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4.19.149-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 5 participants 256 messages Sep 29, 2020 – Oct 1, 2020 Page 2 of 2

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#140 lore raw

PATCH 139/245 mm/filemap.c: clear page error before actual read

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xianting Tian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit faffdfa04fa11ccf048cebdde73db41ede0679e0 ]

Mount failure issue happens under the scenario: Application forked dozens of threads to mount the same number of cramfs images separately in docker, but several mounts failed with high probability. Mount failed due to the checking result of the page(read from the superblock of loop dev) is not uptodate after wait_on_page_locked(page) returned in function cramfs_read:

   wait_on_page_locked(page);
   if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
      ...
   }

The reason of the checking result of the page not uptodate: systemd-udevd read the loopX dev before mount, because the status of loopX is Lo_unbound at this time, so loop_make_request directly trigger the calling of io_end handler end_buffer_async_read, which called SetPageError(page). So It caused the page can't be set to uptodate in function end_buffer_async_read:

   if(page_uptodate && !PageError(page)) {
      SetPageUptodate(page);
   }

Then mount operation is performed, it used the same page which is just accessed by systemd-udevd above, Because this page is not uptodate, it will launch a actual read via submit_bh, then wait on this page by calling wait_on_page_locked(page). When the I/O of the page done, io_end handler end_buffer_async_read is called, because no one cleared the page error(during the whole read path of mount), which is caused by systemd-udevd reading, so this page is still in "PageError" status, which can't be set to uptodate in function end_buffer_async_read, then caused mount failure.

But sometimes mount succeed even through systemd-udeved read loopX dev just before, The reason is systemd-udevd launched other loopX read just between step 3.1 and 3.2, the steps as below:

1, loopX dev default status is Lo_unbound;
2, systemd-udved read loopX dev (page is set to PageError); 3, mount operation
1) set loopX status to Lo_bound; ==>systemd-udevd read loopX dev<==
2) read loopX dev(page has no error)
3) mount succeed

As the loopX dev status is set to Lo_bound after step 3.1, so the other loopX dev read by systemd-udevd will go through the whole I/O stack, part of the call trace as below:

   SYS_read
      vfs_read
          do_sync_read
              blkdev_aio_read
                 generic_file_aio_read
                     do_generic_file_read:
                        ClearPageError(page);
                        mapping->a_ops->readpage(filp, page);

here, mapping->a_ops->readpage() is blkdev_readpage. In latest kernel, some function name changed, the call trace as below:

blkdev_read_iter

      generic_file_read_iter
         generic_file_buffered_read:
            /*
             * A previous I/O error may have been due to temporary
             * failures, eg. mutipath errors.
             * Pg_error will be set again if readpage fails.
             */
            ClearPageError(page);
            /* Start the actual read. The read will unlock the page*/
            error=mapping->a_ops->readpage(flip, page);

We can see ClearPageError(page) is called before the actual read, then the read in step 3.2 succeed.

This patch is to add the calling of ClearPageError just before the actual read of read path of cramfs mount. Without the patch, the call trace as below when performing cramfs mount:

   do_mount
      cramfs_read
         cramfs_blkdev_read
            read_cache_page
               do_read_cache_page:
                  filler(data, page);
                  or
                  mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);

With the patch, the call trace as below when performing mount:

   do_mount
      cramfs_read
         cramfs_blkdev_read
            read_cache_page:
               do_read_cache_page:
                  ClearPageError(page); <== new add
                  filler(data, page);
                  or
                  mapping->a_ops->readpage(data, page);

With the patch, mount operation trigger the calling of ClearPageError(page) before the actual read, the page has no error if no additional page error happen when I/O done.

---
 mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
mm/filemap.c +8 -0
index 45f1c6d73b5b0..f2e777003b901 100644
@@ -2889,6 +2889,14 @@ filler:
 		unlock_page(page);
 		goto out;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A previous I/O error may have been due to temporary
+	 * failures.
+	 * Clear page error before actual read, PG_error will be
+	 * set again if read page fails.
+	 */
+	ClearPageError(page);
 	goto filler;
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#141 lore raw

PATCH 140/245 mm/vmscan.c: fix data races using kswapd_classzone_idx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5644e1fbbfe15ad06785502bbfe5751223e5841d ]

pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx could be accessed concurrently in wakeup_kswapd(). Plain writes and reads without any lock protection result in data races. Fix them by adding a pair of READ|WRITE_ONCE() as well as saving a branch (compilers might well optimize the original code in an unintentional way anyway). While at it, also take care of pgdat->kswapd_order and non-kswapd threads in allow_direct_reclaim(). The data races were reported by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in wakeup_kswapd / wakeup_kswapd

write to 0xffff9f427ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 7454 on cpu 13:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xf1/0x400
  wakeup_kswapd at mm/vmscan.c:3967
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  wake_all_kswapds at mm/page_alloc.c:4241
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_slowpath at mm/page_alloc.c:4512
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x16e/0x6f0
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcd5/0xd40
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by mtest01/7454:
#0: ffff9f425afe8808 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}, at:

 do_page_fault+0x143/0x6f9
 do_user_addr_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1405
 (inlined by) do_page_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539
 irq event stamp: 6944085
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

read to 0xffff9f427ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 7472 on cpu 38:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xc8/0x400
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x16e/0x6f0
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcd5/0xd40
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by mtest01/7472:
#0: ffff9f425a9ac148 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}, at:

 do_page_fault+0x143/0x6f9
 irq event stamp: 6793561
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kswapd / wakeup_kswapd

write to 0xffff90973ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 820 on cpu 6:

  kswapd+0x27c/0x8d0
  kthread+0x1e0/0x200
  ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

read to 0xffff90973ffff2dc of 4 bytes by task 6299 on cpu 0:

  wakeup_kswapd+0xf3/0x450
  wake_all_kswapds+0x59/0xc0
  __alloc_pages_slowpath+0xdcc/0x1290
  __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3bb/0x450
  alloc_pages_vma+0x8a/0x2c0
  do_anonymous_page+0x170/0x700
  __handle_mm_fault+0xc9f/0xd00
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x6f9
  page_fault+0x34/0x40
---
 mm/vmscan.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
mm/vmscan.c +26 -19
index b93dc8fc6007f..b7d7f6d65bd5b 100644
@@ -3109,8 +3109,9 @@ static bool allow_direct_reclaim(pg_data_t *pgdat)
 
 	/* kswapd must be awake if processes are being throttled */
 	if (!wmark_ok && waitqueue_active(&pgdat->kswapd_wait)) {
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = min(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
-						(enum zone_type)ZONE_NORMAL);
+		if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx) > ZONE_NORMAL)
+			WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, ZONE_NORMAL);
+
 		wake_up_interruptible(&pgdat->kswapd_wait);
 	}
 
@@ -3626,9 +3627,9 @@ out:
 static enum zone_type kswapd_classzone_idx(pg_data_t *pgdat,
 					   enum zone_type prev_classzone_idx)
 {
-	if (pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES)
-		return prev_classzone_idx;
-	return pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx;
+	enum zone_type curr_idx = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx);
+
+	return curr_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES ? prev_classzone_idx : curr_idx;
 }
 
 static void kswapd_try_to_sleep(pg_data_t *pgdat, int alloc_order, int reclaim_order,
@@ -3672,8 +3673,11 @@ static void kswapd_try_to_sleep(pg_data_t *pgdat, int alloc_order, int reclaim_o
 		 * the previous request that slept prematurely.
 		 */
 		if (remaining) {
-			pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
-			pgdat->kswapd_order = max(pgdat->kswapd_order, reclaim_order);
+			WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
+				   kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx));
+
+			if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order) < reclaim_order)
+				WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, reclaim_order);
 		}
 
 		finish_wait(&pgdat->kswapd_wait, &wait);
@@ -3755,12 +3759,12 @@ static int kswapd(void *p)
 	tsk->flags |= PF_MEMALLOC | PF_SWAPWRITE | PF_KSWAPD;
 	set_freezable();
 
-	pgdat->kswapd_order = 0;
-	pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = MAX_NR_ZONES;
+	WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, 0);
+	WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, MAX_NR_ZONES);
 	for ( ; ; ) {
 		bool ret;
 
-		alloc_order = reclaim_order = pgdat->kswapd_order;
+		alloc_order = reclaim_order = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order);
 		classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
 
 kswapd_try_sleep:
@@ -3768,10 +3772,10 @@ kswapd_try_sleep:
 					classzone_idx);
 
 		/* Read the new order and classzone_idx */
-		alloc_order = reclaim_order = pgdat->kswapd_order;
+		alloc_order = reclaim_order = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order);
 		classzone_idx = kswapd_classzone_idx(pgdat, classzone_idx);
-		pgdat->kswapd_order = 0;
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = MAX_NR_ZONES;
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, 0);
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, MAX_NR_ZONES);
 
 		ret = try_to_freeze();
 		if (kthread_should_stop())
@@ -3816,20 +3820,23 @@ void wakeup_kswapd(struct zone *zone, gfp_t gfp_flags, int order,
 		   enum zone_type classzone_idx)
 {
 	pg_data_t *pgdat;
+	enum zone_type curr_idx;
 
 	if (!managed_zone(zone))
 		return;
 
 	if (!cpuset_zone_allowed(zone, gfp_flags))
 		return;
+
 	pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat;
+	curr_idx = READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx);
+
+	if (curr_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES || curr_idx < classzone_idx)
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx, classzone_idx);
+
+	if (READ_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order) < order)
+		WRITE_ONCE(pgdat->kswapd_order, order);
 
-	if (pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx == MAX_NR_ZONES)
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = classzone_idx;
-	else
-		pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx = max(pgdat->kswapd_classzone_idx,
-						  classzone_idx);
-	pgdat->kswapd_order = max(pgdat->kswapd_order, order);
 	if (!waitqueue_active(&pgdat->kswapd_wait))
 		return;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#142 lore raw

PATCH 141/245 nvmet-rdma: fix double free of rdma queue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Israel Rukshin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 21f9024355e58772ec5d7fc3534aa5e29d72a8b6 ]

In case rdma accept fails at nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(), release work is scheduled. Later on, a new RDMA CM event may arrive since we didn't destroy the cm-id and call nvmet_rdma_queue_connect_fail(), which schedule another release work. This will cause calling nvmet_rdma_free_queue twice. To fix this we implicitly destroy the cm_id with non-zero ret code, which guarantees that new rdma_cm events will not arrive afterwards. Also add a qp pointer to nvmet_rdma_queue structure, so we can use it when the cm_id pointer is NULL or was destroyed.

---
 drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c +18 -12
index 08f997a390d5d..cfd26437aeaea 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum nvmet_rdma_queue_state {
 
 struct nvmet_rdma_queue {
 	struct rdma_cm_id	*cm_id;
+	struct ib_qp		*qp;
 	struct nvmet_port	*port;
 	struct ib_cq		*cq;
 	atomic_t		sq_wr_avail;
@@ -471,7 +472,7 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_post_recv(struct nvmet_rdma_device *ndev,
 	if (ndev->srq)
 		ret = ib_post_srq_recv(ndev->srq, &cmd->wr, NULL);
 	else
-		ret = ib_post_recv(cmd->queue->cm_id->qp, &cmd->wr, NULL);
+		ret = ib_post_recv(cmd->queue->qp, &cmd->wr, NULL);
 
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		pr_err("post_recv cmd failed\n");
@@ -510,7 +511,7 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_release_rsp(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
 	atomic_add(1 + rsp->n_rdma, &queue->sq_wr_avail);
 
 	if (rsp->n_rdma) {
-		rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+		rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 				queue->cm_id->port_num, rsp->req.sg,
 				rsp->req.sg_cnt, nvmet_data_dir(&rsp->req));
 	}
@@ -594,7 +595,7 @@ static void nvmet_rdma_read_data_done(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
 
 	WARN_ON(rsp->n_rdma <= 0);
 	atomic_add(rsp->n_rdma, &queue->sq_wr_avail);
-	rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+	rdma_rw_ctx_destroy(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 			queue->cm_id->port_num, rsp->req.sg,
 			rsp->req.sg_cnt, nvmet_data_dir(&rsp->req));
 	rsp->n_rdma = 0;
@@ -737,7 +738,7 @@ static bool nvmet_rdma_execute_command(struct nvmet_rdma_rsp *rsp)
 	}
 
 	if (nvmet_rdma_need_data_in(rsp)) {
-		if (rdma_rw_ctx_post(&rsp->rw, queue->cm_id->qp,
+		if (rdma_rw_ctx_post(&rsp->rw, queue->qp,
 				queue->cm_id->port_num, &rsp->read_cqe, NULL))
 			nvmet_req_complete(&rsp->req, NVME_SC_DATA_XFER_ERROR);
 	} else {
@@ -1020,6 +1021,7 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_create_queue_ib(struct nvmet_rdma_queue *queue)
 		pr_err("failed to create_qp ret= %d\n", ret);
 		goto err_destroy_cq;
 	}
+	queue->qp = queue->cm_id->qp;
 
 	atomic_set(&queue->sq_wr_avail, qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr);
 
@@ -1048,11 +1050,10 @@ err_destroy_cq:
 
 static void nvmet_rdma_destroy_queue_ib(struct nvmet_rdma_queue *queue)
 {
-	struct ib_qp *qp = queue->cm_id->qp;
-
-	ib_drain_qp(qp);
-	rdma_destroy_id(queue->cm_id);
-	ib_destroy_qp(qp);
+	ib_drain_qp(queue->qp);
+	if (queue->cm_id)
+		rdma_destroy_id(queue->cm_id);
+	ib_destroy_qp(queue->qp);
 	ib_free_cq(queue->cq);
 }
 
@@ -1286,9 +1287,12 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
 
 	ret = nvmet_rdma_cm_accept(cm_id, queue, &event->param.conn);
 	if (ret) {
-		schedule_work(&queue->release_work);
-		/* Destroying rdma_cm id is not needed here */
-		return 0;
+		/*
+		 * Don't destroy the cm_id in free path, as we implicitly
+		 * destroy the cm_id here with non-zero ret code.
+		 */
+		queue->cm_id = NULL;
+		goto free_queue;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&nvmet_rdma_queue_mutex);
@@ -1297,6 +1301,8 @@ static int nvmet_rdma_queue_connect(struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id,
 
 	return 0;
 
+free_queue:
+	nvmet_rdma_free_queue(queue);
 put_device:
 	kref_put(&ndev->ref, nvmet_rdma_free_dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#143 lore raw

PATCH 142/245 mm/mmap.c: initialize align_offset explicitly for vm_unmapped_area

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jaewon Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 09ef5283fd96ac424ef0e569626f359bf9ab86c9 ]

On passing requirement to vm_unmapped_area, arch_get_unmapped_area and arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown did not set align_offset. Internally on both unmapped_area and unmapped_area_topdown, if info->align_mask is 0, then info->align_offset was meaningless.

But commit df529cabb7a2 ("mm: mmap: add trace point of vm_unmapped_area") always prints info->align_offset even though it is uninitialized.

Fix this uninitialized value issue by setting it to 0 explicitly.

Before:
vm_unmapped_area: addr=0x755b155000 err=0 total_vm=0x15aaf0 flags=0x1 len=0x109000 lo=0x8000 hi=0x75eed48000 mask=0x0 ofs=0x4022

After:
vm_unmapped_area: addr=0x74a4ca1000 err=0 total_vm=0x168ab1 flags=0x1 len=0x9000 lo=0x8000 hi=0x753d94b000 mask=0x0 ofs=0x0

---
 mm/mmap.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/mmap.c +2 -0
index e84fd3347a518..f875386e7acd4 100644
@@ -2077,6 +2077,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area(struct file *filp, unsigned long addr,
 	info.low_limit = mm->mmap_base;
 	info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
 	info.align_mask = 0;
+	info.align_offset = 0;
 	return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
 }
 #endif
@@ -2118,6 +2119,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
 	info.low_limit = max(PAGE_SIZE, mmap_min_addr);
 	info.high_limit = mm->mmap_base;
 	info.align_mask = 0;
+	info.align_offset = 0;
 	addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#144 lore raw

PATCH 143/245 scsi: qedi: Fix termination timeouts in session logout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b9b97e6903032ec56e6dcbe137a9819b74a17fea ]

The destroy connection ramrod timed out during session logout. Fix the wait delay for graceful vs abortive termination as per the FW requirements.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c +3 -0
index 751941a3ed303..aa451c8b49e56 100644
@@ -1065,6 +1065,9 @@ static void qedi_ep_disconnect(struct iscsi_endpoint *ep)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	if (!abrt_conn)
+		wait_delay += qedi->pf_params.iscsi_pf_params.two_msl_timer;
+
 	qedi_ep->state = EP_STATE_DISCONN_START;
 	ret = qedi_ops->destroy_conn(qedi->cdev, qedi_ep->handle, abrt_conn);
 	if (ret) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#145 lore raw

PATCH 144/245 serial: uartps: Wait for tx_empty in console setup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Raviteja Narayanam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42e11948ddf68b9f799cad8c0ddeab0a39da33e8 ]

On some platforms, the log is corrupted while console is being registered. It is observed that when set_termios is called, there are still some bytes in the FIFO to be transmitted.

So, wait for tx_empty inside cdns_uart_console_setup before calling set_termios.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +8 -0
index 31950a38f0fb7..23f9b0cdff086 100644
@@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 	int bits = 8;
 	int parity = 'n';
 	int flow = 'n';
+	unsigned long time_out;
 
 	if (!port->membase) {
 		pr_debug("console on " CDNS_UART_TTY_NAME "%i not present\n",
@@ -1246,6 +1247,13 @@ static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 	if (options)
 		uart_parse_options(options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
 
+	/* Wait for tx_empty before setting up the console */
+	time_out = jiffies + usecs_to_jiffies(TX_TIMEOUT);
+
+	while (time_before(jiffies, time_out) &&
+	       cdns_uart_tx_empty(port) != TIOCSER_TEMT)
+		cpu_relax();
+
 	return uart_set_options(port, co, baud, parity, bits, flow);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#146 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 144/245] serial: uartps: Wait for tx_empty in console setup

Hi!

Quoted 12 lines

From: Raviteja Narayanam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42e11948ddf68b9f799cad8c0ddeab0a39da33e8 ]

On some platforms, the log is corrupted while console is being registered. It is observed that when set_termios is called, there are still some bytes in the FIFO to be transmitted.

So, wait for tx_empty inside cdns_uart_console_setup before calling set_termios.

drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options) · line 1256

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/tty/serial/xilinx_uartps.c +7 -0
@@ -1246,6 +1247,13 @@ static int cdns_uart_console_setup(struct console *co, char *options)
 	if (options)
 		uart_parse_options(options, &baud, &parity, &bits, &flow);
 
+	/* Wait for tx_empty before setting up the console */
+	time_out = jiffies + usecs_to_jiffies(TX_TIMEOUT);
+
+	while (time_before(jiffies, time_out) &&
+	       cdns_uart_tx_empty(port) != TIOCSER_TEMT)
+		cpu_relax();
+

So this is spinning for half a second. Could we use msleep(1) instead of cpu_relax or something like that?

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
author maintainer
#147 lore raw

PATCH 145/245 KVM: Remove CREATE_IRQCHIP/SET_PIT2 race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steve Rutherford <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7289fdb5dcdbc5155b5531529c44105868a762f2 ]

Fixes a NULL pointer dereference, caused by the PIT firing an interrupt before the interrupt table has been initialized.

SET_PIT2 can race with the creation of the IRQchip. In particular, if SET_PIT2 is called with a low PIT timer period (after the creation of the IOAPIC, but before the instantiation of the irq routes), the PIT can fire an interrupt at an uninitialized table.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -2
index 430a4bc66f604..620ed1fa35119 100644
@@ -4668,10 +4668,13 @@ set_identity_unlock:
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
 			goto out;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 		r = -ENXIO;
 		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
-			goto out;
+			goto set_pit_out;
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
+set_pit_out:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
@@ -4691,10 +4694,13 @@ set_identity_unlock:
 		r = -EFAULT;
 		if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
 			goto out;
+		mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
 		r = -ENXIO;
 		if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
-			goto out;
+			goto set_pit2_out;
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
+set_pit2_out:
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
 		break;
 	}
 	case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#148 lore raw

PATCH 146/245 perf stat: Force error in fallback on :k events

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bec49a9e05db3dbdca696fa07c62c52638fb6371 ]

When it is not possible for a non-privilege perf command to monitor at the kernel level (:k), the fallback code forces a :u. That works if the event was previously monitoring both levels. But if the event was already constrained to kernel only, then it does not make sense to restrict it to user only.

Given the code works by exclusion, a kernel only event would have:

attr->exclude_user = 1

The fallback code would add:

attr->exclude_kernel = 1

In the end the end would not monitor in either the user level or kernel level. In other words, it would count nothing.

An event programmed to monitor kernel only cannot be switched to user only without seriously warning the user.

This patch forces an error in this case to make it clear the request cannot really be satisfied.

Behavior with paranoid 1:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1

Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

           1,520,413      cycles:k

         1.002361664 seconds time elapsed

         0.002480000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

Old behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                   0      cycles:ku

         1.002358127 seconds time elapsed

         0.002384000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

New behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
  Error:
  You may not have permission to collect stats.

Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid, which controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The current value is 2:

-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK

Quoted 1 line

= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Quoted 2 lines

= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:

kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1

v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from [email protected].

---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +4 -0
index 68c5ab0e1800b..e8586957562b3 100644
@@ -2796,6 +2796,10 @@ bool perf_evsel__fallback(struct perf_evsel *evsel, int err,
 		char *new_name;
 		const char *sep = ":";
 
+		/* If event has exclude user then don't exclude kernel. */
+		if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)
+			return false;
+
 		/* Is there already the separator in the name. */
 		if (strchr(name, '/') ||
 		    strchr(name, ':'))
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#149 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 146/245] perf stat: Force error in fallback on :k events

Quoted 81 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bec49a9e05db3dbdca696fa07c62c52638fb6371 ]

When it is not possible for a non-privilege perf command to monitor at the kernel level (:k), the fallback code forces a :u. That works if the event was previously monitoring both levels. But if the event was already constrained to kernel only, then it does not make sense to restrict it to user only.

Given the code works by exclusion, a kernel only event would have:

attr->exclude_user = 1

The fallback code would add:

attr->exclude_kernel = 1

In the end the end would not monitor in either the user level or kernel level. In other words, it would count nothing.

An event programmed to monitor kernel only cannot be switched to user only without seriously warning the user.

This patch forces an error in this case to make it clear the request cannot really be satisfied.

Behavior with paranoid 1:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

           1,520,413      cycles:k

         1.002361664 seconds time elapsed

         0.002480000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

Old behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                   0      cycles:ku

         1.002358127 seconds time elapsed

         0.002384000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

New behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
  Error:
  You may not have permission to collect stats.

Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid, which controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The current value is 2:

-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK

Quoted 1 line

= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Quoted 2 lines

= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:

kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1

v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from [email protected].

Quoted 12 lines

perf failed on stable rc branch 4.19 on all devices.

build warning and errors,
-----------------------------------
In file included from util/evlist.h:15:0,

                 from util/evsel.c:30:
util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__exit':
util/util.h:25:28: warning: passing argument 1 of 'free' discards
'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
 #define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
                            ^

util/evsel.c:1293:2: note: in expansion of macro 'zfree'
zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
^~~~~
In file included from /srv/oe/build/tmp-lkft-glibc/work/intel_corei7_64-linaro-linux/perf/1.0-r9/perf-1.0/tools/perf/arch/x86/include/perf_regs.h:5:0,

                 from util/perf_regs.h:27,
                 from util/event.h:11,
                 from util/callchain.h:8,
                 from util/evsel.c:26:
perf/1.0-r9/recipe-sysroot/usr/include/stdlib.h:563:13: note: expected
'void *' but argument is of type 'const char *'
 extern void free (void *__ptr) __THROW;
             ^~~~

util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__fallback':
util/evsel.c:2802:14: error: 'struct perf_evsel' has no member named 'core'; did you mean 'node'?
if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)

              ^~~~
              node
Quoted 24 lines
---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +4 -1
index 68c5ab0e1800b..e8586957562b3 100644
@@ -2796,6 +2796,10 @@ bool perf_evsel__fallback(struct perf_evsel *evsel, int err,
                char *new_name;
                const char *sep = ":";
 
+               /* If event has exclude user then don't exclude kernel. */
+               if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)
+                       return false;
+
                /* Is there already the separator in the name. */
                if (strchr(name, '/') ||
                    strchr(name, ':'))
--

2.25.1

author maintainer
#150 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 146/245] perf stat: Force error in fallback on :k events

Quoted 122 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 81 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bec49a9e05db3dbdca696fa07c62c52638fb6371 ]

When it is not possible for a non-privilege perf command to monitor at the kernel level (:k), the fallback code forces a :u. That works if the event was previously monitoring both levels. But if the event was already constrained to kernel only, then it does not make sense to restrict it to user only.

Given the code works by exclusion, a kernel only event would have:

attr->exclude_user = 1

The fallback code would add:

attr->exclude_kernel = 1

In the end the end would not monitor in either the user level or kernel level. In other words, it would count nothing.

An event programmed to monitor kernel only cannot be switched to user only without seriously warning the user.

This patch forces an error in this case to make it clear the request cannot really be satisfied.

Behavior with paranoid 1:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

           1,520,413      cycles:k

         1.002361664 seconds time elapsed

         0.002480000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

Old behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                   0      cycles:ku

         1.002358127 seconds time elapsed

         0.002384000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

New behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
  Error:
  You may not have permission to collect stats.

Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid, which controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The current value is 2:

-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK

Quoted 1 line

= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Quoted 2 lines

= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:

kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1

v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from [email protected].

Quoted 12 lines

perf failed on stable rc branch 4.19 on all devices.

build warning and errors,
-----------------------------------
In file included from util/evlist.h:15:0,

                 from util/evsel.c:30:
util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__exit':
util/util.h:25:28: warning: passing argument 1 of 'free' discards
'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
 #define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
                            ^

util/evsel.c:1293:2: note: in expansion of macro 'zfree'
zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
^~~~~
In file included from /srv/oe/build/tmp-lkft-glibc/work/intel_corei7_64-linaro-linux/perf/1.0-r9/perf-1.0/tools/perf/arch/x86/include/perf_regs.h:5:0,

                 from util/perf_regs.h:27,
                 from util/event.h:11,
                 from util/callchain.h:8,
                 from util/evsel.c:26:
perf/1.0-r9/recipe-sysroot/usr/include/stdlib.h:563:13: note: expected
'void *' but argument is of type 'const char *'
 extern void free (void *__ptr) __THROW;
             ^~~~
Quoted 6 lines

util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__fallback':
util/evsel.c:2802:14: error: 'struct perf_evsel' has no member named 'core'; did you mean 'node'?
if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)

              ^~~~
              node

I thought Sasha had dropped all of the offending patches. I'll go drop this one and push out a new 4.19-rc release.

But note, the latest 4.19.y tree doesn't even build perf for me, so I can't really check this locally :(

thanks,

greg k-h

maintainer
#151 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 146/245] perf stat: Force error in fallback on :k events

Quoted 130 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 122 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 81 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bec49a9e05db3dbdca696fa07c62c52638fb6371 ]

When it is not possible for a non-privilege perf command to monitor at the kernel level (:k), the fallback code forces a :u. That works if the event was previously monitoring both levels. But if the event was already constrained to kernel only, then it does not make sense to restrict it to user only.

Given the code works by exclusion, a kernel only event would have:

attr->exclude_user = 1

The fallback code would add:

attr->exclude_kernel = 1

In the end the end would not monitor in either the user level or kernel level. In other words, it would count nothing.

An event programmed to monitor kernel only cannot be switched to user only without seriously warning the user.

This patch forces an error in this case to make it clear the request cannot really be satisfied.

Behavior with paranoid 1:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':

           1,520,413      cycles:k

         1.002361664 seconds time elapsed

         0.002480000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

Old behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
   Performance counter stats for 'sleep 1':
                   0      cycles:ku

         1.002358127 seconds time elapsed

         0.002384000 seconds user
         0.000000000 seconds sys

New behavior with paranoid 2:

  $ sudo bash -c "echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid"
  $ perf stat -e cycles:k sleep 1
  Error:
  You may not have permission to collect stats.

Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid, which controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).

The current value is 2:

-1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users
Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK

Quoted 1 line

= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

Quoted 2 lines

= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN = 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN

To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:

kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1

v2 of this patch addresses the review feedback from [email protected].

Quoted 12 lines

perf failed on stable rc branch 4.19 on all devices.

build warning and errors,
-----------------------------------
In file included from util/evlist.h:15:0,

                 from util/evsel.c:30:
util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__exit':
util/util.h:25:28: warning: passing argument 1 of 'free' discards
'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
 #define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
                            ^

util/evsel.c:1293:2: note: in expansion of macro 'zfree'
zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
^~~~~
In file included from /srv/oe/build/tmp-lkft-glibc/work/intel_corei7_64-linaro-linux/perf/1.0-r9/perf-1.0/tools/perf/arch/x86/include/perf_regs.h:5:0,

                 from util/perf_regs.h:27,
                 from util/event.h:11,
                 from util/callchain.h:8,
                 from util/evsel.c:26:
perf/1.0-r9/recipe-sysroot/usr/include/stdlib.h:563:13: note: expected
'void *' but argument is of type 'const char *'
 extern void free (void *__ptr) __THROW;
             ^~~~
Quoted 6 lines

util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__fallback':
util/evsel.c:2802:14: error: 'struct perf_evsel' has no member named 'core'; did you mean 'node'?
if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)

              ^~~~
              node
Quoted 2 lines

I thought Sasha had dropped all of the offending patches. I'll go drop this one and push out a new 4.19-rc release.

I did, looks like this a new report.

Quoted 2 lines

But note, the latest 4.19.y tree doesn't even build perf for me, so I can't really check this locally :(

Same here. Naresh, does perf builds "out of the box" for you, or do you carry any patches on top?

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Sasha
author maintainer
#152 lore raw

PATCH 147/245 bdev: Reduce time holding bd_mutex in sync in blkdev_close()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b849dd84b6ccfe32622988b79b7b073861fcf9f7 ]

While trying to "dd" to the block device for a USB stick, I encountered a hung task warning (blocked for > 120 seconds). I managed to come up with an easy way to reproduce this on my system (where /dev/sdb is the block device for my USB stick) with:

while true; do dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=4M; done

With my reproduction here are the relevant bits from the hung task detector:

 INFO: task udevd:294 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
 ...
 udevd           D    0   294      1 0x00400008
 Call trace:
  ...
  mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
  __blkdev_get+0x7c/0x3d4
  blkdev_get+0x118/0x138
  blkdev_open+0x94/0xa8
  do_dentry_open+0x268/0x3a0
  vfs_open+0x34/0x40
  path_openat+0x39c/0xdf4
  do_filp_open+0x90/0x10c
  do_sys_open+0x150/0x3c8
  ...

...

 Showing all locks held in the system:
 ...
 1 lock held by dd/2798:
  #0: ffffff814ac1a3b8 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_put+0x50/0x204
 ...
 dd              D    0  2798   2764 0x00400208
 Call trace:
  ...
  schedule+0x8c/0xbc
  io_schedule+0x1c/0x40
  wait_on_page_bit_common+0x238/0x338
  __lock_page+0x5c/0x68
  write_cache_pages+0x194/0x500
  generic_writepages+0x64/0xa4
  blkdev_writepages+0x24/0x30
  do_writepages+0x48/0xa8
  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xac/0xd8
  filemap_write_and_wait+0x30/0x84
  __blkdev_put+0x88/0x204
  blkdev_put+0xc4/0xe4
  blkdev_close+0x28/0x38
  __fput+0xe0/0x238
  ____fput+0x1c/0x28
  task_work_run+0xb0/0xe4
  do_notify_resume+0xfc0/0x14bc
  work_pending+0x8/0x14

The problem appears related to the fact that my USB disk is terribly slow and that I have a lot of RAM in my system to cache things. Specifically my writes seem to be happening at ~15 MB/s and I've got ~4 GB of RAM in my system that can be used for buffering. To write 4 GB of buffer to disk thus takes ~4000 MB / ~15 MB/s = ~267 seconds.

The 267 second number is a problem because in __blkdev_put() we call sync_blockdev() while holding the bd_mutex. Any other callers who want the bd_mutex will be blocked for the whole time.

The problem is made worse because I believe blkdev_put() specifically tells other tasks (namely udev) to go try to access the device at right around the same time we're going to hold the mutex for a long time.

Putting some traces around this (after disabling the hung task detector), I could confirm:
dd: 437.608600: __blkdev_put() right before sync_blockdev() for sdb
udevd: 437.623901: blkdev_open() right before blkdev_get() for sdb
dd: 661.468451: __blkdev_put() right after sync_blockdev() for sdb
udevd: 663.820426: blkdev_open() right after blkdev_get() for sdb

A simple fix for this is to realize that sync_blockdev() works fine if you're not holding the mutex. Also, it's not the end of the world if you sync a little early (though it can have performance impacts). Thus we can make a guess that we're going to need to do the sync and then do it without holding the mutex. We still do one last sync with the mutex but it should be much, much faster.

With this, my hung task warnings for my test case are gone.

---
 fs/block_dev.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/block_dev.c +10 -0
index 8ac8f7469354b..9f3faac490259 100644
@@ -1793,6 +1793,16 @@ static void __blkdev_put(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, int for_part)
 	struct gendisk *disk = bdev->bd_disk;
 	struct block_device *victim = NULL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Sync early if it looks like we're the last one.  If someone else
+	 * opens the block device between now and the decrement of bd_openers
+	 * then we did a sync that we didn't need to, but that's not the end
+	 * of the world and we want to avoid long (could be several minute)
+	 * syncs while holding the mutex.
+	 */
+	if (bdev->bd_openers == 1)
+		sync_blockdev(bdev);
+
 	mutex_lock_nested(&bdev->bd_mutex, for_part);
 	if (for_part)
 		bdev->bd_part_count--;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#153 lore raw

PATCH 148/245 drivers: char: tlclk.c: Avoid data race between init and interrupt handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 44b8fb6eaa7c3fb770bf1e37619cdb3902cca1fc ]

After registering character device the file operation callbacks can be called. The open callback registers interrupt handler. Therefore interrupt handler can execute in parallel with rest of the init function. To avoid such data race initialize telclk_interrupt variable and struct alarm_events before registering character device.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

---
 drivers/char/tlclk.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tlclk.c +10 -7
index 8eeb4190207d1..dce22b7fc5449 100644
@@ -776,17 +776,21 @@ static int __init tlclk_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	telclk_interrupt = (inb(TLCLK_REG7) & 0x0f);
+
+	alarm_events = kzalloc( sizeof(struct tlclk_alarms), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!alarm_events) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out1;
+	}
+
 	ret = register_chrdev(tlclk_major, "telco_clock", &tlclk_fops);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "tlclk: can't get major %d.\n", tlclk_major);
+		kfree(alarm_events);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	tlclk_major = ret;
-	alarm_events = kzalloc( sizeof(struct tlclk_alarms), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!alarm_events) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out1;
-	}
 
 	/* Read telecom clock IRQ number (Set by BIOS) */
 	if (!request_region(TLCLK_BASE, 8, "telco_clock")) {
@@ -795,7 +799,6 @@ static int __init tlclk_init(void)
 		ret = -EBUSY;
 		goto out2;
 	}
-	telclk_interrupt = (inb(TLCLK_REG7) & 0x0f);
 
 	if (0x0F == telclk_interrupt ) { /* not MCPBL0010 ? */
 		printk(KERN_ERR "telclk_interrupt = 0x%x non-mcpbl0010 hw.\n",
@@ -836,8 +839,8 @@ out3:
 	release_region(TLCLK_BASE, 8);
 out2:
 	kfree(alarm_events);
-out1:
 	unregister_chrdev(tlclk_major, "telco_clock");
+out1:
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#154 lore raw

PATCH 149/245 KVM: arm64: vgic-its: Fix memory leak on the error path of vgic_add_lpi()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zenghui Yu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 57bdb436ce869a45881d8aa4bc5dac8e072dd2b6 ]

If we're going to fail out the vgic_add_lpi(), let's make sure the allocated vgic_irq memory is also freed. Though it seems that both cases are unlikely to fail.

---
 virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
virt/kvm/arm/vgic/vgic-its.c +9 -2
index 9295addea7ecf..f139b1c62ca38 100644
@@ -107,14 +107,21 @@ out_unlock:
 	 * We "cache" the configuration table entries in our struct vgic_irq's.
 	 * However we only have those structs for mapped IRQs, so we read in
 	 * the respective config data from memory here upon mapping the LPI.
+	 *
+	 * Should any of these fail, behave as if we couldn't create the LPI
+	 * by dropping the refcount and returning the error.
 	 */
 	ret = update_lpi_config(kvm, irq, NULL, false);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		vgic_put_irq(kvm, irq);
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
 	ret = vgic_v3_lpi_sync_pending_status(kvm, irq);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		vgic_put_irq(kvm, irq);
 		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
 
 	return irq;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#155 lore raw

PATCH 150/245 net: openvswitch: use u64 for meter bucket

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tonghao Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e57358873bb5d6caa882b9684f59140912b37dde ]

When setting the meter rate to 4+Gbps, there is an overflow, the meters don't work as expected.

---
 net/openvswitch/meter.c | 2 +-
 net/openvswitch/meter.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/meter.c +1 -1
index c038e021a5916..6f5131d1074b0 100644
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ static struct dp_meter *dp_meter_create(struct nlattr **a)
 		 *
 		 * Start with a full bucket.
 		 */
-		band->bucket = (band->burst_size + band->rate) * 1000;
+		band->bucket = (band->burst_size + band->rate) * 1000ULL;
 		band_max_delta_t = band->bucket / band->rate;
 		if (band_max_delta_t > meter->max_delta_t)
 			meter->max_delta_t = band_max_delta_t;
net/openvswitch/meter.h +1 -1
index 964ace2650f89..970557ed5b5b6 100644
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ struct dp_meter_band {
 	u32 type;
 	u32 rate;
 	u32 burst_size;
-	u32 bucket; /* 1/1000 packets, or in bits */
+	u64 bucket; /* 1/1000 packets, or in bits */
 	struct ovs_flow_stats stats;
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#156 lore raw

PATCH 151/245 scsi: aacraid: Fix error handling paths in aac_probe_one()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f7854c382240c1686900b2f098b36430c6f5047e ]

If 'scsi_host_alloc()' or 'kcalloc()' fail, 'error' is known to be 0. Set it explicitly to -ENOMEM before branching to the error handling path.

While at it, remove 2 useless assignments to 'error'. These values are overwridden a few lines later.

---
 drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +8 -4
index 0142547aaadd2..eecffc03084c0 100644
@@ -1620,7 +1620,7 @@ static int aac_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost;
 	struct aac_dev *aac;
 	struct list_head *insert = &aac_devices;
-	int error = -ENODEV;
+	int error;
 	int unique_id = 0;
 	u64 dmamask;
 	int mask_bits = 0;
@@ -1645,7 +1645,6 @@ static int aac_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	error = pci_enable_device(pdev);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
-	error = -ENODEV;
 
 	if (!(aac_drivers[index].quirks & AAC_QUIRK_SRC)) {
 		error = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
@@ -1677,8 +1676,10 @@ static int aac_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	pci_set_master(pdev);
 
 	shost = scsi_host_alloc(&aac_driver_template, sizeof(struct aac_dev));
-	if (!shost)
+	if (!shost) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_disable_pdev;
+	}
 
 	shost->irq = pdev->irq;
 	shost->unique_id = unique_id;
@@ -1703,8 +1704,11 @@ static int aac_probe_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	aac->fibs = kcalloc(shost->can_queue + AAC_NUM_MGT_FIB,
 			    sizeof(struct fib),
 			    GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!aac->fibs)
+	if (!aac->fibs) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_free_host;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_init(&aac->fib_lock);
 
 	mutex_init(&aac->ioctl_mutex);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#157 lore raw

PATCH 152/245 staging:r8188eu: avoid skb_clone for amsdu to msdu conversion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ivan Safonov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 628cbd971a927abe6388d44320e351c337b331e4 ]

skb clones use same data buffer,
so tail of one skb is corrupted by beginning of next skb.

---
 drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_recv.c | 19 ++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/core/rtw_recv.c +6 -13
index 17b4b9257b495..0ddf41b5a734a 100644
@@ -1535,21 +1535,14 @@ static int amsdu_to_msdu(struct adapter *padapter, struct recv_frame *prframe)
 
 		/* Allocate new skb for releasing to upper layer */
 		sub_skb = dev_alloc_skb(nSubframe_Length + 12);
-		if (sub_skb) {
-			skb_reserve(sub_skb, 12);
-			skb_put_data(sub_skb, pdata, nSubframe_Length);
-		} else {
-			sub_skb = skb_clone(prframe->pkt, GFP_ATOMIC);
-			if (sub_skb) {
-				sub_skb->data = pdata;
-				sub_skb->len = nSubframe_Length;
-				skb_set_tail_pointer(sub_skb, nSubframe_Length);
-			} else {
-				DBG_88E("skb_clone() Fail!!! , nr_subframes=%d\n", nr_subframes);
-				break;
-			}
+		if (!sub_skb) {
+			DBG_88E("dev_alloc_skb() Fail!!! , nr_subframes=%d\n", nr_subframes);
+			break;
 		}
 
+		skb_reserve(sub_skb, 12);
+		skb_put_data(sub_skb, pdata, nSubframe_Length);
+
 		subframes[nr_subframes++] = sub_skb;
 
 		if (nr_subframes >= MAX_SUBFRAME_COUNT) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#158 lore raw

PATCH 153/245 sparc64: vcc: Fix error return code in vcc_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ff62255a2a5c1228a28f2bb063646f948115a309 ]

Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

---
 drivers/tty/vcc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/tty/vcc.c +1 -0
index 58b454c34560a..10a832a2135e2 100644
@@ -604,6 +604,7 @@ static int vcc_probe(struct vio_dev *vdev, const struct vio_device_id *id)
 	port->index = vcc_table_add(port);
 	if (port->index == -1) {
 		pr_err("VCC: no more TTY indices left for allocation\n");
+		rv = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_ldc;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#159 lore raw

PATCH 154/245 arm64: cpufeature: Relax checks for AArch32 support at EL[0-2]

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 98448cdfe7060dd5491bfbd3f7214ffe1395d58e ]

We don't need to be quite as strict about mismatched AArch32 support, which is good because the friendly hardware folks have been busy mismatching this to their hearts' content.

* We don't care about EL2 or EL3 (there are silly comments concerning the latter, so remove those)

* EL1 support is gated by the ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL1 capability and handled gracefully when a mismatch occurs

* EL0 support is gated by the ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0 capability and handled gracefully when a mismatch occurs

Relax the AArch32 checks to FTR_NONSTRICT.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 10 +++-------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -7
index ac3126aba0368..095dec566275f 100644
@@ -155,11 +155,10 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_GIC_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_ASIMD_NI),
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_FP_NI),
-	/* Linux doesn't care about the EL3 */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_64BIT_ONLY),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_64BIT_ONLY),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_SHIFT, 4, ID_AA64PFR0_EL0_64BIT_ONLY),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
@@ -671,9 +670,6 @@ void update_cpu_features(int cpu,
 	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, cpu,
 				      info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2, boot->reg_id_aa64mmfr2);
 
-	/*
-	 * EL3 is not our concern.
-	 */
 	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, cpu,
 				      info->reg_id_aa64pfr0, boot->reg_id_aa64pfr0);
 	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, cpu,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#160 lore raw

PATCH 155/245 dt-bindings: sound: wm8994: Correct required supplies based on actual implementaion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8c149b7d75e53be47648742f40fc90d9fc6fa63a ]

The required supplies in bindings were actually not matching implementation making the bindings incorrect and misleading. The Linux kernel driver requires all supplies to be present. Also for wlf,wm8994 uses just DBVDD-supply instead of DBVDDn-supply (n: <1,3>).

---
 .../devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt       | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/wm8994.txt +12 -6
index 68cccc4653ba3..367b58ce1bb92 100644
@@ -14,9 +14,15 @@ Required properties:
   - #gpio-cells : Must be 2. The first cell is the pin number and the
     second cell is used to specify optional parameters (currently unused).
 
-  - AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply, CPVDD-supply,
-    SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply : power supplies for the device, as covered
-    in Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt
+  - power supplies for the device, as covered in
+    Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/regulator.txt, depending
+    on compatible:
+    - for wlf,wm1811 and wlf,wm8958:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD1-supply, DBVDD2-supply, DBVDD3-supply,
+      DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply, SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
+    - for wlf,wm8994:
+      AVDD1-supply, AVDD2-supply, DBVDD-supply, DCVDD-supply, CPVDD-supply,
+      SPKVDD1-supply, SPKVDD2-supply
 
 Optional properties:
 
@@ -73,11 +79,11 @@ wm8994: codec@1a {
 
 	lineout1-se;
 
+	AVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	AVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 	CPVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
-	DBVDD3-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DBVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
+	DCVDD-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD1-supply = <&regulator>;
 	SPKVDD2-supply = <&regulator>;
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#161 lore raw

PATCH 156/245 atm: fix a memory leak of vcc->user_back

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d9f73c0ad2f20e9fed5380de0a3097825859d03 ]

In lec_arp_clear_vccs() only entry->vcc is freed, but vcc could be installed on entry->recv_vcc too in lec_vcc_added().

This fixes the following memory leak:

unreferenced object 0xffff8880d9266b90 (size 16):
comm "atm2", pid 425, jiffies 4294907980 (age 23.488s) hex dump (first 16 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5  ............kkk.
  backtrace:
    [<(____ptrval____)>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10e/0x151
    [<(____ptrval____)>] lane_ioctl+0x4b3/0x569
    [<(____ptrval____)>] do_vcc_ioctl+0x1ea/0x236
    [<(____ptrval____)>] svc_ioctl+0x17d/0x198
    [<(____ptrval____)>] sock_do_ioctl+0x47/0x12f
    [<(____ptrval____)>] sock_ioctl+0x2f9/0x322
    [<(____ptrval____)>] vfs_ioctl+0x1e/0x2b
    [<(____ptrval____)>] ksys_ioctl+0x61/0x80
    [<(____ptrval____)>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x19
    [<(____ptrval____)>] do_syscall_64+0x57/0x65
    [<(____ptrval____)>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
---
 net/atm/lec.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/atm/lec.c +6 -0
index ad4f829193f05..5a6186b809874 100644
@@ -1270,6 +1270,12 @@ static void lec_arp_clear_vccs(struct lec_arp_table *entry)
 		entry->vcc = NULL;
 	}
 	if (entry->recv_vcc) {
+		struct atm_vcc *vcc = entry->recv_vcc;
+		struct lec_vcc_priv *vpriv = LEC_VCC_PRIV(vcc);
+
+		kfree(vpriv);
+		vcc->user_back = NULL;
+
 		entry->recv_vcc->push = entry->old_recv_push;
 		vcc_release_async(entry->recv_vcc, -EPIPE);
 		entry->recv_vcc = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 157/245 perf mem2node: Avoid double free related to realloc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 266150c94c69429cf6d18e130237224a047f5061 ]

Realloc of size zero is a free not an error, avoid this causing a double free. Caught by clang's address sanitizer:

==2634==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x6020000015f0 in thread T0:

    #0 0x5649659297fd in free llvm/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:123:3
    #1 0x5649659e9251 in __zfree tools/lib/zalloc.c:13:2
    #2 0x564965c0f92c in mem2node__exit tools/perf/util/mem2node.c:114:2
    #3 0x564965a08b4c in perf_c2c__report tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2867:2
    #4 0x564965a0616a in cmd_c2c tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2989:10
    #5 0x564965944348 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:312:11
    #6 0x564965943235 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:364:8
    #7 0x5649659440c4 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:408:2
    #8 0x564965942e41 in main tools/perf/perf.c:538:3

0x6020000015f0 is located 0 bytes inside of 1-byte region [0x6020000015f0,0x6020000015f1) freed by thread T0 here:

    #0 0x564965929da3 in realloc third_party/llvm/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0x564965c0f55e in mem2node__init tools/perf/util/mem2node.c:97:16
    #2 0x564965a08956 in perf_c2c__report tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2803:8
    #3 0x564965a0616a in cmd_c2c tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2989:10
    #4 0x564965944348 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:312:11
    #5 0x564965943235 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:364:8
    #6 0x5649659440c4 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:408:2
    #7 0x564965942e41 in main tools/perf/perf.c:538:3

previously allocated by thread T0 here:

    #0 0x564965929c42 in calloc third_party/llvm/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3
    #1 0x5649659e9220 in zalloc tools/lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0x564965c0f32d in mem2node__init tools/perf/util/mem2node.c:61:12
    #3 0x564965a08956 in perf_c2c__report tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2803:8
    #4 0x564965a0616a in cmd_c2c tools/perf/builtin-c2c.c:2989:10
    #5 0x564965944348 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:312:11
    #6 0x564965943235 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:364:8
    #7 0x5649659440c4 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:408:2
    #8 0x564965942e41 in main tools/perf/perf.c:538:3

v2: add a WARN_ON_ONCE when the free condition arises.

---
 tools/perf/util/mem2node.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/mem2node.c +2 -1
index c6fd81c025863..81c5a2e438b7d 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
+#include <asm/bug.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include "mem2node.h"
 #include "util.h"
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ int mem2node__init(struct mem2node *map, struct perf_env *env)
 
 	/* Cut unused entries, due to merging. */
 	tmp_entries = realloc(entries, sizeof(*entries) * j);
-	if (tmp_entries)
+	if (tmp_entries || WARN_ON_ONCE(j == 0))
 		entries = tmp_entries;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 158/245 power: supply: max17040: Correct voltage reading

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jonathan Bakker <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0383024f811aa469df258039807810fc3793a105 ]

According to the datasheet available at (1), the bottom four bits are always zero and the actual voltage is 1.25x this value in mV. Since the kernel API specifies that voltages should be in uV, it should report 1250x the shifted value.

1) https://datasheets.maximintegrated.com/en/ds/MAX17040-MAX17041.pdf

---
 drivers/power/supply/max17040_battery.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/supply/max17040_battery.c +1 -1
index 33c40f79d23d5..2c35c13ad546f 100644
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void max17040_get_vcell(struct i2c_client *client)
 
 	vcell = max17040_read_reg(client, MAX17040_VCELL);
 
-	chip->vcell = vcell;
+	chip->vcell = (vcell >> 4) * 1250;
 }
 
 static void max17040_get_soc(struct i2c_client *client)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 159/245 phy: samsung: s5pv210-usb2: Add delay after reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jonathan Bakker <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05942b8c36c7eb5d3fc5e375d4b0d0c49562e85d ]

The USB phy takes some time to reset, so make sure we give it to it. The delay length was taken from the 4x12 phy driver.

This manifested in issues with the DWC2 driver since commit fe369e1826b3 ("usb: dwc2: Make dwc2_readl/writel functions endianness-agnostic.") where the endianness check would read the DWC ID as 0 due to the phy still resetting, resulting in the wrong endian mode being chosen.

---
 drivers/phy/samsung/phy-s5pv210-usb2.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/phy/samsung/phy-s5pv210-usb2.c +4 -0
index f6f72339bbc32..bb7fdf491c1c2 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,10 @@ static void s5pv210_phy_pwr(struct samsung_usb2_phy_instance *inst, bool on)
 		udelay(10);
 		rst &= ~rstbits;
 		writel(rst, drv->reg_phy + S5PV210_UPHYRST);
+		/* The following delay is necessary for the reset sequence to be
+		 * completed
+		 */
+		udelay(80);
 	} else {
 		pwr = readl(drv->reg_phy + S5PV210_UPHYPWR);
 		pwr |= phypwr;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 160/245 Bluetooth: Handle Inquiry Cancel error after Inquiry Complete

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit adf1d6926444029396861413aba8a0f2a805742a ]

After sending Inquiry Cancel command to the controller, it is possible that Inquiry Complete event comes before Inquiry Cancel command complete event. In this case the Inquiry Cancel command will have status of Command Disallowed since there is no Inquiry session to be cancelled. This case should not be treated as error, otherwise we can reach an inconsistent state.

Example of a btmon trace when this happened:

< HCI Command: Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) plen 0

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Inquiry Complete (0x01) plen 1

        Status: Success (0x00)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Command Complete (0x0e) plen 4

      Inquiry Cancel (0x01|0x0002) ncmd 1
        Status: Command Disallowed (0x0c)
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +17 -2
index ec6b3a87b3e7f..310622086f74b 100644
@@ -41,12 +41,27 @@
 
 /* Handle HCI Event packets */
 
-static void hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static void hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				  u8 *new_status)
 {
 	__u8 status = *((__u8 *) skb->data);
 
 	BT_DBG("%s status 0x%2.2x", hdev->name, status);
 
+	/* It is possible that we receive Inquiry Complete event right
+	 * before we receive Inquiry Cancel Command Complete event, in
+	 * which case the latter event should have status of Command
+	 * Disallowed (0x0c). This should not be treated as error, since
+	 * we actually achieve what Inquiry Cancel wants to achieve,
+	 * which is to end the last Inquiry session.
+	 */
+	if (status == 0x0c && !test_bit(HCI_INQUIRY, &hdev->flags)) {
+		bt_dev_warn(hdev, "Ignoring error of Inquiry Cancel command");
+		status = 0x00;
+	}
+
+	*new_status = status;
+
 	if (status)
 		return;
 
@@ -3039,7 +3054,7 @@ static void hci_cmd_complete_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	switch (*opcode) {
 	case HCI_OP_INQUIRY_CANCEL:
-		hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(hdev, skb);
+		hci_cc_inquiry_cancel(hdev, skb, status);
 		break;
 
 	case HCI_OP_PERIODIC_INQ:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 161/245 USB: EHCI: ehci-mv: fix error handling in mv_ehci_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tang Bin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c856b4b0fdb5044bca4c0acf9a66f3b5cc01a37a ]

If the function platform_get_irq() failed, the negative value returned will not be detected here. So fix error handling in mv_ehci_probe(). And when get irq failed, the function platform_get_irq() logs an error message, so remove redundant message here.

---
 drivers/usb/host/ehci-mv.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-mv.c +2 -3
index de764459e05a6..4edcd7536a01b 100644
@@ -193,9 +193,8 @@ static int mv_ehci_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	hcd->regs = ehci_mv->op_regs;
 
 	hcd->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
-	if (!hcd->irq) {
-		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Cannot get irq.");
-		retval = -ENODEV;
+	if (hcd->irq < 0) {
+		retval = hcd->irq;
 		goto err_disable_clk;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 162/245 tipc: fix memory leak in service subscripting

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tuong Lien <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0771d7df819284d46cf5cfb57698621b503ec17f ]

Upon receipt of a service subscription request from user via a topology connection, one 'sub' object will be allocated in kernel, so it will be able to send an event of the service if any to the user correspondingly then. Also, in case of any failure, the connection will be shutdown and all the pertaining 'sub' objects will be freed.

However, there is a race condition as follows resulting in memory leak:

       receive-work       connection        send-work
              |                |                |
        sub-1 |<------//-------|                |
        sub-2 |<------//-------|                |
              |                |<---------------| evt for sub-x
        sub-3 |<------//-------|                |
              :                :                :
              :                :                :
              |       /--------|                |
              |       |        * peer closed    |
              |       |        |                |
              |       |        |<-------X-------| evt for sub-y
              |       |        |<===============|
        sub-n |<------/        X    shutdown    |
    -> orphan |                                 |

That is, the 'receive-work' may get the last subscription request while the 'send-work' is shutting down the connection due to peer close.

We had a 'lock' on the connection, so the two actions cannot be carried out simultaneously. If the last subscription is allocated e.g. 'sub-n', before the 'send-work' closes the connection, there will be no issue at all, the 'sub' objects will be freed. In contrast the last subscription will become orphan since the connection was closed, and we released all references.

This commit fixes the issue by simply adding one test if the connection remains in 'connected' state right after we obtain the connection lock, then a subscription object can be created as usual, otherwise we ignore it.

---
 net/tipc/topsrv.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tipc/topsrv.c +3 -1
index 41f4464ac6cc5..ec9a7137d2677 100644
@@ -407,7 +407,9 @@ static int tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock(struct tipc_conn *con)
 		return -EWOULDBLOCK;
 	if (ret == sizeof(s)) {
 		read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
-		ret = tipc_conn_rcv_sub(srv, con, &s);
+		/* RACE: the connection can be closed in the meantime */
+		if (likely(connected(con)))
+			ret = tipc_conn_rcv_sub(srv, con, &s);
 		read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
 		if (!ret)
 			return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 163/245 tty: serial: samsung: Correct clock selection logic

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jonathan Bakker <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d31676a8d91dd18e08853efd1cb26961a38c6a6 ]

Some variants of the samsung tty driver can pick which clock to use for their baud rate generation. In the DT conversion, a default clock was selected to be used if a specific one wasn't assigned and then a comparison of which clock rate worked better was done. Unfortunately, the comparison was implemented in such a way that only the default clock was ever actually compared. Fix this by iterating through all possible clocks, except when a specific clock has already been picked via clk_sel (which is only possible via board files).

---
 drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/samsung.c +4 -4
index fcb89bf2524d1..1528a7ba2bf4d 100644
@@ -1187,14 +1187,14 @@ static unsigned int s3c24xx_serial_getclk(struct s3c24xx_uart_port *ourport,
 	struct s3c24xx_uart_info *info = ourport->info;
 	struct clk *clk;
 	unsigned long rate;
-	unsigned int cnt, baud, quot, clk_sel, best_quot = 0;
+	unsigned int cnt, baud, quot, best_quot = 0;
 	char clkname[MAX_CLK_NAME_LENGTH];
 	int calc_deviation, deviation = (1 << 30) - 1;
 
-	clk_sel = (ourport->cfg->clk_sel) ? ourport->cfg->clk_sel :
-			ourport->info->def_clk_sel;
 	for (cnt = 0; cnt < info->num_clks; cnt++) {
-		if (!(clk_sel & (1 << cnt)))
+		/* Keep selected clock if provided */
+		if (ourport->cfg->clk_sel &&
+			!(ourport->cfg->clk_sel & (1 << cnt)))
 			continue;
 
 		sprintf(clkname, "clk_uart_baud%d", cnt);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 164/245 ALSA: hda: Fix potential race in unsol event handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c637fa151259c0f74665fde7cba5b7eac1417ae5 ]

The unsol event handling code has a loop retrieving the read/write indices and the arrays without locking while the append to the array may happen concurrently. This may lead to some inconsistency. Although there hasn't been any proof of this bad results, it's still safer to protect the racy accesses.

This patch adds the spinlock protection around the unsol handling loop for addressing it. Here we take bus->reg_lock as the writer side snd_hdac_bus_queue_event() is also protected by that lock.

---
 sound/hda/hdac_bus.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
sound/hda/hdac_bus.c +4 -0
index 714a51721a313..ab9236e4c157e 100644
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ static void process_unsol_events(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct hdac_driver *drv;
 	unsigned int rp, caddr, res;
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&bus->reg_lock);
 	while (bus->unsol_rp != bus->unsol_wp) {
 		rp = (bus->unsol_rp + 1) % HDA_UNSOL_QUEUE_SIZE;
 		bus->unsol_rp = rp;
@@ -166,10 +167,13 @@ static void process_unsol_events(struct work_struct *work)
 		codec = bus->caddr_tbl[caddr & 0x0f];
 		if (!codec || !codec->dev.driver)
 			continue;
+		spin_unlock_irq(&bus->reg_lock);
 		drv = drv_to_hdac_driver(codec->dev.driver);
 		if (drv->unsol_event)
 			drv->unsol_event(codec, res);
+		spin_lock_irq(&bus->reg_lock);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irq(&bus->reg_lock);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 165/245 powerpc/traps: Make unrecoverable NMIs die instead of panic

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 265d6e588d87194c2fe2d6c240247f0264e0c19b ]

System Reset and Machine Check interrupts that are not recoverable due to being nested or interrupting when RI=0 currently panic. This is not necessary, and can often just kill the current context and recover.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +3 -3
index d5f351f02c153..7781f0168ce8c 100644
@@ -430,11 +430,11 @@ out:
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
 	BUG_ON(get_paca()->in_nmi == 0);
 	if (get_paca()->in_nmi > 1)
-		nmi_panic(regs, "Unrecoverable nested System Reset");
+		die("Unrecoverable nested System Reset", regs, SIGABRT);
 #endif
 	/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */
 	if (!(regs->msr & MSR_RI))
-		nmi_panic(regs, "Unrecoverable System Reset");
+		die("Unrecoverable System Reset", regs, SIGABRT);
 
 	if (!nested)
 		nmi_exit();
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ void machine_check_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	/* Must die if the interrupt is not recoverable */
 	if (!(regs->msr & MSR_RI))
-		nmi_panic(regs, "Unrecoverable Machine check");
+		die("Unrecoverable Machine check", regs, SIGBUS);
 
 	return;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 166/245 fuse: dont check refcount after stealing page

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32f98877c57bee6bc27f443a96f49678a2cd6a50 ]

page_count() is unstable. Unless there has been an RCU grace period between when the page was removed from the page cache and now, a speculative reference may exist from the page cache.

---
 fs/fuse/dev.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
fs/fuse/dev.c +0 -1
index 01e6ea11822bf..c51c9a6881e49 100644
@@ -831,7 +831,6 @@ static int fuse_check_page(struct page *page)
 {
 	if (page_mapcount(page) ||
 	    page->mapping != NULL ||
-	    page_count(page) != 1 ||
 	    (page->flags & PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP &
 	     ~(1 << PG_locked |
 	       1 << PG_referenced |
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 167/245 USB: EHCI: ehci-mv: fix less than zero comparison of an unsigned int

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a7f40c233a6b0540d28743267560df9cfb571ca9 ]

The comparison of hcd->irq to less than zero for an error check will never be true because hcd->irq is an unsigned int. Fix this by assigning the int retval to the return of platform_get_irq and checking this for the -ve error condition and assigning hcd->irq to retval.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0")

Fixes c856b4b0fdb5 ("USB: EHCI: ehci-mv: fix error handling in mv_ehci_probe()")
---
 drivers/usb/host/ehci-mv.c | 7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-mv.c +3 -4
index 4edcd7536a01b..9d93e7441bbca 100644
@@ -192,11 +192,10 @@ static int mv_ehci_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(r);
 	hcd->regs = ehci_mv->op_regs;
 
-	hcd->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
-	if (hcd->irq < 0) {
-		retval = hcd->irq;
+	retval = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
+	if (retval < 0)
 		goto err_disable_clk;
-	}
+	hcd->irq = retval;
 
 	ehci = hcd_to_ehci(hcd);
 	ehci->caps = (struct ehci_caps *) ehci_mv->cap_regs;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 168/245 scsi: cxlflash: Fix error return code in cxlflash_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d0b1e4a638d670a09f42017a3e567dc846931ba8 ]

Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from create_afu error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

---
 drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/cxlflash/main.c +1 -0
index f987c40c47a13..443813feaef47 100644
@@ -3749,6 +3749,7 @@ static int cxlflash_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	cfg->afu_cookie = cfg->ops->create_afu(pdev);
 	if (unlikely(!cfg->afu_cookie)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s: create_afu failed\n", __func__);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out_remove;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 169/245 arm64/cpufeature: Drop TraceFilt feature exposure from ID_DFR0 register

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1ed1b90a0594c8c9d31e8bb8be25a2b37717dc9e ]

ID_DFR0 based TraceFilt feature should not be exposed to guests. Hence lets drop it.

Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc James Morse <[email protected]>
Cc Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -1
index 095dec566275f..de6fa9b4abfa0 100644
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_pfr0[] = {
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_dfr0[] = {
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 28, 4, 0),
+	/* [31:28] TraceFilt */
 	S_ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 24, 4, 0xf),	/* PerfMon */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 20, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, 16, 4, 0),
Signature · 9 lines
2.25.1




_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 170/245 e1000: Do not perform reset in reset_task if we are already down

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 49ee3c2ab5234757bfb56a0b3a3cb422f427e3a3 ]

We are seeing a deadlock in e1000 down when NAPI is being disabled. Looking over the kernel function trace of the system it appears that the interface is being closed and then a reset is hitting which deadlocks the interface as the NAPI interface is already disabled.

To prevent this from happening I am disabling the reset task when __E1000_DOWN is already set. In addition code has been added so that we set the __E1000_DOWN while holding the __E1000_RESET flag in e1000_close in order to guarantee that the reset task will not run after we have started the close call.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c +14 -4
index 47b867c64b147..195108858f38f 100644
@@ -542,8 +542,13 @@ void e1000_reinit_locked(struct e1000_adapter *adapter)
 	WARN_ON(in_interrupt());
 	while (test_and_set_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags))
 		msleep(1);
-	e1000_down(adapter);
-	e1000_up(adapter);
+
+	/* only run the task if not already down */
+	if (!test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->flags)) {
+		e1000_down(adapter);
+		e1000_up(adapter);
+	}
+
 	clear_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags);
 }
 
@@ -1433,10 +1438,15 @@ int e1000_close(struct net_device *netdev)
 	struct e1000_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
 	int count = E1000_CHECK_RESET_COUNT;
 
-	while (test_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags) && count--)
+	while (test_and_set_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags) && count--)
 		usleep_range(10000, 20000);
 
-	WARN_ON(test_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags));
+	WARN_ON(count < 0);
+
+	/* signal that we're down so that the reset task will no longer run */
+	set_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->flags);
+	clear_bit(__E1000_RESETTING, &adapter->flags);
+
 	e1000_down(adapter);
 	e1000_power_down_phy(adapter);
 	e1000_free_irq(adapter);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 171/245 drm/nouveau/debugfs: fix runtime pm imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 00583fbe8031f69bba8b0a9a861efb75fb7131af ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even the call returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_debugfs.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_debugfs.c +4 -1
index 9635704a1d864..4561a786fab07 100644
@@ -161,8 +161,11 @@ nouveau_debugfs_pstate_set(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
 	}
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(drm->dev);
-	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES)
+	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES) {
+		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(drm->dev);
 		return ret;
+	}
+
 	ret = nvif_mthd(ctrl, NVIF_CONTROL_PSTATE_USER, &args, sizeof(args));
 	pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(drm->dev);
 	if (ret < 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 172/245 drm/nouveau: fix runtime pm imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d7372dfb3f7f1602b87e0663e8b8646da23ebca7 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even the call returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_gem.c +3 -1
index 791f970714ed6..a98fccb0d32f9 100644
@@ -82,8 +82,10 @@ nouveau_gem_object_open(struct drm_gem_object *gem, struct drm_file *file_priv)
 		return ret;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
-	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES)
+	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES) {
+		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = nouveau_vma_new(nvbo, &cli->vmm, &vma);
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 173/245 drm/nouveau/dispnv50: fix runtime pm imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dc455f4c888365595c0a13da445e092422d55b8d ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even the call returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/disp.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/dispnv50/disp.c +3 -1
index e06ea8c8184cb..1bb0a9f6fa730 100644
@@ -909,8 +909,10 @@ nv50_mstc_detect(struct drm_connector *connector, bool force)
 		return connector_status_disconnected;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(connector->dev->dev);
-	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES)
+	if (ret < 0 && ret != -EACCES) {
+		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(connector->dev->dev);
 		return connector_status_disconnected;
+	}
 
 	conn_status = drm_dp_mst_detect_port(connector, mstc->port->mgr,
 					     mstc->port);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 174/245 printk: handle blank console arguments passed in.

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shreyas Joshi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 48021f98130880dd74286459a1ef48b5e9bc374f ]

If uboot passes a blank string to console_setup then it results in a trashed memory. Ultimately, the kernel crashes during freeing up the memory.

This fix checks if there is a blank parameter being passed to console_setup from uboot. In case it detects that the console parameter is blank then it doesn't setup the serial device and it gracefully exits.

---
 kernel/printk/printk.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/printk/printk.c +3 -0
index 3cb0e5b479ff3..cf272aba362be 100644
@@ -2148,6 +2148,9 @@ static int __init console_setup(char *str)
 	char *s, *options, *brl_options = NULL;
 	int idx;
 
+	if (str[0] == 0)
+		return 1;
+
 	if (_braille_console_setup(&str, &brl_options))
 		return 1;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 175/245 usb: dwc3: Increase timeout for CmdAct cleared by device controller

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yu Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1c0e69ae1b9f9004fd72978612ae3463791edc56 ]

If the SS PHY is in P3, there is no pipe_clk, HW may use suspend_clk for function, as suspend_clk is slow so EP command need more time to complete, e.g, imx8M suspend_clk is 32K, set ep configuration will take about 380us per below trace time stamp(44.286278 - 44.285897 = 0.000381):

configfs_acm.sh-822 [000] d..1 44.285896: dwc3_writel: addr
000000006d59aae1 value 00000401
configfs_acm.sh-822 [000] d..1 44.285897: dwc3_readl: addr
000000006d59aae1 value 00000401
... ...
configfs_acm.sh-822 [000] d..1 44.286278: dwc3_readl: addr
000000006d59aae1 value 00000001
configfs_acm.sh-822 [000] d..1 44.286279: dwc3_gadget_ep_cmd:
ep0out: cmd 'Set Endpoint Configuration' [401] params 00001000 00000500 00000000 --> status: Successful

This was originally found on Hisilicon Kirin Soc that need more time for the device controller to clear the CmdAct of DEPCMD.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +1 -1
index 7bf2573dd459e..37cc3fd7c3cad 100644
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ int dwc3_send_gadget_ep_cmd(struct dwc3_ep *dep, unsigned cmd,
 {
 	const struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *desc = dep->endpoint.desc;
 	struct dwc3		*dwc = dep->dwc;
-	u32			timeout = 1000;
+	u32			timeout = 5000;
 	u32			saved_config = 0;
 	u32			reg;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 176/245 btrfs: dont force read-only after error in drop snapshot

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Sterba <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7c09c03091ac562ddca2b393e5d65c1d37da79f1 ]

Deleting a subvolume on a full filesystem leads to ENOSPC followed by a forced read-only. This is not a transaction abort and the filesystem is otherwise ok, so the error should be just propagated to the callers.

This is caused by unnecessary call to btrfs_handle_fs_error for all errors, except EAGAIN. This does not make sense as the standard transaction abort mechanism is in btrfs_drop_snapshot so all relevant failures are handled.

Originally in commit cb1b69f4508a ("Btrfs: forced readonly when btrfs_drop_snapshot() fails") there was no return value at all, so the btrfs_std_error made some sense but once the error handling and propagation has been implemented we don't need it anymore.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +0 -2
index 319a89d4d0735..ce5e0f6c6af4f 100644
@@ -9098,8 +9098,6 @@ out:
 	 */
 	if (!for_reloc && !root_dropped)
 		btrfs_add_dead_root(root);
-	if (err && err != -EAGAIN)
-		btrfs_handle_fs_error(fs_info, err, NULL);
 	return err;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 177/245 vfio/pci: fix memory leaks of eventfd ctx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1518ac272e789cae8c555d69951b032a275b7602 ]

Finished a qemu-kvm (-device vfio-pci,host=0001:01:00.0) triggers a few memory leaks after a while because vfio_pci_set_ctx_trigger_single() calls eventfd_ctx_fdget() without the matching eventfd_ctx_put() later. Fix it by calling eventfd_ctx_put() for those memory in vfio_pci_release() before vfio_device_release().

unreferenced object 0xebff008981cc2b00 (size 128):
comm "qemu-kvm", pid 4043, jiffies 4294994816 (age 9796.310s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ....kkkk.....N.. ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........
backtrace:

    [<00000000917e8f8d>] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x74/0x9c
    [<00000000df0f2aa2>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2b4/0x3d4
    [<000000005fcec025>] do_eventfd+0x54/0x1ac
    [<0000000082791a69>] __arm64_sys_eventfd2+0x34/0x44
    [<00000000b819758c>] do_el0_svc+0x128/0x1dc
    [<00000000b244e810>] el0_sync_handler+0xd0/0x268
    [<00000000d495ef94>] el0_sync+0x164/0x180

unreferenced object 0x29ff008981cc4180 (size 128):
comm "qemu-kvm", pid 4043, jiffies 4294994818 (age 9796.290s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ....kkkk.....N.. ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........
backtrace:

    [<00000000917e8f8d>] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x74/0x9c
    [<00000000df0f2aa2>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2b4/0x3d4
    [<000000005fcec025>] do_eventfd+0x54/0x1ac
    [<0000000082791a69>] __arm64_sys_eventfd2+0x34/0x44
    [<00000000b819758c>] do_el0_svc+0x128/0x1dc
    [<00000000b244e810>] el0_sync_handler+0xd0/0x268
    [<00000000d495ef94>] el0_sync+0x164/0x180
---
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +4 -0
index 9f72a6ee13b53..86cd8bdfa9f28 100644
@@ -409,6 +409,10 @@ static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
 	if (!(--vdev->refcnt)) {
 		vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_release(vdev->pdev);
 		vfio_pci_disable(vdev);
+		if (vdev->err_trigger)
+			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->err_trigger);
+		if (vdev->req_trigger)
+			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->req_trigger);
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&driver_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 178/245 perf evsel: Fix 2 memory leaks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3efc899d9afb3d03604f191a0be9669eabbfc4aa ]

If allocated, perf_pkg_mask and metric_events need freeing.

---
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/evsel.c +2 -0
index e8586957562b3..1b7b6244c8cfe 100644
@@ -1291,6 +1291,8 @@ void perf_evsel__exit(struct perf_evsel *evsel)
 	zfree(&evsel->group_name);
 	zfree(&evsel->name);
 	zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
+	zfree(&evsel->per_pkg_mask);
+	zfree(&evsel->metric_events);
 	perf_evsel__object.fini(evsel);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#184 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 5 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.149 release. There are 245 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Quoted 8 lines

Responses should be made by Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:59:03 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.149-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

No problems detected by CIP testing:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/pipelines/195833156

The failures are caused by boards being offline; they are not caused by kernel problems.

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
author maintainer
#185 lore raw
Quoted 16 lines · Pavel Machek

Hi!

Quoted 5 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.149 release. There are 245 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Quoted 8 lines

Responses should be made by Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:59:03 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.149-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 6 lines

No problems detected by CIP testing:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/pipelines/195833156

The failures are caused by boards being offline; they are not caused by kernel problems.

Thanks for testing two of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 179/245 perf trace: Fix the selection for architectures to generate the errno name tables

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7597ce89b3ed239f7a3408b930d2a6c7a4c938a1 ]

Make the architecture test directory agree with the code comment.

Committer notes:

This was split from a larger patch.

The code was assuming the developer always worked from tools/perf/, so make sure we do the test -d having $toolsdir/perf/arch/$arch, to match the intent expressed in the comment, just above that loop.

Cc Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Alexios Zavras <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Igor Lubashev <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc Wei Li <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/trace/beauty/arch_errno_names.sh | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/trace/beauty/arch_errno_names.sh +1 -1
index 22c9fc900c847..f8c44a85650be 100755
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ EoHEADER
 # in tools/perf/arch
 archlist=""
 for arch in $(find $toolsdir/arch -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d -printf "%f\n" | grep -v x86 | sort); do
-	test -d arch/$arch && archlist="$archlist $arch"
+	test -d $toolsdir/perf/arch/$arch && archlist="$archlist $arch"
 done
 
 for arch in x86 $archlist generic; do
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 180/245 perf stat: Fix duration_time value for higher intervals

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ea9eb1f456a08c18feb485894185f7a4e31cc8a4 ]

Joakim reported wrong duration_time value for interval bigger than 4000 [1].

The problem is in the interval value we pass to update_stats function, which is typed as 'unsigned int' and overflows when we get over 2^32 (happens between intervals 4000 and 5000).

Retyping the passed value to unsigned long long.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-perf-users/msg11777.html

Fixes b90f1333ef08 ("perf stat: Update walltime_nsecs_stats in interval mode")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Michael Petlan <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/builtin-stat.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-stat.c +1 -1
index 6aae10ff954c7..adabe9d4dc866 100644
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static void process_interval(void)
 	}
 
 	init_stats(&walltime_nsecs_stats);
-	update_stats(&walltime_nsecs_stats, stat_config.interval * 1000000);
+	update_stats(&walltime_nsecs_stats, stat_config.interval * 1000000ULL);
 	print_counters(&rs, 0, NULL);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 181/245 perf util: Fix memory leak of prefix_if_not_in

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 07e9a6f538cbeecaf5c55b6f2991416f873cdcbd ]

Need to free "str" before return when asprintf() failed to avoid memory leak.

---
 tools/perf/util/sort.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/sort.c +1 -1
index 46daa22b86e3b..85ff4f68adc00 100644
@@ -2690,7 +2690,7 @@ static char *prefix_if_not_in(const char *pre, char *str)
 		return str;
 
 	if (asprintf(&n, "%s,%s", pre, str) < 0)
-		return NULL;
+		n = NULL;
 
 	free(str);
 	return n;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 182/245 perf metricgroup: Free metric_events on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a159e2fe89b4d1f9fb54b0ae418b961e239bf617 ]

Avoid a simple memory leak.

Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Cc Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc Jin Yao <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Cc John Garry <[email protected]>
Cc Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Song Liu <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Cc Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Cc kp singh <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c +3 -0
index 8b3dafe3fac3a..6dcc6e1182a54 100644
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static int metricgroup__setup_events(struct list_head *groups,
 		if (!evsel) {
 			pr_debug("Cannot resolve %s: %s\n",
 					eg->metric_name, eg->metric_expr);
+			free(metric_events);
 			continue;
 		}
 		for (i = 0; i < eg->idnum; i++)
@@ -178,11 +179,13 @@ static int metricgroup__setup_events(struct list_head *groups,
 		me = metricgroup__lookup(metric_events_list, evsel, true);
 		if (!me) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			free(metric_events);
 			break;
 		}
 		expr = malloc(sizeof(struct metric_expr));
 		if (!expr) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			free(metric_events);
 			break;
 		}
 		expr->metric_expr = eg->metric_expr;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 183/245 perf kcore_copy: Fix module map when there are no modules loaded

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 61f82e3fb697a8e85f22fdec786528af73dc36d1 ]

In the absence of any modules, no "modules" map is created, but there are other executable pages to map, due to eBPF JIT, kprobe or ftrace. Map them by recognizing that the first "module" symbol is not necessarily from a module, and adjust the map accordingly.

Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +7 -0
index a701a8a48f005..166c621e02235 100644
@@ -1421,6 +1421,7 @@ struct kcore_copy_info {
 	u64 first_symbol;
 	u64 last_symbol;
 	u64 first_module;
+	u64 first_module_symbol;
 	u64 last_module_symbol;
 	size_t phnum;
 	struct list_head phdrs;
@@ -1497,6 +1498,8 @@ static int kcore_copy__process_kallsyms(void *arg, const char *name, char type,
 		return 0;
 
 	if (strchr(name, '[')) {
+		if (!kci->first_module_symbol || start < kci->first_module_symbol)
+			kci->first_module_symbol = start;
 		if (start > kci->last_module_symbol)
 			kci->last_module_symbol = start;
 		return 0;
@@ -1694,6 +1697,10 @@ static int kcore_copy__calc_maps(struct kcore_copy_info *kci, const char *dir,
 		kci->etext += page_size;
 	}
 
+	if (kci->first_module_symbol &&
+	    (!kci->first_module || kci->first_module_symbol < kci->first_module))
+		kci->first_module = kci->first_module_symbol;
+
 	kci->first_module = round_down(kci->first_module, page_size);
 
 	if (kci->last_module_symbol) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 184/245 ASoC: img-i2s-out: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 65bd91dd6957390c42a0491b9622cf31a2cdb140 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even the call returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 sound/soc/img/img-i2s-out.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/img/img-i2s-out.c +6 -2
index fc2d1dac63339..798ab579564cb 100644
@@ -350,8 +350,10 @@ static int img_i2s_out_set_fmt(struct snd_soc_dai *dai, unsigned int fmt)
 	chan_control_mask = IMG_I2S_OUT_CHAN_CTL_CLKT_MASK;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(i2s->dev);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(i2s->dev);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	img_i2s_out_disable(i2s);
 
@@ -491,8 +493,10 @@ static int img_i2s_out_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			goto err_pm_disable;
 	}
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(&pdev->dev);
 		goto err_suspend;
+	}
 
 	reg = IMG_I2S_OUT_CTL_FRM_SIZE_MASK;
 	img_i2s_out_writel(i2s, reg, IMG_I2S_OUT_CTL);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 185/245 wlcore: fix runtime pm imbalance in wl1271_tx_work

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9604617e998b49f7695fea1479ed82421ef8c9f0 ]

There are two error handling paths in this functon. When wlcore_tx_work_locked() returns an error code, we should decrease the runtime PM usage counter the same way as the error handling path beginning from pm_runtime_get_sync().

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/tx.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/tx.c +1 -0
index b6e19c2d66b0a..250bcbf4ea2f2 100644
@@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ void wl1271_tx_work(struct work_struct *work)
 
 	ret = wlcore_tx_work_locked(wl);
 	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(wl->dev);
 		wl12xx_queue_recovery_work(wl);
 		goto out;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 186/245 wlcore: fix runtime pm imbalance in wlcore_regdomain_config

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 282a04bf1d8029eb98585cb5db3fd70fe8bc91f7 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even the call returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c +3 -1
index 2ca5658bbc2ab..43c7b37dec0c9 100644
@@ -3671,8 +3671,10 @@ void wlcore_regdomain_config(struct wl1271 *wl)
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(wl->dev);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(wl->dev);
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	ret = wlcore_cmd_regdomain_config_locked(wl);
 	if (ret < 0) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 187/245 mtd: rawnand: omap_elm: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 37f7212148cf1d796135cdf8d0c7fee13067674b ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/omap_elm.c +1 -0
index a3f32f939cc17..6736777a41567 100644
@@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ static int elm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 	if (pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev) < 0) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
+		pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
 		pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't enable clock\n");
 		return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 188/245 PCI: tegra: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fcee90cdf6f3a3a371add04d41528d5ba9c3b411 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

Also, call pm_runtime_disable() when pm_runtime_get_sync() returns an error code.

---
 drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/controller/pci-tegra.c +1 -2
index 6f86583605a46..097c02197ec8f 100644
@@ -2400,7 +2400,7 @@ static int tegra_pcie_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	err = pm_runtime_get_sync(pcie->dev);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "fail to enable pcie controller: %d\n", err);
-		goto teardown_msi;
+		goto pm_runtime_put;
 	}
 
 	err = tegra_pcie_request_resources(pcie);
@@ -2440,7 +2440,6 @@ free_resources:
 pm_runtime_put:
 	pm_runtime_put_sync(pcie->dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(pcie->dev);
-teardown_msi:
 	tegra_pcie_msi_teardown(pcie);
 put_resources:
 	tegra_pcie_put_resources(pcie);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 189/245 ceph: fix potential race in ceph_check_caps

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dc3da0461cc4b76f2d0c5b12247fcb3b520edbbf ]

Nothing ensures that session will still be valid by the time we dereference the pointer. Take and put a reference.

In principle, we should always be able to get a reference here, but throw a warning if that's ever not the case.

---
 fs/ceph/caps.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +13 -1
index a2d4eed27f804..c0dbf8b7762b4 100644
@@ -2015,12 +2015,24 @@ ack:
 			if (mutex_trylock(&session->s_mutex) == 0) {
 				dout("inverting session/ino locks on %p\n",
 				     session);
+				session = ceph_get_mds_session(session);
 				spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 				if (took_snap_rwsem) {
 					up_read(&mdsc->snap_rwsem);
 					took_snap_rwsem = 0;
 				}
-				mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex);
+				if (session) {
+					mutex_lock(&session->s_mutex);
+					ceph_put_mds_session(session);
+				} else {
+					/*
+					 * Because we take the reference while
+					 * holding the i_ceph_lock, it should
+					 * never be NULL. Throw a warning if it
+					 * ever is.
+					 */
+					WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
+				}
 				goto retry;
 			}
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 190/245 mm/swap_state: fix a data race in swapin_nr_pages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d6c1f098f2a7ba62627c9bc17cda28f534ef9e4a ]

"prev_offset" is a static variable in swapin_nr_pages() that can be accessed concurrently with only mmap_sem held in read mode as noticed by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in swap_cluster_readahead / swap_cluster_readahead

write to 0xffffffff92763830 of 8 bytes by task 14795 on cpu 17:

  swap_cluster_readahead+0x2a6/0x5e0
  swapin_readahead+0x92/0x8dc
  do_swap_page+0x49b/0xf20
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcfb/0xd70
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x715
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by (dnf)/14795:
#0: ffff897bd2e98858 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_page_fault+0x143/0x715 do_user_addr_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1405
(inlined by) do_page_fault at arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1535

 irq event stamp: 83493
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x365/0x589
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

read to 0xffffffff92763830 of 8 bytes by task 1 on cpu 22:

  swap_cluster_readahead+0xfd/0x5e0
  swapin_readahead+0x92/0x8dc
  do_swap_page+0x49b/0xf20
  __handle_mm_fault+0xcfb/0xd70
  handle_mm_fault+0xfc/0x2f0
  do_page_fault+0x263/0x715
  page_fault+0x34/0x40

1 lock held by systemd/1:
#0: ffff897c38f14858 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_page_fault+0x143/0x715

 irq event stamp: 43530289
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x1a6/0x270
 count_memcg_event_mm+0x119/0x270
 __do_softirq+0x365/0x589
 irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0
---
 mm/swap_state.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/swap_state.c +3 -2
index 09731f4174c7e..3febffe0fca4a 100644
@@ -537,10 +537,11 @@ static unsigned long swapin_nr_pages(unsigned long offset)
 		return 1;
 
 	hits = atomic_xchg(&swapin_readahead_hits, 0);
-	pages = __swapin_nr_pages(prev_offset, offset, hits, max_pages,
+	pages = __swapin_nr_pages(READ_ONCE(prev_offset), offset, hits,
+				  max_pages,
 				  atomic_read(&last_readahead_pages));
 	if (!hits)
-		prev_offset = offset;
+		WRITE_ONCE(prev_offset, offset);
 	atomic_set(&last_readahead_pages, pages);
 
 	return pages;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 191/245 rapidio: avoid data race between file operation callbacks and mport_cdev_add().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Madhuparna Bhowmik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1c3cdb26ab881b77486dc50370356a349077c74 ]

Fields of md(mport_dev) are set after cdev_device_add(). However, the file operation callbacks can be called after cdev_device_add() and therefore accesses to fields of md in the callbacks can race with the rest of the mport_cdev_add() function.

One such example is INIT_LIST_HEAD(&md->portwrites) in mport_cdev_add(), the list is initialised after cdev_device_add(). This can race with list_add_tail(&pw_filter->md_node,&md->portwrites) in rio_mport_add_pw_filter() which is called by unlocked_ioctl.

To avoid such data races use cdev_device_add() after initializing md.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

---
 drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c +7 -7
index 5940780648e0f..f36a8a5261a13 100644
@@ -2385,13 +2385,6 @@ static struct mport_dev *mport_cdev_add(struct rio_mport *mport)
 	cdev_init(&md->cdev, &mport_fops);
 	md->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE;
 
-	ret = cdev_device_add(&md->cdev, &md->dev);
-	if (ret) {
-		rmcd_error("Failed to register mport %d (err=%d)",
-		       mport->id, ret);
-		goto err_cdev;
-	}
-
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&md->doorbells);
 	spin_lock_init(&md->db_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&md->portwrites);
@@ -2411,6 +2404,13 @@ static struct mport_dev *mport_cdev_add(struct rio_mport *mport)
 #else
 	md->properties.transfer_mode |= RIO_TRANSFER_MODE_TRANSFER;
 #endif
+
+	ret = cdev_device_add(&md->cdev, &md->dev);
+	if (ret) {
+		rmcd_error("Failed to register mport %d (err=%d)",
+		       mport->id, ret);
+		goto err_cdev;
+	}
 	ret = rio_query_mport(mport, &attr);
 	if (!ret) {
 		md->properties.flags = attr.flags;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 192/245 mtd: parser: cmdline: Support MTD names containing one or more colons

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Boris Brezillon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb13fa0227417e84aecc3bd9c029d376e33474d3 ]

Looks like some drivers define MTD names with a colon in it, thus making mtdpart= parsing impossible. Let's fix the parser to gracefully handle that case: the last ':' in a partition definition sequence is considered instead of the first one.

---
 drivers/mtd/cmdlinepart.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/cmdlinepart.c +20 -3
index 3ea44cff9b759..c29205ee82e20 100644
@@ -231,12 +231,29 @@ static int mtdpart_setup_real(char *s)
 		struct cmdline_mtd_partition *this_mtd;
 		struct mtd_partition *parts;
 		int mtd_id_len, num_parts;
-		char *p, *mtd_id;
+		char *p, *mtd_id, *semicol;
+
+		/*
+		 * Replace the first ';' by a NULL char so strrchr can work
+		 * properly.
+		 */
+		semicol = strchr(s, ';');
+		if (semicol)
+			*semicol = '\0';
 
 		mtd_id = s;
 
-		/* fetch <mtd-id> */
-		p = strchr(s, ':');
+		/*
+		 * fetch <mtd-id>. We use strrchr to ignore all ':' that could
+		 * be present in the MTD name, only the last one is interpreted
+		 * as an <mtd-id>/<part-definition> separator.
+		 */
+		p = strrchr(s, ':');
+
+		/* Restore the ';' now. */
+		if (semicol)
+			*semicol = ';';
+
 		if (!p) {
 			pr_err("no mtd-id\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 193/245 x86/speculation/mds: Mark mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() __always_inline

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a7ef9ba986b5fae9d80f8a7b31db0423687efe4e ]

Prevent the compiler from uninlining and creating traceable/probable functions as this is invoked _after_ context tracking switched to CONTEXT_USER and rcu idle.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +2 -2
index e3f70c60e8ccd..62f9903544b59 100644
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
  * instruction is executed.
  */
-static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
 	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
 
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */
-static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 {
 	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 194/245 vfio/pci: Clear error and request eventfd ctx after releasing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c5866c593bbd444d0339ede6a8fb5f14ff66d72 ]

The next use of the device will generate an underflow from the stale reference.

Cc Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Fixes 1518ac272e78 ("vfio/pci: fix memory leaks of eventfd ctx")
---
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +6 -2
index 86cd8bdfa9f28..94fad366312f1 100644
@@ -409,10 +409,14 @@ static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
 	if (!(--vdev->refcnt)) {
 		vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_release(vdev->pdev);
 		vfio_pci_disable(vdev);
-		if (vdev->err_trigger)
+		if (vdev->err_trigger) {
 			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->err_trigger);
-		if (vdev->req_trigger)
+			vdev->err_trigger = NULL;
+		}
+		if (vdev->req_trigger) {
 			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->req_trigger);
+			vdev->req_trigger = NULL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&driver_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 195/245 cifs: Fix double add page to memcg when cifs_readpages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 95a3d8f3af9b0d63b43f221b630beaab9739d13a ]

When xfstests generic/451, there is an BUG at mm/memcontrol.c:
page:ffffea000560f2c0 refcount:2 mapcount:0 mapping:000000008544e0ea

       index:0xf
  mapping->aops:cifs_addr_ops dentry name:"tst-aio-dio-cycle-write.451"
  flags: 0x2fffff80000001(locked)
  raw: 002fffff80000001 ffffc90002023c50 ffffea0005280088 ffff88815cda0210
  raw: 000000000000000f 0000000000000000 00000002ffffffff ffff88817287d000
  page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page->mem_cgroup)
  page->mem_cgroup:ffff88817287d000
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at mm/memcontrol.c:2659!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 2 PID: 2038 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1 #44
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_
    073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.4
  RIP: 0010:commit_charge+0x35/0x50
  Code: 0d 48 83 05 54 b2 02 05 01 48 89 77 38 c3 48 c7
        c6 78 4a ea ba 48 83 05 38 b2 02 05 01 e8 63 0d9
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90002023a50 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88817287d000 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88817ac97ea0 RDI: ffff88817ac97ea0
  RBP: ffffea000560f2c0 R08: 0000000000000203 R09: 0000000000000005
  R10: 0000000000000030 R11: ffffc900020237a8 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88815a1272c0
  FS:  00007f5071ab0800(0000) GS:ffff88817ac80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 000055efcd5ca000 CR3: 000000015d312000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   mem_cgroup_charge+0x166/0x4f0
   __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x4a9/0x710
   add_to_page_cache_locked+0x15/0x20
   cifs_readpages+0x217/0x1270
   read_pages+0x29a/0x670
   page_cache_readahead_unbounded+0x24f/0x390
   __do_page_cache_readahead+0x3f/0x60
   ondemand_readahead+0x1f1/0x470
   page_cache_async_readahead+0x14c/0x170
   generic_file_buffered_read+0x5df/0x1100
   generic_file_read_iter+0x10c/0x1d0
   cifs_strict_readv+0x139/0x170
   new_sync_read+0x164/0x250
   __vfs_read+0x39/0x60
   vfs_read+0xb5/0x1e0
   ksys_pread64+0x85/0xf0
   __x64_sys_pread64+0x22/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x69/0x150
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7f5071fcb1af
  Code: Bad RIP value.
  RSP: 002b:00007ffde2cdb8e0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000011
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffde2cdb990 RCX: 00007f5071fcb1af
  RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 000055efcd5ca000 RDI: 0000000000000003
  RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000001
  R13: 000000000009f000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000001000
  Modules linked in:
  ---[ end trace 725fa14a3e1af65c ]---

Since commit 3fea5a499d57 ("mm: memcontrol: convert page cache to a new mem_cgroup_charge() API") not cancel the page charge, the pages maybe double add to pagecache:
thread1 | thread2
cifs_readpages
readpages_get_pages
add_to_page_cache_locked(head,index=n)=0

                              | readpages_get_pages
                              | add_to_page_cache_locked(head,index=n+1)=0

add_to_page_cache_locked(head, index=n+1)=-EEXIST then, will next loop with list head page's index=n+1 and the page->mapping not NULL
readpages_get_pages add_to_page_cache_locked(head, index=n+1)
commit_charge
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE

So, we should not do the next loop when any page add to page cache failed.

---
 fs/cifs/file.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/file.c +7 -4
index e78b52c582f18..5cb15649adb07 100644
@@ -3804,7 +3804,8 @@ readpages_get_pages(struct address_space *mapping, struct list_head *page_list,
 			break;
 
 		__SetPageLocked(page);
-		if (add_to_page_cache_locked(page, mapping, page->index, gfp)) {
+		rc = add_to_page_cache_locked(page, mapping, page->index, gfp);
+		if (rc) {
 			__ClearPageLocked(page);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -3820,6 +3821,7 @@ static int cifs_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 	struct list_head *page_list, unsigned num_pages)
 {
 	int rc;
+	int err = 0;
 	struct list_head tmplist;
 	struct cifsFileInfo *open_file = file->private_data;
 	struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_FILE_SB(file);
@@ -3860,7 +3862,7 @@ static int cifs_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 	 * the order of declining indexes. When we put the pages in
 	 * the rdata->pages, then we want them in increasing order.
 	 */
-	while (!list_empty(page_list)) {
+	while (!list_empty(page_list) && !err) {
 		unsigned int i, nr_pages, bytes, rsize;
 		loff_t offset;
 		struct page *page, *tpage;
@@ -3883,9 +3885,10 @@ static int cifs_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
 			return 0;
 		}
 
-		rc = readpages_get_pages(mapping, page_list, rsize, &tmplist,
+		nr_pages = 0;
+		err = readpages_get_pages(mapping, page_list, rsize, &tmplist,
 					 &nr_pages, &offset, &bytes);
-		if (rc) {
+		if (!nr_pages) {
 			add_credits_and_wake_if(server, credits, 0);
 			break;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 196/245 nvme: fix possible deadlock when I/O is blocked

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b4b19721ec652ad2c4fe51dfbe5124212b5f581 ]

Revert fab7772bfbcf ("nvme-multipath: revalidate nvme_ns_head gendisk in nvme_validate_ns")

When adding a new namespace to the head disk (via nvme_mpath_set_live) we will see partition scan which triggers I/O on the mpath device node. This process will usually be triggered from the scan_work which holds the scan_lock. If I/O blocks (if we got ana change currently have only available paths but none are accessible) this can deadlock on the head disk bd_mutex as both partition scan I/O takes it, and head disk revalidation takes it to check for resize (also triggered from scan_work on a different path). See trace [1].

The mpath disk revalidation was originally added to detect online disk size change, but this is no longer needed since commit cb224c3af4df ("nvme: Convert to use set_capacity_revalidate_and_notify") which already updates resize info without unnecessarily revalidating the disk (the mpath disk doesn't even implement .revalidate_disk fop).

[1]:
--

kernel: INFO: task kworker/u65:9:494 blocked for more than 241 seconds.
kernel:       Tainted: G           OE     5.3.5-050305-generic #201910071830
kernel: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kernel: kworker/u65:9   D    0   494      2 0x80004000
kernel: Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  __schedule+0x2b9/0x6c0
kernel:  schedule+0x42/0xb0
kernel:  schedule_preempt_disabled+0xe/0x10
kernel:  __mutex_lock.isra.0+0x182/0x4f0
kernel:  __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x13/0x20
kernel:  mutex_lock+0x2e/0x40
kernel:  revalidate_disk+0x63/0xa0
kernel:  __nvme_revalidate_disk+0xfe/0x110 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_revalidate_disk+0xa4/0x160 [nvme_core]
kernel:  ? evict+0x14c/0x1b0
kernel:  revalidate_disk+0x2b/0xa0
kernel:  nvme_validate_ns+0x49/0x940 [nvme_core]
kernel:  ? blk_mq_free_request+0xd2/0x100
kernel:  ? __nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0xbe/0x1e0 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_scan_work+0x24f/0x380 [nvme_core]
kernel:  process_one_work+0x1db/0x380
kernel:  worker_thread+0x249/0x400
kernel:  kthread+0x104/0x140
kernel:  ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
kernel:  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
kernel:  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
...
kernel: INFO: task kworker/u65:1:2630 blocked for more than 241 seconds.
kernel:       Tainted: G           OE     5.3.5-050305-generic #201910071830
kernel: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
kernel: kworker/u65:1   D    0  2630      2 0x80004000
kernel: Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel:  __schedule+0x2b9/0x6c0
kernel:  schedule+0x42/0xb0
kernel:  io_schedule+0x16/0x40
kernel:  do_read_cache_page+0x438/0x830
kernel:  ? __switch_to_asm+0x34/0x70
kernel:  ? file_fdatawait_range+0x30/0x30
kernel:  read_cache_page+0x12/0x20
kernel:  read_dev_sector+0x27/0xc0
kernel:  read_lba+0xc1/0x220
kernel:  ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x19c/0x230
kernel:  efi_partition+0x1e6/0x708
kernel:  ? vsnprintf+0x39e/0x4e0
kernel:  ? snprintf+0x49/0x60
kernel:  check_partition+0x154/0x244
kernel:  rescan_partitions+0xae/0x280
kernel:  __blkdev_get+0x40f/0x560
kernel:  blkdev_get+0x3d/0x140
kernel:  __device_add_disk+0x388/0x480
kernel:  device_add_disk+0x13/0x20
kernel:  nvme_mpath_set_live+0x119/0x140 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_update_ns_ana_state+0x5c/0x60 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_set_ns_ana_state+0x1e/0x30 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_parse_ana_log+0xa1/0x180 [nvme_core]
kernel:  ? nvme_update_ns_ana_state+0x60/0x60 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_mpath_add_disk+0x47/0x90 [nvme_core]
kernel:  nvme_validate_ns+0x396/0x940 [nvme_core]
kernel:  ? blk_mq_free_request+0xd2/0x100
kernel:  nvme_scan_work+0x24f/0x380 [nvme_core]
kernel:  process_one_work+0x1db/0x380
kernel:  worker_thread+0x249/0x400
kernel:  kthread+0x104/0x140
kernel:  ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380
kernel:  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
kernel:  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40

--

Fixes fab7772bfbcf ("nvme-multipath: revalidate nvme_ns_head gendisk

in nvme_validate_ns")

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +0 -1
index faa7feebb6095..84fcfcdb8ba5f 100644
@@ -1599,7 +1599,6 @@ static void __nvme_revalidate_disk(struct gendisk *disk, struct nvme_id_ns *id)
 	if (ns->head->disk) {
 		nvme_update_disk_info(ns->head->disk, ns, id);
 		blk_queue_stack_limits(ns->head->disk->queue, ns->queue);
-		revalidate_disk(ns->head->disk);
 	}
 #endif
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#204 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.19 196/245] nvme: fix possible deadlock when I/O is blocked

Hi!

Quoted 14 lines

[ Upstream commit 3b4b19721ec652ad2c4fe51dfbe5124212b5f581 ]

Revert fab7772bfbcf ("nvme-multipath: revalidate nvme_ns_head gendisk in nvme_validate_ns")

When adding a new namespace to the head disk (via nvme_mpath_set_live) we will see partition scan which triggers I/O on the mpath device node. This process will usually be triggered from the scan_work which holds the scan_lock. If I/O blocks (if we got ana change currently have only available paths but none are accessible) this can deadlock on the head disk bd_mutex as both partition scan I/O takes it, and head disk revalidation takes it to check for resize (also triggered from scan_work on a different path). See trace [1].

Quoted 5 lines

The mpath disk revalidation was originally added to detect online disk size change, but this is no longer needed since commit cb224c3af4df ("nvme: Convert to use set_capacity_revalidate_and_notify") which already updates resize info without unnecessarily revalidating the disk (the mpath disk doesn't even implement .revalidate_disk fop).

Commit cb224c3af4df ("nvme: Convert to use set_capacity_revalidate_and_notify") is not in 4.19-stable.

Does that mean we'll no longer detect disk size changes after this?

Best regards,
Pavel

Quoted 11 lines

index faa7feebb6095..84fcfcdb8ba5f 100644

drivers/nvme/host/core.c +0 -1
@@ -1599,7 +1599,6 @@ static void __nvme_revalidate_disk(struct gendisk *disk, struct nvme_id_ns *id)
 	if (ns->head->disk) {
 		nvme_update_disk_info(ns->head->disk, ns, id);
 		blk_queue_stack_limits(ns->head->disk->queue, ns->queue);
-		revalidate_disk(ns->head->disk);
 	}
 #endif
 
Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
author maintainer
#205 lore raw

PATCH 197/245 scsi: libfc: Handling of extra kref

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Javed Hasan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 71f2bf85e90d938d4a9ef9dd9bfa8d9b0b6a03f7 ]

Handling of extra kref which is done by lookup table in case rdata is already present in list.

This issue was leading to memory leak. Trace from KMEMLEAK tool:

unreferenced object 0xffff8888259e8780 (size 512):

    comm "kworker/2:1", pid 182614, jiffies 4433237386 (age 113021.971s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    58 0a ec cf 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    01 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 13 7d f0 1e 0e 00 00 10
  backtrace:
	[<000000006b25760f>] fc_rport_recv_req+0x3c6/0x18f0 [libfc]
	[<00000000f208d994>] fc_lport_recv_els_req+0x120/0x8a0 [libfc]
	[<00000000a9c437b8>] fc_lport_recv+0xb9/0x130 [libfc]
	[<00000000ad5be37b>] qedf_ll2_process_skb+0x73d/0xad0 [qedf]
	[<00000000e0eb6893>] process_one_work+0x382/0x6c0
	[<000000002dfd9e21>] worker_thread+0x57/0x5c0
	[<00000000b648204f>] kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
	[<0000000072f5ab20>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
	[<000000001d5c05d8>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Below is the log sequence which leads to memory leak. Here we get the nested "Received PLOGI request" for same port and this request leads to call the fc_rport_create() twice for the same rport.

kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI request
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI in INIT state
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Port is Ready
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received PRLI request while in state Ready
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: PRLI rspp type 8 active 1 passive 0
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received LOGO request while in state Ready
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Delete port
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI request
kernel: host1: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI in state Delete - send busy

---
 drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c +3 -1
index 90a748551ede5..f39d2d62b002f 100644
@@ -145,8 +145,10 @@ struct fc_rport_priv *fc_rport_create(struct fc_lport *lport, u32 port_id)
 	lockdep_assert_held(&lport->disc.disc_mutex);
 
 	rdata = fc_rport_lookup(lport, port_id);
-	if (rdata)
+	if (rdata) {
+		kref_put(&rdata->kref, fc_rport_destroy);
 		return rdata;
+	}
 
 	if (lport->rport_priv_size > 0)
 		rport_priv_size = lport->rport_priv_size;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#206 lore raw

PATCH 198/245 scsi: libfc: Skip additional kref updating work event

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Javed Hasan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 823a65409c8990f64c5693af98ce0e7819975cba ]

When an rport event (RPORT_EV_READY) is updated without work being queued, avoid taking an additional reference.

This issue was leading to memory leak. Trace from KMEMLEAK tool:

unreferenced object 0xffff8888259e8780 (size 512):
comm "kworker/2:1", jiffies 4433237386 (age 113021.971s)

    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
	58 0a ec cf 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
	01 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 13 7d f0 1e 0e 00 00 10
  backtrace:
  [<000000006b25760f>] fc_rport_recv_req+0x3c6/0x18f0 [libfc]
  [<00000000f208d994>] fc_lport_recv_els_req+0x120/0x8a0 [libfc]
  [<00000000a9c437b8>] fc_lport_recv+0xb9/0x130 [libfc]
  [<00000000a9c437b8>] fc_lport_recv+0xb9/0x130 [libfc]
  [<00000000ad5be37b>] qedf_ll2_process_skb+0x73d/0xad0 [qedf]
  [<00000000e0eb6893>] process_one_work+0x382/0x6c0
  [<000000002dfd9e21>] worker_thread+0x57/0x5c0
  [<00000000b648204f>] kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
  [<0000000072f5ab20>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
  [<000000001d5c05d8>] 0xffffffffffffffff

Below is the log sequence which leads to memory leak. Here we get the RPORT_EV_READY and RPORT_EV_STOP back to back, which lead to overwrite the event RPORT_EV_READY by event RPORT_EV_STOP. Because of this, kref_count gets incremented by 1.

kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI request
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI in INIT state
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Port is Ready
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received PRLI request while in state Ready
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: PRLI rspp type 8 active 1 passive 0
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received LOGO request while in state Ready
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Delete port
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI request
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: Received PLOGI in state Delete - send busy
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: work event 3
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: lld callback ev 3
kernel: host0: rport fffce5: work delete

---
 drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/libfc/fc_rport.c +5 -4
index f39d2d62b002f..2b3239765c249 100644
@@ -495,10 +495,11 @@ static void fc_rport_enter_delete(struct fc_rport_priv *rdata,
 
 	fc_rport_state_enter(rdata, RPORT_ST_DELETE);
 
-	kref_get(&rdata->kref);
-	if (rdata->event == RPORT_EV_NONE &&
-	    !queue_work(rport_event_queue, &rdata->event_work))
-		kref_put(&rdata->kref, fc_rport_destroy);
+	if (rdata->event == RPORT_EV_NONE) {
+		kref_get(&rdata->kref);
+		if (!queue_work(rport_event_queue, &rdata->event_work))
+			kref_put(&rdata->kref, fc_rport_destroy);
+	}
 
 	rdata->event = event;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#207 lore raw

PATCH 199/245 selftests/x86/syscall_nt: Clear weird flags after each test

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a61fa2799ef9bf6c4f54cf7295036577cececc72 ]

Clear the weird flags before logging to improve strace output -- logging results while, say, TF is set does no one any favors.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/syscall_nt.c +1 -0
index 43fcab367fb0a..74e6b3fc2d09e 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static void do_it(unsigned long extraflags)
 	set_eflags(get_eflags() | extraflags);
 	syscall(SYS_getpid);
 	flags = get_eflags();
+	set_eflags(X86_EFLAGS_IF | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
 	if ((flags & extraflags) == extraflags) {
 		printf("[OK]\tThe syscall worked and flags are still set\n");
 	} else {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#208 lore raw

PATCH 200/245 vfio/pci: fix racy on error and request eventfd ctx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zeng Tao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b872d0640840018669032b20b6375a478ed1f923 ]

The vfio_pci_release call will free and clear the error and request eventfd ctx while these ctx could be in use at the same time in the function like vfio_pci_request, and it's expected to protect them under the vdev->igate mutex, which is missing in vfio_pci_release.

This issue is introduced since commit 1518ac272e78 ("vfio/pci: fix memory leaks of eventfd ctx"),and since commit 5c5866c593bb ("vfio/pci: Clear error and request eventfd ctx after releasing"), it's very easily to trigger the kernel panic like this:

[ 9513.904346] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
[ 9513.913091] Mem abort info:
[ 9513.915871]   ESR = 0x96000006
[ 9513.918912]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 9513.924198]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 9513.927238]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 9513.930364] Data abort info:
[ 9513.933231]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
[ 9513.937048]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 9513.940003] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000007ec7d12000
[ 9513.946414] [0000000000000008] pgd=0000007ec7d13003, p4d=0000007ec7d13003, pud=0000007ec728c003, pmd=0000000000000000
[ 9513.956975] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 9513.962521] Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio hclge hns3 hnae3 [last unloaded: vfio_pci]
[ 9513.972998] CPU: 4 PID: 1327 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W         5.8.0-rc4+ #3
[ 9513.980443] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B270.01 05/08/2020
[ 9513.989274] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[ 9513.994827] pc : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x48/0x88
[ 9513.999515] lr : eventfd_signal+0x6c/0x1b0
[ 9514.003591] sp : ffff800038a0b960
[ 9514.006889] x29: ffff800038a0b960 x28: ffff007ef7f4da10
[ 9514.012175] x27: ffff207eefbbfc80 x26: ffffbb7903457000
[ 9514.017462] x25: ffffbb7912191000 x24: ffff007ef7f4d400
[ 9514.022747] x23: ffff20be6e0e4c00 x22: 0000000000000008
[ 9514.028033] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000
[ 9514.033321] x19: 0000000000000008 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 9514.038606] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffbb7910029328
[ 9514.043893] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000001
[ 9514.049179] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000002
[ 9514.054466] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000a00
[ 9514.059752] x9 : ffff800038a0b840 x8 : ffff007ef7f4de60
[ 9514.065038] x7 : ffff007fffc96690 x6 : fffffe01faffb748
[ 9514.070324] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 9514.075609] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000001
[ 9514.080895] x1 : ffff007ef7f4d400 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 9514.086181] Call trace:
[ 9514.088618]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x48/0x88
[ 9514.092954]  eventfd_signal+0x6c/0x1b0
[ 9514.096691]  vfio_pci_request+0x84/0xd0 [vfio_pci]
[ 9514.101464]  vfio_del_group_dev+0x150/0x290 [vfio]
[ 9514.106234]  vfio_pci_remove+0x30/0x128 [vfio_pci]
[ 9514.111007]  pci_device_remove+0x48/0x108
[ 9514.115001]  device_release_driver_internal+0x100/0x1b8
[ 9514.120200]  device_release_driver+0x28/0x38
[ 9514.124452]  pci_stop_bus_device+0x68/0xa8
[ 9514.128528]  pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0x20/0x38
[ 9514.133557]  pci_iov_remove_virtfn+0xb4/0x128
[ 9514.137893]  sriov_disable+0x3c/0x108
[ 9514.141538]  pci_disable_sriov+0x28/0x38
[ 9514.145445]  hns3_pci_sriov_configure+0x48/0xb8 [hns3]
[ 9514.150558]  sriov_numvfs_store+0x110/0x198
[ 9514.154724]  dev_attr_store+0x44/0x60
[ 9514.158373]  sysfs_kf_write+0x5c/0x78
[ 9514.162018]  kernfs_fop_write+0x104/0x210
[ 9514.166010]  __vfs_write+0x48/0x90
[ 9514.169395]  vfs_write+0xbc/0x1c0
[ 9514.172694]  ksys_write+0x74/0x100
[ 9514.176079]  __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
[ 9514.179987]  el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x110/0x200
[ 9514.184842]  do_el0_svc+0x34/0x98
[ 9514.188144]  el0_svc+0x14/0x40
[ 9514.191185]  el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0x2d0
[ 9514.195088]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 9514.198389] Code: b9001020 d2800000 52800022 f9800271 (885ffe61)
[ 9514.204455] ---[ end trace 648de00c8406465f ]---
[ 9514.212308] note: bash[1327] exited with preempt_count 1
Cc Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Cc Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Fixes 1518ac272e78 ("vfio/pci: fix memory leaks of eventfd ctx")
---
 drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +5 -0
index 94fad366312f1..58e7336b2748b 100644
@@ -409,14 +409,19 @@ static void vfio_pci_release(void *device_data)
 	if (!(--vdev->refcnt)) {
 		vfio_spapr_pci_eeh_release(vdev->pdev);
 		vfio_pci_disable(vdev);
+		mutex_lock(&vdev->igate);
 		if (vdev->err_trigger) {
 			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->err_trigger);
 			vdev->err_trigger = NULL;
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&vdev->igate);
+
+		mutex_lock(&vdev->igate);
 		if (vdev->req_trigger) {
 			eventfd_ctx_put(vdev->req_trigger);
 			vdev->req_trigger = NULL;
 		}
+		mutex_unlock(&vdev->igate);
 	}
 
 	mutex_unlock(&driver_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#209 lore raw

PATCH 201/245 btrfs: qgroup: fix data leak caused by race between writeback and truncate

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa91e4aa1716004ea8096d5185ec0451e206aea0 ]

[BUG]
When running tests like generic/013 on test device with btrfs quota enabled, it can normally lead to data leak, detected at unmount time:

BTRFS warning (device dm-3): qgroup 0/5 has unreleased space, type 0 rsv 4096

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 16386 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4142 close_ctree+0x1dc/0x323 [btrfs]
  RIP: 0010:close_ctree+0x1dc/0x323 [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   btrfs_put_super+0x15/0x17 [btrfs]
   generic_shutdown_super+0x72/0x110
   kill_anon_super+0x18/0x30
   btrfs_kill_super+0x17/0x30 [btrfs]
   deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0xa0
   deactivate_super+0x40/0x50
   cleanup_mnt+0x135/0x190
   __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
   task_work_run+0x64/0xb0
   __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bc/0x1c0
   __syscall_return_slowpath+0x47/0x230
   do_syscall_64+0x64/0xb0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  ---[ end trace caf08beafeca2392 ]---
  BTRFS error (device dm-3): qgroup reserved space leaked

[CAUSE]
In the offending case, the offending operations are:
2/6: writev f2X[269 1 0 0 0 0] [1006997,67,288] 0 2/7: truncate f2X[269 1 0 0 48 1026293] 18388 0

The following sequence of events could happen after the writev():

	CPU1 (writeback)		|		CPU2 (truncate)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
btrfs_writepages()			|
|- extent_write_cache_pages()		|
   |- Got page for 1003520		|
   |  1003520 is Dirty, no writeback	|
   |  So (!clear_page_dirty_for_io())   |
   |  gets called for it		|
   |- Now page 1003520 is Clean.	|
   |					| btrfs_setattr()
   |					| |- btrfs_setsize()
   |					|    |- truncate_setsize()
   |					|       New i_size is 18388
   |- __extent_writepage()		|
   |  |- page_offset() > i_size		|
      |- btrfs_invalidatepage()		|
	 |- Page is clean, so no qgroup |

callback executed

This means, the qgroup reserved data space is not properly released in btrfs_invalidatepage() as the page is Clean.

[FIX]
Instead of checking the dirty bit of a page, call btrfs_qgroup_free_data() unconditionally in btrfs_invalidatepage().

As qgroup rsv are completely bound to the QGROUP_RESERVED bit of io_tree, not bound to page status, thus we won't cause double freeing anyway.

Fixes 0b34c261e235 ("btrfs: qgroup: Prevent qgroup->reserved from going subzero")
---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c | 23 ++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/inode.c +10 -13
index bdfe159a60da6..64d459ca76d06 100644
@@ -8913,20 +8913,17 @@ again:
 	/*
 	 * Qgroup reserved space handler
 	 * Page here will be either
-	 * 1) Already written to disk
-	 *    In this case, its reserved space is released from data rsv map
-	 *    and will be freed by delayed_ref handler finally.
-	 *    So even we call qgroup_free_data(), it won't decrease reserved
-	 *    space.
-	 * 2) Not written to disk
-	 *    This means the reserved space should be freed here. However,
-	 *    if a truncate invalidates the page (by clearing PageDirty)
-	 *    and the page is accounted for while allocating extent
-	 *    in btrfs_check_data_free_space() we let delayed_ref to
-	 *    free the entire extent.
+	 * 1) Already written to disk or ordered extent already submitted
+	 *    Then its QGROUP_RESERVED bit in io_tree is already cleaned.
+	 *    Qgroup will be handled by its qgroup_record then.
+	 *    btrfs_qgroup_free_data() call will do nothing here.
+	 *
+	 * 2) Not written to disk yet
+	 *    Then btrfs_qgroup_free_data() call will clear the QGROUP_RESERVED
+	 *    bit of its io_tree, and free the qgroup reserved data space.
+	 *    Since the IO will never happen for this page.
 	 */
-	if (PageDirty(page))
-		btrfs_qgroup_free_data(inode, NULL, page_start, PAGE_SIZE);
+	btrfs_qgroup_free_data(inode, NULL, page_start, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (!inode_evicting) {
 		clear_extent_bit(tree, page_start, page_end,
 				 EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DIRTY |
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#210 lore raw

PATCH 202/245 ubi: fastmap: Free unused fastmap anchor peb during detach

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hou Tao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c16f39d14a7e0ec59881fbdb22ae494907534384 ]

When CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP is enabled, fm_anchor will be assigned a free PEB during ubi_wl_init() or ubi_update_fastmap(). However if fastmap is not used or disabled on the MTD device, ubi_wl_entry related with the PEB will not be freed during detach.

So Fix it by freeing the unused fastmap anchor during detach.

Fixes f9c34bb52997 ("ubi: Fix producing anchor PEBs")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/ubi/fastmap-wl.c +13 -2
index 13efebb400225..e08f6b4637dda 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ static struct ubi_wl_entry *find_anchor_wl_entry(struct rb_root *root)
 	return victim;
 }
 
+static inline void return_unused_peb(struct ubi_device *ubi,
+				     struct ubi_wl_entry *e)
+{
+	wl_tree_add(e, &ubi->free);
+	ubi->free_count++;
+}
+
 /**
  * return_unused_pool_pebs - returns unused PEB to the free tree.
  * @ubi: UBI device description object
@@ -61,8 +68,7 @@ static void return_unused_pool_pebs(struct ubi_device *ubi,
 
 	for (i = pool->used; i < pool->size; i++) {
 		e = ubi->lookuptbl[pool->pebs[i]];
-		wl_tree_add(e, &ubi->free);
-		ubi->free_count++;
+		return_unused_peb(ubi, e);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -370,6 +376,11 @@ static void ubi_fastmap_close(struct ubi_device *ubi)
 	return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_pool);
 	return_unused_pool_pebs(ubi, &ubi->fm_wl_pool);
 
+	if (ubi->fm_anchor) {
+		return_unused_peb(ubi, ubi->fm_anchor);
+		ubi->fm_anchor = NULL;
+	}
+
 	if (ubi->fm) {
 		for (i = 0; i < ubi->fm->used_blocks; i++)
 			kfree(ubi->fm->e[i]);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#211 lore raw

PATCH 203/245 perf parse-events: Use strcmp() to compare the PMU name

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jin Yao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8510895bafdbf7c4dd24c22946d925691135c2b2 ]

A big uncore event group is split into multiple small groups which only include the uncore events from the same PMU. This has been supported in the commit 3cdc5c2cb924a ("perf parse-events: Handle uncore event aliases in small groups properly").

If the event's PMU name starts to repeat, it must be a new event. That can be used to distinguish the leader from other members. But now it only compares the pointer of pmu_name (leader->pmu_name == evsel->pmu_name).

If we use "perf stat -M LLC_MISSES.PCIE_WRITE -a" on cascadelakex, the event list is:

evsel->name evsel->pmu_name
---------------------------------------------------------------
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_4 (as leader)
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_2
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_0
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_5
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_3
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part0 uncore_iio_1
unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part1 uncore_iio_4
......

For the event "unc_iio_data_req_of_cpu.mem_write.part1" with "uncore_iio_4", it should be the event from PMU "uncore_iio_4". It's not a new leader for this PMU.

But if we use "(leader->pmu_name == evsel->pmu_name)", the check would be failed and the event is stored to leaders[] as a new PMU leader.

So this patch uses strcmp to compare the PMU name between events.

Fixes d4953f7ef1a2 ("perf parse-events: Fix 3 use after frees found with clang ASAN")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Jin Yao <[email protected]>
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/parse-events.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/parse-events.c +2 -3
@@ -1421,12 +1421,11 @@ parse_events__set_leader_for_uncore_alia
 		 * event. That can be used to distinguish the leader from
 		 * other members, even they have the same event name.
 		 */
-		if ((leader != evsel) && (leader->pmu_name == evsel->pmu_name)) {
+		if ((leader != evsel) &&
+		    !strcmp(leader->pmu_name, evsel->pmu_name)) {
 			is_leader = false;
 			continue;
 		}
-		/* The name is always alias name */
-		WARN_ON(strcmp(leader->name, evsel->name));
 
 		/* Store the leader event for each PMU */
 		leaders[nr_pmu++] = (uintptr_t) evsel;
author maintainer
#212 lore raw

PATCH 204/245 net: openvswitch: use div_u64() for 64-by-32 divisions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tonghao Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 659d4587fe7233bfdff303744b20d6f41ad04362 ]

Compile the kernel for arm 32 platform, the build warning found. To fix that, should use div_u64() for divisions.
| net/openvswitch/meter.c:396: undefined reference to `__udivdi3'

[add more commit msg, change reported tag, and use div_u64 instead of do_div by Tonghao]

Fixes e57358873bb5d6ca ("net: openvswitch: use u64 for meter bucket")
---
 net/openvswitch/meter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/openvswitch/meter.c +1 -1
index 6f5131d1074b0..5ea2471ffc03f 100644
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static struct dp_meter *dp_meter_create(struct nlattr **a)
 		 * Start with a full bucket.
 		 */
 		band->bucket = (band->burst_size + band->rate) * 1000ULL;
-		band_max_delta_t = band->bucket / band->rate;
+		band_max_delta_t = div_u64(band->bucket, band->rate);
 		if (band_max_delta_t > meter->max_delta_t)
 			meter->max_delta_t = band_max_delta_t;
 		band++;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#213 lore raw

PATCH 205/245 nvme: explicitly update mpath disk capacity on revalidation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anthony Iliopoulos <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 05b29021fba5e725dd385151ef00b6340229b500 ]

Commit 3b4b19721ec652 ("nvme: fix possible deadlock when I/O is blocked") reverted multipath head disk revalidation due to deadlocks caused by holding the bd_mutex during revalidate.

Updating the multipath disk blockdev size is still required though for userspace to be able to observe any resizing while the device is mounted. Directly update the bdev inode size to avoid unnecessarily holding the bdev->bd_mutex.

Fixes 3b4b19721ec652 ("nvme: fix possible deadlock when I/O is

blocked")

---
 drivers/nvme/host/core.c |  1 +
 drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/nvme/host/core.c +1 -0
index 84fcfcdb8ba5f..33dad9774da01 100644
@@ -1599,6 +1599,7 @@ static void __nvme_revalidate_disk(struct gendisk *disk, struct nvme_id_ns *id)
 	if (ns->head->disk) {
 		nvme_update_disk_info(ns->head->disk, ns, id);
 		blk_queue_stack_limits(ns->head->disk->queue, ns->queue);
+		nvme_mpath_update_disk_size(ns->head->disk);
 	}
 #endif
 }
drivers/nvme/host/nvme.h +13 -0
index a70b997060e68..9c2e7a151e400 100644
@@ -504,6 +504,16 @@ static inline void nvme_mpath_check_last_path(struct nvme_ns *ns)
 		kblockd_schedule_work(&head->requeue_work);
 }
 
+static inline void nvme_mpath_update_disk_size(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+	struct block_device *bdev = bdget_disk(disk, 0);
+
+	if (bdev) {
+		bd_set_size(bdev, get_capacity(disk) << SECTOR_SHIFT);
+		bdput(bdev);
+	}
+}
+
 extern struct device_attribute dev_attr_ana_grpid;
 extern struct device_attribute dev_attr_ana_state;
 
@@ -570,6 +580,9 @@ static inline void nvme_mpath_wait_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys)
 static inline void nvme_mpath_start_freeze(struct nvme_subsystem *subsys)
 {
 }
+static inline void nvme_mpath_update_disk_size(struct gendisk *disk)
+{
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NVME_MULTIPATH */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NVM
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#214 lore raw

PATCH 206/245 ASoC: wm8994: Skip setting of the WM8994_MICBIAS register for WM1811

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 811c5494436789e7149487c06e0602b507ce274b ]

The WM8994_MICBIAS register is not available in the WM1811 CODEC so skip initialization of that register for that device.
This suppresses an error during boot:
"wm8994-codec: ASoC: error at snd_soc_component_update_bits on wm8994-codec"

---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c  | 2 ++
 sound/soc/codecs/wm_hubs.c | 3 +++
 sound/soc/codecs/wm_hubs.h | 1 +
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +2 -0
index 01acb8da2f48e..cd089b4143029 100644
@@ -4051,11 +4051,13 @@ static int wm8994_component_probe(struct snd_soc_component *component)
 			wm8994->hubs.dcs_readback_mode = 2;
 			break;
 		}
+		wm8994->hubs.micd_scthr = true;
 		break;
 
 	case WM8958:
 		wm8994->hubs.dcs_readback_mode = 1;
 		wm8994->hubs.hp_startup_mode = 1;
+		wm8994->hubs.micd_scthr = true;
 
 		switch (control->revision) {
 		case 0:
sound/soc/codecs/wm_hubs.c +3 -0
index fed6ea9b019f7..da7fa6f5459e6 100644
@@ -1227,6 +1227,9 @@ int wm_hubs_handle_analogue_pdata(struct snd_soc_component *component,
 		snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, WM8993_ADDITIONAL_CONTROL,
 				    WM8993_LINEOUT2_FB, WM8993_LINEOUT2_FB);
 
+	if (!hubs->micd_scthr)
+		return 0;
+
 	snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, WM8993_MICBIAS,
 			    WM8993_JD_SCTHR_MASK | WM8993_JD_THR_MASK |
 			    WM8993_MICB1_LVL | WM8993_MICB2_LVL,
sound/soc/codecs/wm_hubs.h +1 -0
index ee339ad8514d1..1433d73e09bf8 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct wm_hubs_data {
 	int hp_startup_mode;
 	int series_startup;
 	int no_series_update;
+	bool micd_scthr;
 
 	bool no_cache_dac_hp_direct;
 	struct list_head dcs_cache;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#215 lore raw

PATCH 207/245 ASoC: wm8994: Ensure the device is resumed in wm89xx_mic_detect functions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sylwester Nawrocki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5a2cda4f1db89776b64c4f0f2c2ac609527ac70 ]

When the wm8958_mic_detect, wm8994_mic_detect functions get called from the machine driver, e.g. from the card's late_probe() callback, the CODEC device may be PM runtime suspended and any regmap writes have no effect. Add PM runtime calls to these functions to ensure the device registers are updated as expected.
This suppresses an error during boot
"wm8994-codec: ASoC: error at snd_soc_component_update_bits on wm8994-codec" caused by the regmap access error due to the cache_only flag being set.

---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +8 -0
index cd089b4143029..e3e069277a3ff 100644
@@ -3376,6 +3376,8 @@ int wm8994_mic_detect(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_soc_jack *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	pm_runtime_get_sync(component->dev);
+
 	switch (micbias) {
 	case 1:
 		micdet = &wm8994->micdet[0];
@@ -3423,6 +3425,8 @@ int wm8994_mic_detect(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_soc_jack *
 
 	snd_soc_dapm_sync(dapm);
 
+	pm_runtime_put(component->dev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wm8994_mic_detect);
@@ -3790,6 +3794,8 @@ int wm8958_mic_detect(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_soc_jack *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	pm_runtime_get_sync(component->dev);
+
 	if (jack) {
 		snd_soc_dapm_force_enable_pin(dapm, "CLK_SYS");
 		snd_soc_dapm_sync(dapm);
@@ -3858,6 +3864,8 @@ int wm8958_mic_detect(struct snd_soc_component *component, struct snd_soc_jack *
 		snd_soc_dapm_sync(dapm);
 	}
 
+	pm_runtime_put(component->dev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wm8958_mic_detect);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#216 lore raw

PATCH 208/245 ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add quirk for MPMAN Converter9 2-in-1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a0137101f47301fff2da6ba4b9048383d569909 ]

The MPMAN Converter9 2-in-1 almost fully works with out default settings. The only problem is that it has only 1 speaker so any sounds only playing on the right channel get lost.

Add a quirk for this model using the default settings + MONO_SPEAKER.

---
 sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
sound/soc/intel/boards/bytcr_rt5640.c +10 -0
index 0dcd249877c55..ec630127ef2f3 100644
@@ -588,6 +588,16 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id byt_rt5640_quirk_table[] = {
 					BYT_RT5640_SSP0_AIF1 |
 					BYT_RT5640_MCLK_EN),
 	},
+	{	/* MPMAN Converter 9, similar hw as the I.T.Works TW891 2-in-1 */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "MPMAN"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Converter9"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)(BYTCR_INPUT_DEFAULTS |
+					BYT_RT5640_MONO_SPEAKER |
+					BYT_RT5640_SSP0_AIF1 |
+					BYT_RT5640_MCLK_EN),
+	},
 	{
 		/* MPMAN MPWIN895CL */
 		.matches = {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 209/245 RISC-V: Take text_mutex in ftrace_init_nop()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 66d18dbda8469a944dfec6c49d26d5946efba218 ]

Without this we get lockdep failures. They're spurious failures as SMP isn't up when ftrace_init_nop() is called. As far as I can tell the easiest fix is to just take the lock, which also seems like the safest fix.

---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h |  7 +++++++
 arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c      | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
arch/riscv/include/asm/ftrace.h +7 -0
index c6dcc5291f972..02fbc175142e2 100644
@@ -63,4 +63,11 @@ do {									\
  * Let auipc+jalr be the basic *mcount unit*, so we make it 8 bytes here.
  */
 #define MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE 8
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+struct dyn_ftrace;
+int ftrace_init_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec);
+#define ftrace_init_nop ftrace_init_nop
+#endif
+
 #endif
arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c +19 -0
index 6d39f64e4dce4..fa8530f05ed4f 100644
@@ -88,6 +88,25 @@ int ftrace_make_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec,
 	return __ftrace_modify_call(rec->ip, addr, false);
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * This is called early on, and isn't wrapped by
+ * ftrace_arch_code_modify_{prepare,post_process}() and therefor doesn't hold
+ * text_mutex, which triggers a lockdep failure.  SMP isn't running so we could
+ * just directly poke the text, but it's simpler to just take the lock
+ * ourselves.
+ */
+int ftrace_init_nop(struct module *mod, struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
+{
+	int out;
+
+	ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare();
+	out = ftrace_make_nop(mod, rec, MCOUNT_ADDR);
+	ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process();
+
+	return out;
+}
+
 int ftrace_update_ftrace_func(ftrace_func_t func)
 {
 	int ret = __ftrace_modify_call((unsigned long)&ftrace_call,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 210/245 s390/init: add missing __init annotations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ilya Leoshkevich <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fcb2b70cdb194157678fb1a75f9ff499aeba3d2a ]

Add __init to reserve_memory_end, reserve_oldmem and remove_oldmem. Sometimes these functions are not inlined, and then the build complains about section mismatch.

---
 arch/s390/kernel/setup.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/setup.c +3 -3
index 5f85e0dfa66d1..4bda9055daefa 100644
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static struct notifier_block kdump_mem_nb = {
 /*
  * Make sure that the area behind memory_end is protected
  */
-static void reserve_memory_end(void)
+static void __init reserve_memory_end(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
 	if (ipl_info.type == IPL_TYPE_FCP_DUMP &&
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static void reserve_memory_end(void)
 /*
  * Make sure that oldmem, where the dump is stored, is protected
  */
-static void reserve_oldmem(void)
+static void __init reserve_oldmem(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
 	if (OLDMEM_BASE)
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static void reserve_oldmem(void)
 /*
  * Make sure that oldmem, where the dump is stored, is protected
  */
-static void remove_oldmem(void)
+static void __init remove_oldmem(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
 	if (OLDMEM_BASE)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 211/245 lockdep: fix order in trace_hardirqs_off_caller()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 73ac74c7d489756d2313219a108809921dbfaea1 ]

Switch order so that locking state is consistent even if the IRQ tracer calls into lockdep again.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_preemptirq.c +2 -2
index 71f553cceb3c1..0e373cb0106bb 100644
@@ -59,14 +59,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(trace_hardirqs_on_caller);
 
 __visible void trace_hardirqs_off_caller(unsigned long caller_addr)
 {
+	lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
+
 	if (!this_cpu_read(tracing_irq_cpu)) {
 		this_cpu_write(tracing_irq_cpu, 1);
 		tracer_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0, caller_addr);
 		if (!in_nmi())
 			trace_irq_disable_rcuidle(CALLER_ADDR0, caller_addr);
 	}
-
-	lockdep_hardirqs_off(CALLER_ADDR0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(trace_hardirqs_off_caller);
 #endif /* CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 212/245 drm/amdkfd: fix a memory leak issue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dennis Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 087d764159996ae378b08c0fdd557537adfd6899 ]

In the resume stage of GPU recovery, start_cpsch will call pm_init which set pm->allocated as false, cause the next pm_release_ib has no chance to release ib memory.

Add pm_release_ib in stop_cpsch which will be called in the suspend stage of GPU recovery.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c +2 -0
index 189212cb35475..bff39f561264e 100644
@@ -1101,6 +1101,8 @@ static int stop_cpsch(struct device_queue_manager *dqm)
 	unmap_queues_cpsch(dqm, KFD_UNMAP_QUEUES_FILTER_ALL_QUEUES, 0);
 	dqm_unlock(dqm);
 
+	pm_release_ib(&dqm->packets);
+
 	kfd_gtt_sa_free(dqm->dev, dqm->fence_mem);
 	pm_uninit(&dqm->packets);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 213/245 i2c: core: Call i2c_acpi_install_space_handler() before i2c_acpi_register_devices()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 21653a4181ff292480599dad996a2b759ccf050f ]

Some ACPI i2c-devices _STA method (which is used to detect if the device is present) use autodetection code which probes which device is present over i2c. This requires the I2C ACPI OpRegion handler to be registered before we enumerate i2c-clients under the i2c-adapter.

This fixes the i2c touchpad on the Lenovo ThinkBook 14-IIL and ThinkBook 15 IIL not getting an i2c-client instantiated and thus not working.

---
 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +1 -1
index f225bef1e043c..41dd0a08a625c 100644
@@ -1292,8 +1292,8 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap)
 
 	/* create pre-declared device nodes */
 	of_i2c_register_devices(adap);
-	i2c_acpi_register_devices(adap);
 	i2c_acpi_install_space_handler(adap);
+	i2c_acpi_register_devices(adap);
 
 	if (adap->nr < __i2c_first_dynamic_bus_num)
 		i2c_scan_static_board_info(adap);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 214/245 objtool: Fix noreturn detection for ignored functions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db6c6a0df840e3f52c84cc302cc1a08ba11a4416 ]

When a function is annotated with STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD, objtool doesn't validate its code paths. It also skips sibling call detection within the function.

But sibling call detection is actually needed for the case where the ignored function doesn't have any return instructions. Otherwise objtool naively marks the function as implicit static noreturn, which affects the reachability of its callers, resulting in "unreachable instruction" warnings.

Fix it by just enabling sibling call detection for ignored functions. The 'insn->ignore' check in add_jump_destinations() is no longer needed after

e6da9567959e ("objtool: Don't use ignore flag for fake jumps").

Fixes the following warning:

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.o: warning: objtool: vmx_handle_exit_irqoff()+0x142: unreachable instruction

which triggers on an allmodconfig with CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL unset.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +1 -1
index fd3071d83deae..c0ab27368a345 100644
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct objtool_file *file)
 		    insn->type != INSN_JUMP_UNCONDITIONAL)
 			continue;
 
-		if (insn->ignore || insn->offset == FAKE_JUMP_OFFSET)
+		if (insn->offset == FAKE_JUMP_OFFSET)
 			continue;
 
 		rela = find_rela_by_dest_range(insn->sec, insn->offset,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 215/245 ieee802154: fix one possible memleak in ca8210_dev_com_init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Liu Jian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88f46b3fe2ac41c381770ebad9f2ee49346b57a2 ]

We should call destroy_workqueue to destroy mlme_workqueue in error branch.

Fixes ded845a781a5 ("ieee802154: Add CA8210 IEEE 802.15.4 device driver")
---
 drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ieee802154/ca8210.c +1 -0
index 38a41651e451c..deace0aadad24 100644
@@ -2923,6 +2923,7 @@ static int ca8210_dev_com_init(struct ca8210_priv *priv)
 	);
 	if (!priv->irq_workqueue) {
 		dev_crit(&priv->spi->dev, "alloc of irq_workqueue failed!\n");
+		destroy_workqueue(priv->mlme_workqueue);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 216/245 ieee802154/adf7242: check status of adf7242_read_reg

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tom Rix <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e3914ed6cf44bfe1f169e26241f8314556fd1ac1 ]

Clang static analysis reports this error

adf7242.c:887:6: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined

        len = len_u8;
            ^ ~~~~~~

len_u8 is set in

       adf7242_read_reg(lp, 0, &len_u8);

When this call fails, len_u8 is not set.

So check the return code.

Fixes 7302b9d90117 ("ieee802154/adf7242: Driver for ADF7242 MAC IEEE802154")
---
 drivers/net/ieee802154/adf7242.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ieee802154/adf7242.c +3 -1
index 71be8524cca87..a686926bba71e 100644
@@ -883,7 +883,9 @@ static int adf7242_rx(struct adf7242_local *lp)
 	int ret;
 	u8 lqi, len_u8, *data;
 
-	adf7242_read_reg(lp, 0, &len_u8);
+	ret = adf7242_read_reg(lp, 0, &len_u8);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	len = len_u8;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 217/245 clocksource/drivers/h8300_timer8: Fix wrong return value in h8300_8timer_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tianjia Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 400d033f5a599120089b5f0c54d14d198499af5a ]

In the init function, if the call to of_iomap() fails, the return value is ENXIO instead of -ENXIO.

Change to the right negative errno.

Fixes 691f8f878290f ("clocksource/drivers/h8300_timer8: Convert init function to return error")
Cc Daniel Lezcano <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/clocksource/h8300_timer8.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clocksource/h8300_timer8.c +1 -1
index 1d740a8c42ab3..47114c2a7cb54 100644
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int __init h8300_8timer_init(struct device_node *node)
 		return PTR_ERR(clk);
 	}
 
-	ret = ENXIO;
+	ret = -ENXIO;
 	base = of_iomap(node, 0);
 	if (!base) {
 		pr_err("failed to map registers for clockevent\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 218/245 mwifiex: Increase AES key storage size to 256 bits

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maximilian Luz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4afc850e2e9e781976fb2c7852ce7bac374af938 ]

Following commit e18696786548 ("mwifiex: Prevent memory corruption handling keys") the mwifiex driver fails to authenticate with certain networks, specifically networks with 256 bit keys, and repeatedly asks for the password. The kernel log repeats the following lines (id and bssid redacted):

mwifiex_pcie 0000:01:00.0: info: trying to associate to '<id>' bssid <bssid> mwifiex_pcie 0000:01:00.0: info: associated to bssid <bssid> successfully mwifiex_pcie 0000:01:00.0: crypto keys added
mwifiex_pcie 0000:01:00.0: info: successfully disconnected from <bssid>: reason code 3

Tracking down this problem lead to the overflow check introduced by the aforementioned commit into mwifiex_ret_802_11_key_material_v2(). This check fails on networks with 256 bit keys due to the current storage size for AES keys in struct mwifiex_aes_param being only 128 bit.

To fix this issue, increase the storage size for AES keys to 256 bit.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h          | 2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_cmdresp.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/fw.h +1 -1
index 1fb76d2f5d3fd..8b9d0809daf62 100644
@@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ struct mwifiex_tkip_param {
 struct mwifiex_aes_param {
 	u8 pn[WPA_PN_SIZE];
 	__le16 key_len;
-	u8 key[WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP];
+	u8 key[WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP_256];
 } __packed;
 
 struct mwifiex_wapi_param {
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_cmdresp.c +2 -2
index 797c2e9783943..7003767eef423 100644
@@ -620,7 +620,7 @@ static int mwifiex_ret_802_11_key_material_v2(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 	key_v2 = &resp->params.key_material_v2;
 
 	len = le16_to_cpu(key_v2->key_param_set.key_params.aes.key_len);
-	if (len > WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP)
+	if (len > sizeof(key_v2->key_param_set.key_params.aes.key))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (le16_to_cpu(key_v2->action) == HostCmd_ACT_GEN_SET) {
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ static int mwifiex_ret_802_11_key_material_v2(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 		return 0;
 
 	memset(priv->aes_key_v2.key_param_set.key_params.aes.key, 0,
-	       WLAN_KEY_LEN_CCMP);
+	       sizeof(key_v2->key_param_set.key_params.aes.key));
 	priv->aes_key_v2.key_param_set.key_params.aes.key_len =
 				cpu_to_le16(len);
 	memcpy(priv->aes_key_v2.key_param_set.key_params.aes.key,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 219/245 batman-adv: bla: fix type misuse for backbone_gw hash indexing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 097930e85f90f252c44dc0d084598265dd44ca48 ]

It seems that due to a copy & paste error the void pointer in batadv_choose_backbone_gw() is cast to the wrong type.

Fixing this by using "struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw" instead of "struct batadv_bla_claim" which better matches the caller's side.

For now it seems that we were lucky because the two structs both have their orig/vid and addr/vid in the beginning. However I stumbled over this issue when I was trying to add some debug variables in front of "orig" in batadv_backbone_gw, which caused hash lookups to fail.

Fixes 07568d0369f9 ("batman-adv: don't rely on positions in struct for hashing")
---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +4 -3
index 9b8bf06ccb613..e71a35a3950de 100644
@@ -96,11 +96,12 @@ static inline u32 batadv_choose_claim(const void *data, u32 size)
  */
 static inline u32 batadv_choose_backbone_gw(const void *data, u32 size)
 {
-	const struct batadv_bla_claim *claim = (struct batadv_bla_claim *)data;
+	const struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *gw;
 	u32 hash = 0;
 
-	hash = jhash(&claim->addr, sizeof(claim->addr), hash);
-	hash = jhash(&claim->vid, sizeof(claim->vid), hash);
+	gw = (struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *)data;
+	hash = jhash(&gw->orig, sizeof(gw->orig), hash);
+	hash = jhash(&gw->vid, sizeof(gw->vid), hash);
 
 	return hash % size;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 220/245 atm: eni: fix the missed pci_disable_device() for eni_init_one()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c2b947879ca320ac5505c6c29a731ff17da5e805 ]

eni_init_one() misses to call pci_disable_device() in an error path. Jump to err_disable to fix it.

Fixes ede58ef28e10 ("atm: remove deprecated use of pci api")
---
 drivers/atm/eni.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/atm/eni.c +1 -1
index 7323e9210f4b1..38fec976e62d4 100644
@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static int eni_init_one(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 
 	rc = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pci_dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 	if (rc < 0)
-		goto out;
+		goto err_disable;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
 	eni_dev = kmalloc(sizeof(struct eni_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 221/245 batman-adv: mcast/TT: fix wrongly dropped or rerouted packets

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7dda5b3384121181c4e79f6eaeac2b94c0622c8d ]

The unicast packet rerouting code makes several assumptions. For instance it assumes that there is always exactly one destination in the TT. This breaks for multicast frames in a unicast packets in several ways:

For one thing if there is actually no TT entry and the destination node was selected due to the multicast tvlv flags it announced. Then an intermediate node will wrongly drop the packet.

For another thing if there is a TT entry but the TTVN of this entry is newer than the originally addressed destination node: Then the intermediate node will wrongly redirect the packet, leading to duplicated multicast packets at a multicast listener and missing packets at other multicast listeners or multicast routers.

Fixing this by not applying the unicast packet rerouting to batman-adv unicast packets with a multicast payload. We are not able to detect a roaming multicast listener at the moment and will just continue to send the multicast frame to both the new and old destination for a while in case of such a roaming multicast listener.

Fixes a73105b8d4c7 ("batman-adv: improved client announcement mechanism")
---
 net/batman-adv/routing.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/batman-adv/routing.c +4 -0
index cc3ed93a6d513..98af41e3810dc 100644
@@ -838,6 +838,10 @@ static bool batadv_check_unicast_ttvn(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	vid = batadv_get_vid(skb, hdr_len);
 	ethhdr = (struct ethhdr *)(skb->data + hdr_len);
 
+	/* do not reroute multicast frames in a unicast header */
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest))
+		return true;
+
 	/* check if the destination client was served by this node and it is now
 	 * roaming. In this case, it means that the node has got a ROAM_ADV
 	 * message and that it knows the new destination in the mesh to re-route
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 222/245 mac802154: tx: fix use-after-free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0ff4628f4c6c1ab87eef9f16b25355cadc426d64 ]

syzbot reported a bug in ieee802154_tx() [1]

A similar issue in ieee802154_xmit_worker() is also fixed in this patch.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880251a8c70 by task syz-executor.3/928

CPU: 0 PID: 928 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xae/0x497 mm/kasan/report.c:383
 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
 ieee802154_tx+0x3d2/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:88
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
 dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45d5b9
Code: 5d b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b b4 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fc98e749c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000002ccc0 RCX: 000000000045d5b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020007780 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000118d020 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cfec
R13: 00007fff690c720f R14: 00007fc98e74a9c0 R15: 000000000118cfec

Allocated by task 928:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:461
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:518 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slab.c:3254 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x3e0 mm/slab.c:3574
 __alloc_skb+0x71/0x550 net/core/skbuff.c:198
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1094 [inline]
 alloc_skb_with_frags+0x92/0x570 net/core/skbuff.c:5771
 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x72a/0x880 net/core/sock.c:2348
 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2837 [inline]
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2932 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x19fb/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Freed by task 928:
 kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:48
 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:56
 kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:355
 __kasan_slab_free+0xd8/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:422
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3418 [inline]
 kmem_cache_free.part.0+0x74/0x1e0 mm/slab.c:3693
 kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:622
 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
 consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline]
 consume_skb+0xcf/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:832
 __dev_kfree_skb_any+0x9c/0xc0 net/core/dev.c:3107
 fakelb_hw_xmit+0x20e/0x2a0 drivers/net/ieee802154/fakelb.c:81
 drv_xmit_async net/mac802154/driver-ops.h:16 [inline]
 ieee802154_tx+0x282/0x480 net/mac802154/tx.c:81
 ieee802154_subif_start_xmit+0xbe/0xe4 net/mac802154/tx.c:130
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4634 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4648 [inline]
 dev_direct_xmit+0x4e9/0x6e0 net/core/dev.c:4203
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2989 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x2413/0x5290 net/packet/af_packet.c:3014
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:651 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:671
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2353
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2407
 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2440
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880251a8c00
 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
 224-byte region [ffff8880251a8c00, ffff8880251a8ce0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:0000000062b6a4f1 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x251a8
flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab)
raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0000435c88 ffffea00028b6c08 ffff8880a9055d00
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff8880251a80c0 000000010000000c 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8880251a8b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8880251a8b80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8880251a8c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                             ^
 ffff8880251a8c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
 ffff8880251a8d00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes 409c3b0c5f03 ("mac802154: tx: move stats tx increment")
Cc Alexander Aring <[email protected]>
Cc Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
---
 net/mac802154/tx.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/mac802154/tx.c +5 -3
index bcd1a5e6ebf42..2f873a0dc5836 100644
@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ void ieee802154_xmit_worker(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (res)
 		goto err_tx;
 
-	ieee802154_xmit_complete(&local->hw, skb, false);
-
 	dev->stats.tx_packets++;
 	dev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
 
+	ieee802154_xmit_complete(&local->hw, skb, false);
+
 	return;
 
 err_tx:
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ ieee802154_tx(struct ieee802154_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	/* async is priority, otherwise sync is fallback */
 	if (local->ops->xmit_async) {
+		unsigned int len = skb->len;
+
 		ret = drv_xmit_async(local, skb);
 		if (ret) {
 			ieee802154_wake_queue(&local->hw);
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ ieee802154_tx(struct ieee802154_local *local, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		}
 
 		dev->stats.tx_packets++;
-		dev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len;
+		dev->stats.tx_bytes += len;
 	} else {
 		local->tx_skb = skb;
 		queue_work(local->workqueue, &local->tx_work);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 223/245 bpf: Fix clobbering of r2 in bpf_gen_ld_abs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e6a18d36118bea3bf497c9df4d9988b6df120689 ]

Bryce reported that he saw the following with:

  0:  r6 = r1
  1:  r1 = 12
  2:  r0 = *(u16 *)skb[r1]

The xlated sequence was incorrectly clobbering r2 with pointer value of r6 ...

0: (bf) r6 = r1
1: (b7) r1 = 12
2: (bf) r1 = r6
3: (bf) r2 = r1
4: (85) call bpf_skb_load_helper_16_no_cache#7692160

... and hence call to the load helper never succeeded given the offset was too high. Fix it by reordering the load of r6 to r1.

Other than that the insn has similar calling convention than BPF helpers, that is, r0 - r5 are scratch regs, so nothing else affected after the insn.

---
 net/core/filter.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -2
index 25a2c3186e14a..557bd5cc8f94c 100644
@@ -5418,8 +5418,6 @@ static int bpf_gen_ld_abs(const struct bpf_insn *orig,
 	bool indirect = BPF_MODE(orig->code) == BPF_IND;
 	struct bpf_insn *insn = insn_buf;
 
-	/* We're guaranteed here that CTX is in R6. */
-	*insn++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_CTX);
 	if (!indirect) {
 		*insn++ = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, orig->imm);
 	} else {
@@ -5427,6 +5425,8 @@ static int bpf_gen_ld_abs(const struct bpf_insn *orig,
 		if (orig->imm)
 			*insn++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, orig->imm);
 	}
+	/* We're guaranteed here that CTX is in R6. */
+	*insn++ = BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_CTX);
 
 	switch (BPF_SIZE(orig->code)) {
 	case BPF_B:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#232 lore raw

PATCH 224/245 drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi: fill ASoC card owner

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec653df2a0cbc306a4bfcb0e3484d318fa779002 ]

card->owner is a required property and since commit 81033c6b584b ("ALSA:
core: Warn on empty module") a warning is issued if it is empty. Fix lack of it. This fixes following warning observed on RaspberryPi 3B board with ARM 32bit kernel and multi_v7_defconfig:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 210 at sound/core/init.c:207 snd_card_new+0x378/0x398 [snd]
Modules linked in: vc4(+) snd_soc_core ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bluetooth snd_pcm snd_timer crc32_arm_ce raspberrypi_hwmon snd soundcore ecdh_generic ecc bcm2835_thermal phy_generic
CPU: 1 PID: 210 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1-00027-g81033c6b584b #1087
Hardware name: BCM2835
[<c03113c0>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030bcb4>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c030bcb4>] (show_stack) from [<c071cef8>] (dump_stack+0xd4/0xe8)
[<c071cef8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0345bfc>] (__warn+0xdc/0xf4)
[<c0345bfc>] (__warn) from [<c0345cc4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xb0/0xb8)
[<c0345cc4>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<bf02ff74>] (snd_card_new+0x378/0x398 [snd])
[<bf02ff74>] (snd_card_new [snd]) from [<bf11f0b4>] (snd_soc_bind_card+0x280/0x99c [snd_soc_core])
[<bf11f0b4>] (snd_soc_bind_card [snd_soc_core]) from [<bf12f000>] (devm_snd_soc_register_card+0x34/0x6c [snd_soc_core])
[<bf12f000>] (devm_snd_soc_register_card [snd_soc_core]) from [<bf165654>] (vc4_hdmi_bind+0x43c/0x5f4 [vc4])
[<bf165654>] (vc4_hdmi_bind [vc4]) from [<c09d660c>] (component_bind_all+0xec/0x24c)
[<c09d660c>] (component_bind_all) from [<bf15c44c>] (vc4_drm_bind+0xd4/0x174 [vc4])
[<bf15c44c>] (vc4_drm_bind [vc4]) from [<c09d6ac0>] (try_to_bring_up_master+0x160/0x1b0)
[<c09d6ac0>] (try_to_bring_up_master) from [<c09d6f38>] (component_master_add_with_match+0xd0/0x104)
[<c09d6f38>] (component_master_add_with_match) from [<bf15c588>] (vc4_platform_drm_probe+0x9c/0xbc [vc4])
[<bf15c588>] (vc4_platform_drm_probe [vc4]) from [<c09df740>] (platform_drv_probe+0x6c/0xa4)
[<c09df740>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c09dd6f0>] (really_probe+0x210/0x350)
[<c09dd6f0>] (really_probe) from [<c09dd940>] (driver_probe_device+0x5c/0xb4)
[<c09dd940>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c09ddb38>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60)
[<c09ddb38>] (device_driver_attach) from [<c09ddbc0>] (__driver_attach+0x80/0xbc)
[<c09ddbc0>] (__driver_attach) from [<c09db820>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xb4)
[<c09db820>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c09dc9f8>] (bus_add_driver+0x130/0x1e8)
[<c09dc9f8>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c09de648>] (driver_register+0x78/0x110)
[<c09de648>] (driver_register) from [<c0302038>] (do_one_initcall+0x50/0x220)
[<c0302038>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c03db544>] (do_init_module+0x60/0x210)
[<c03db544>] (do_init_module) from [<c03da4f8>] (load_module+0x1e34/0x2338)
[<c03da4f8>] (load_module) from [<c03dac00>] (sys_finit_module+0xac/0xbc)
[<c03dac00>] (sys_finit_module) from [<c03000c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54)
Exception stack(0xeded9fa8 to 0xeded9ff0)
...
---[ end trace 6414689569c2bc08 ]---
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c +1 -0
index 86b98856756d9..1161662664577 100644
@@ -1134,6 +1134,7 @@ static int vc4_hdmi_audio_init(struct vc4_hdmi *hdmi)
 	card->num_links = 1;
 	card->name = "vc4-hdmi";
 	card->dev = dev;
+	card->owner = THIS_MODULE;
 
 	/*
 	 * Be careful, snd_soc_register_card() calls dev_set_drvdata() and
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#233 lore raw

PATCH 225/245 net: qed: RDMA personality shouldnt fail VF load

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dmitry Bogdanov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce1cf9e5025f4e2d2198728391f1847b3e168bc6 ]

Fix the assert during VF driver installation when the personality is iWARP

Fixes 1fe614d10f45 ("qed: Relax VF firmware requirements")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_sriov.c +1 -0
index 71a7af134dd8e..886c7aae662fa 100644
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int qed_sp_vf_start(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn, struct qed_vf_info *p_vf)
 		p_ramrod->personality = PERSONALITY_ETH;
 		break;
 	case QED_PCI_ETH_ROCE:
+	case QED_PCI_ETH_IWARP:
 		p_ramrod->personality = PERSONALITY_RDMA_AND_ETH;
 		break;
 	default:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#234 lore raw

PATCH 226/245 drm/sun4i: sun8i-csc: Secondary CSC register correction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Martin Cerveny <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cab4c03b4ba54c8d9378298cacb8bc0fd74ceece ]

"Allwinner V3s" has secondary video layer (VI). Decoded video is displayed in wrong colors until secondary CSC registers are programmed correctly.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun8i_csc.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun8i_csc.h +1 -1
index 880e8fbb08556..242752b2d328c 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ struct sun8i_mixer;
 
 /* VI channel CSC units offsets */
 #define CCSC00_OFFSET 0xAA050
-#define CCSC01_OFFSET 0xFA000
+#define CCSC01_OFFSET 0xFA050
 #define CCSC10_OFFSET 0xA0000
 #define CCSC11_OFFSET 0xF0000
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#235 lore raw

PATCH 227/245 batman-adv: Add missing include for in_interrupt()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4bba9dab86b6ac15ca560ef1f2b5aa4529cbf784 ]

The fix for receiving (internally generated) bla packets outside the interrupt context introduced the usage of in_interrupt(). But this functionality is only defined in linux/preempt.h which was not included with the same patch.

Fixes 279e89b2281a ("batman-adv: bla: use netif_rx_ni when not in interrupt context")
---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +1 -0
index e71a35a3950de..557d7fdf0b8dc 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/lockdep.h>
 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#236 lore raw

PATCH 228/245 batman-adv: mcast: fix duplicate mcast packets in BLA backbone from mesh

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 74c09b7275126da1b642b90c9cdc3ae8b729ad4b ]

Scenario:
* Multicast frame send from mesh to a BLA backbone (multiple nodes with their bat0 bridged together, with BLA enabled)

Issue:
* BLA backbone nodes receive the frame multiple times on bat0, once from mesh->bat0 and once from each backbone_gw from LAN

For unicast, a node will send only to the best backbone gateway according to the TQ. However for multicast we currently cannot determine if multiple destination nodes share the same backbone if they don't share the same backbone with us. So we need to keep sending the unicasts to all backbone gateways and let the backbone gateways decide which one will forward the frame. We can use the CLAIM mechanism to make this decision.

One catch: The batman-adv gateway feature for DHCP packets potentially sends multicast packets in the same batman-adv unicast header as the multicast optimizations code. And we are not allowed to drop those even if we did not claim the source address of the sender, as for such packets there is only this one multicast-in-unicast packet.

How can we distinguish the two cases?

The gateway feature uses a batman-adv unicast 4 address header. While the multicast-to-unicasts feature uses a simple, 3 address batman-adv unicast header. So let's use this to distinguish.

Fixes fe2da6ff27c7 ("batman-adv: check incoming packet type for bla")
---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h |  4 +--
 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c        |  6 ++---
 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +25 -9
index 557d7fdf0b8dc..3f76872d411bc 100644
@@ -1827,7 +1827,7 @@ batadv_bla_loopdetect_check(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
  * @skb: the frame to be checked
  * @vid: the VLAN ID of the frame
- * @is_bcast: the packet came in a broadcast packet type.
+ * @packet_type: the batman packet type this frame came in
  *
  * batadv_bla_rx avoidance checks if:
  *  * we have to race for a claim
@@ -1839,7 +1839,7 @@ batadv_bla_loopdetect_check(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * further process the skb.
  */
 bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		   unsigned short vid, bool is_bcast)
+		   unsigned short vid, int packet_type)
 {
 	struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;
 	struct ethhdr *ethhdr;
@@ -1861,9 +1861,24 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto handled;
 
 	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&bat_priv->bla.num_requests)))
-		/* don't allow broadcasts while requests are in flight */
-		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) && is_bcast)
-			goto handled;
+		/* don't allow multicast packets while requests are in flight */
+		if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest))
+			/* Both broadcast flooding or multicast-via-unicasts
+			 * delivery might send to multiple backbone gateways
+			 * sharing the same LAN and therefore need to coordinate
+			 * which backbone gateway forwards into the LAN,
+			 * by claiming the payload source address.
+			 *
+			 * Broadcast flooding and multicast-via-unicasts
+			 * delivery use the following two batman packet types.
+			 * Note: explicitly exclude BATADV_UNICAST_4ADDR,
+			 * as the DHCP gateway feature will send explicitly
+			 * to only one BLA gateway, so the claiming process
+			 * should be avoided there.
+			 */
+			if (packet_type == BATADV_BCAST ||
+			    packet_type == BATADV_UNICAST)
+				goto handled;
 
 	ether_addr_copy(search_claim.addr, ethhdr->h_source);
 	search_claim.vid = vid;
@@ -1898,13 +1913,14 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		goto allow;
 	}
 
-	/* if it is a broadcast ... */
-	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) && is_bcast) {
+	/* if it is a multicast ... */
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) &&
+	    (packet_type == BATADV_BCAST || packet_type == BATADV_UNICAST)) {
 		/* ... drop it. the responsible gateway is in charge.
 		 *
-		 * We need to check is_bcast because with the gateway
+		 * We need to check packet type because with the gateway
 		 * feature, broadcasts (like DHCP requests) may be sent
-		 * using a unicast packet type.
+		 * using a unicast 4 address packet type. See comment above.
 		 */
 		goto handled;
 	} else {
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.h +2 -2
index 71f95a3e4d3f3..af28fdb01467c 100644
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline bool batadv_bla_is_loopdetect_mac(const uint8_t *mac)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BLA
 bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		   unsigned short vid, bool is_bcast);
+		   unsigned short vid, int packet_type);
 bool batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		   unsigned short vid);
 bool batadv_bla_is_backbone_gw(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_check_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *addr,
 
 static inline bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 				 struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short vid,
-				 bool is_bcast)
+				 int packet_type)
 {
 	return false;
 }
net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c +3 -3
index a2976adeeedce..6ff78080ec7fb 100644
@@ -426,10 +426,10 @@ void batadv_interface_rx(struct net_device *soft_iface,
 	struct vlan_ethhdr *vhdr;
 	struct ethhdr *ethhdr;
 	unsigned short vid;
-	bool is_bcast;
+	int packet_type;
 
 	batadv_bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
-	is_bcast = (batadv_bcast_packet->packet_type == BATADV_BCAST);
+	packet_type = batadv_bcast_packet->packet_type;
 
 	skb_pull_rcsum(skb, hdr_size);
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ void batadv_interface_rx(struct net_device *soft_iface,
 	/* Let the bridge loop avoidance check the packet. If will
 	 * not handle it, we can safely push it up.
 	 */
-	if (batadv_bla_rx(bat_priv, skb, vid, is_bcast))
+	if (batadv_bla_rx(bat_priv, skb, vid, packet_type))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (orig_node)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#237 lore raw

PATCH 229/245 batman-adv: mcast: fix duplicate mcast packets from BLA backbone to mesh

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Linus Lüssing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2369e827046920ef0599e6a36b975ac5c0a359c2 ]

Scenario:
* Multicast frame send from BLA backbone gateways (multiple nodes with their bat0 bridged together, with BLA enabled) sharing the same LAN to nodes in the mesh

Issue:
* Nodes receive the frame multiple times on bat0 from the mesh, once from each foreign BLA backbone gateway which shares the same LAN with another

For multicast frames via batman-adv broadcast packets coming from the same BLA backbone but from different backbone gateways duplicates are currently detected via a CRC history of previously received packets.

However this CRC so far was not performed for multicast frames received via batman-adv unicast packets. Fixing this by appyling the same check for such packets, too.

Room for improvements in the future: Ideally we would introduce the possibility to not only claim a client, but a complete originator, too. This would allow us to only send a multicast-in-unicast packet from a BLA backbone gateway claiming the node and by that avoid potential redundant transmissions in the first place.

Fixes 279e89b2281a ("batman-adv: add broadcast duplicate check")
---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 87 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +87 -16
index 3f76872d411bc..1401031f4bb4a 100644
@@ -1594,13 +1594,16 @@ int batadv_bla_init(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
 }
 
 /**
- * batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist() - Check if a frame is in the broadcast dup.
+ * batadv_bla_check_duplist() - Check if a frame is in the broadcast dup.
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
- * @skb: contains the bcast_packet to be checked
+ * @skb: contains the multicast packet to be checked
+ * @payload_ptr: pointer to position inside the head buffer of the skb
+ *  marking the start of the data to be CRC'ed
+ * @orig: originator mac address, NULL if unknown
  *
- * check if it is on our broadcast list. Another gateway might
- * have sent the same packet because it is connected to the same backbone,
- * so we have to remove this duplicate.
+ * Check if it is on our broadcast list. Another gateway might have sent the
+ * same packet because it is connected to the same backbone, so we have to
+ * remove this duplicate.
  *
  * This is performed by checking the CRC, which will tell us
  * with a good chance that it is the same packet. If it is furthermore
@@ -1609,19 +1612,17 @@ int batadv_bla_init(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
  *
  * Return: true if a packet is in the duplicate list, false otherwise.
  */
-bool batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
-				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+static bool batadv_bla_check_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *payload_ptr,
+				     const u8 *orig)
 {
-	int i, curr;
-	__be32 crc;
-	struct batadv_bcast_packet *bcast_packet;
 	struct batadv_bcast_duplist_entry *entry;
 	bool ret = false;
-
-	bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
+	int i, curr;
+	__be32 crc;
 
 	/* calculate the crc ... */
-	crc = batadv_skb_crc32(skb, (u8 *)(bcast_packet + 1));
+	crc = batadv_skb_crc32(skb, payload_ptr);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->bla.bcast_duplist_lock);
 
@@ -1640,8 +1641,21 @@ bool batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (entry->crc != crc)
 			continue;
 
-		if (batadv_compare_eth(entry->orig, bcast_packet->orig))
-			continue;
+		/* are the originators both known and not anonymous? */
+		if (orig && !is_zero_ether_addr(orig) &&
+		    !is_zero_ether_addr(entry->orig)) {
+			/* If known, check if the new frame came from
+			 * the same originator:
+			 * We are safe to take identical frames from the
+			 * same orig, if known, as multiplications in
+			 * the mesh are detected via the (orig, seqno) pair.
+			 * So we can be a bit more liberal here and allow
+			 * identical frames from the same orig which the source
+			 * host might have sent multiple times on purpose.
+			 */
+			if (batadv_compare_eth(entry->orig, orig))
+				continue;
+		}
 
 		/* this entry seems to match: same crc, not too old,
 		 * and from another gw. therefore return true to forbid it.
@@ -1657,7 +1671,14 @@ bool batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	entry = &bat_priv->bla.bcast_duplist[curr];
 	entry->crc = crc;
 	entry->entrytime = jiffies;
-	ether_addr_copy(entry->orig, bcast_packet->orig);
+
+	/* known originator */
+	if (orig)
+		ether_addr_copy(entry->orig, orig);
+	/* anonymous originator */
+	else
+		eth_zero_addr(entry->orig);
+
 	bat_priv->bla.bcast_duplist_curr = curr;
 
 out:
@@ -1666,6 +1687,48 @@ bool batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_bla_check_ucast_duplist() - Check if a frame is in the broadcast dup.
+ * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
+ * @skb: contains the multicast packet to be checked, decapsulated from a
+ *  unicast_packet
+ *
+ * Check if it is on our broadcast list. Another gateway might have sent the
+ * same packet because it is connected to the same backbone, so we have to
+ * remove this duplicate.
+ *
+ * Return: true if a packet is in the duplicate list, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool batadv_bla_check_ucast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return batadv_bla_check_duplist(bat_priv, skb, (u8 *)skb->data, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist() - Check if a frame is in the broadcast dup.
+ * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
+ * @skb: contains the bcast_packet to be checked
+ *
+ * Check if it is on our broadcast list. Another gateway might have sent the
+ * same packet because it is connected to the same backbone, so we have to
+ * remove this duplicate.
+ *
+ * Return: true if a packet is in the duplicate list, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool batadv_bla_check_bcast_duplist(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct batadv_bcast_packet *bcast_packet;
+	u8 *payload_ptr;
+
+	bcast_packet = (struct batadv_bcast_packet *)skb->data;
+	payload_ptr = (u8 *)(bcast_packet + 1);
+
+	return batadv_bla_check_duplist(bat_priv, skb, payload_ptr,
+					bcast_packet->orig);
+}
+
 /**
  * batadv_bla_is_backbone_gw_orig() - Check if the originator is a gateway for
  *  the VLAN identified by vid.
@@ -1880,6 +1943,14 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			    packet_type == BATADV_UNICAST)
 				goto handled;
 
+	/* potential duplicates from foreign BLA backbone gateways via
+	 * multicast-in-unicast packets
+	 */
+	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(ethhdr->h_dest) &&
+	    packet_type == BATADV_UNICAST &&
+	    batadv_bla_check_ucast_duplist(bat_priv, skb))
+		goto handled;
+
 	ether_addr_copy(search_claim.addr, ethhdr->h_source);
 	search_claim.vid = vid;
 	claim = batadv_claim_hash_find(bat_priv, &search_claim);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#238 lore raw

PATCH 230/245 bpf: Fix a rcu warning for bpffs map pretty-print

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce880cb825fcc22d4e39046a6c3a3a7f6603883d ]

Running selftest
./btf_btf -p
the kernel had the following warning:

  [   51.528185] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1756 at kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:717 htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
  [   51.529217] Modules linked in:
  [   51.529583] CPU: 3 PID: 1756 Comm: test_btf Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1+ #878
  [   51.530346] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.el7.centos 04/01/2014
  [   51.531410] RIP: 0010:htab_map_get_next_key+0x2eb/0x300
  ...
  [   51.542826] Call Trace:
  [   51.543119]  map_seq_next+0x53/0x80
  [   51.543528]  seq_read+0x263/0x400
  [   51.543932]  vfs_read+0xad/0x1c0
  [   51.544311]  ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
  [   51.544689]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
  [   51.545116]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The related source code in kernel/bpf/hashtab.c:
709 static int htab_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key) 710 {

  711         struct bpf_htab *htab = container_of(map, struct bpf_htab, map);
  712         struct hlist_nulls_head *head;
  713         struct htab_elem *l, *next_l;
  714         u32 hash, key_size;
  715         int i = 0;

716
717 WARN_ON_ONCE(!rcu_read_lock_held());

In kernel/bpf/inode.c, bpffs map pretty print calls map->ops->map_get_next_key() without holding a rcu_read_lock(), hence causing the above warning.
To fix the issue, just surrounding map->ops->map_get_next_key() with rcu read lock.

Fixes a26ca7c982cb ("bpf: btf: Add pretty print support to the basic arraymap")
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/inode.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/inode.c +3 -1
index c04815bb15cc1..11fade89c1f38 100644
@@ -207,10 +207,12 @@ static void *map_seq_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
 	else
 		prev_key = key;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (map->ops->map_get_next_key(map, prev_key, key)) {
 		map_iter(m)->done = true;
-		return NULL;
+		key = NULL;
 	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return key;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#239 lore raw

PATCH 231/245 ALSA: asihpi: fix iounmap in error handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tom Rix <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 472eb39103e885f302fd8fd6eff104fcf5503f1b ]

clang static analysis flags this problem hpioctl.c:513:7: warning: Branch condition evaluates to
a garbage value

                if (pci.ap_mem_base[idx]) {
                    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

If there is a failure in the middle of the memory space loop, only some of the memory spaces need to be cleaned up.

At the error handler, idx holds the number of successful memory spaces mapped. So rework the handler loop to use the old idx.

There is a second problem, the memory space loop conditionally iomaps()/sets the mem_base so it is necessay to initize pci.

Fixes 719f82d3987a ("ALSA: Add support of AudioScience ASI boards")
---
 sound/pci/asihpi/hpioctl.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/pci/asihpi/hpioctl.c +2 -2
index 7d049569012c1..3f06986fbecf8 100644
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ int asihpi_adapter_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 	struct hpi_message hm;
 	struct hpi_response hr;
 	struct hpi_adapter adapter;
-	struct hpi_pci pci;
+	struct hpi_pci pci = { 0 };
 
 	memset(&adapter, 0, sizeof(adapter));
 
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int asihpi_adapter_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 	return 0;
 
 err:
-	for (idx = 0; idx < HPI_MAX_ADAPTER_MEM_SPACES; idx++) {
+	while (--idx >= 0) {
 		if (pci.ap_mem_base[idx]) {
 			iounmap(pci.ap_mem_base[idx]);
 			pci.ap_mem_base[idx] = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#240 lore raw

PATCH 232/245 regmap: fix page selection for noinc reads

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4003324856311faebb46cbd56a1616bd3f3b67c2 ]

Non-incrementing reads can fail if register + length crosses page border. However for non-incrementing reads we should not check for page border crossing. Fix this by passing additional flag to _regmap_raw_read and passing length to _regmap_select_page basing on the flag.

Fixes 74fe7b551f33 ("regmap: Add regmap_noinc_read API")
---
 drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c +6 -6
index d26b485ccc7d0..e8b3353c18eb8 100644
@@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ int regmap_raw_write_async(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(regmap_raw_write_async);
 
 static int _regmap_raw_read(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, void *val,
-			    unsigned int val_len)
+			    unsigned int val_len, bool noinc)
 {
 	struct regmap_range_node *range;
 	int ret;
@@ -2380,7 +2380,7 @@ static int _regmap_raw_read(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, void *val,
 	range = _regmap_range_lookup(map, reg);
 	if (range) {
 		ret = _regmap_select_page(map, &reg, range,
-					  val_len / map->format.val_bytes);
+					  noinc ? 1 : val_len / map->format.val_bytes);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			return ret;
 	}
@@ -2418,7 +2418,7 @@ static int _regmap_bus_read(void *context, unsigned int reg,
 	if (!map->format.parse_val)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, work_val, map->format.val_bytes);
+	ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, work_val, map->format.val_bytes, false);
 	if (ret == 0)
 		*val = map->format.parse_val(work_val);
 
@@ -2536,7 +2536,7 @@ int regmap_raw_read(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, void *val,
 
 		/* Read bytes that fit into whole chunks */
 		for (i = 0; i < chunk_count; i++) {
-			ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, chunk_bytes);
+			ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, chunk_bytes, false);
 			if (ret != 0)
 				goto out;
 
@@ -2547,7 +2547,7 @@ int regmap_raw_read(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg, void *val,
 
 		/* Read remaining bytes */
 		if (val_len) {
-			ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, val_len);
+			ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, val_len, false);
 			if (ret != 0)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -2622,7 +2622,7 @@ int regmap_noinc_read(struct regmap *map, unsigned int reg,
 			read_len = map->max_raw_read;
 		else
 			read_len = val_len;
-		ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, read_len);
+		ret = _regmap_raw_read(map, reg, val, read_len, true);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		val = ((u8 *)val) + read_len;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#241 lore raw

PATCH 233/245 MIPS: Add the missing CPU_1074K into __get_cpu_type()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wei Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e393fbe6fa27af23f78df6e16a8fd2963578a8c4 ]

Commit 442e14a2c55e ("MIPS: Add 1074K CPU support explicitly.") split 1074K from the 74K as an unique CPU type, while it missed to add the 'CPU_1074K' in __get_cpu_type(). So let's add it back.

Fixes 442e14a2c55e ("MIPS: Add 1074K CPU support explicitly.")
---
 arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-type.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-type.h +1 -0
index a45af3de075d9..d43e4ab20b238 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static inline int __pure __get_cpu_type(const int cpu_type)
 	case CPU_34K:
 	case CPU_1004K:
 	case CPU_74K:
+	case CPU_1074K:
 	case CPU_M14KC:
 	case CPU_M14KEC:
 	case CPU_INTERAPTIV:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#242 lore raw

PATCH 234/245 KVM: x86: Reset MMU context if guest toggles CR4.SMAP or CR4.PKE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d214c481611b29458a57913bd786f0ac06f0605 ]

Reset the MMU context during kvm_set_cr4() if SMAP or PKE is toggled. Recent commits to (correctly) not reload PDPTRs when SMAP/PKE are toggled inadvertantly skipped the MMU context reset due to the mask of bits that triggers PDPTR loads also being used to trigger MMU context resets.

Fixes 427890aff855 ("kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.SMAP does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode")
Fixes cb957adb4ea4 ("kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.PKE does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode")
Cc Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Shier <[email protected]>
Cc Oliver Upton <[email protected]>

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -1
index 620ed1fa35119..dd182228be714 100644
@@ -858,6 +858,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 	unsigned long old_cr4 = kvm_read_cr4(vcpu);
 	unsigned long pdptr_bits = X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PSE | X86_CR4_PAE |
 				   X86_CR4_SMEP;
+	unsigned long mmu_role_bits = pdptr_bits | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE;
 
 	if (kvm_valid_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
 		return 1;
@@ -885,7 +886,7 @@ int kvm_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
 	if (kvm_x86_ops->set_cr4(vcpu, cr4))
 		return 1;
 
-	if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & pdptr_bits) ||
+	if (((cr4 ^ old_cr4) & mmu_role_bits) ||
 	    (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE) && (old_cr4 & X86_CR4_PCIDE)))
 		kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#243 lore raw

PATCH 235/245 KVM: SVM: Add a dedicated INVD intercept routine

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4bb05f30483fd21ea5413eaf1182768f251cf625 ]

The INVD instruction intercept performs emulation. Emulation can't be done on an SEV guest because the guest memory is encrypted.

Provide a dedicated intercept routine for the INVD intercept. And since the instruction is emulated as a NOP, just skip it instead.

Fixes 1654efcbc431 ("KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command")

Message-Id: <a0b9a19ffa7fef86a3cc700c7ea01cb2731e04e5.1600972918.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +7 -1
index 2aafb6c791345..cb09a0ec87500 100644
@@ -3942,6 +3942,12 @@ static int iret_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static int invd_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+	/* Treat an INVD instruction as a NOP and just skip it. */
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
+}
+
 static int invlpg_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
@@ -4831,7 +4837,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm *svm) = {
 	[SVM_EXIT_RDPMC]			= rdpmc_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_CPUID]			= cpuid_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_IRET]                         = iret_interception,
-	[SVM_EXIT_INVD]                         = emulate_on_interception,
+	[SVM_EXIT_INVD]                         = invd_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_PAUSE]			= pause_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_HLT]				= halt_interception,
 	[SVM_EXIT_INVLPG]			= invlpg_interception,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#244 lore raw

PATCH 236/245 tracing: fix double free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tom Rix <[email protected]>

commit 46bbe5c671e06f070428b9be142cc4ee5cedebac upstream.

clang static analyzer reports this problem

trace_events_hist.c:3824:3: warning: Attempt to free
released memory

    kfree(hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[i]);

In parse_var_defs() if there is a problem allocating var_defs.expr, the earlier var_defs.name is freed. This free is duplicated by free_var_defs() which frees the rest of the list.

Because free_var_defs() has to run anyway, remove the second free fom parse_var_defs().

Fixes 30350d65ac56 ("tracing: Add variable support to hist triggers")
---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +0 -1
@@ -4225,7 +4225,6 @@ static int parse_var_defs(struct hist_tr
 
 			s = kstrdup(field_str, GFP_KERNEL);
 			if (!s) {
-				kfree(hist_data->attrs->var_defs.name[n_vars]);
 				ret = -ENOMEM;
 				goto free;
 			}
author maintainer
#245 lore raw

PATCH 237/245 s390/dasd: Fix zero write for FBA devices

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Höppner <[email protected]>

commit 709192d531e5b0a91f20aa14abfe2fc27ddd47af upstream.

A discard request that writes zeros using the global kernel internal ZERO_PAGE will fail for machines with more than 2GB of memory due to the location of the ZERO_PAGE.

Fix this by using a driver owned global zero page allocated with GFP_DMA flag set.

Fixes 28b841b3a7cb ("s390/dasd: Add discard support for FBA devices")
Cc <[email protected]> # 4.14+
---
 drivers/s390/block/dasd_fba.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/block/dasd_fba.c +8 -1
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 
 static struct dasd_discipline dasd_fba_discipline;
+static void *dasd_fba_zero_page;
 
 struct dasd_fba_private {
 	struct dasd_fba_characteristics rdc_data;
@@ -270,7 +271,7 @@ static void ccw_write_zero(struct ccw1 *
 	ccw->cmd_code = DASD_FBA_CCW_WRITE;
 	ccw->flags |= CCW_FLAG_SLI;
 	ccw->count = count;
-	ccw->cda = (__u32) (addr_t) page_to_phys(ZERO_PAGE(0));
+	ccw->cda = (__u32) (addr_t) dasd_fba_zero_page;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -811,6 +812,11 @@ dasd_fba_init(void)
 	int ret;
 
 	ASCEBC(dasd_fba_discipline.ebcname, 4);
+
+	dasd_fba_zero_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
+	if (!dasd_fba_zero_page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	ret = ccw_driver_register(&dasd_fba_driver);
 	if (!ret)
 		wait_for_device_probe();
@@ -822,6 +828,7 @@ static void __exit
 dasd_fba_cleanup(void)
 {
 	ccw_driver_unregister(&dasd_fba_driver);
+	free_page((unsigned long)dasd_fba_zero_page);
 }
 
 module_init(dasd_fba_init);
author maintainer
#246 lore raw

PATCH 238/245 kprobes: Fix to check probe enabled before disarm_kprobe_ftrace()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>

commit 3031313eb3d549b7ad6f9fbcc52ba04412e3eb9e upstream.

Commit 0cb2f1372baa ("kprobes: Fix NULL pointer dereference at kprobe_ftrace_handler") fixed one bug but not completely fixed yet. If we run a kprobe_module.tc of ftracetest, kernel showed a warning as below.

# ./ftracetest test.d/kprobe/kprobe_module.tc
=== Ftrace unit tests ===
[1] Kprobe dynamic event - probing module
...
[   22.400215] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   22.400962] Failed to disarm kprobe-ftrace at trace_printk_irq_work+0x0/0x7e [trace_printk] (-2)
[   22.402139] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 200 at kernel/kprobes.c:1091 __disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.0+0x7e/0xa0
[   22.403358] Modules linked in: trace_printk(-)
[   22.404028] CPU: 7 PID: 200 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2+ #66
[   22.404870] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   22.406139] RIP: 0010:__disarm_kprobe_ftrace.isra.0+0x7e/0xa0
[   22.406947] Code: 30 8b 03 eb c9 80 3d e5 09 1f 01 00 75 dc 49 8b 34 24 89 c2 48 c7 c7 a0 c2 05 82 89 45 e4 c6 05 cc 09 1f 01 01 e8 a9 c7 f0 ff <0f> 0b 8b 45 e4 eb b9 89 c6 48 c7 c7 70 c2 05 82 89 45 e4 e8 91 c7
[   22.409544] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000237df0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   22.410385] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff83066024 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   22.411434] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff810de8d3 RDI: ffffffff810de8d3
[   22.412687] RBP: ffffc90000237e10 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[   22.413762] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88807c478640
[   22.414852] R13: ffffffff8235ebc0 R14: ffffffffa00060c0 R15: 0000000000000000
[   22.415941] FS:  00000000019d48c0(0000) GS:ffff88807d7c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   22.417264] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   22.418176] CR2: 00000000005bb7e3 CR3: 0000000078f7a000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[   22.419309] Call Trace:
[   22.419990]  kill_kprobe+0x94/0x160
[   22.420652]  kprobes_module_callback+0x64/0x230
[   22.421470]  notifier_call_chain+0x4f/0x70
[   22.422184]  blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x49/0x70
[   22.422979]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x1ac/0x240
[   22.423733]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x50
[   22.424366]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   22.425176] RIP: 0033:0x4bb81d
[   22.425741] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[   22.428726] RSP: 002b:00007ffc70fef008 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
[   22.430169] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000019d48a0 RCX: 00000000004bb81d
[   22.431375] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000880 RDI: 00007ffc70fef028
[   22.432543] RBP: 0000000000000880 R08: 00000000ffffffff R09: 00007ffc70fef320
[   22.433692] R10: 0000000000656300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc70fef028
[   22.434635] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[   22.435682] irq event stamp: 1169
[   22.436240] hardirqs last  enabled at (1179): [<ffffffff810df542>] console_unlock+0x422/0x580
[   22.437466] hardirqs last disabled at (1188): [<ffffffff810df19b>] console_unlock+0x7b/0x580
[   22.438608] softirqs last  enabled at (866): [<ffffffff81c0038e>] __do_softirq+0x38e/0x490
[   22.439637] softirqs last disabled at (859): [<ffffffff81a00f42>] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
[   22.440690] ---[ end trace 1e7ce7e1e4567276 ]---
[   22.472832] trace_kprobe: This probe might be able to register after target module is loaded. Continue.

This is because the kill_kprobe() calls disarm_kprobe_ftrace() even if the given probe is not enabled. In that case, ftrace_set_filter_ip() fails because the given probe point is not registered to ftrace.

Fix to check the given (going) probe is enabled before invoking disarm_kprobe_ftrace().

Fixes 0cb2f1372baa ("kprobes: Fix NULL pointer dereference at kprobe_ftrace_handler")
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc "Naveen N . Rao" <[email protected]>
Cc Anil S Keshavamurthy <[email protected]>
Cc David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc Muchun Song <[email protected]>
Cc Chengming Zhou <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/kprobes.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +3 -2
@@ -2083,9 +2083,10 @@ static void kill_kprobe(struct kprobe *p
 
 	/*
 	 * The module is going away. We should disarm the kprobe which
-	 * is using ftrace.
+	 * is using ftrace, because ftrace framework is still available at
+	 * MODULE_STATE_GOING notification.
 	 */
-	if (kprobe_ftrace(p))
+	if (kprobe_ftrace(p) && !kprobe_disabled(p) && !kprobes_all_disarmed)
 		disarm_kprobe_ftrace(p);
 }
 
author maintainer
#247 lore raw

PATCH 239/245 mm, THP, swap: fix allocating cluster for swapfile by mistake

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gao Xiang <[email protected]>

commit 41663430588c737dd735bad5a0d1ba325dcabd59 upstream.

SWP_FS is used to make swap_{read,write}page() go through the filesystem, and it's only used for swap files over NFS. So, !SWP_FS means non NFS for now, it could be either file backed or device backed. Something similar goes with legacy SWP_FILE.

So in order to achieve the goal of the original patch, SWP_BLKDEV should be used instead.

FS corruption can be observed with SSD device + XFS + fragmented swapfile due to CONFIG_THP_SWAP=y.

I reproduced the issue with the following details:

Environment:

QEMU + upstream kernel + buildroot + NVMe (2 GB)

Kernel config:

CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME=y
CONFIG_THP_SWAP=y

Some reproducible steps:

mkfs.xfs -f /dev/nvme0n1
mkdir /tmp/mnt
mount /dev/nvme0n1 /tmp/mnt
bs="32k"
sz="1024m" # doesn't matter too much, I also tried 16m
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -R -b $bs 0 $sz" -c "fdatasync" /tmp/mnt/sw xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -R -b $bs 0 $sz" -c "fdatasync" /tmp/mnt/sw xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -R -b $bs 0 $sz" -c "fdatasync" /tmp/mnt/sw xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -F -S 0 -b $bs 0 $sz" -c "fdatasync" /tmp/mnt/sw xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -R -b $bs 0 $sz" -c "fsync" /tmp/mnt/sw

mkswap /tmp/mnt/sw
swapon /tmp/mnt/sw

  stress --vm 2 --vm-bytes 600M   # doesn't matter too much as well

Symptoms:
- FS corruption (e.g. checksum failure)
- memory corruption at: 0xd2808010
- segfault

Fixes f0eea189e8e9 ("mm, THP, swap: Don't allocate huge cluster for file backed swap device")
Fixes 38d8b4e6bdc8 ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP during swap out")
Cc Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
---
 mm/swapfile.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/swapfile.c +1 -1
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ start_over:
 			goto nextsi;
 		}
 		if (size == SWAPFILE_CLUSTER) {
-			if (!(si->flags & SWP_FILE))
+			if (si->flags & SWP_BLKDEV)
 				n_ret = swap_alloc_cluster(si, swp_entries);
 		} else
 			n_ret = scan_swap_map_slots(si, SWAP_HAS_CACHE,
author maintainer
#248 lore raw

PATCH 240/245 s390/zcrypt: Fix ZCRYPT_PERDEV_REQCNT ioctl

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>

commit f7e80983f0cf470bb82036e73bff4d5a7daf8fc2 upstream.

reqcnt is an u32 pointer but we do copy sizeof(reqcnt) which is the size of the pointer. This means we only copy 8 byte. Let us copy the full monty.

Cc Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
Fixes af4a72276d49 ("s390/zcrypt: Support up to 256 crypto adapters.")
---
 drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c +2 -1
@@ -915,7 +915,8 @@ static long zcrypt_unlocked_ioctl(struct
 		if (!reqcnt)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		zcrypt_perdev_reqcnt(reqcnt, AP_DEVICES);
-		if (copy_to_user((int __user *) arg, reqcnt, sizeof(reqcnt)))
+		if (copy_to_user((int __user *) arg, reqcnt,
+				 sizeof(u32) * AP_DEVICES))
 			rc = -EFAULT;
 		kfree(reqcnt);
 		return rc;
author maintainer
#249 lore raw

PATCH 241/245 kprobes: Fix compiler warning for !CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Muchun Song <[email protected]>

commit 10de795a5addd1962406796a6e13ba6cc0fc6bee upstream.

Fix compiler warning(as show below) for !CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE.

kernel/kprobes.c: In function 'kill_kprobe':
kernel/kprobes.c:1116:33: warning: statement with no effect [-Wunused-value]
1116 | #define disarm_kprobe_ftrace(p) (-ENODEV)
| ^
kernel/kprobes.c:2154:3: note: in expansion of macro 'disarm_kprobe_ftrace'
2154 | disarm_kprobe_ftrace(p);

Fixes 0cb2f1372baa ("kprobes: Fix NULL pointer dereference at kprobe_ftrace_handler")
---
 kernel/kprobes.c |   17 ++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/kprobes.c +14 -3
@@ -1065,9 +1065,20 @@ static int disarm_kprobe_ftrace(struct k
 	return ret;
 }
 #else	/* !CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE */
-#define prepare_kprobe(p)	arch_prepare_kprobe(p)
-#define arm_kprobe_ftrace(p)	(-ENODEV)
-#define disarm_kprobe_ftrace(p)	(-ENODEV)
+static inline int prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
+{
+	return arch_prepare_kprobe(p);
+}
+
+static inline int arm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kprobe *p)
+{
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+
+static inline int disarm_kprobe_ftrace(struct kprobe *p)
+{
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
 #endif
 
 /* Arm a kprobe with text_mutex */
author maintainer
#250 lore raw

PATCH 242/245 ata: define AC_ERR_OK

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>

commit 25937580a5065d6fbd92d9c8ebd47145ad80052e upstream.

Since we will return enum ata_completion_errors from qc_prep in the next patch, let's define AC_ERR_OK to mark the OK status.

---
 include/linux/libata.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/libata.h +1 -0
@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ enum hsm_task_states {
 };
 
 enum ata_completion_errors {
+	AC_ERR_OK		= 0,	    /* no error */
 	AC_ERR_DEV		= (1 << 0), /* device reported error */
 	AC_ERR_HSM		= (1 << 1), /* host state machine violation */
 	AC_ERR_TIMEOUT		= (1 << 2), /* timeout */
author maintainer
#251 lore raw

PATCH 243/245 ata: make qc_prep return ata_completion_errors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>

commit 95364f36701e62dd50eee91e1303187fd1a9f567 upstream.

In case a driver wants to return an error from qc_prep, return enum ata_completion_errors. sata_mv is one of those drivers -- see the next patch. Other drivers return the newly defined AC_ERR_OK.

[v2] use enum ata_completion_errors and AC_ERR_OK.

---
 Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst |    2 +-
 drivers/ata/acard-ahci.c            |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/libahci.c               |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/libata-core.c           |    9 +++++++--
 drivers/ata/libata-sff.c            |   12 ++++++++----
 drivers/ata/pata_macio.c            |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/pata_pxa.c              |    8 +++++---
 drivers/ata/pdc_adma.c              |    7 ++++---
 drivers/ata/sata_fsl.c              |    4 +++-
 drivers/ata/sata_inic162x.c         |    4 +++-
 drivers/ata/sata_mv.c               |   26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 drivers/ata/sata_nv.c               |   18 +++++++++++-------
 drivers/ata/sata_promise.c          |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/sata_qstor.c            |    8 +++++---
 drivers/ata/sata_rcar.c             |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/sata_sil.c              |    8 +++++---
 drivers/ata/sata_sil24.c            |    6 ++++--
 drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c              |    6 ++++--
 include/linux/libata.h              |   12 ++++++------
 19 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
Documentation/driver-api/libata.rst +1 -1
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ High-level taskfile hooks
 
 ::
 
-    void (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+    enum ata_completion_errors (*qc_prep) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
     int (*qc_issue) (struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 
 
drivers/ata/acard-ahci.c +4 -2
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ struct acard_sg {
 	__le32			size;	 /* bit 31 (EOT) max==0x10000 (64k) */
 };
 
-static void acard_ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors acard_ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static bool acard_ahci_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int acard_ahci_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int acard_ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static unsigned int acard_ahci_fill_sg(s
 	return si;
 }
 
-static void acard_ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors acard_ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct ahci_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -295,6 +295,8 @@ static void acard_ahci_qc_prep(struct at
 		opts |= AHCI_CMD_ATAPI | AHCI_CMD_PREFETCH;
 
 	ahci_fill_cmd_slot(pp, qc->hw_tag, opts);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static bool acard_ahci_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/libahci.c +4 -2
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int ahci_scr_write(struct ata_lin
 static bool ahci_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int ahci_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void ahci_port_stop(struct ata_port *ap);
-static void ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int ahci_pmp_qc_defer(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void ahci_freeze(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void ahci_thaw(struct ata_port *ap);
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ static int ahci_pmp_qc_defer(struct ata_
 		return sata_pmp_qc_defer_cmd_switch(qc);
 }
 
-static void ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct ahci_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -1676,6 +1676,8 @@ static void ahci_qc_prep(struct ata_queu
 		opts |= AHCI_CMD_ATAPI | AHCI_CMD_PREFETCH;
 
 	ahci_fill_cmd_slot(pp, qc->hw_tag, opts);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static void ahci_fbs_dec_intr(struct ata_port *ap)
drivers/ata/libata-core.c +7 -2
@@ -4996,7 +4996,10 @@ int ata_std_qc_defer(struct ata_queued_c
 	return ATA_DEFER_LINK;
 }
 
-void ata_noop_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc) { }
+enum ata_completion_errors ata_noop_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+{
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
+}
 
 /**
  *	ata_sg_init - Associate command with scatter-gather table.
@@ -5483,7 +5486,9 @@ void ata_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd
 		return;
 	}
 
-	ap->ops->qc_prep(qc);
+	qc->err_mask |= ap->ops->qc_prep(qc);
+	if (unlikely(qc->err_mask))
+		goto err;
 	trace_ata_qc_issue(qc);
 	qc->err_mask |= ap->ops->qc_issue(qc);
 	if (unlikely(qc->err_mask))
drivers/ata/libata-sff.c +8 -4
@@ -2695,12 +2695,14 @@ static void ata_bmdma_fill_sg_dumb(struc
  *	LOCKING:
  *	spin_lock_irqsave(host lock)
  */
-void ata_bmdma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+enum ata_completion_errors ata_bmdma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	ata_bmdma_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ata_bmdma_qc_prep);
 
@@ -2713,12 +2715,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ata_bmdma_qc_prep);
  *	LOCKING:
  *	spin_lock_irqsave(host lock)
  */
-void ata_bmdma_dumb_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+enum ata_completion_errors ata_bmdma_dumb_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	ata_bmdma_fill_sg_dumb(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ata_bmdma_dumb_qc_prep);
 
drivers/ata/pata_macio.c +4 -2
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static int pata_macio_cable_detect(struc
 	return ATA_CBL_PATA40;
 }
 
-static void pata_macio_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors pata_macio_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	unsigned int write = (qc->tf.flags & ATA_TFLAG_WRITE);
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static void pata_macio_qc_prep(struct at
 		   __func__, qc, qc->flags, write, qc->dev->devno);
 
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	table = (struct dbdma_cmd *) priv->dma_table_cpu;
 
@@ -565,6 +565,8 @@ static void pata_macio_qc_prep(struct at
 	table->command = cpu_to_le16(DBDMA_STOP);
 
 	dev_dbgdma(priv->dev, "%s: %d DMA list entries\n", __func__, pi);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 
drivers/ata/pata_pxa.c +5 -3
@@ -58,25 +58,27 @@ static void pxa_ata_dma_irq(void *d)
 /*
  * Prepare taskfile for submission.
  */
-static void pxa_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors pxa_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct pata_pxa_data *pd = qc->ap->private_data;
 	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx;
 	enum dma_transfer_direction dir;
 
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	dir = (qc->dma_dir == DMA_TO_DEVICE ? DMA_MEM_TO_DEV : DMA_DEV_TO_MEM);
 	tx = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(pd->dma_chan, qc->sg, qc->n_elem, dir,
 				     DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT);
 	if (!tx) {
 		ata_dev_err(qc->dev, "prep_slave_sg() failed\n");
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	}
 	tx->callback = pxa_ata_dma_irq;
 	tx->callback_param = pd;
 	pd->dma_cookie = dmaengine_submit(tx);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 /*
drivers/ata/pdc_adma.c +4 -3
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int adma_ata_init_one(struct pci_
 				const struct pci_device_id *ent);
 static int adma_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void adma_port_stop(struct ata_port *ap);
-static void adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int adma_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int adma_check_atapi_dma(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void adma_freeze(struct ata_port *ap);
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static int adma_fill_sg(struct ata_queue
 	return i;
 }
 
-static void adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct adma_port_priv *pp = qc->ap->private_data;
 	u8  *buf = pp->pkt;
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static void adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queu
 
 	adma_enter_reg_mode(qc->ap);
 	if (qc->tf.protocol != ATA_PROT_DMA)
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	buf[i++] = 0;	/* Response flags */
 	buf[i++] = 0;	/* reserved */
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static void adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queu
 			printk("%s\n", obuf);
 	}
 #endif
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static inline void adma_packet_start(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_fsl.c +3 -1
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ static unsigned int sata_fsl_fill_sg(str
 	return num_prde;
 }
 
-static void sata_fsl_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors sata_fsl_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct sata_fsl_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ static void sata_fsl_qc_prep(struct ata_
 
 	VPRINTK("SATA FSL : xx_qc_prep, di = 0x%x, ttl = %d, num_prde = %d\n",
 		desc_info, ttl_dwords, num_prde);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static unsigned int sata_fsl_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_inic162x.c +3 -1
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static void inic_fill_sg(struct inic_prd
 	prd[-1].flags |= PRD_END;
 }
 
-static void inic_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors inic_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct inic_port_priv *pp = qc->ap->private_data;
 	struct inic_pkt *pkt = pp->pkt;
@@ -532,6 +532,8 @@ static void inic_qc_prep(struct ata_queu
 		inic_fill_sg(prd, qc);
 
 	pp->cpb_tbl[0] = pp->pkt_dma;
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static unsigned int inic_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_mv.c +15 -11
@@ -605,8 +605,8 @@ static int mv5_scr_write(struct ata_link
 static int mv_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void mv_port_stop(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int mv_qc_defer(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-static void mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int mv_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int mv_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
 			unsigned long deadline);
@@ -2044,7 +2044,7 @@ static void mv_rw_multi_errata_sata24(st
  *      LOCKING:
  *      Inherited from caller.
  */
-static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct mv_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -2056,15 +2056,15 @@ static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued
 	switch (tf->protocol) {
 	case ATA_PROT_DMA:
 		if (tf->command == ATA_CMD_DSM)
-			return;
+			return AC_ERR_OK;
 		/* fall-thru */
 	case ATA_PROT_NCQ:
 		break;	/* continue below */
 	case ATA_PROT_PIO:
 		mv_rw_multi_errata_sata24(qc);
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	default:
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	}
 
 	/* Fill in command request block
@@ -2129,8 +2129,10 @@ static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued
 	mv_crqb_pack_cmd(cw++, tf->command, ATA_REG_CMD, 1);	/* last */
 
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	mv_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2145,7 +2147,7 @@ static void mv_qc_prep(struct ata_queued
  *      LOCKING:
  *      Inherited from caller.
  */
-static void mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct mv_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -2156,9 +2158,9 @@ static void mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_qu
 
 	if ((tf->protocol != ATA_PROT_DMA) &&
 	    (tf->protocol != ATA_PROT_NCQ))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	if (tf->command == ATA_CMD_DSM)
-		return;  /* use bmdma for this */
+		return AC_ERR_OK;  /* use bmdma for this */
 
 	/* Fill in Gen IIE command request block */
 	if (!(tf->flags & ATA_TFLAG_WRITE))
@@ -2199,8 +2201,10 @@ static void mv_qc_prep_iie(struct ata_qu
 		);
 
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	mv_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 /**
drivers/ata/sata_nv.c +11 -7
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void nv_ck804_freeze(struct ata_p
 static void nv_ck804_thaw(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int nv_adma_slave_config(struct scsi_device *sdev);
 static int nv_adma_check_atapi_dma(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-static void nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int nv_adma_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static irqreturn_t nv_adma_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance);
 static void nv_adma_irq_clear(struct ata_port *ap);
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ static void nv_mcp55_freeze(struct ata_p
 static void nv_swncq_error_handler(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int nv_swncq_slave_config(struct scsi_device *sdev);
 static int nv_swncq_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
-static void nv_swncq_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors nv_swncq_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void nv_swncq_fill_sg(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int nv_swncq_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void nv_swncq_irq_clear(struct ata_port *ap, u16 fis);
@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ static int nv_adma_use_reg_mode(struct a
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static void nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct nv_adma_port_priv *pp = qc->ap->private_data;
 	struct nv_adma_cpb *cpb = &pp->cpb[qc->hw_tag];
@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ static void nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_q
 			(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP));
 		nv_adma_register_mode(qc->ap);
 		ata_bmdma_qc_prep(qc);
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	}
 
 	cpb->resp_flags = NV_CPB_RESP_DONE;
@@ -1409,6 +1409,8 @@ static void nv_adma_qc_prep(struct ata_q
 	cpb->ctl_flags = ctl_flags;
 	wmb();
 	cpb->resp_flags = 0;
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static unsigned int nv_adma_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
@@ -1972,17 +1974,19 @@ static int nv_swncq_port_start(struct at
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void nv_swncq_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors nv_swncq_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	if (qc->tf.protocol != ATA_PROT_NCQ) {
 		ata_bmdma_qc_prep(qc);
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 	}
 
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	nv_swncq_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static void nv_swncq_fill_sg(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_promise.c +4 -2
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static int pdc_sata_scr_write(struct ata
 static int pdc_ata_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
 static int pdc_common_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int pdc_sata_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
-static void pdc_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors pdc_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void pdc_tf_load_mmio(struct ata_port *ap, const struct ata_taskfile *tf);
 static void pdc_exec_command_mmio(struct ata_port *ap, const struct ata_taskfile *tf);
 static int pdc_check_atapi_dma(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static void pdc_fill_sg(struct ata_queue
 	prd[idx - 1].flags_len |= cpu_to_le32(ATA_PRD_EOT);
 }
 
-static void pdc_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors pdc_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct pdc_port_priv *pp = qc->ap->private_data;
 	unsigned int i;
@@ -681,6 +681,8 @@ static void pdc_qc_prep(struct ata_queue
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static int pdc_is_sataii_tx4(unsigned long flags)
drivers/ata/sata_qstor.c +5 -3
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int qs_scr_write(struct ata_link
 static int qs_ata_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
 static int qs_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void qs_host_stop(struct ata_host *host);
-static void qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int qs_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static int qs_check_atapi_dma(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void qs_freeze(struct ata_port *ap);
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static unsigned int qs_fill_sg(struct at
 	return si;
 }
 
-static void qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct qs_port_priv *pp = qc->ap->private_data;
 	u8 dflags = QS_DF_PORD, *buf = pp->pkt;
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static void qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued
 
 	qs_enter_reg_mode(qc->ap);
 	if (qc->tf.protocol != ATA_PROT_DMA)
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	nelem = qs_fill_sg(qc);
 
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ static void qs_qc_prep(struct ata_queued
 
 	/* frame information structure (FIS) */
 	ata_tf_to_fis(&qc->tf, 0, 1, &buf[32]);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static inline void qs_packet_start(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_rcar.c +4 -2
@@ -554,12 +554,14 @@ static void sata_rcar_bmdma_fill_sg(stru
 	prd[si - 1].addr |= cpu_to_le32(SATA_RCAR_DTEND);
 }
 
-static void sata_rcar_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors sata_rcar_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	sata_rcar_bmdma_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static void sata_rcar_bmdma_setup(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_sil.c +5 -3
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static void sil_dev_config(struct ata_de
 static int sil_scr_read(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int sc_reg, u32 *val);
 static int sil_scr_write(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int sc_reg, u32 val);
 static int sil_set_mode(struct ata_link *link, struct ata_device **r_failed);
-static void sil_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors sil_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void sil_bmdma_setup(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void sil_bmdma_start(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void sil_bmdma_stop(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
@@ -333,12 +333,14 @@ static void sil_fill_sg(struct ata_queue
 		last_prd->flags_len |= cpu_to_le32(ATA_PRD_EOT);
 }
 
-static void sil_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors sil_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	if (!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP))
-		return;
+		return AC_ERR_OK;
 
 	sil_fill_sg(qc);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static unsigned char sil_get_device_cache_line(struct pci_dev *pdev)
drivers/ata/sata_sil24.c +4 -2
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void sil24_dev_config(struct ata_
 static int sil24_scr_read(struct ata_link *link, unsigned sc_reg, u32 *val);
 static int sil24_scr_write(struct ata_link *link, unsigned sc_reg, u32 val);
 static int sil24_qc_defer(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-static void sil24_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors sil24_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static unsigned int sil24_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static bool sil24_qc_fill_rtf(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void sil24_pmp_attach(struct ata_port *ap);
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static int sil24_qc_defer(struct ata_que
 	return ata_std_qc_defer(qc);
 }
 
-static void sil24_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors sil24_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	struct ata_port *ap = qc->ap;
 	struct sil24_port_priv *pp = ap->private_data;
@@ -884,6 +884,8 @@ static void sil24_qc_prep(struct ata_que
 
 	if (qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_DMAMAP)
 		sil24_fill_sg(qc, sge);
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static unsigned int sil24_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
drivers/ata/sata_sx4.c +4 -2
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static void pdc_error_handler(struct ata
 static void pdc_freeze(struct ata_port *ap);
 static void pdc_thaw(struct ata_port *ap);
 static int pdc_port_start(struct ata_port *ap);
-static void pdc20621_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+static enum ata_completion_errors pdc20621_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 static void pdc_tf_load_mmio(struct ata_port *ap, const struct ata_taskfile *tf);
 static void pdc_exec_command_mmio(struct ata_port *ap, const struct ata_taskfile *tf);
 static unsigned int pdc20621_dimm_init(struct ata_host *host);
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static void pdc20621_nodata_prep(struct
 	VPRINTK("ata pkt buf ofs %u, mmio copied\n", i);
 }
 
-static void pdc20621_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
+static enum ata_completion_errors pdc20621_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
 {
 	switch (qc->tf.protocol) {
 	case ATA_PROT_DMA:
@@ -558,6 +558,8 @@ static void pdc20621_qc_prep(struct ata_
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
+
+	return AC_ERR_OK;
 }
 
 static void __pdc20621_push_hdma(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc,
include/linux/libata.h +6 -6
@@ -913,9 +913,9 @@ struct ata_port_operations {
 	/*
 	 * Command execution
 	 */
-	int  (*qc_defer)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-	int  (*check_atapi_dma)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-	void (*qc_prep)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+	int (*qc_defer)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+	int (*check_atapi_dma)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+	enum ata_completion_errors (*qc_prep)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 	unsigned int (*qc_issue)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 	bool (*qc_fill_rtf)(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 
@@ -1182,7 +1182,7 @@ extern int ata_xfer_mode2shift(unsigned
 extern const char *ata_mode_string(unsigned long xfer_mask);
 extern unsigned long ata_id_xfermask(const u16 *id);
 extern int ata_std_qc_defer(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-extern void ata_noop_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+extern enum ata_completion_errors ata_noop_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 extern void ata_sg_init(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc, struct scatterlist *sg,
 		 unsigned int n_elem);
 extern unsigned int ata_dev_classify(const struct ata_taskfile *tf);
@@ -1917,9 +1917,9 @@ extern const struct ata_port_operations
 	.sg_tablesize		= LIBATA_MAX_PRD,		\
 	.dma_boundary		= ATA_DMA_BOUNDARY
 
-extern void ata_bmdma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+extern enum ata_completion_errors ata_bmdma_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 extern unsigned int ata_bmdma_qc_issue(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
-extern void ata_bmdma_dumb_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
+extern enum ata_completion_errors ata_bmdma_dumb_qc_prep(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 extern unsigned int ata_bmdma_port_intr(struct ata_port *ap,
 				      struct ata_queued_cmd *qc);
 extern irqreturn_t ata_bmdma_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_instance);
author maintainer
#252 lore raw

PATCH 244/245 ata: sata_mv, avoid trigerrable BUG_ON

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>

commit e9f691d899188679746eeb96e6cb520459eda9b4 upstream.

There are several reports that the BUG_ON on unsupported command in mv_qc_prep can be triggered under some circumstances:
https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1110252
https://serverfault.com/questions/888897/raid-problems-after-power-outage
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1652185
https://bugs.centos.org/view.php?id=14998

Let sata_mv handle the failure gracefully: warn about that incl. the failed command number and return an AC_ERR_INVALID error. We can do that now thanks to the previous patch.

Remove also the long-standing FIXME.

[v2] use %.2x as commands are defined as hexa.

---
 drivers/ata/sata_mv.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/sata_mv.c +3 -5
@@ -2111,12 +2111,10 @@ static enum ata_completion_errors mv_qc_
 		 * non-NCQ mode are: [RW] STREAM DMA and W DMA FUA EXT, none
 		 * of which are defined/used by Linux.  If we get here, this
 		 * driver needs work.
-		 *
-		 * FIXME: modify libata to give qc_prep a return value and
-		 * return error here.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(tf->command);
-		break;
+		ata_port_err(ap, "%s: unsupported command: %.2x\n", __func__,
+				tf->command);
+		return AC_ERR_INVALID;
 	}
 	mv_crqb_pack_cmd(cw++, tf->nsect, ATA_REG_NSECT, 0);
 	mv_crqb_pack_cmd(cw++, tf->hob_lbal, ATA_REG_LBAL, 0);
author maintainer
#253 lore raw

PATCH 245/245 KVM: arm64: Assume write fault on S1PTW permission fault on instruction fetch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

commit c4ad98e4b72cb5be30ea282fce935248f2300e62 upstream.

KVM currently assumes that an instruction abort can never be a write. This is in general true, except when the abort is triggered by a S1PTW on instruction fetch that tries to update the S1 page tables (to set AF, for example).

This can happen if the page tables have been paged out and brought back in without seeing a direct write to them (they are thus marked read only), and the fault handling code will make the PT executable(!) instead of writable. The guest gets stuck forever.

In these conditions, the permission fault must be considered as a write so that the Stage-1 update can take place. This is essentially the I-side equivalent of the problem fixed by 60e21a0ef54c ("arm64: KVM:
Take S1 walks into account when determining S2 write faults").

Update kvm_is_write_fault() to return true on IABT+S1PTW, and introduce kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault() that only return true when no faulting on a S1 fault. Additionally, kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw() is renamed to kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(), as the above makes it plain that it isn't specific to data abort.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h   |   11 ++++++++---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h |    9 +++++++--
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c          |    2 +-
 virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c                  |    2 +-
 virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c                   |    5 ++++-
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +8 -3
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static inline int kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(s
 	return (kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_SRT_MASK) >> HSR_SRT_SHIFT;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_DABT_S1PTW;
 }
@@ -248,16 +248,21 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_il_is32
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_IL;
 }
 
-static inline u8 kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline u8 kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) >> HSR_EC_SHIFT;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu) == HSR_EC_IABT;
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu) && !kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu);
+}
+
 static inline u8 kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & HSR_FSC;
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +7 -2
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ static inline int kvm_vcpu_dabt_get_rd(c
 	return (kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_SRT_MASK) >> ESR_ELx_SRT_SHIFT;
 }
 
-static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return !!(kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_S1PTW);
 }
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(
 static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_iswrite(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return !!(kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_WNR) ||
-		kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(vcpu); /* AF/DBM update */
+		kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu); /* AF/DBM update */
 }
 
 static inline bool kvm_vcpu_dabt_is_cm(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -340,6 +340,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt
 	return kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(vcpu) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	return kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu) && !kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu);
+}
+
 static inline u8 kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	return kvm_vcpu_get_hsr(vcpu) & ESR_ELx_FSC;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +1 -1
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static bool __hyp_text fixup_guest_exit(
 			kvm_vcpu_trap_get_fault_type(vcpu) == FSC_FAULT &&
 			kvm_vcpu_dabt_isvalid(vcpu) &&
 			!kvm_vcpu_dabt_isextabt(vcpu) &&
-			!kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(vcpu);
+			!kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu);
 
 		if (valid) {
 			int ret = __vgic_v2_perform_cpuif_access(vcpu);
virt/kvm/arm/mmio.c +1 -1
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int decode_hsr(struct kvm_vcpu *v
 	bool sign_extend;
 	bool sixty_four;
 
-	if (kvm_vcpu_dabt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
+	if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu)) {
 		/* page table accesses IO mem: tell guest to fix its TTBR */
 		kvm_inject_dabt(vcpu, kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(vcpu));
 		return 1;
virt/kvm/arm/mmu.c +4 -1
@@ -1282,6 +1282,9 @@ static bool transparent_hugepage_adjust(
 
 static bool kvm_is_write_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu))
+		return true;
+
 	if (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu))
 		return false;
 
@@ -1496,7 +1499,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcp
 	unsigned long flags = 0;
 
 	write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
-	exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_iabt(vcpu);
+	exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
 	VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
 
 	if (fault_status == FSC_PERM && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
#254 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.149 release. There are 245 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:59:03 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.149-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

<trim>

Quoted 3 lines

Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
perf stat: Force error in fallback on :k events

perf failed on stable rc branch 4.19 on all devices.

In file included from util/evlist.h:15:0,

                 from util/evsel.c:30:
util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__exit':
util/util.h:25:28: warning: passing argument 1 of 'free' discards
'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
 #define zfree(ptr) ({ free(*ptr); *ptr = NULL; })
                            ^

util/evsel.c:1293:2: note: in expansion of macro 'zfree'
zfree(&evsel->pmu_name);
^~~~~
In file included from /srv/oe/build/tmp-lkft-glibc/work/intel_corei7_64-linaro-linux/perf/1.0-r9/perf-1.0/tools/perf/arch/x86/include/perf_regs.h:5:0,

                 from util/perf_regs.h:27,
                 from util/event.h:11,
                 from util/callchain.h:8,
                 from util/evsel.c:26:
perf/1.0-r9/recipe-sysroot/usr/include/stdlib.h:563:13: note: expected
'void *' but argument is of type 'const char *'
 extern void free (void *__ptr) __THROW;
             ^~~~

util/evsel.c: In function 'perf_evsel__fallback':
util/evsel.c:2802:14: error: 'struct perf_evsel' has no member named 'core'; did you mean 'node'?
if (evsel->core.attr.exclude_user)

              ^~~~
              node
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#255 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.149 release. There are 245 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 01 Oct 2020 10:59:03 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.149-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.19:

    14 builds:	14 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    38 tests:	38 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.19.149-rc1-gf0a043791d0e
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon