Enforce buffer boundaries on RNDIS USB Gadget
PATCH 1/1 Enforce buffer boundaries on RNDIS USB Gadget
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in gen_ndis_set_resp via manipulation of buf->InformationBufferOffset. Lack of validation of BufOffset could be exploited to dump arbitrary memory contents via NDIS packet filter.
--- drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6 -3
@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf; - BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -#ifdef VERBOSE debug ("%s: Length: %d\n" , __func__, BufLength);debug ("%s: Offset: %d\n" , __func__, BufOffset);
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Szymon,
Quoted 7 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Lack of validation of BufOffset could be exploited to dump arbitrary memory contents via NDIS packet filter.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
Please run ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl on your patch and copy the maintainers.
Quoted 32 lines
--- drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-4@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf; - BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -#ifdef VERBOSE debug ("%s: Length: %d\n" , __func__, BufLength);debug ("%s: Offset: %d\n" , __func__, BufOffset); --2.38.1
Quoted 5 lines · Fabio Estevam
Szymon,
Quoted 1 line · Szymon Heidrich
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Lack of validation of BufOffset could be exploited to dump arbitrary memory contents via NDIS packet filter.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>Please run
./scripts/get_maintainer.plon your patch and copy the maintainers.
Hello Fabio,
Sorry I missed adding Lukasz and Marek - I'll keep that in mind for future.
Is there anything else missing from my side?
Best regards,
Szymon
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines
--- drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-4@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf; - BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -#ifdef VERBOSE debug ("%s: Length: %d\n" , __func__, BufLength);debug ("%s: Offset: %d\n" , __func__, BufOffset); --2.38.1
Quoted 13 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Quoted 12 lines · Fabio Estevam
Szymon,
Quoted 7 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Lack of validation of BufOffset could be exploited to dump arbitrary memory contents via NDIS packet filter.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Please run
./scripts/get_maintainer.plon your patch and copy the maintainers.Hello Fabio,
Sorry I missed adding Lukasz and Marek - I'll keep that in mind for future.
Is there anything else missing from my side?
There have been various security fixes recently which broke other things, so I am being careful now.
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-0@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf;
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) · line 865
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +0
-3- BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -
Reading through the RNDIS code, do you think the rndis_query_response and others which use buffer/offset data from the message should also be sanitized the same way ? I can imagine the query can be used to do test for 1bit of data all over the memory too.
Quoted 17 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 16 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Quoted 14 lines · Fabio Estevam
Szymon,
Quoted 7 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Lack of validation of BufOffset could be exploited to dump arbitrary memory contents via NDIS packet filter.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>Please run
./scripts/get_maintainer.plon your patch and copy the maintainers.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Hello Fabio,
Sorry I missed adding Lukasz and Marek - I'll keep that in mind for future.
Is there anything else missing from my side?
There have been various security fixes recently which broke other things, so I am being careful now.
Sure, I completely understand that.
Thank you for your time and review.
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-0@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp; rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); + if ((BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8) || + (BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8 - BufOffset)) + return -EINVAL; + r = rndis_add_response(configNr, sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type)); if (!r) return -ENOMEM; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf;
Quoted 5 lines
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) · line 865
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +0
-3- BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -Reading through the RNDIS code, do you think the
rndis_query_responseand others which use buffer/offset data from the message should also be sanitized the same way ? I can imagine the query can be used to do test for 1bit of data all over the memory too.
I added the extra validation in rndis_set_response as with the current implementation it is possible to manipulate InformationBufferOffset to exploit OID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTER to set arbitrary memory contents within a 32byte offset as the devices packet filter. This value may be next retrieved using gen_ndis_query_resp so one may extract specific memory regions two bytes a time.
As for rndis_query_response I didn't touch it as the buffer offset and length passed to gen_ndis_query_resp are not used. Please let me know in case I'm missing something.
On 12/4/22 21:36, Szymon Heidrich wrote:
Hi,
sorry for the delays.
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-0@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp; rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); + if ((BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8) || + (BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8 - BufOffset)) + return -EINVAL; + r = rndis_add_response(configNr, sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type)); if (!r) return -ENOMEM; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf;Quoted 5 lines
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drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) · line 865
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +0
-3- BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -Reading through the RNDIS code, do you think the
rndis_query_responseand others which use buffer/offset data from the message should also be sanitized the same way ? I can imagine the query can be used to do test for 1bit of data all over the memory too.
Quoted 5 lines
I added the extra validation in
rndis_set_responseas with the current implementation it is possible to manipulate InformationBufferOffset to exploitOID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTERto set arbitrary memory contents within a 32byte offset as the devices packet filter. This value may be next retrieved usinggen_ndis_query_respso one may extract specific memory regions two bytes a time.
I see, can you please add that ^ explanation into the commit message and send V2 ? I'll pick it into the current MR.
Thanks
Quoted 2 lines
As for
rndis_query_responseI didn't touch it as the buffer offset and length passed togen_ndis_query_respare not used. Please let me know in case I'm missing something.
[...]
PATCH v2 1/1 usb: gadget: rndis: Prevent InformationBufferOffset manipulation
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in gen_ndis_set_resp via manipulation of buf->InformationBufferOffset. Original implementation permits manipulation of InformationBufferOffset to exploit OID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTER to set arbitrary memory contents within a 32byte offset as the devices packet filter. The packet filter value may be next retrieved using gen_ndis_query_resp so it is possible to extract specific memory regions two bytes a time.
The rndis_query_response was not modified as neither the buffer offset nor length passed to gen_ndis_query_resp is used.
---
V1 -> V2: Updated commit message
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6 -3
@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf; - BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -#ifdef VERBOSE debug ("%s: Length: %d\n" , __func__, BufLength);debug ("%s: Offset: %d\n" , __func__, BufOffset);
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Marek Vasut
AppliedRe: [PATCH v2] usb: gadget: rndis: Prevent InformationBufferOffset manipulation
Quoted 33 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Original implementation permits manipulation of InformationBufferOffset to exploitOID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTERto set arbitrary memory contents within a 32byte offset as the devices packet filter. The packet filter value may be next retrieved usinggen_ndis_query_respso it is possible to extract specific memory regions two bytes a time.The
rndis_query_responsewas not modified as neither the buffer offset nor length passed togen_ndis_query_respis used.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>---
V1 -> V2: Updated commit messagedrivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +6
-0@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf)rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp;rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); +if ((BufOffset >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 ) || + (BufLength >RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE -8 - BufOffset)) +return -EINVAL ; + r =rndis_add_response (configNr,sizeof (rndis_set_cmplt_type));
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) · line 871
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +0
-3if (!r)return -ENOMEM ; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf; - BufLength =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset =get_unaligned_le32 (&buf->InformationBufferOffset); -#ifdef VERBOSE debug ("%s: Length: %d\n" , __func__, BufLength);debug ("%s: Offset: %d\n" , __func__, BufOffset);
Applied to usb/master, thanks
Re: [PATCH v2] usb: gadget: rndis: Prevent InformationBufferOffset manipulation
Quoted 36 lines · Marek Vasut
Quoted 35 lines · Szymon Heidrich
Prevent access to arbitrary memory locations in
gen_ndis_set_respvia manipulation ofbuf->InformationBufferOffset. Original implementation permits manipulation of InformationBufferOffset to exploitOID_GEN_CURRENT_PACKET_FILTERto set arbitrary memory contents within a 32byte offset as the devices packet filter. The packet filter value may be next retrieved usinggen_ndis_query_respso it is possible to extract specific memory regions two bytes a time.The
rndis_query_responsewas not modified as neither the buffer offset nor length passed togen_ndis_query_respis used.Signed-off-by Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>---
V1 -> V2: Updated commit message
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c| 9 ++++++---1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +5
-0@@ -855,14 +855,17 @@ static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) rndis_set_cmplt_type *resp; rndis_resp_t *r; + BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); + BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); + if ((BufOffset > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8) || + (BufLength > RNDIS_MAX_TOTAL_SIZE - 8 - BufOffset)) + return -EINVAL; + r = rndis_add_response(configNr, sizeof(rndis_set_cmplt_type)); if (!r) return -ENOMEM; resp = (rndis_set_cmplt_type *) r->buf;
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c static int rndis_set_response(int configNr, rndis_set_msg_type *buf) · line 871
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/usb/gadget/rndis.c +0
-2- BufLength = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferLength); - BufOffset = get_unaligned_le32(&buf->InformationBufferOffset); - #ifdef VERBOSE debug("%s: Length: %d\n", __func__, BufLength); debug("%s: Offset: %d\n", __func__, BufOffset);Applied to usb/master, thanks
Thank you very much for your time and review.