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From: Michael Gebetsroither <gebi@sbox.tugraz.at>
Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2009 17:15:34 +0200
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Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS/dm-crypt vulnerable?
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To: dm-crypt@saout.de

* Marc Ballarin <Ballarin.Marc@gmx.de> wrote:

> In this case you need a method to verify the integrity of every compnent 
> of your system. The best bet would probably be something like TPM. This 
> should cover at least the BIOS and the rest of the software but 
> manipulated firmware might still slip through.

The real solution would be TXT from new intel chips.
This can provide runtime secure boot so the chain of trust is _really_
short.
In fact only the cpu, northbridge and the signed module provided by
intel.

I've tested it with an intel executive DQ45 motherboard and a q9550 cpu.
It works though requires a good deal of work (patching included).

http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot/

michael
-- 
It's already too late!