From: Andi Kleen Subject: Re: topics for the file system mini-summit Date: 07 Jun 2006 16:03:30 +0200 Message-ID: References: <44762552.8000906@emc.com> <20060529001103.GA23405@parisc-linux.org> <447A5747.2020806@emc.com> <20060529160905.GX5964@schatzie.adilger.int> <1149675046.5520.13.camel@sisko.sctweedie.blueyonder.co.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: Ric Wheeler , Matthew Wilcox , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from ns1.suse.de ([195.135.220.2]:33755 "EHLO mx1.suse.de") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932090AbWFGODo (ORCPT ); Wed, 7 Jun 2006 10:03:44 -0400 To: "Stephen C. Tweedie" In-Reply-To: <1149675046.5520.13.camel@sisko.sctweedie.blueyonder.co.uk> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org "Stephen C. Tweedie" writes: > The inclusion of checksums would certainly allow us to harden things. > In the above scenario, failure of the checksum test would allow us to > discard corrupt indirect blocks before we could allow any harm to come > to other disk blocks. But that only works for cases where the checksum > notices the problem; if we're talking about possible OS bugs, memory > corruption etc. then it is quite possible to get corruption in the in- > memory copy, which gets properly checksummed and written to disk, so you > can't rely on that catching all cases. I don't think you'll ever get a good solution for random kernel memory corruption - if that happens you are dead no matter what you do. Even if your file system still works then your application will eventually produce garbage when its own data gets corrupted. Limiting detection to on storage corruption is entirely reasonable. And also handling 100% of all cases is not feasible anyways. Just handling more than currently would be already a big step forward. "The perfect is the enemy of the good" -Andi