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5.10.111-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 4 participants 175 messages Apr 12, 2022 – Apr 13, 2022 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#162 lore raw

PATCH 162/171 cgroup: Use open-time credentials for process migraton perm checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

commit 1756d7994ad85c2479af6ae5a9750b92324685af upstream.

cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of the write - the PID. This currently uses current's credentials which is a potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that it created.

This patch makes both cgroup2 and cgroup1 process migration interfaces to use the credentials saved at the time of open (file->f_cred) instead of current's.

Fixes 187fe84067bd ("cgroup: require write perm on common ancestor when moving processes on the default hierarchy")

[OP: apply original __cgroup_procs_write() changes to cgroup_threads_write() and cgroup_procs_write(), as the refactoring commit da70862efe006 ("cgroup:
cgroup.{procs,threads} factor out common parts") is not present in 5.10-stable]

---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c |    7 ++++---
 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c    |   17 ++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +4 -3
@@ -505,10 +505,11 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup1_procs_write(str
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/*
-	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only
-	 * need to check permissions on one of them.
+	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only need
+	 * to check permissions on one of them. Check permissions using the
+	 * credentials from file open to protect against inherited fd attacks.
 	 */
-	cred = current_cred();
+	cred = of->file->f_cred;
 	tcred = get_task_cred(task);
 	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
 	    !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +16 -1
@@ -4788,6 +4788,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_procs_write(struct
 	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	const struct cred *saved_cred;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	bool locked;
 
@@ -4805,9 +4806,16 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_procs_write(struct
 	src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
+	/*
+	 * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check
+	 * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against
+	 * inherited fd attacks.
+	 */
+	saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred);
 	ret = cgroup_attach_permissions(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp,
 					of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb, true,
 					ctx->ns);
+	revert_creds(saved_cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_finish;
 
@@ -4832,6 +4840,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_threads_write(stru
 	struct cgroup_file_ctx *ctx = of->priv;
 	struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	const struct cred *saved_cred;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	bool locked;
 
@@ -4851,10 +4860,16 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_threads_write(stru
 	src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
-	/* thread migrations follow the cgroup.procs delegation rule */
+	/*
+	 * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check
+	 * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against
+	 * inherited fd attacks.
+	 */
+	saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred);
 	ret = cgroup_attach_permissions(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp,
 					of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb, false,
 					ctx->ns);
+	revert_creds(saved_cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_finish;
 
author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 163/171 selftests/cgroup: Fix build on older distros

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sachin Sant <[email protected]>

commit c2e46f6b3e3551558d44c4dc518b9667cb0d5f8b upstream.

On older distros struct clone_args does not have a cgroup member, leading to build errors:

cgroup_util.c: In function 'clone_into_cgroup':
cgroup_util.c:343:4: error: 'struct clone_args' has no member named 'cgroup' cgroup_util.c:346:33: error: invalid application of 'sizeof' to incomplete
type 'struct clone_args'

But the selftests already have a locally defined version of the structure which is up to date, called __clone_args.

So use __clone_args which fixes the error.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c +2 -2
@@ -337,13 +337,13 @@ pid_t clone_into_cgroup(int cgroup_fd)
 #ifdef CLONE_ARGS_SIZE_VER2
 	pid_t pid;
 
-	struct clone_args args = {
+	struct __clone_args args = {
 		.flags = CLONE_INTO_CGROUP,
 		.exit_signal = SIGCHLD,
 		.cgroup = cgroup_fd,
 	};
 
-	pid = sys_clone3(&args, sizeof(struct clone_args));
+	pid = sys_clone3(&args, sizeof(struct __clone_args));
 	/*
 	 * Verify that this is a genuine test failure:
 	 * ENOSYS -> clone3() not available
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 164/171 selftests: cgroup: Make cg_create() use 0755 for permission instead of 0644

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

commit b09c2baa56347ae65795350dfcc633dedb1c2970 upstream.

0644 is an odd perm to create a cgroup which is a directory. Use the regular 0755 instead. This is necessary for euid switching test case.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/cgroup_util.c +1 -1
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ int cg_find_unified_root(char *root, siz
 
 int cg_create(const char *cgroup)
 {
-	return mkdir(cgroup, 0644);
+	return mkdir(cgroup, 0755);
 }
 
 int cg_wait_for_proc_count(const char *cgroup, int count)
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 165/171 selftests: cgroup: Test open-time credential usage for migration checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

commit 613e040e4dc285367bff0f8f75ea59839bc10947 upstream.

When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check should use the credentials of the latter task. Add a test for it.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c |   68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c +68 -0
@@ -674,6 +674,73 @@ cleanup:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * cgroup migration permission check should be performed based on the
+ * credentials at the time of open instead of write.
+ */
+static int test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open(const char *root)
+{
+	const uid_t test_euid = 65534;	/* usually nobody, any !root is fine */
+	int ret = KSFT_FAIL;
+	char *cg_test_a = NULL, *cg_test_b = NULL;
+	char *cg_test_a_procs = NULL, *cg_test_b_procs = NULL;
+	int cg_test_b_procs_fd = -1;
+	uid_t saved_uid;
+
+	cg_test_a = cg_name(root, "cg_test_a");
+	cg_test_b = cg_name(root, "cg_test_b");
+
+	if (!cg_test_a || !cg_test_b)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	cg_test_a_procs = cg_name(cg_test_a, "cgroup.procs");
+	cg_test_b_procs = cg_name(cg_test_b, "cgroup.procs");
+
+	if (!cg_test_a_procs || !cg_test_b_procs)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_create(cg_test_a) || cg_create(cg_test_b))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_enter_current(cg_test_a))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (chown(cg_test_a_procs, test_euid, -1) ||
+	    chown(cg_test_b_procs, test_euid, -1))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	saved_uid = geteuid();
+	if (seteuid(test_euid))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	cg_test_b_procs_fd = open(cg_test_b_procs, O_RDWR);
+
+	if (seteuid(saved_uid))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_test_b_procs_fd < 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (write(cg_test_b_procs_fd, "0", 1) >= 0 || errno != EACCES)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	ret = KSFT_PASS;
+
+cleanup:
+	cg_enter_current(root);
+	if (cg_test_b_procs_fd >= 0)
+		close(cg_test_b_procs_fd);
+	if (cg_test_b)
+		cg_destroy(cg_test_b);
+	if (cg_test_a)
+		cg_destroy(cg_test_a);
+	free(cg_test_b_procs);
+	free(cg_test_a_procs);
+	free(cg_test_b);
+	free(cg_test_a);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #define T(x) { x, #x }
 struct corecg_test {
 	int (*fn)(const char *root);
@@ -689,6 +756,7 @@ struct corecg_test {
 	T(test_cgcore_proc_migration),
 	T(test_cgcore_thread_migration),
 	T(test_cgcore_destroy),
+	T(test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open),
 };
 #undef T
 
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 166/171 selftests: cgroup: Test open-time cgroup namespace usage for migration checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>

commit bf35a7879f1dfb0d050fe779168bcf25c7de66f5 upstream.

When a task is writing to an fd opened by a different task, the perm check should use the cgroup namespace of the latter task. Add a test for it.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c |   97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/cgroup/test_core.c +97 -0
@@ -1,11 +1,14 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
 #include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sched.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <signal.h>
@@ -741,6 +744,99 @@ cleanup:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg {
+	const char	*path;
+	int		fd;
+	int		err;
+};
+
+static int lesser_ns_open_thread_fn(void *arg)
+{
+	struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg *targ = arg;
+
+	targ->fd = open(targ->path, O_RDWR);
+	targ->err = errno;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cgroup migration permission check should be performed based on the cgroup
+ * namespace at the time of open instead of write.
+ */
+static int test_cgcore_lesser_ns_open(const char *root)
+{
+	static char stack[65536];
+	const uid_t test_euid = 65534;	/* usually nobody, any !root is fine */
+	int ret = KSFT_FAIL;
+	char *cg_test_a = NULL, *cg_test_b = NULL;
+	char *cg_test_a_procs = NULL, *cg_test_b_procs = NULL;
+	int cg_test_b_procs_fd = -1;
+	struct lesser_ns_open_thread_arg targ = { .fd = -1 };
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	cg_test_a = cg_name(root, "cg_test_a");
+	cg_test_b = cg_name(root, "cg_test_b");
+
+	if (!cg_test_a || !cg_test_b)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	cg_test_a_procs = cg_name(cg_test_a, "cgroup.procs");
+	cg_test_b_procs = cg_name(cg_test_b, "cgroup.procs");
+
+	if (!cg_test_a_procs || !cg_test_b_procs)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_create(cg_test_a) || cg_create(cg_test_b))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_enter_current(cg_test_b))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (chown(cg_test_a_procs, test_euid, -1) ||
+	    chown(cg_test_b_procs, test_euid, -1))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	targ.path = cg_test_b_procs;
+	pid = clone(lesser_ns_open_thread_fn, stack + sizeof(stack),
+		    CLONE_NEWCGROUP | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_VM | SIGCHLD,
+		    &targ);
+	if (pid < 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	cg_test_b_procs_fd = targ.fd;
+	if (cg_test_b_procs_fd < 0)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if (cg_enter_current(cg_test_a))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	if ((status = write(cg_test_b_procs_fd, "0", 1)) >= 0 || errno != ENOENT)
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	ret = KSFT_PASS;
+
+cleanup:
+	cg_enter_current(root);
+	if (cg_test_b_procs_fd >= 0)
+		close(cg_test_b_procs_fd);
+	if (cg_test_b)
+		cg_destroy(cg_test_b);
+	if (cg_test_a)
+		cg_destroy(cg_test_a);
+	free(cg_test_b_procs);
+	free(cg_test_a_procs);
+	free(cg_test_b);
+	free(cg_test_a);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #define T(x) { x, #x }
 struct corecg_test {
 	int (*fn)(const char *root);
@@ -757,6 +853,7 @@ struct corecg_test {
 	T(test_cgcore_thread_migration),
 	T(test_cgcore_destroy),
 	T(test_cgcore_lesser_euid_open),
+	T(test_cgcore_lesser_ns_open),
 };
 #undef T
 
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 167/171 arm64: module: remove (NOLOAD) from linker script

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fangrui Song <[email protected]>

commit 4013e26670c590944abdab56c4fa797527b74325 upstream.

On ELF, (NOLOAD) sets the section type to SHT_NOBITS[1]. It is conceptually inappropriate for .plt and .text.* sections which are always SHT_PROGBITS.

In GNU ld, if PLT entries are needed, .plt will be SHT_PROGBITS anyway and (NOLOAD) will be essentially ignored. In ld.lld, since
https://reviews.llvm.org/D118840 ("[ELF] Support (TYPE=<value>) to customize the output section type"), ld.lld will report a section type mismatch error. Just remove (NOLOAD) to fix the error.

[1] https://lld.llvm.org/ELF/linker_script.html As of today, "The section should be marked as not loadable" on
https://sourceware.org/binutils/docs/ld/Output-Section-Type.html is outdated for ELF.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/module.lds.h +3 -3
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
 SECTIONS {
-	.plt 0 (NOLOAD) : { BYTE(0) }
-	.init.plt 0 (NOLOAD) : { BYTE(0) }
-	.text.ftrace_trampoline 0 (NOLOAD) : { BYTE(0) }
+	.plt 0 : { BYTE(0) }
+	.init.plt 0 : { BYTE(0) }
+	.text.ftrace_trampoline 0 : { BYTE(0) }
 }
 #endif
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 168/171 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Replace smp_store_mb() with virt_store_mb()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <[email protected]>

commit eaa03d34535872d29004cb5cf77dc9dec1ba9a25 upstream.

Following the recommendation in Documentation/memory-barriers.txt for virtual machine guests.

Fixes 8b6a877c060ed ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Replace the per-CPU channel lists with a global array of channels")
---
 drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +3 -3
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void vmbus_channel_map_relid(struct vmbu
 	 * execute:
 	 *
 	 *  (a) In the "normal (i.e., not resuming from hibernation)" path,
-	 *      the full barrier in smp_store_mb() guarantees that the store
+	 *      the full barrier in virt_store_mb() guarantees that the store
 	 *      is propagated to all CPUs before the add_channel_work work
 	 *      is queued.  In turn, add_channel_work is queued before the
 	 *      channel's ring buffer is allocated/initialized and the
@@ -362,14 +362,14 @@ void vmbus_channel_map_relid(struct vmbu
 	 *      recv_int_page before retrieving the channel pointer from the
 	 *      array of channels.
 	 *
-	 *  (b) In the "resuming from hibernation" path, the smp_store_mb()
+	 *  (b) In the "resuming from hibernation" path, the virt_store_mb()
 	 *      guarantees that the store is propagated to all CPUs before
 	 *      the VMBus connection is marked as ready for the resume event
 	 *      (cf. check_ready_for_resume_event()).  The interrupt handler
 	 *      of the VMBus driver and vmbus_chan_sched() can not run before
 	 *      vmbus_bus_resume() has completed execution (cf. resume_noirq).
 	 */
-	smp_store_mb(
+	virt_store_mb(
 		vmbus_connection.channels[channel->offermsg.child_relid],
 		channel);
 }
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 169/171 irqchip/gic, gic-v3: Prevent GSI to SGI translations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>

commit 544808f7e21cb9ccdb8f3aa7de594c05b1419061 upstream.

At the moment the GIC IRQ domain translation routine happily converts ACPI table GSI numbers below 16 to GIC SGIs (Software Generated Interrupts aka IPIs). On the Devicetree side we explicitly forbid this translation, actually the function will never return HWIRQs below 16 when using a DT based domain translation.

We expect SGIs to be handled in the first part of the function, and any further occurrence should be treated as a firmware bug, so add a check and print to report this explicitly and avoid lengthy debug sessions.

Fixes 64b499d8df40 ("irqchip/gic-v3: Configure SGIs as standard interrupts")
---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c |    6 ++++++
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c    |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +6 -0
@@ -1467,6 +1467,12 @@ static int gic_irq_domain_translate(stru
 		if(fwspec->param_count != 2)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		if (fwspec->param[0] < 16) {
+			pr_err(FW_BUG "Illegal GSI%d translation request\n",
+			       fwspec->param[0]);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		*hwirq = fwspec->param[0];
 		*type = fwspec->param[1];
 
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c +6 -0
@@ -1094,6 +1094,12 @@ static int gic_irq_domain_translate(stru
 		if(fwspec->param_count != 2)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		if (fwspec->param[0] < 16) {
+			pr_err(FW_BUG "Illegal GSI%d translation request\n",
+			       fwspec->param[0]);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		*hwirq = fwspec->param[0];
 		*type = fwspec->param[1];
 
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 170/171 mm/sparsemem: fix mem_section will never be NULL gcc 12 warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

commit a431dbbc540532b7465eae4fc8b56a85a9fc7d17 upstream.

The gcc 12 compiler reports a "'mem_section' will never be NULL" warning on the following code:

    static inline struct mem_section *__nr_to_section(unsigned long nr)
    {
    #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
        if (!mem_section)
                return NULL;
    #endif
        if (!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)])
                return NULL;
       :

It happens with CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME off. The mem_section definition is

    #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
    extern struct mem_section **mem_section;
    #else
    extern struct mem_section mem_section[NR_SECTION_ROOTS][SECTIONS_PER_ROOT];
    #endif

In the !CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME case, mem_section is a static 2-dimensional array and so the check "!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)]" doesn't make sense.

Fix this warning by moving the "!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)]" check up inside the CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME block and adding an explicit NR_SECTION_ROOTS check to make sure that there is no out-of-bound array access.

Fixes 3e347261a80b ("sparsemem extreme implementation")
Cc "Kirill A . Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Rafael Aquini <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/mmzone.h |   11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/mmzone.h +7 -4
@@ -1252,13 +1252,16 @@ static inline unsigned long *section_to_
 
 static inline struct mem_section *__nr_to_section(unsigned long nr)
 {
+	unsigned long root = SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr);
+
+	if (unlikely(root >= NR_SECTION_ROOTS))
+		return NULL;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME
-	if (!mem_section)
+	if (!mem_section || !mem_section[root])
 		return NULL;
 #endif
-	if (!mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)])
-		return NULL;
-	return &mem_section[SECTION_NR_TO_ROOT(nr)][nr & SECTION_ROOT_MASK];
+	return &mem_section[root][nr & SECTION_ROOT_MASK];
 }
 extern unsigned long __section_nr(struct mem_section *ms);
 extern size_t mem_section_usage_size(void);
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 171/171 powerpc: Fix virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit Book3E & 32-bit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>

commit ffa0b64e3be58519ae472ea29a1a1ad681e32f48 upstream.

mpe: On 64-bit Book3E vmalloc space starts at 0x8000000000000000.

Because of the way __pa() works we have:
__pa(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore virt_to_pfn(0x8000000000000000) == 0, and therefore virt_addr_valid(0x8000000000000000) == true

Which is wrong, virt_addr_valid() should be false for vmalloc space. In fact all vmalloc addresses that alias with a valid PFN will return true from virt_addr_valid(). That can cause bugs with hardened usercopy as described below by Kefeng Wang:

When running ethtool eth0 on 64-bit Book3E, a BUG occurred:

    usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object not in SLUB page?! (offset 0, size 1048)!
    kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99
    ...
    usercopy_abort+0x64/0xa0 (unreliable)
    __check_heap_object+0x168/0x190
    __check_object_size+0x1a0/0x200
    dev_ethtool+0x2494/0x2b20
    dev_ioctl+0x5d0/0x770
    sock_do_ioctl+0xf0/0x1d0
    sock_ioctl+0x3ec/0x5a0
    __se_sys_ioctl+0xf0/0x160
    system_call_exception+0xfc/0x1f0
    system_call_common+0xf8/0x200

The code shows below,

data = vzalloc(array_size(gstrings.len, ETH_GSTRING_LEN)); copy_to_user(useraddr, data, gstrings.len * ETH_GSTRING_LEN))

The data is alloced by vmalloc(), virt_addr_valid(ptr) will return true on 64-bit Book3E, which leads to the panic.

As commit 4dd7554a6456 ("powerpc/64: Add VIRTUAL_BUG_ON checks for __va and __pa addresses") does, make sure the virt addr above PAGE_OFFSET in the virt_addr_valid() for 64-bit, also add upper limit check to make sure the virt is below high_memory.

Meanwhile, for 32-bit PAGE_OFFSET is the virtual address of the start of lowmem, high_memory is the upper low virtual address, the check is suitable for 32-bit, this will fix the issue mentioned in commit 602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly") too.

On 32-bit there is a similar problem with high memory, that was fixed in commit 602946ec2f90 ("powerpc: Set max_mapnr correctly"), but that commit breaks highmem and needs to be reverted.

We can't easily fix __pa(), we have code that relies on its current behaviour. So for now add extra checks to virt_addr_valid().

For 64-bit Book3S the extra checks are not necessary, the combination of virt_to_pfn() and pfn_valid() should yield the correct result, but they are harmless.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/page.h +5 -1
@@ -132,7 +132,11 @@ static inline bool pfn_valid(unsigned lo
 #define virt_to_page(kaddr)	pfn_to_page(virt_to_pfn(kaddr))
 #define pfn_to_kaddr(pfn)	__va((pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT)
 
-#define virt_addr_valid(kaddr)	pfn_valid(virt_to_pfn(kaddr))
+#define virt_addr_valid(vaddr)	({					\
+	unsigned long _addr = (unsigned long)vaddr;			\
+	_addr >= PAGE_OFFSET && _addr < (unsigned long)high_memory &&	\
+	pfn_valid(virt_to_pfn(_addr));					\
+})
 
 /*
  * On Book-E parts we need __va to parse the device tree and we can't
Tested-by on the v1 series
#172 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.111 release. There are 171 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-5.10.y

We tested commit d3243c194290743f86302b7d651338c47b29f406.

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Tested-by on the v1 series
#173 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.111 release. There are 171 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.111-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

5.10.111-rc1 Successfully Compiled and booted on my Raspberry PI 4b (8g) (bcm2711)

Tested-by Hulk Robot on the v1 series
#174 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.111 release. There are 171 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 14 Apr 2022 06:28:59 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.111-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Tested on arm64 and x86 for 5.10.111-rc1,

Kernel repo:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Branch: linux-5.10.y
Version: 5.10.111-rc1
Commit: d3243c194290743f86302b7d651338c47b29f406
Compiler: gcc version 7.3.0 (GCC)

arm64:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9030
passed: 9030
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

x86:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 9030
passed: 9030
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------