Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=192.55.52.43; helo=mga05.intel.com; envelope-from=aleksandr.v.tereschenko@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga05.intel.com (mga05.intel.com [192.55.52.43]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 49rgNB3cyzzDqB9 for ; Tue, 23 Jun 2020 19:05:12 +1000 (AEST) IronPort-SDR: 7dQ4YnpNGavqFU8cfGRvhv6hr+6mSLs6d4rF8E75iLN1wHlB2UxqzCrjf2Jjk4uaRBBuxPzEmY U5gfXR6w9g5w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9660"; a="228679234" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,270,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="228679234" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga001.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.23]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 23 Jun 2020 02:05:10 -0700 IronPort-SDR: p84GbDDYlIFG28td6OIhs1thOZ1Pezki8EEs46YXjuFqV1dcvKW0EnLpud1w1RhBT5yqTW+ShY pbfj7d6f5K0Q== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.75,270,1589266800"; d="scan'208";a="384789696" Received: from avteresc-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.213.26.51]) ([10.213.26.51]) by fmsmga001.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 23 Jun 2020 02:05:09 -0700 Subject: Re: OpenBMC 2.8 security audit results To: Joseph Reynolds , openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org References: <2abafb26-29d5-0a0b-7969-19b32556adc5@linux.intel.com> <21ebed5c-ad63-84a1-0b0e-8b5fdb83387d@linux.ibm.com> From: Alexander Tereschenko Message-ID: Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 11:05:08 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.9.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <21ebed5c-ad63-84a1-0b0e-8b5fdb83387d@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 09:05:15 -0000 On 22-Jun-20 16:08, Joseph Reynolds wrote: > On 6/22/20 4:30 AM, Alexander Tereschenko wrote: >> On 20-Jun-20 03:26, Joseph Reynolds wrote: >>> Here are the results from my "security audit" on the planned OpenBMC >>> 2.8 release.  The results are not intended as a complete analysis, >>> but only offer highlights into the BMC's security configuration. >>> Contributions are appreciated. >>> The script to perform these tests was presented here: >>> https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2020-April/021186.html >>> and was followed more-or-less. >>> >>> $ echo "Checking test host openssl version" >>> Checking test host openssl version >>> $ openssl version >>> OpenSSL 1.0.2k-fips  26 Jan 2017 >>> >> I'm not sure I get this one - is "test host" a BMC or the one where >> the test script is being run? If the former, this is really old, no >> longer publicly supported by the OpenSSL team and has multiple CVEs >> against it [1], so should be upgraded. >> >> [1] https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-1.0.2-notes.html > > Alexander, thanks for your reply.  The "test host" is a Linux system > used to probe the BMC via network interfaces such as SSH, HTTPS, and > REST APIs.  To reflect actual customer use, I used a test host that > has an older operating system.  I've included the test host's software > versions to help answer questions about the results below, when the > host version factors into the results. [I'll update my preamble with > this information.] Got it, in this case that comment is not important, the text host may have whatever versions :) >>> /etc/ssl/certs: >>> drwx------    2 root     root           160 Jun 10 06:22 authority >>> drwx------    2 root     root           304 Jun 10 06:23 https >>> >>> observation: Certificates under /etc/ssl are protected from reading >> >> This actually seems to be surplus - *certificates* are public by >> definition, it's the private parts of them (private keys >> corresponding to public ones in certificates) that need protection >> like that. > > Thanks for the clarification.  I've heard a private certificate is > improperly being stored along with its public cert in there somewhere, > but I don't really know. Ah, indeed, that reminds me - OpenBMC stores both private key and the cert (with the public key) in one file, concatenated. That's how bmcweb consumes that (unlike e.g. Apache or nginx, which have separate settings/paths for private and public keys, though nginx also allows for combining) and indeed that in turn necessitates closing down the respective files/dirs - so your check is correct and my comment is not applicable. regards, Alexander