UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
syzbot
syzbotHello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 9187210eee7d Merge tag 'net-next-6.9' of git://git.kernel... git tree: upstream console+strace: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1736a3da180000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=222448ff79dba2ea dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d2a2c639d03ac200a4f1 compiler: gcc (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=16b3fdc1180000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=11201969180000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/98c1ea7ddb95/disk-9187210e.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/343c5524f68f/vmlinux-9187210e.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6c0c68b0ee90/bzImage-9187210e.xz
The issue was bisected to:
commit 011832b97b311bb9e3c27945bc0d1089a14209c9
Author: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> Date: Wed Mar 6 03:19:26 2024 +0000
bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction
bisection log: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/bisect.txt?x=115e578e180000 final oops: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/report.txt?x=135e578e180000 console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=155e578e180000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/core.c:2349:29 index 16 is out of range for type '<unknown> *[16]' CPU: 1 PID: 5060 Comm: syz-executor255 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-05202-g9187210eee7d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x125/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x110/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:415 bpf_prog_select_func kernel/bpf/core.c:2349 [inline] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x5aa/0x640 kernel/bpf/core.c:2380 bpf_prog_load+0xf0f/0x2660 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2899 __sys_bpf+0x9b4/0x4b40 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd2/0x260 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fa2a0fe73e9 Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 37 17 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdd829a698 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000141 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdd829a878 RCX: 00007fa2a0fe73e9 RDX: 0000000000000048 RSI: 00000000200017c0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007fa2a105a610 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffdd829a868 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]---
---
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syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
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***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
#syz test
BPF documentation specifies that the maximum stack depth for a BPF program is 512 bytes. This is not enforced when selecting a bpf interpreter, thus casuing an index out of bounds error when trying to obtain an interpreter with a bigger stack size.
This patch enforces the stack size to be not bigger than 512.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)BUG_ON (1 );return 0 ; } - +#define BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE 512#define PROG_NAME (stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN (stack_size) \ static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp) {#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth =max_t (u32, fp->aux->stack_depth,1 ); - + stack_depth =min_t (u32, stack_depth,BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE ); fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up (stack_depth,32 ) /32 ) -1 ];#else fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
syzbot
syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
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***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
Please test the following
#syz test
BPF documentation specifies that the maximum stack depth for a BPF program is 512 bytes. This is not enforced when selecting a bpf interpreter, thus casuing an index out of bounds error when trying to obtain an interpreter with a bigger stack size.
This patch enforces the stack size to be not bigger than 512.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)BUG_ON (1 );return 0 ; } - +#define BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE 512#define PROG_NAME (stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN (stack_size) \ static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp) {#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth =max_t (u32, fp->aux->stack_depth,1 ); - + stack_depth =min_t (u32, stack_depth,BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE ); fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up (stack_depth,32 ) /32 ) -1 ];#else fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
syzbot
syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
In reply to syzbotFor archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
Please test the following
#syz test
BPF documentation specifies that the maximum stack depth for a BPF program is 512 bytes. This is not enforced when selecting a bpf interpreter, thus casuing an index out of bounds error when trying to obtain an interpreter with a bigger stack size.
This patch enforces the stack size to be not bigger than 512.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)BUG_ON (1 );return 0 ; } - +#define BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE 512#define PROG_NAME (stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN (stack_size) \ static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp) {#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth =max_t (u32, fp->aux->stack_depth,1 ); - + stack_depth =min_t (u32, stack_depth,BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE ); fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up (stack_depth,32 ) /32 ) -1 ];#else fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
syzbot
syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
In reply to syzbotFor archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
BPF documentation specifies that the maximum stack depth for a BPF program is 512 bytes. This is not enforced when selecting a bpf interpreter, thus casuing an index out of bounds error when trying to obtain an interpreter with a bigger stack size.
This patch enforces the stack size to be not bigger than 512.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)BUG_ON (1 );return 0 ; } - +#define BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE 512#define PROG_NAME (stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN (stack_size) \ static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp) {#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth =max_t (u32, fp->aux->stack_depth,1 ); - + stack_depth =min_t (u32, stack_depth,BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE ); fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up (stack_depth,32 ) /32 ) -1 ];#else fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
syzbot
syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
In reply to syzbotFor archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
Please test the following
#syz test https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 9187210eee7d
BPF documentation specifies that the maximum stack depth for a BPF program is 512 bytes. This is not enforced when selecting a bpf interpreter, thus casuing an index out of bounds error when trying to obtain an interpreter with a bigger stack size.
This patch enforces the stack size to be not bigger than 512.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -2196,7 +2196,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)BUG_ON (1 );return 0 ; } - +#define BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE 512#define PROG_NAME (stack_size) __bpf_prog_run##stack_size#define DEFINE_BPF_PROG_RUN (stack_size) \ static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
@@ -2345,7 +2345,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp) {#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON u32 stack_depth =max_t (u32, fp->aux->stack_depth,1 ); - + stack_depth =min_t (u32, stack_depth,BPF_MAX_STACK_SIZE ); fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up (stack_depth,32 ) /32 ) -1 ];#else fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
syzbot
syzbotRe: [syzbot] [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
In reply to syzbotFor archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
For archival purposes, forwarding an incoming command email to [email protected].
***
Subject: [PATCH] fix array-index-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_select_runtime
Author: [email protected]
#syz test
The error indicates that the verifier is letting through a program with a stack depth bigger than 512.
This is due to the verifier not checking the stack depth after instruction rewrites are perfomed. For example, the MAY_GOTO instruction adds 8 bytes to the stack, which means that if the stack at the moment was already 512 bytes it would overflow after rewriting the instruction.
The fix involves adding a stack depth check after all instruction rewrites are performed.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -0
@@ -21285,6 +21285,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3if (ret ==0 ) ret =do_misc_fixups (env); +/* max stack depth verification must be done after rewrites as well */ +if (ret ==0 ) + ret =check_max_stack_depth (env); +/* do 32-bit optimization after insn patching has done so those patched * insns could be handled correctly. */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1