_unit_test(test_parse_ack),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),=
+ cmocka_unit_test(t= est_verify_hmac_none),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hm= ac_none_out_of_range_ack),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),+ cmocka_unit_test(tes= t_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message)
+ };
<= /span>
#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
Op= enSSL_add_all_algorithms();

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
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Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
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