6.6.136-rc1 review
Subsystems (6)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/166 ALSA: caiaq: take a reference on the USB device in create_card()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Berk Cem Goksel <[email protected]>
commit 80bb50e2d459213cccff3111d5ef98ed4238c0d5 upstream.
The caiaq driver stores a pointer to the parent USB device in cdev->chip.dev but never takes a reference on it. The card's private_free callback, snd_usb_caiaq_card_free(), can run asynchronously via snd_card_free_when_closed() after the USB device has already been disconnected and freed, so any access to cdev->chip.dev in that path dereferences a freed usb_device.
On top of the refcounting issue, the current card_free implementation calls usb_reset_device(cdev->chip.dev). A reset in a free callback is inappropriate: the device is going away, the call takes the device lock in a teardown context, and the reset races with the disconnect path that the callback is already cleaning up after.
Take a reference on the USB device in create_card() with usb_get_dev(), drop it with usb_put_dev() in the free callback, and remove the usb_reset_device() call.
--- sound/usb/caiaq/device.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/usb/caiaq/device.c +2 -2
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void card_free(struct snd_card *csnd_usb_caiaq_input_free (cdev);#endif snd_usb_caiaq_audio_free (cdev); -usb_reset_device (cdev->chip.dev); +usb_put_dev (cdev->chip.dev); } static int create_card(struct usb_device *usb_dev,
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int create_card(struct usb_devicereturn err; cdev =caiaqdev (card); - cdev->chip.dev = usb_dev; + cdev->chip.dev =usb_get_dev (usb_dev); cdev->chip.card = card; cdev->chip.usb_id =USB_ID (le16_to_cpu (usb_dev->descriptor.idVendor),le16_to_cpu (usb_dev->descriptor.idProduct));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/166 net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmapd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bingquan Chen <[email protected]>
commit 2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5 upstream.
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +13 -8
@@ -2777,7 +2777,8 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc {struct sk_buff *skb =NULL ;struct net_device *dev; -struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr =NULL ; +struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr; +bool has_vnet_hdr = false;struct sockcm_cookie sockc;__be16 proto;int err, reserve =0 ;
@@ -2878,16 +2879,20 @@ static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_soc hlen =LL_RESERVED_SPACE (dev); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;if (vnet_hdr_sz) { - vnet_hdr = data; data += vnet_hdr_sz; tp_len -= vnet_hdr_sz; -if (tp_len <0 || -__packet_snd_vnet_parse (vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { +if (tp_len <0 ) { + tp_len = -EINVAL ; + goto tpacket_error; + } +memcpy (&vnet_hdr, data - vnet_hdr_sz,sizeof (vnet_hdr)); +if (__packet_snd_vnet_parse (&vnet_hdr, tp_len)) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } copylen =__virtio16_to_cpu (vio_le (), - vnet_hdr->hdr_len); + vnet_hdr.hdr_len); + has_vnet_hdr = true; } copylen =max_t (int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len); skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
@@ -2924,12 +2929,12 @@ tpacket_error: } } -if (vnet_hdr_sz) { -if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { +if (has_vnet_hdr) { +if (virtio_net_hdr_to_skb (skb, &vnet_hdr,vio_le ())) { tp_len = -EINVAL ; goto tpacket_error; } -virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, vnet_hdr); +virtio_net_hdr_set_proto (skb, &vnet_hdr); } skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/166 crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errors
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit 4eded6d14f5b7bb857b68872970a40cf3105c015 upstream.
When a crypto algorithm with a higher priority is registered, it kills the spawns of all lower-priority algorithms. Thus it is to be expected for an algorithm to go away at any time, even during a self-test. This is now much more common with asynchronous testing.
Remove the printk when an ENOENT is encountered during a self-test. This is not really an error since the algorithm being tested is no longer there (i.e., it didn't fail the test which is what we care about).
--- crypto/testmgr.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/testmgr.c +22 -1
@@ -1916,6 +1916,8 @@ static int __alg_test_hash(const struct atfm =crypto_alloc_ahash (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (atfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (atfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (atfm));return PTR_ERR (atfm);
@@ -2680,6 +2682,8 @@ static int alg_test_aead(const struct al tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3257,6 +3261,8 @@ static int alg_test_skcipher(const struc tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3670,6 +3676,8 @@ static int alg_test_cipher(const struct tfm =crypto_alloc_cipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Failed to load transform for " "%s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3694,6 +3702,8 @@ static int alg_test_comp(const struct alif (algo_type ==CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS ) { acomp =crypto_alloc_acomp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (acomp)) { +if (PTR_ERR (acomp) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: acomp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (acomp));return PTR_ERR (acomp);
@@ -3706,6 +3716,8 @@ static int alg_test_comp(const struct al }else { comp =crypto_alloc_comp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (comp)) { +if (PTR_ERR (comp) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: comp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (comp));return PTR_ERR (comp);
@@ -3782,6 +3794,8 @@ static int alg_test_cprng(const struct a rng =crypto_alloc_rng (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (rng)) { +if (PTR_ERR (rng) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to load transform for %s: " "%ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (rng));return PTR_ERR (rng);
@@ -3809,10 +3823,13 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct d drng =crypto_alloc_rng (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (drng)) { +if (PTR_ERR (drng) == -ENOENT ) + goto out_no_rng;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for " "%s\n" , driver); +out_no_rng:kfree_sensitive (buf); -return -ENOMEM ; +return PTR_ERR (drng); } test_data.testentropy = &testentropy;
@@ -4054,6 +4071,8 @@ static int alg_test_kpp(const struct alg tfm =crypto_alloc_kpp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -4282,6 +4301,8 @@ static int alg_test_akcipher(const struc tfm =crypto_alloc_akcipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) { +if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) +return -ENOENT ;pr_err ("alg: akcipher: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/166 crypto: testmgr - Hide ENOENT errors better
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit 6318fbe26e67f9c27a1917fe63936b0fc6000373 upstream.
The previous patch removed the ENOENT warning at the point of allocation, but the overall self-test warning is still there.
Fix all of them by returning zero as the test result. This is safe because if the algorithm has gone away, then it cannot be marked as tested.
--- crypto/testmgr.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
crypto/testmgr.c +11 -12
@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ static int __alg_test_hash(const struct atfm =crypto_alloc_ahash (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (atfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (atfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (atfm));return PTR_ERR (atfm);
@@ -2683,7 +2683,7 @@ static int alg_test_aead(const struct al tfm =crypto_alloc_aead (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3262,7 +3262,7 @@ static int alg_test_skcipher(const struc tfm =crypto_alloc_skcipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3677,7 +3677,7 @@ static int alg_test_cipher(const struct tfm =crypto_alloc_cipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Failed to load transform for " "%s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -3703,7 +3703,7 @@ static int alg_test_comp(const struct al acomp =crypto_alloc_acomp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (acomp)) {if (PTR_ERR (acomp) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: acomp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (acomp));return PTR_ERR (acomp);
@@ -3717,7 +3717,7 @@ static int alg_test_comp(const struct al comp =crypto_alloc_comp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (comp)) {if (PTR_ERR (comp) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: comp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (comp));return PTR_ERR (comp);
@@ -3795,7 +3795,7 @@ static int alg_test_cprng(const struct a rng =crypto_alloc_rng (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (rng)) {if (PTR_ERR (rng) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to load transform for %s: " "%ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (rng));return PTR_ERR (rng);
@@ -3823,12 +3823,11 @@ static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct d drng =crypto_alloc_rng (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (drng)) { +kfree_sensitive (buf);if (PTR_ERR (drng) == -ENOENT ) - goto out_no_rng; +return 0 ;printk (KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for " "%s\n" , driver); -out_no_rng: -kfree_sensitive (buf);return PTR_ERR (drng); }
@@ -4072,7 +4071,7 @@ static int alg_test_kpp(const struct alg tfm =crypto_alloc_kpp (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
@@ -4302,7 +4301,7 @@ static int alg_test_akcipher(const struc tfm =crypto_alloc_akcipher (driver, type, mask);if (IS_ERR (tfm)) {if (PTR_ERR (tfm) == -ENOENT ) -return -ENOENT ; +return 0 ;pr_err ("alg: akcipher: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n" , driver,PTR_ERR (tfm));return PTR_ERR (tfm);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/166 crypto: ccp: Dont attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit abe4a6d6f606113251868c2c4a06ba904bb41eed upstream.
When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405 CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline] sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872 sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562 vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any firwmware error.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +7 -1
@@ -674,7 +674,10 @@ cmd: ret =__sev_do_cmd_locked (SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR , &data, &argp->error); -/* If we query the CSR length, FW responded with expected data. */ +/* +* Firmware will returns the length of the CSR blob (either the minimum +* required length or the actual length written), return it to the user. +*/ input.length = data.len;if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)argp->data, &input,sizeof (input))) {
@@ -682,6 +685,9 @@ cmd: goto e_free_blob; } +if (ret ||WARN_ON_ONCE (argp->error)) + goto e_free_blob; +if (blob) {if (copy_to_user (input_address, blob, input.length)) ret = -EFAULT ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/166 crypto: ccp: Dont attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit e76239fed3cffd6d304d8ca3ce23984fd24f57d3 upstream.
When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033 CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline] sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347 sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568 vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any firwmware error.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +7 -1
@@ -1046,7 +1046,10 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struc cmd: ret =__sev_do_cmd_locked (SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT , &data, &argp->error); -/* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */ +/* +* Firmware will return the length of the blobs (either the minimum +* required length or the actual length written), return 'em to the user. +*/ input.cert_chain_len = data.cert_chain_len; input.pdh_cert_len = data.pdh_cert_len;
@@ -1055,6 +1058,9 @@ cmd: goto e_free_cert; } +if (ret ||WARN_ON_ONCE (argp->error)) + goto e_free_cert; +if (pdh_blob) {if (copy_to_user (input_pdh_cert_address, pdh_blob, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/166 crypto: ccp: Dont attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
commit 4f685dbfa87c546e51d9dc6cab379d20f275e114 upstream.
When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388 CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline] _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline] _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26 copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline] sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222 sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575 vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any firwmware error.
--- drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +3 -0
@@ -932,6 +932,9 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_get_id2(struct s goto e_free; } +if (ret ||WARN_ON_ONCE (argp->error)) + goto e_free; +if (id_blob) {if (copy_to_user (input_address, id_blob, data.len)) { ret = -EFAULT ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/166 rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anderson Nascimento <[email protected]>
commit ac33733b10b484d666f97688561670afd5861383 upstream.
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28 bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length. When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse() to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
--- net/rxrpc/key.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/rxrpc/key.c +4 -0
@@ -340,6 +340,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preif (v1->security_index !=RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD ) goto error; + ret = -EKEYREJECTED ; +if (v1->ticket_length >AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX ) + goto error; + plen =sizeof (*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length; prep->quotalen += plen +sizeof (*token);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/166 md/raid1: fix data lost for writemostly rdev
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
commit 93dec51e716db88f32d770dc9ab268964fff320b upstream.
If writemostly is enabled, alloc_behind_master_bio() will allocate a new bio for rdev, with bi_opf set to 0. Later, raid1_write_request() will clone from this bio, hence bi_opf is still 0 for the cloned bio. Submit this cloned bio will end up to be read, causing write data lost.
Fix this problem by inheriting bi_opf from original bio for behind_mast_bio.
--- drivers/md/raid1.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -1
@@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ static void alloc_behind_master_bio(struint i =0 ;struct bio *behind_bio =NULL ; - behind_bio =bio_alloc_bioset (NULL , vcnt,0 ,GFP_NOIO , + behind_bio =bio_alloc_bioset (NULL , vcnt, bio->bi_opf,GFP_NOIO , &r1_bio->mddev->bio_set);if (!behind_bio)return ;
Am 24.04.2026 um 15:28 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
Signature · 8 lines
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge, enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world, not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr. OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244 Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected] https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:23:21 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.136-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Hi!
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
CIP testing did not find any problems here:
https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-6.6.y
Best regards,
Pavel
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:23:21 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.136-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
# Librecast Test Results
020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.6.136-rc1-g3e00a9adb2ee #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Sat Apr 25 07:26:54 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Quoted 8 lines · On Fri, 24 Apr 2026 15:28:34 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:23:21 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64:
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:23:21 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.136-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.6.136 release. There are 166 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sun, 26 Apr 2026 13:23:21 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.6.136-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.6.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Tested on my Lenovo ThinkPad T14 Gen 1. Working well, no regressions observed.
Signature · 1 line
-Barry K. Nathan <[email protected]>