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scsi: ufs: Fix UIC result byte and BSG request length handling

PATCH Superseded Stanley Jhu 5 participants 15 messages Oct 13 – Oct 15

Subsystems (3)

v1 of 2 Superseded Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

cover scsi: ufs: Fix UIC result byte and BSG request length handling

Two ufs-bsg fixes for issues found by fuzzing /dev/bsg/ufs-bsg* with syzkaller on QEMU's emulated UFS host controller, plus a related fix for the same UIC result byte problem in the peer DME retry path.

Patch 1 rejects requests shorter than the UFS BSG request structures. Patch 2 clears the UIC result byte supplied by userspace. Patch 3 clears the stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries.

Tested on QEMU arm64: the reproducers no longer trigger.

Stanley Jhu (3):
scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request
scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands
scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 9 +++++++++
 drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c  | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.385.gd3acb90ef8-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request

ufs_bsg_request() and ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req() read the request buffer without checking job->request_len, which userspace controls. A short request causes an out-of-bounds read. Found by syzkaller.

Reject requests shorter than the structure each path reads.

Fixes 64d4864714c2 ("scsi: ufs: bsg: Remove unnecessary length checkup")
Fixes 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in ufs_bsg")
---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +8 -0
index 7a66917b3fc0..dab1f05aff38 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static int ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct bsg_job *j
 	if (hba->ufs_version < ufshci_version(4, 0) || !hba->dev_info.b_advanced_rpmb_en)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (job->request_len < sizeof(*rpmb_request))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (rpmb_request->ehs_req.length != 2 || rpmb_request->ehs_req.ehs_type != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -142,6 +145,11 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job)
 
 	bsg_reply->reply_payload_rcv_len = 0;
 
+	if (job->request_len < sizeof(*bsg_request)) {
+		bsg_reply->result = -EINVAL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	ufshcd_rpm_get_sync(hba);
 
 	msgcode = bsg_request->msgcode;
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.385.gd3acb90ef8-goog
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] ufs/bsg: heap buffer overflow in Advanced RPMB reply handling - [Medium] block: memory and device…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] ufs/bsg: heap buffer overflow in Advanced RPMB reply handling
- [Medium] block: memory and device refcount leak on ufs_bsg_request() error path --

commit 6c7ab99a857f0be8f1f19eb78aa230d8ccb39b14
Author: Stanley Jhu <[email protected]>

scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request

This commit adds validation checks for job->request_len in the UFS BSG paths to prevent out-of-bounds reads when userspace provides short requests.

drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c static int ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct bsg_job *j · line 78

Quoted 11 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +3 -0
index 7a66917b3fc0e..dab1f05aff383 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static int ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct bsg_job *j
 	if (hba->ufs_version < ufshci_version(4, 0) || !hba->dev_info.b_advanced_rpmb_en)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (job->request_len < sizeof(*rpmb_request))
+		return -EINVAL;
+

[Severity: High]
While this properly validates the request size, does the reply handling contain a heap buffer overflow for advanced RPMB requests?

The BSG core allocates job->reply in bsg_init_rq() with a fixed size of SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE (96 bytes). However, ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req() casts job->reply to struct ufs_rpmb_reply, which has a size of 104 bytes:
sizeof(struct ufs_bsg_reply) (40 bytes) + sizeof(struct ufs_ehs) (64 bytes).

When ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() is called, it writes 64 bytes to the ehs_rsp field at offset 40, resulting in an 8-byte out-of-bounds write on the heap:

drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c:ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() {
    ...
    memcpy(rsp_ehs, ehs_data, ehs_len * 32);
    ...
}

Later, ufs_bsg_request() sets job->reply_len to 104 for RPMB replies, which configures the block layer to copy 104 bytes to user space from this 96-byte allocation. Will this leak adjacent heap memory to userspace?

[ ... ]

drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job) · line 152

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +5 -0
@@ -142,6 +145,11 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job)
 
 	bsg_reply->reply_payload_rcv_len = 0;
 
+	if (job->request_len < sizeof(*bsg_request)) {
+		bsg_reply->result = -EINVAL;
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+

[Severity: Medium]
Does returning -EINVAL directly bypass the BSG job completion mechanism and permanently leak the job's resources?

When ufs_bsg_request() returns -EINVAL directly, the block layer's bsg_queue_rq() returns BLK_STS_IOERR. This causes blk_mq_end_request() to complete the request without invoking the queue's .complete callback (bsg_complete()).

Because bsg_complete() is bypassed, bsg_job_put() is never called, meaning bsg_teardown_job() never executes. This leaves the sg_list memory and the job->dev reference count permanently leaked, which would prevent the UFS device from ever being cleanly removed.

Should this error path instead call bsg_job_done(job, -EINVAL, 0) and return 0 to ensure proper teardown?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request

Quoted 3 lines · On Tue, Oct 13, 2026 at 10:44:34AM +0000, [email protected] wrote:

Later, ufs_bsg_request() sets job->reply_len to 104 for RPMB replies, which configures the block layer to copy 104 bytes to user space from this 96-byte allocation. Will this leak adjacent heap memory to userspace?

Pre-existing; fixed separately in bsg-lib:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Quoted 2 lines

Should this error path instead call bsg_job_done(job, -EINVAL, 0) and return 0 to ensure proper teardown?

Yes, done in v2 (1/5 and 3/5):
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Reviewed-by on v1 1/3
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Validate request_len before accessing request

In reply to Stanley Jhu
Quoted 37 lines · Stanley Jhu

ufs_bsg_request() and ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req() read the request buffer without checking job->request_len, which userspace controls. A short request causes an out-of-bounds read. Found by syzkaller.

Reject requests shorter than the structure each path reads.

Fixes 64d4864714c2 ("scsi: ufs: bsg: Remove unnecessary length checkup")
Fixes 6ff265fc5ef6 ("scsi: ufs: core: bsg: Add advanced RPMB support in

ufs_bsg")

---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 8 ++++++++

 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +0 -0
index 7a66917b3fc0..dab1f05aff38 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static int ufs_bsg_exec_advanced_rpmb_req(struct ufs_hba
 *hba, struct bsg_job *j

        if (hba->ufs_version < ufshci_version(4, 0) || !hba-

Quoted 1 line

dev_info.b_advanced_rpmb_en)

                return -EINVAL;

+       if (job->request_len < sizeof(*rpmb_request)) +               return -EINVAL;
+
        if (rpmb_request->ehs_req.length != 2 || rpmb_request-

Quoted 1 line

ehs_req.ehs_type != 1)

                return -EINVAL;

drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +0 -0
@@ -142,6 +145,11 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job)


        bsg_reply->reply_payload_rcv_len = 0;

Quoted 8 lines

+       if (job->request_len < sizeof(*let )) {
+               bsg_reply->result = -EINVAL;
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
        ufshcd_rpm_get_sync(hba);

        msgcode = bsg_request->msgcode;

Stanley,

The check was removed by my commit 64d4864714c2 when adding arpmb support, since msgcode check was thought to be enough, thanks for fixing it.

#5 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands

In reply to Stanley Jhu

ufs_bsg_request() passes the user-supplied UIC argument2 unchanged, including the result byte (bits 7:0) that only the host controller writes. A non-zero value triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd() and corrupts the reported result. Found by syzkaller.

Clear the result byte before sending the command.

Fixes e77044c5a842 ("scsi: ufs-bsg: Add support for uic commands in ufs_bsg_request()")
Fixes 9fb4c793223b ("scsi: ufs: core: Complain if UIC argument 2 is invalid")
---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +1 -0
index dab1f05aff38..331ead0403a1 100644
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job)
 		break;
 	case UPIU_TRANSACTION_UIC_CMD:
 		memcpy(&uc, &bsg_request->upiu_req.uc, UIC_CMD_SIZE);
+		uc.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT;
 		ret = ufshcd_send_bsg_uic_cmd(hba, &uc);
 		if (ret)
 			dev_err(hba->dev, "send uic cmd: error code %d\n", ret);
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.385.gd3acb90ef8-goog
Reviewed-by on v1 2/3
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands

Quoted 8 lines · Stanley Jhu

ufs_bsg_request() passes the user-supplied UIC argument2 unchanged, including the result byte (bits 7:0) that only the host controller writes. A non-zero value triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd() and corrupts the reported result. Found by syzkaller.

Clear the result byte before sending the command.

Quoted 7 lines
Fixes e77044c5a842 ("scsi: ufs-bsg: Add support for uic commands in

ufs_bsg_request()")

Fixes 9fb4c793223b ("scsi: ufs: core: Complain if UIC argument 2 is

invalid")

---

Reviewed-by on v1 2/3
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands

In reply to Stanley Jhu
Quoted 6 lines · Stanley Jhu

ufs_bsg_request() passes the user-supplied UIC argument2 unchanged, including the result byte (bits 7:0) that only the host controller writes. A non-zero value triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd() and corrupts the reported result. Found by syzkaller.

Quoted 7 lines

Clear the result byte before sending the command.

Fixes e77044c5a842 ("scsi: ufs-bsg: Add support for uic commands in

ufs_bsg_request()")

Fixes 9fb4c793223b ("scsi: ufs: core: Complain if UIC argument 2 is invalid")
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands

In reply to Stanley Jhu
Quoted 21 lines · Stanley Jhu

ufs_bsg_request() passes the user-supplied UIC argument2 unchanged, including the result byte (bits 7:0) that only the host controller writes. A non-zero value triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd() and corrupts the reported result. Found by syzkaller.

Clear the result byte before sending the command.

Fixes e77044c5a842 ("scsi: ufs-bsg: Add support for uic commands in ufs_bsg_request()")
Fixes 9fb4c793223b ("scsi: ufs: core: Complain if UIC argument 2 is invalid")
---
  drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +0 -0
index dab1f05aff38..331ead0403a1 100644

drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job) · line 185

Quoted 7 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufs_bsg.c +1 -0
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static int ufs_bsg_request(struct bsg_job *job)
  		break;
  	case UPIU_TRANSACTION_UIC_CMD:
  		memcpy(&uc, &bsg_request->upiu_req.uc, UIC_CMD_SIZE);
+		uc.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT;
  		ret = ufshcd_send_bsg_uic_cmd(hba, &uc);
  		if (ret)
  			dev_err(hba->dev, "send uic cmd: error code %d\n", ret);

Shouldn't invalid inputs be rejected rather than trying to correct these?

Thanks,

Bart.

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] scsi: ufs: bsg: Clear the UIC result byte before sending UIC commands

Quoted 1 line · Bart Van Assche

Shouldn't invalid inputs be rejected rather than trying to correct these?

Agreed. v2 rejects a non-zero result byte with -EINVAL:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

#10 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

In reply to Stanley Jhu

Peer DME get and set retry a failed attempt with the same struct uic_command. UIC completion ORs the ConfigResultCode into argument2[7:0], and nothing clears it before the next attempt. Once an attempt fails, every retry keeps reporting that error code, even when the device returns success, so a transient failure becomes a hard failure after three retries. Each such retry also triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd().

Clear the result byte before each attempt.

Fixes 64238fbd15ea ("scsi: ufs: add retries to dme_peer get and set attribute")
---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +2 -0
index bcc2512bf34b..9adb3b576e28 100644
@@ -4398,6 +4398,7 @@ int ufshcd_dme_set_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32 attr_sel,
 	int retries = UFS_UIC_COMMAND_RETRIES;
 
 	do {
+		uic_cmd.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT;
 		/* for peer attributes we retry upon failure */
 		ret = ufshcd_send_uic_cmd(hba, &uic_cmd);
 		if (ret)
@@ -4465,6 +4466,7 @@ int ufshcd_dme_get_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32 attr_sel,
 	}
 
 	do {
+		uic_cmd.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT;
 		/* for peer attributes we retry upon failure */
 		ret = ufshcd_send_uic_cmd(hba, &uic_cmd);
 		if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.56.0.385.gd3acb90ef8-goog
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] scsi: ufs: dme_set retry loop reuses potentially corrupted argument3 --

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] scsi: ufs: dme_set retry loop reuses potentially corrupted argument3 --

commit b7bd98803047d25927dcd2349ce8724199680d23
Author: Stanley Jhu <[email protected]>

scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

Peer DME get and set retry a failed attempt with the same struct uic_command. This commit clears the result byte in argument2 before each attempt to prevent transient failures from becoming hard failures due to stale error codes.

Fixes 64238fbd15ea ("scsi: ufs: add retries to dme_peer get and set attribute")

drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c int ufshcd_dme_set_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32 attr_sel, · line 4401

Quoted 9 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +1 -0
index cc75384c65021..1f254402d3b4b 100644
@@ -4398,6 +4398,7 @@ int ufshcd_dme_set_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32 attr_sel,
 	int retries = UFS_UIC_COMMAND_RETRIES;
 
 	do {
+		uic_cmd.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT;

[Severity: Medium]
When ufshcd_send_uic_cmd() fails, does the completion handler overwrite argument3?

Looking at ufshcd_uic_cmd_compl(), it appears argument3 is unconditionally updated with the hardware register's contents:

ufshcd_uic_cmd_compl() {
	...
	/* Store the DME attribute value in cmd->argument3. */
	cmd->argument3 = ufshcd_readl(hba, REG_UIC_COMMAND_ARG_3);
	...
}

Since uic_cmd.argument3 is initialized to mib_val only once outside the retry loop in ufshcd_dme_set_attr(), can this regression cause a subsequent retry to write whatever value the hardware left in the register during the failure?

Should uic_cmd.argument3 be restored to mib_val before retrying, similar to how argument2 is cleared here?

Quoted 3 lines
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +0 -0
 		/* for peer attributes we retry upon failure */
 		ret = ufshcd_send_uic_cmd(hba, &uic_cmd);
 		if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, Oct 13, 2026 at 10:41:55AM +0000, [email protected] wrote:

Since uic_cmd.argument3 is initialized to mib_val only once outside the retry loop in ufshcd_dme_set_attr(), can this regression cause a subsequent retry to write whatever value the hardware left in the register during the failure?

Should uic_cmd.argument3 be restored to mib_val before retrying, similar to how argument2 is cleared here?

Good point. ufshcd_uic_cmd_compl() always overwrites argument3, so the DME_SET retry should restore mib_val as well. I'll fold that into v2.

Reviewed-by on v1 3/3
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] scsi: ufs: core: Clear stale UIC result byte before peer DME retries

In reply to Stanley Jhu
Quoted 34 lines · Stanley Jhu

Peer DME get and set retry a failed attempt with the same struct uic_command. UIC completion ORs the ConfigResultCode into argument2[7:0], and nothing clears it before the next attempt. Once an attempt fails, every retry keeps reporting that error code, even when the device returns success, so a transient failure becomes a hard failure after three retries. Each such retry also triggers the WARN_ON_ONCE() in ufshcd_dispatch_uic_cmd().

Clear the result byte before each attempt.

Fixes 64238fbd15ea ("scsi: ufs: add retries to dme_peer get and set

attribute")

---
 drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 2 ++

 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +0 -0
index bcc2512bf34b..9adb3b576e28 100644
@@ -4398,6 +4398,7 @@ int ufshcd_dme_set_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32
 attr_sel,
         int retries = UFS_UIC_COMMAND_RETRIES;


        do {
+               uic_cmd.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT; /* for peer attributes we retry upon failure */ ret = ufshcd_send_uic_cmd(hba, &uic_cmd); if (ret)

drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +0 -0
@@ -4465,6 +4466,7 @@ int ufshcd_dme_get_attr(struct ufs_hba *hba, u32
 attr_sel,
         }
Quoted 6 lines


        do {
+               uic_cmd.argument2 &= ~MASK_UIC_COMMAND_RESULT; /* for peer attributes we retry upon failure */ ret = ufshcd_send_uic_cmd(hba, &uic_cmd); if (ret)

Stanley,

AI Sashiko comment on arg3 should not happen on a spec compliant ufshci controller, since arg3 is an input for dme_set, arg2 indeed has an output byte for every command, but restoring arg3 in the set loop would be cheap safety enhancement, but up to you:

for me this patch is ok: