Return-Path: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, "Al Viro" Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2017 22:41:41 +0000 Message-ID: Subject: [PATCH 3.16 304/306] sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 3.16.40-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Al Viro commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 upstream. Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload; worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS. Bail out early if that happens. Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- block/bsg.c | 3 +++ drivers/scsi/sg.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/block/bsg.c +++ b/block/bsg.c @@ -676,6 +676,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count); + if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))) + return -EINVAL; + bsg_set_block(bd, file); bytes_written = 0; --- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c @@ -568,6 +568,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char _ sg_io_hdr_t *hp; unsigned char cmnd[MAX_COMMAND_SIZE]; + if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS))) + return -EINVAL; + if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp))) return -ENXIO; SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, printk("sg_write: %s, count=%d\n",