Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============1413415323860134295==" MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Peter Krystad To: mptcp at lists.01.org Subject: [MPTCP] Re: [PATCH 1/2] mptcp: Re-factor mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha() Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2020 12:46:30 -0800 Message-ID: In-Reply-To: alpine.OSX.2.22.394.2002121521290.31766@echiprou-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com X-Status: X-Keywords: X-UID: 3764 --===============1413415323860134295== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Wed, 2020-02-12 at 15:28 -0800, Mat Martineau wrote: > On Fri, 7 Feb 2020, Peter Krystad wrote: > = > > Allow it to take variable-length messages so that v1 ADD_ADDR > > option processing may use it. > > = > > squashto: Add ADD_ADDR handling > > = > > Signed-off-by: Peter Krystad > > --- > > net/mptcp/crypto.c | 14 ++++++++------ > > net/mptcp/protocol.h | 3 +-- > > net/mptcp/subflow.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- > > 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > = > > diff --git a/net/mptcp/crypto.c b/net/mptcp/crypto.c > > index 40d1bb18fd60..16d0b2b60b25 100644 > > --- a/net/mptcp/crypto.c > > +++ b/net/mptcp/crypto.c > > @@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ void mptcp_crypto_key_sha(u64 key, u32 *token, u64 *i= dsn) > > *idsn =3D be64_to_cpu(*((__be64 *)&mptcp_hashed_key[6])); > > } > > = > > -void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u32 nonce1, u32 nonce2, > > - void *hmac) > > +void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 *msg, int len, void = *hmac) > > { > > u8 input[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > __be32 mptcp_hashed_key[SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS]; > > @@ -65,11 +64,10 @@ void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u32 = nonce1, u32 nonce2, > > for (i =3D 0; i < 8; i++) > > input[i + 8] ^=3D key2be[i]; > > = > > - put_unaligned_be32(nonce1, &input[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]); > > - put_unaligned_be32(nonce2, &input[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + 4]); > > + memcpy(&input[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE], msg, len); > = > Now that 'len' could be anything, the code should check that it's not = > longer than SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE. As for what to do if it's too big, maybe = a = > WARN_ON_ONCE() and limit it to SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE? Will do. Peter. > Other than that, looks good. > = > Mat > = > > sha256_init(&state); > > - sha256_update(&state, input, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + 8); > > + sha256_update(&state, input, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE + len); > > = > > /* emit sha256(K1 || msg) on the second input block, so we can > > * reuse 'input' for the last hashing > > @@ -125,6 +123,7 @@ static int __init test_mptcp_crypto(void) > > char hmac[20], hmac_hex[41]; > > u32 nonce1, nonce2; > > u64 key1, key2; > > + u8 msg[8]; > > int i, j; > > = > > for (i =3D 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tests); ++i) { > > @@ -134,7 +133,10 @@ static int __init test_mptcp_crypto(void) > > nonce1 =3D be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *)&tests[i].msg[0])); > > nonce2 =3D be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *)&tests[i].msg[4])); > > = > > - mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, nonce1, nonce2, hmac); > > + put_unaligned_be32(nonce1, &msg[0]); > > + put_unaligned_be32(nonce2, &msg[4]); > > + > > + mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 8, hmac); > > for (j =3D 0; j < 20; ++j) > > sprintf(&hmac_hex[j << 1], "%02x", hmac[j] & 0xff); > > hmac_hex[40] =3D 0; > > diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h > > index 3fbb33deb764..e10b24ba1636 100644 > > --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h > > +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h > > @@ -339,8 +339,7 @@ static inline void mptcp_crypto_key_gen_sha(u64 *ke= y, u32 *token, u64 *idsn) > > mptcp_crypto_key_sha(*key, token, idsn); > > } > > = > > -void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u32 nonce1, u32 nonce2, > > - void *hash_out); > > +void mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(u64 key1, u64 key2, u8 *msg, int len, void = *hmac); > > = > > void mptcp_pm_init(void); > > void mptcp_pm_new_connection(struct mptcp_sock *msk, int server_side); > > diff --git a/net/mptcp/subflow.c b/net/mptcp/subflow.c > > index 547d5ffef070..8a41f6b661c9 100644 > > --- a/net/mptcp/subflow.c > > +++ b/net/mptcp/subflow.c > > @@ -61,6 +61,17 @@ static void subflow_req_destructor(struct request_so= ck *req) > > tcp_request_sock_ops.destructor(req); > > } > > = > > +static void subflow_generate_hmac(u64 key1, u64 key2, u32 nonce1, u32 = nonce2, > > + void *hmac) > > +{ > > + u8 msg[8]; > > + > > + put_unaligned_be32(nonce1, &msg[0]); > > + put_unaligned_be32(nonce2, &msg[4]); > > + > > + mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(key1, key2, msg, 8, (u32 *)hmac); > > +} > > + > > /* validate received token and create truncated hmac and nonce for SYN-= ACK */ > > static bool subflow_token_join_request(struct request_sock *req, > > const struct sk_buff *skb) > > @@ -82,7 +93,7 @@ static bool subflow_token_join_request(struct request= _sock *req, > > = > > get_random_bytes(&subflow_req->local_nonce, sizeof(u32)); > > = > > - mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(msk->local_key, msk->remote_key, > > + subflow_generate_hmac(msk->local_key, msk->remote_key, > > subflow_req->local_nonce, > > subflow_req->remote_nonce, (u32 *)hmac); > > = > > @@ -180,7 +191,7 @@ static bool subflow_thmac_valid(struct mptcp_subflo= w_context *subflow) > > u8 hmac[MPTCPOPT_HMAC_LEN]; > > u64 thmac; > > = > > - mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(subflow->remote_key, subflow->local_key, > > + subflow_generate_hmac(subflow->remote_key, subflow->local_key, > > subflow->remote_nonce, subflow->local_nonce, > > (u32 *)hmac); > > = > > @@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ static void subflow_finish_connect(struct sock *sk,= const struct sk_buff *skb) > > goto do_reset; > > } > > = > > - mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(subflow->local_key, subflow->remote_key, > > + subflow_generate_hmac(subflow->local_key, subflow->remote_key, > > subflow->local_nonce, > > subflow->remote_nonce, > > (u32 *)subflow->hmac); > > @@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ static bool subflow_hmac_valid(const struct request= _sock *req, > > if (!msk) > > return false; > > = > > - mptcp_crypto_hmac_sha(msk->remote_key, msk->local_key, > > + subflow_generate_hmac(msk->remote_key, msk->local_key, > > subflow_req->remote_nonce, > > subflow_req->local_nonce, (u32 *)hmac); > > = > > -- = > > 2.17.2 > > _______________________________________________ > > mptcp mailing list -- mptcp(a)lists.01.org > > To unsubscribe send an email to mptcp-leave(a)lists.01.org > > = > = > -- > Mat Martineau > Intel --===============1413415323860134295==--