vmx/hap: optimize CR4 trapping
PATCH 1/1 vmx/hap: optimize CR4 trapping
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920}
cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920}
cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}
*[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}
After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032}
cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032}
cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}
*[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}
Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>
--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +41 -0
@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4. +* +* NB: shadow path has not been optimized because it requires +* unconditionally trapping more CR4 bits, at which point the +* performance benefit of doing this is quite dubious. +*/ +__vmwrite (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , ~0UL ); +else + { +uint64_t mask =HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK |X86_CR4_PKE | + ~hvm_cr4_guest_valid_bits (v,0 ); + +/* +* Update CR4 host mask to only trap when the guest tries to set +* bits that are controlled by the hypervisor. +*/ + mask |= v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmx_realmode ?X86_CR4_VME :0 ; + mask |= !hvm_paging_enabled (v) ? (X86_CR4_PSE |X86_CR4_SMEP | +X86_CR4_SMAP ) + :0 ; +__vmwrite (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , mask); + } +break ;case 2 :
@@ -3512,6 +3541,18 @@ void vmx_vmexit_handler(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)if (paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) { +uint64_t cr4, mask; + +/* +* Xen allows the guest to modify some CR4 bits directly, update cached +* values to match. +*/ +__vmread (GUEST_CR4 , &cr4); +__vmread (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , &mask); + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ] = cr4; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4 ] &= mask; + v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4 ] |= cr4 & ~mask; +__vmread (GUEST_CR3 , &v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[3 ]);if (vmx_unrestricted_guest (v) ||hvm_paging_enabled (v) ) v->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[3 ] = v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[3 ];
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +4 -1
@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ static void load_shadow_guest_state(struct vcpu *v) {struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm (v);u32 control; -u64 cr_gh_mask, cr_read_shadow; +uint64_t cr_gh_mask, cr_mask, cr_read_shadow;int rc;static const u16 vmentry_fields[] = {
@@ -1100,6 +1100,9 @@ static void load_shadow_guest_state(struct vcpu *v) cr_read_shadow = (get_vvmcs (v,GUEST_CR4 ) & ~cr_gh_mask) | (get_vvmcs (v,CR4_READ_SHADOW ) & cr_gh_mask);__vmwrite (CR4_READ_SHADOW , cr_read_shadow); +/* Add the nested host mask to the one set by vmx_update_guest_cr. */ +__vmread (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , &cr_mask); +__vmwrite (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , cr_gh_mask | cr_mask);/* TODO: CR3 target control */ }
xen/arch/x86/monitor.c +3 -2
@@ -189,10 +189,11 @@ int arch_monitor_domctl_event(struct domain *d, ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled &= ~ctrlreg_bitmask; } -if (VM_EVENT_X86_CR3 == mop->u.mov_to_cr.index ) +if (VM_EVENT_X86_CR3 == mop->u.mov_to_cr.index || +VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 == mop->u.mov_to_cr.index ) {struct vcpu *v; -/* Latches new CR3 mask through CR0 code. */ +/* Latches new CR3 or CR4 mask through CR0 code. */ for_each_vcpu ( d, v )hvm_update_guest_cr (v,0 ); }
Signature · 7 lines
2.16.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel
Quoted 49 lines · Roger Pau Monne
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032} cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
Reported-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1693
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4.
The monitor write_ctrlreg_onchangeonly feature was purposefully introduced to avoid sending PGE updates to the introspection agent. It would be ideal to include that in the mask calculation so introspection cases don't vmexit for PGE changes.
Also, AMD has similar capabilities, and (as of today) has gained CR monitoring.
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1699
Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0+* +* NB: shadow path has not been optimized because it requires +* unconditionally trapping more CR4 bits, at which point the +* performance benefit of doing this is quite dubious. +*/ +__vmwrite (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , ~0UL );
It would be better to stash the calculated mask, rather than reading it back in the vmexit handler.
~Andrew
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Quoted 66 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 49 lines · Roger Pau Monne
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032} cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
Reported-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1693
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4. The monitor
write_ctrlreg_onchangeonlyfeature was purposefully introduced to avoid sending PGE updates to the introspection agent. It would be ideal to include that in the mask calculation so introspection cases don't vmexit for PGE changes.
Quoted 2 lines
Also, AMD has similar capabilities, and (as of today) has gained CR monitoring.
I believe the patch Andrew is referring to is this one:
https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=59aad28cfac09640e2272f1e87951406233c3192
We added that specifically so that no PGE-only exits end up needing (pointless) processing by the introspection agent.
Thanks,
Razvan
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Quoted 70 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
Quoted 66 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 49 lines · Roger Pau Monne
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032} cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
Reported-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1693
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4. The monitor
write_ctrlreg_onchangeonlyfeature was purposefully introduced to avoid sending PGE updates to the introspection agent. It would be ideal to include that in the mask calculation so introspection cases don't vmexit for PGE changes.Quoted 2 lines
Also, AMD has similar capabilities, and (as of today) has gained CR monitoring.
Quoted 6 lines
I believe the patch Andrew is referring to is this one:
https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=59aad28cfac09640e2272f1e87951406233c3192
We added that specifically so that no PGE-only exits end up needing (pointless) processing by the introspection agent.
I've been looking at that change and I think the logic is wrong, the following chunk:
if ( (ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask) &&
(!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_onchangeonly & ctrlreg_bitmask) ||
- value != old) )
+ value != old) &&
+ (!((value ^ old) & ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_mask[index])) )
{
bool_t sync = !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_sync & ctrlreg_bitmask);Seems wrong. Imagine for example the case where (value ^ old) == PGE|PSE, and mask == PGE:
!((PGE|PSE) & PGE) will yield false, and the monitor won't be notified.
I think what you want is:
((value ^ old) & ~ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_mask[index])
But maybe I'm just confused.
Roger.
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Quoted 92 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 70 lines · Razvan Cojocaru
Quoted 66 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 49 lines · Roger Pau Monne
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032} cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
Reported-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1693
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4. The monitor
write_ctrlreg_onchangeonlyfeature was purposefully introduced to avoid sending PGE updates to the introspection agent. It would be ideal to include that in the mask calculation so introspection cases don't vmexit for PGE changes.Quoted 2 lines
Also, AMD has similar capabilities, and (as of today) has gained CR monitoring.
Quoted 6 lines
I believe the patch Andrew is referring to is this one:
https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commitdiff;h=59aad28cfac09640e2272f1e87951406233c3192
We added that specifically so that no PGE-only exits end up needing (pointless) processing by the introspection agent.
I've been looking at that change and I think the logic is wrong, the following chunk:
if ( (ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & ctrlreg_bitmask) && (!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_onchangeonly & ctrlreg_bitmask) ||(quoted diff) +2
-1- value != old) ) + value != old) && + (!((value ^ old) & ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_mask[index])) ) { bool_t sync = !!(ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_sync & ctrlreg_bitmask);Seems wrong. Imagine for example the case where (value ^ old) == PGE|PSE, and mask == PGE:
Quoted 7 lines
!((PGE|PSE) & PGE) will yield false, and the monitor won't be notified.
I think what you want is:
((value ^ old) & ~ad->monitor.write_ctrlreg_mask[index])
But maybe I'm just confused.
No, I think you're quite right. Thanks for pointing that out! We'll submit a fix patch shortly.
Thanks,
Razvan
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Xen-devel mailing list
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Quoted 52 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 51 lines · Roger Pau Monne
There a bunch of bits in CR4 that should be allowed to be set directly by the guest without requiring Xen intervention, currently this is already done by passing through guest writes into the CR4 used when running in non-root mode, but taking an expensive vmexit in order to do so.
xenalyze reports the following when running a PV guest in shim mode:
CR_ACCESS 3885950 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr4 3885940 6.41s 17.04% 3957 cyc { 2361| 3378| 7920} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3480 cyc { 3480| 3480| 3480}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 7112 cyc { 3248| 5960|17480}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 4588 cyc { 3456| 5720| 5720}After this change this turns into:
CR_ACCESS 12 0.00s 0.00% 9972 cyc { 3680|11024|24032} cr4 2 0.00s 0.00% 17528 cyc {11024|24032|24032} cr3 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680} *[ 0] 1 0.00s 0.00% 3680 cyc { 3680| 3680| 3680}cr0 7 0.00s 0.00% 9209 cyc { 4184| 7848|17488}
clts 2 0.00s 0.00% 8232 cyc { 5352|11112|11112}Note that this optimized trapping is currently only applied to guests running with HAP on Intel hardware. If using shadow paging more CR4 bits need to be unconditionally trapped, which makes this approach unlikely to yield any important performance improvements.
Reported-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>---
Cc: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc: Kevin Tian <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Cc: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Cc: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 5 ++++- xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +0
-0@@ -1684,6 +1684,35 @@ static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) }
Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1693
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +7
-0__vmwrite (GUEST_CR4 , v->arch.hvm_vcpu.hw_cr[4 ]); + +if ( (v->domain->arch.monitor.write_ctrlreg_enabled & +monitor_ctrlreg_bitmask (VM_EVENT_X86_CR4 )) || + !paging_mode_hap (v->domain) ) +/* +* If requested by introspection or running in shadow mode trap all +* accesses to CR4. The monitor
write_ctrlreg_onchangeonlyfeature was purposefully introduced to avoid sending PGE updates to the introspection agent. It would be ideal to include that in the mask calculation so introspection cases don't vmexit for PGE changes.
Oh, haven't realized about that, will include it.
Quoted 2 lines
Also, AMD has similar capabilities, and (as of today) has gained CR monitoring.
OK, will have to find some AMD hardware and prepare a similar patch, but that's certainly for later.
Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c static void vmx_update_guest_cr(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int cr) · line 1699
Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +6
-0+* +* NB: shadow path has not been optimized because it requires +* unconditionally trapping more CR4 bits, at which point the +* performance benefit of doing this is quite dubious. +*/ +__vmwrite (CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK , ~0UL );It would be better to stash the calculated mask, rather than reading it back in the vmexit handler.
Right, I guess for coherency I should introduce a mask_cr[4] array to hvm_vcpu. I could do that in a pre-patch if it sounds fine.
Thanks, Roger.
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