Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 482z0b2MXBzDqMV for ; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:23:26 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0127361.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 00MLBr2G007189 for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 16:23:24 -0500 Received: from ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (aa.5b.37a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.55.91.170]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2xkwq9e0yy-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 16:23:24 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id 00MLLFq5023266 for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:23 GMT Received: from b03cxnp07028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp07028.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.15]) by ppma02wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 2xksn6rh1v-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:23 +0000 Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.232]) by b03cxnp07028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 00MLNMZr48693574 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:22 GMT Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 640C66E052 for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:22 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 42BCA6E050 for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:22 +0000 (GMT) Received: from demeter.rchland.ibm.com (unknown [9.10.254.252]) by b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:22 +0000 (GMT) From: Joseph Reynolds Subject: Security working group meeting 2020-01-22 To: openbmc Message-ID: Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 15:23:21 -0600 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138, 18.0.572 definitions=2020-01-22_08:2020-01-22, 2020-01-22 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 bulkscore=0 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 priorityscore=1501 mlxscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-1910280000 definitions=main-2001220181 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 21:23:28 -0000 Notes from the security working group meeting 2020-01-22: Highlights below; details in https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group 1. Discuss BMCWeb’s site identity certificate handling, specifically intermediate certificates.  See https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/#configuration 
 Other web servers have directives to concatenate the intermediate certificates (excluding the root CA certificates) and send that. What does BMCWeb do?
  - What is BMCWeb's default default?  - Need better docs, for example: How can a BMC admin replace theBMCWeb site cert?  Is it okay to concatenate intermediate certs? Can we document this for BMCWeb? 2. Design discussions about aggregation broached the security topic : https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2020-January/020142.html 
 We are not sure what security help is needed. at this point. 3. Revisit "Daemons should not run as root" - https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/issues/3383 There is definite interest.  Who can work on this?  Possible initial goal: convert bmcweb so it runs as a non-root user.  BMCWeb is selected because it is higher risk because implements a network interface.
 4. Merged BMCWeb commit to allow slower image uploads: https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/commit/2b5e08e2915d886655a78aaabff40745dca6b517   See also commit: 0e1cf26b1cd98e0ec069e6187434fcabf1e9c200 “Make the max http request body size configurable”.
 Minimal discussion.
 5. Merged BMCWeb commit that added new messages for security events: https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/commit/8988dda41319950476ebb146df06c2e7b3fbf44d
 Minimal discussion.
 6. How do we bring security assurance work into the OpenBMC project?  Is there interest in considering Protection Profiles that apply to OpenBMC?  We can use these as a systematic way review security topics.  For example, the Operating System Protection Profile (OSPP) talks about cryptographic functions, audit logging, network security, secure boot, etc.  The Virtualization Protection Profile (VPP) considers the BMC to be part of the platform management system.
 There was agreement that these security schemes are good starting points to use as a guide.  DONE: Joseph added new “Security Assurance Workflow” section to guide future work in this area - https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group#security-assurance-workflow . - Joseph