arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA
Subsystems (5)
v6 cover arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA
This series adds support for running Linux in a protected VM under the Arm Confidential Compute Architecture (CCA). This is a trimmed down series following the feedback from the v5 posting[1]. Thanks for the feedback!
Individual patches have a change log. But things to highlight:
* Some patches have been merged already. The first two patches from v4 were borrowed from pKVM were merged as part of that series. The GIC ITS patches[2][3] have been merged via the tip tree.
* Final RMM v1.0 spec[4] - only minor changes over the previous spec, but we've now got a proper release.
* Probing/initialisation of the RMM is now done later. This means there's no need for finding the PSCI conduit and can drop the patch for that.
* The patches for set_fixmap_io() is also gone - we the RMM is detected later it's now too late for earlycon. See below for instructions on how to use earlycon.
* Mainline no longer uses PHYS_MASK_SHIFT for manipulating PTEs, so we can drop the patch for making that dynamic.
* There's now some documentation! In particular this clarifies a change in the boot requirements - memory must now be RIPAS RAM for a realm guest.
This series is based on v6.12-rc1.
Testing
=======
Since a couple of the patches have been merged separately, and there was also a bug[5] in -rc1 which impacts 9p filesystems, I've provided the below git tree with everything you need for a CCA guest:
https://gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/linux-cca cca-guest/v6
Back by popular demand is also a tree with both host and guest changes:
https://gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/linux-cca cca-full/v5+v6
(I'll post the v5 series of the host changes shortly)
You will also need an up-to-date RMM - the necessary changes have been merged into the 'main' branch of upstream:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-RMM/tf-rmm.git main
And you also need an updated kvmtool, there's a branch with the necessary changes here:
https://git.gitlab.arm.com/linux-arm/kvmtool-cca.git cca/v3
earlycon
--------
If using 'earlycon' on the kernel command line it is now necessary to pass the address of the serial port *in the unprotected IPA*. This is because the fixmap changes were dropped (due to the late probing of the RMM). E.g. for kvmtool you will need:
earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000
This is the main drawback to late probing. One potential improvement would be an option like "earlycon=realm" to identify that the earlycon uart is in the unprotected space without having to know the actual IPA. I've left this out for now as I'm not sure whether there is any actual interest in this.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240819131924.372366-1-steven.price%40arm.com
[2] e36d4165f079 ("irqchip/gic-v3-its: Rely on genpool alignment")
[3] b08e2f42e86b ("irqchip/gic-v3-its: Share ITS tables with a non-trusted hypervisor")
[4] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/1-0rel0/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cbaf141ba6c0e2e209717d02746584072844841a.1727722269.git.osandov@fb.com/
Sami Mujawar (1):
virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Steven Price (4):
arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM
arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA
arm64: mm: Avoid TLBI when marking pages as valid
arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
Suzuki K Poulose (6):
arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions
arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
arm64: rsi: Add support for checking whether an MMIO is protected
arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared
arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 + Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 8 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 4 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 68 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h | 160 +++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_smc.h | 193 ++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 12 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 141 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 3 + arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 10 +- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 98 +++++++- drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ 23 files changed, 1010 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_smc.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v6 1/11 arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
The RMM (Realm Management Monitor) provides functionality that can be accessed by a realm guest through SMC (Realm Services Interface) calls.
The SMC definitions are based on DEN0137[1] version 1.0-rel0.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/1-0rel0/
---
Changes since v5:
* Rename RSI_RIPAS_IO to RSI_RIPAS_DEV (to match spec v1.0-rel0).
* Correctly deal with the 'response' return value from RSI_IPA_STATE_SET.
* Fix return type of rsi_attestation_token_init().
* Minor documentation typos.
Changes since v4:
* Update to match the latest RMM spec version 1.0-rel0-rc1.
* Make use of the ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL macro.
* Cast using (_UL macro) various values to unsigned long.
Changes since v3:
* Drop invoke_rsi_fn_smc_with_res() function and call arm_smccc_smc() directly instead.
* Rename header guard in rsi_smc.h to be consistent.
Changes since v2:
* Rename rsi_get_version() to rsi_request_version()
* Fix size/alignment of struct realm_config
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_smc.h | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 332 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_smc.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +139 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ASM_RSI_CMDS_H +#define __ASM_RSI_CMDS_H + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> + +#include <asm/rsi_smc.h> + +#define RSI_GRANULE_SHIFT 12 +#define RSI_GRANULE_SIZE (_AC(1, UL) << RSI_GRANULE_SHIFT) + +enum ripas { +RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY =0 , +RSI_RIPAS_RAM =1 , +RSI_RIPAS_DESTROYED =2 , +RSI_RIPAS_DEV =3 , +}; + +static inline unsigned long rsi_request_version (unsigned long req, +unsigned long *out_lower, +unsigned long *out_higher) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_ABI_VERSION , req,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , &res); + +if (out_lower) + *out_lower = res.a1; +if (out_higher) + *out_higher = res.a2; + +return res.a0; +} + +static inline unsigned long rsi_get_realm_config (struct realm_config *cfg) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_REALM_CONFIG ,virt_to_phys (cfg), +0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , &res); +return res.a0; +} + +static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas state, +unsigned long flags, +phys_addr_t *top) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_SET , start, end, state, + flags,0 ,0 ,0 , &res); + +if (top) + *top = res.a1; + +if (res.a2 !=RSI_ACCEPT ) +return -EPERM ; + +return res.a0; +} + +/** +* rsi_attestation_token_init - Initialise the operation to retrieve an +* attestation token. +* +* @challenge: The challenge data to be used in the attestation token +* generation. +* @size: Size of the challenge data in bytes. +* +* Initialises the attestation token generation and returns an upper bound +* on the attestation token size that can be used to allocate an adequate +* buffer. The caller is expected to subsequently call +* rsi_attestation_token_continue() to retrieve the attestation token data on +* the same CPU. +* +* Returns: +* On success, returns the upper limit of the attestation report size. +* Otherwise, -EINVAL +*/ +static inline long +rsi_attestation_token_init (const u8 *challenge,unsigned long size) +{ +struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs regs = {0 }; + +/* The challenge must be at least 32bytes and at most 64bytes */ +if (!challenge || size <32 || size >64 ) +return -EINVAL ; + + regs.a0 =SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT ; +memcpy (®s.a1, challenge, size); +arm_smccc_1_2_smc (®s, ®s); + +if (regs.a0 ==RSI_SUCCESS ) +return regs.a1; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +/** +* rsi_attestation_token_continue - Continue the operation to retrieve an +* attestation token. +* +* @granule: {I}PA of the Granule to which the token will be written. +* @offset: Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes. +* @size: The size of the buffer. +* @len: The number of bytes written to the buffer. +* +* Retrieves up to a RSI_GRANULE_SIZE worth of token data per call. The caller +* is expected to call rsi_attestation_token_init() before calling this +* function to retrieve the attestation token. +* +* Return: +* * %RSI_SUCCESS - Attestation token retrieved successfully. +* * %RSI_INCOMPLETE - Token generation is not complete. +* * %RSI_ERROR_INPUT - A parameter was not valid. +* * %RSI_ERROR_STATE - Attestation not in progress. +*/ +static inline int rsi_attestation_token_continue (phys_addr_t granule, +unsigned long offset, +unsigned long size, +unsigned long *len) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_1_1_invoke (SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE , + granule, offset, size,0 , &res); + +if (len) + *len = res.a1; +return res.a0; +} + +#endif /* __ASM_RSI_CMDS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_smc.h new file +193 -0
193 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 01/11] arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions
Quoted 14 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
The RMM (Realm Management Monitor) provides functionality that can be accessed by a realm guest through SMC (Realm Services Interface) calls.
The SMC definitions are based on DEN0137[1] version 1.0-rel0.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/1-0rel0/
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Acked-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +11
-0+ +static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas state, +unsigned long flags, +phys_addr_t *top) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_SET , start, end, state, + flags,0 ,0 ,0 , &res);
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h line 67
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +10
-0+ +if (top) + *top = res.a1; + +if (res.a2 !=RSI_ACCEPT ) +return -EPERM ; + +return res.a0; +} +
Similar to rsi_attestation_token_init(), the return value type needs to be 'long' since '-EPERM' can be returned from the function.
Quoted 61 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +61
-0+/** +* rsi_attestation_token_init - Initialise the operation to retrieve an +* attestation token. +* +* @challenge: The challenge data to be used in the attestation token +* generation. +* @size: Size of the challenge data in bytes. +* +* Initialises the attestation token generation and returns an upper bound +* on the attestation token size that can be used to allocate an adequate +* buffer. The caller is expected to subsequently call +* rsi_attestation_token_continue() to retrieve the attestation token data on +* the same CPU. +* +* Returns: +* On success, returns the upper limit of the attestation report size. +* Otherwise, -EINVAL +*/ +static inline long +rsi_attestation_token_init (const u8 *challenge,unsigned long size) +{ +struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs regs = {0 }; + +/* The challenge must be at least 32bytes and at most 64bytes */ +if (!challenge || size <32 || size >64 ) +return -EINVAL ; + + regs.a0 =SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT ; +memcpy (®s.a1, challenge, size); +arm_smccc_1_2_smc (®s, ®s); + +if (regs.a0 ==RSI_SUCCESS ) +return regs.a1; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +/** +* rsi_attestation_token_continue - Continue the operation to retrieve an +* attestation token. +* +* @granule: {I}PA of the Granule to which the token will be written. +* @offset: Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes. +* @size: The size of the buffer. +* @len: The number of bytes written to the buffer. +* +* Retrieves up to a RSI_GRANULE_SIZE worth of token data per call. The caller +* is expected to call rsi_attestation_token_init() before calling this +* function to retrieve the attestation token. +* +* Return: +* * %RSI_SUCCESS - Attestation token retrieved successfully. +* * %RSI_INCOMPLETE - Token generation is not complete. +* * %RSI_ERROR_INPUT - A parameter was not valid. +* * %RSI_ERROR_STATE - Attestation not in progress. +*/ +static inline int rsi_attestation_token_continue (phys_addr_t granule, +unsigned long offset, +unsigned long size, +unsigned long *len) +{
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h line 138
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +10
-0+struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_1_1_invoke (SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE , + granule, offset, size,0 , &res); + +if (len) + *len = res.a1; +return res.a0; +} +
The return value type of this function needs to be 'unsigned long' even it's converted to 'int' in arm_cca_attestation_continue(). In this way, the wrapper functions has consistent return value type, which is 'unsigned long' or 'long'.
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 01/11] arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions
Quoted 35 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 14 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
The RMM (Realm Management Monitor) provides functionality that can be accessed by a realm guest through SMC (Realm Services Interface) calls.
The SMC definitions are based on DEN0137[1] version 1.0-rel0.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/1-0rel0/
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Acked-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
[...]
Quoted 17 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +17
-0+ +static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state (phys_addr_t start, + phys_addr_t end, + enum ripas state, + unsigned long flags, + phys_addr_t *top) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_smc(SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_SET, start, end, state, + flags, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (top) + *top = res.a1; + + if (res.a2 != RSI_ACCEPT) + return -EPERM;
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h line 38
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +4
-0+ + return res.a0; +} +Similar to
rsi_attestation_token_init(), the return value type needs to be 'long'
since '-EPERM' can be returned from the function.
Good spot.
Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 75 lines
+/**
+ *rsi_attestation_token_init- Initialise the operation to retrieve an
+ * attestation token.
+ *
+ * @challenge: The challenge data to be used in the attestation token
+ * generation.
+ * @size: Size of the challenge data in bytes.
+ *
+ * Initialises the attestation token generation and returns an upper bound
+ * on the attestation token size that can be used to allocate an adequate
+ * buffer. The caller is expected to subsequently call
+ *rsi_attestation_token_continue()to retrieve the attestation token data on
+ * the same CPU.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * On success, returns the upper limit of the attestation report size.
+ * Otherwise,-EINVAL
+ */arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +21
-0+static inline long +rsi_attestation_token_init (const u8 *challenge,unsigned long size) +{ + struct arm_smccc_1_2_regs regs = { 0 }; + + /* The challenge must be at least 32bytes and at most 64bytes */ + if (!challenge || size < 32 || size > 64) + return -EINVAL; + + regs.a0 = SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT; + memcpy(®s.a1, challenge, size); + arm_smccc_1_2_smc(®s, ®s); + + if (regs.a0 == RSI_SUCCESS) + return regs.a1; + + return -EINVAL; +} + +/** +* rsi_attestation_token_continue - Continue the operation to retrieve an
+ * attestation token.
+ *
+ * @granule: {I}PA of the Granule to which the token will be written.
+ * @offset: Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes.
+ * @size: The size of the buffer.
+ * @len: The number of bytes written to the buffer.
+ *
+ * Retrieves up to aRSI_GRANULE_SIZEworth of token data per call. The caller
+ * is expected to callrsi_attestation_token_init()before calling this
+ * function to retrieve the attestation token.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %RSI_SUCCESS - Attestation token retrieved successfully.
+ * * %RSI_INCOMPLETE - Token generation is not complete.
+ * * %RSI_ERROR_INPUT - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %RSI_ERROR_STATE - Attestation not in progress.
+ */arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h new file +14
-0+static inline int rsi_attestation_token_continue (phys_addr_t granule, + unsigned long offset, + unsigned long size, + unsigned long *len) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(SMC_RSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, + granule, offset, size, 0, &res); + + if (len) + *len = res.a1; + return res.a0; +}
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
+
The return value type of this function needs to be 'unsigned long' even it's
converted to 'int' inarm_cca_attestation_continue(). In this way, the wrapper
functions has consistent return value type, which is 'unsigned long' or 'long'.
Ack, seems reasonable.
Thanks,
Steve
PATCH v6 2/11 arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
If in a realm then all memory needs to be marked as RIPAS RAM initially, the loader may or may not have done this for us. To be sure iterate over all RAM and mark it as such. Any failure is fatal as that implies the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect - which would mean failing later when attempting to access non-existent RAM.
---
Changes since v5:
* Replace BUG_ON() with a panic() call that provides a message with the memory range that couldn't be set to RIPAS_RAM.
* Move the call to arm64_rsi_init() later so that it is after PSCI, this means we can use arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() to check if it is safe to make RSI calls.
Changes since v4:
* Minor tidy ups.
Changes since v3:
* Provide safe/unsafe versions for converting memory to protected, using the safer version only for the early boot.
* Use the new psci_early_test_conduit() function to avoid calling an SMC if EL3 is not present (or not configured to handle an SMC).
Changes since v2:
* Use DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE rather than "extern struct static_key_false".
* Rename set_memory_range() to rsi_set_memory_range().
* Downgrade some BUG()s to WARN()s and handle the condition by propagating up the stack. Comment the remaining case that ends in a BUG() to explain why.
* Rely on the return from rsi_request_version() rather than checking the version the RMM claims to support.
* Rename the generic sounding arm64_setup_memory() to arm64_rsi_setup_memory() and move the call site to setup_arch().
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +66 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2024 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ASM_RSI_H_ +#define __ASM_RSI_H_ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <asm/rsi_cmds.h> + +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (rsi_present); + +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); + +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&rsi_present); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas state,unsigned long flags) +{ +unsigned long ret; +phys_addr_t top; + +while (start != end) { + ret =rsi_set_addr_range_state (start, end, state, flags, &top); +if (WARN_ON (ret || top < start || top > end)) +return -EINVAL ; + start = top; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Convert the specified range to RAM. Do not use this if you rely on the +* contents of a page that may already be in RAM state. +*/ +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_protected (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_RAM , +RSI_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} + +/* +* Convert the specified range to RAM. Do not convert any pages that may have +* been DESTROYED, without our permission. +*/ +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_protected_safe (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_RAM , +RSI_NO_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_shared (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY , +RSI_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} +#endif /* __ASM_RSI_H_ */
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +2 -1
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \ return_address.o cpuinfo.o cpu_errata.o \ cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \ smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \ - syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ + syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ \ + rsi.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += sys32.o signal32.o \ sys_compat.o
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c new file +75 -0
75 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +3 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_ops.h> #include <asm/kasan.h> #include <asm/numa.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> #include <asm/scs.h> #include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -351,6 +352,8 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)else psci_acpi_init (); +arm64_rsi_init (); +init_bootcpu_ops ();smp_init_cpus ();smp_build_mpidr_hash ();
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
Quoted 11 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
If in a realm then all memory needs to be marked as RIPAS RAM initially, the loader may or may not have done this for us. To be sure iterate over all RAM and mark it as such. Any failure is fatal as that implies the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect - which would mean failing later when attempting to access non-existent RAM.
And it appears I didn't review this closely enough before posting ;) Suzuki pointed out to me that this patch description doesn't make sense given my comments in the cover letter about the VMM or bootloader having to set everything RIPAS RAM.
I should have reworded this commit message to something like:
"""
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
If in a realm then iterate over all memory ensuring that it is marked as RIPAS RAM. The loader is required to do this for us, however if some memory is missed this will cause the guest to receive a hard to debug external abort at some random point in the future. So for a belt-and-braces approach set all memory to RIPAS RAM. Any failure here implies that the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect so panic() promptly to make the situation clear.
"""
Steve
Quoted 225 lines
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* ReplaceBUG_ON()with apanic()call that provides a message with the memory range that couldn't be set toRIPAS_RAM.
* Move the call toarm64_rsi_init()later so that it is after PSCI, this means we can usearm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()to check if it is safe to make RSI calls.
Changes since v4:
* Minor tidy ups.
Changes since v3:
* Provide safe/unsafe versions for converting memory to protected, using the safer version only for the early boot.
* Use the newpsci_early_test_conduit()function to avoid calling an SMC if EL3 is not present (or not configured to handle an SMC).
Changes since v2:
* UseDECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSErather than "extern structstatic_key_false".
* Renameset_memory_range()torsi_set_memory_range().
* Downgrade some BUG()s to WARN()s and handle the condition by propagating up the stack. Comment the remaining case that ends in aBUG()to explain why.
* Rely on the return fromrsi_request_version()rather than checking the version the RMM claims to support.
* Rename the generic soundingarm64_setup_memory()toarm64_rsi_setup_memory()and move the call site tosetup_arch().--- arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.carch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +66
-0@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2024 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ASM_RSI_H_ +#define __ASM_RSI_H_ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <asm/rsi_cmds.h> + +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (rsi_present); + +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); + +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&rsi_present); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas state,unsigned long flags) +{ +unsigned long ret; +phys_addr_t top; + +while (start != end) { + ret =rsi_set_addr_range_state (start, end, state, flags, &top); +if (WARN_ON (ret || top < start || top > end)) +return -EINVAL ; + start = top; + } + +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Convert the specified range to RAM. Do not use this if you rely on the +* contents of a page that may already be in RAM state. +*/ +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_protected (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_RAM , +RSI_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} + +/* +* Convert the specified range to RAM. Do not convert any pages that may have +* been DESTROYED, without our permission. +*/ +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_protected_safe (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_RAM , +RSI_NO_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range_shared (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end) +{ +return rsi_set_memory_range (start, end,RSI_RIPAS_EMPTY , +RSI_CHANGE_DESTROYED ); +} +#endif /* __ASM_RSI_H_ */ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile +2
-1@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ obj-y := debug-monitors.o entry.o irq.o fpsimd.o \ return_address.o cpuinfo.o cpu_errata.o \ cpufeature.o alternative.o cacheinfo.o \ smp.o smp_spin_table.o topology.o smccc-call.o \ - syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ + syscall.o proton-pack.o idle.o patching.o pi/ \ + rsi.o obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += sys32.o signal32.o \ sys_compat.oarch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c new file +75
-0@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/psci.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> + +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (rsi_present); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (rsi_present); + +static bool rsi_version_matches (void ) +{ +unsigned long ver_lower, ver_higher; +unsigned long ret =rsi_request_version (RSI_ABI_VERSION , + &ver_lower, + &ver_higher); + +if (ret ==SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED ) +return false; + +if (ret !=RSI_SUCCESS ) { +pr_err ("RME: RMM doesn't support RSI version %lu.%lu. Supported range: %lu.%lu-%lu.%lu\n" , +RSI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR ,RSI_ABI_VERSION_MINOR , +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR (ver_lower), +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR (ver_lower), +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR (ver_higher), +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR (ver_higher)); +return false; + } + +pr_info ("RME: Using RSI version %lu.%lu\n" , +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR (ver_lower), +RSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR (ver_lower)); + +return true; +} + +static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory (void ) +{ +u64 i; +phys_addr_t start, end; + +/* +* Iterate over the available memory ranges and convert the state to +* protected memory. We should take extra care to ensure that we DO NOT +* permit any "DESTROYED" pages to be converted to "RAM". +* +* panic() is used because if the attempt to switch the memory to +* protected has failed here, then future accesses to the memory are +* simply going to be reflected as a SEA (Synchronous External Abort) +* which we can't handle. Bailing out early prevents the guest limping +* on and dying later. +*/ +for_each_mem_range (i, &start, &end) { +if (rsi_set_memory_range_protected_safe (start, end)) +panic ("Failed to set memory range to protected: %pa-%pa" , + &start, &end); + } +} + +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ) +{ +if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit () !=SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC ) +return ; +if (!rsi_version_matches ()) +return ; + +arm64_rsi_setup_memory (); + +static_branch_enable (&rsi_present); +} +arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +3
-0@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_ops.h> #include <asm/kasan.h> #include <asm/numa.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> #include <asm/scs.h> #include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/setup.h> @@ -351,6 +352,8 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)else psci_acpi_init (); +arm64_rsi_init (); +init_bootcpu_ops ();smp_init_cpus ();smp_build_mpidr_hash ();
Re: [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
Quoted 7 lines · Steven Price
I should have reworded this commit message to something like:
"""
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
Quoted 8 lines
If in a realm then iterate over all memory ensuring that it is marked as RIPAS RAM. The loader is required to do this for us, however if some memory is missed this will cause the guest to receive a hard to debug external abort at some random point in the future. So for a belt-and-braces approach set all memory to RIPAS RAM. Any failure here implies that the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect so
panic()promptly to make the situation clear.
"""
With the updated commit description, the patch looks fine to me.
Re: [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 40 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
If in a realm then all memory needs to be marked as RIPAS RAM initially, the loader may or may not have done this for us. To be sure iterate over all RAM and mark it as such. Any failure is fatal as that implies the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect - which would mean failing later when attempting to access non-existent RAM.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* ReplaceBUG_ON()with apanic()call that provides a message with the memory range that couldn't be set toRIPAS_RAM.
* Move the call toarm64_rsi_init()later so that it is after PSCI, this means we can usearm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()to check if it is safe to make RSI calls.
Changes since v4:
* Minor tidy ups.
Changes since v3:
* Provide safe/unsafe versions for converting memory to protected, using the safer version only for the early boot.
* Use the newpsci_early_test_conduit()function to avoid calling an SMC if EL3 is not present (or not configured to handle an SMC).
Changes since v2:
* UseDECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSErather than "extern structstatic_key_false".
* Renameset_memory_range()torsi_set_memory_range().
* Downgrade some BUG()s to WARN()s and handle the condition by propagating up the stack. Comment the remaining case that ends in aBUG()to explain why.
* Rely on the return fromrsi_request_version()rather than checking the version the RMM claims to support.
* Rename the generic soundingarm64_setup_memory()toarm64_rsi_setup_memory()and move the call site tosetup_arch().
Quoted 9 lines
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)create mode 100644
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
create mode 100644arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c
Two nitpicks below.
Quoted 33 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +27
-0@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2024 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ASM_RSI_H_ +#define __ASM_RSI_H_ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <asm/rsi_cmds.h> + +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (rsi_present); + +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); + +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&rsi_present); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas state,unsigned long flags) +{ +unsigned long ret; +phys_addr_t top; +
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h line 37
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +10
-0+while (start != end) { + ret =rsi_set_addr_range_state (start, end, state, flags, &top); +if (WARN_ON (ret || top < start || top > end)) +return -EINVAL ; + start = top; + } + +return 0 ; +} +
The WARN_ON() is redundant when the caller is arm64_rsi_setup_memory(), where system panic is invoked on any errors. So we perhaps need to drop the WARN_ON().
[...]
Quoted 14 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +14
-0+ +static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory (void ) +{ +u64 i; +phys_addr_t start, end; + +/* +* Iterate over the available memory ranges and convert the state to +* protected memory. We should take extra care to ensure that we DO NOT +* permit any "DESTROYED" pages to be converted to "RAM". +* +* panic() is used because if the attempt to switch the memory to +* protected has failed here, then future accesses to the memory are +* simply going to be reflected as a SEA (Synchronous External Abort)
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h line 61
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +10
-0+* which we can't handle. Bailing out early prevents the guest limping +* on and dying later. +*/ +for_each_mem_range (i, &start, &end) { +if (rsi_set_memory_range_protected_safe (start, end)) +panic ("Failed to set memory range to protected: %pa-%pa" , + &start, &end); + } +} +
{} is needed since the panic statement spans multiple lines.
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM
Quoted 96 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 45 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Detect that the VM is a realm guest by the presence of the RSI interface. This is done after PSCI has been initialised so that we can check the SMCCC conduit before making any RSI calls.
If in a realm then all memory needs to be marked as RIPAS RAM initially, the loader may or may not have done this for us. To be sure iterate over all RAM and mark it as such. Any failure is fatal as that implies the RAM regions passed to Linux are incorrect - which would mean failing later when attempting to access non-existent RAM.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* ReplaceBUG_ON()with apanic()call that provides a message with the memory range that couldn't be set toRIPAS_RAM.
* Move the call toarm64_rsi_init()later so that it is after PSCI, this means we can usearm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit()to check if it is safe to make RSI calls.
Changes since v4:
* Minor tidy ups.
Changes since v3:
* Provide safe/unsafe versions for converting memory to protected, using the safer version only for the early boot.
* Use the newpsci_early_test_conduit()function to avoid calling an SMC if EL3 is not present (or not configured to handle an SMC). Changes since v2:
* UseDECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSErather than "extern structstatic_key_false".
* Renameset_memory_range()torsi_set_memory_range().
* Downgrade some BUG()s to WARN()s and handle the condition by propagating up the stack. Comment the remaining case that ends in aBUG()to explain why.
* Rely on the return fromrsi_request_version()rather than checking the version the RMM claims to support.
* Rename the generic soundingarm64_setup_memory()toarm64_rsi_setup_memory()and move the call site tosetup_arch().
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h| 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++Quoted 4 lines
4 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)create mode 100644
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
create mode 100644arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.cTwo nitpicks below.
Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Quoted 41 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +22
-0@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* +* Copyright (C) 2024 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#ifndef __ASM_RSI_H_ +#define __ASM_RSI_H_ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <asm/rsi_cmds.h> + +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (rsi_present); + +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); + +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) +{ + return static_branch_unlikely(&rsi_present); +} + +static inline int rsi_set_memory_range(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_tend,
+ enum ripas state, unsigned long flags)arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +11
-0+{ + unsigned long ret; + phys_addr_t top; + + while (start != end) { + ret = rsi_set_addr_range_state(start, end, state, flags, &top); + if (WARN_ON(ret || top < start || top > end)) + return -EINVAL; + start = top; + } +
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
Quoted 3 lines
+ return 0;
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +2
-0+} +The
WARN_ON()is redundant when the caller isarm64_rsi_setup_memory(), where
system panic is invoked on any errors. So we perhaps need to drop theWARN_ON().
Actually this is error when I was preparing the series - the WARN_ON is then dropped in the next patch. Thanks for pointing it out!
Quoted 23 lines
[...]
Quoted 21 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +9
-0+ +static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory (void ) +{ + u64 i; + phys_addr_t start, end; + + /* +* Iterate over the available memory ranges and convert the state to +* protected memory. We should take extra care to ensure that we DO NOT
+ * permit any "DESTROYED" pages to be converted to "RAM". + *
+ *panic()is used because if the attempt to switch the memory to + * protected has failed here, then future accesses to the memory are + * simply going to be reflected as a SEA (Synchronous External Abort)
+ * which we can't handle. Bailing out early prevents the guest limping
+ * on and dying later.
+ */
+for_each_mem_range(i, &start, &end){
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h
Quoted 6 lines
+ if (
rsi_set_memory_range_protected_safe(start, end)) + panic("Failed to set memory range to protected: %pa-%pa", + &start, &end);
+ }arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h new file +2
-0+} +{} is needed since the panic statement spans multiple lines.
Ack.
Thanks,
Steve
PATCH v6 3/11 arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM
In reply to Steven PriceThe top bit of the configured IPA size is used as an attribute to control whether the address is protected or shared. Query the configuration from the RMM to assertain which bit this is.
---
Changes since v4:
* Make PROT_NS_SHARED check is_realm_world() to reduce impact on non-CCA systems.
Changes since v2:
* Drop unneeded extra brackets from PROT_NS_SHARED.
* Drop the explicit alignment from 'config' as struct realm_config now specifies the alignment.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h +4 -0
@@ -68,8 +68,12 @@#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/pgtable-types.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> extern bool arm64_use_ng_mappings; +extern unsigned long prot_ns_shared; + +#define PROT_NS_SHARED (is_realm_world() ? prot_ns_shared : 0)#define PTE_MAYBE_NG (arm64_use_ng_mappings ? PTE_NG : 0)#define PMD_MAYBE_NG (arm64_use_ng_mappings ? PMD_SECT_NG : 0)
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +1 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline int rsi_set_memory_range(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end,while (start != end) { ret =rsi_set_addr_range_state (start, end, state, flags, &top); -if (WARN_ON (ret || top < start || top > end)) +if (ret || top < start || top > end)return -EINVAL ; start = top; }
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +8 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@#include <linux/psci.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> +struct realm_config config; + +unsigned long prot_ns_shared; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (prot_ns_shared); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (rsi_present);EXPORT_SYMBOL (rsi_present);
@@ -67,6 +72,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)return ;if (!rsi_version_matches ())return ; +if (WARN_ON (rsi_get_realm_config (&config))) +return ; + prot_ns_shared =BIT (config.ipa_bits -1 );arm64_rsi_setup_memory ();
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 03/11] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM
Quoted 23 lines · Steven Price
The top bit of the configured IPA size is used as an attribute to control whether the address is protected or shared. Query the configuration from the RMM to assertain which bit this is.
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v4:
* MakePROT_NS_SHAREDcheckis_realm_world()to reduce impact on non-CCA systems.
Changes since v2:
* Drop unneeded extra brackets fromPROT_NS_SHARED.
* Drop the explicit alignment from 'config' as structrealm_confignow specifies the alignment.--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
[...]
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h static inline int rsi_set_memory_range(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, · line 33
Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +1
-1@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline int rsi_set_memory_range(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end,while (start != end) { ret =rsi_set_addr_range_state (start, end, state, flags, &top); -if (WARN_ON (ret || top < start || top > end)) +if (ret || top < start || top > end)return -EINVAL ; start = top; }
I think the changes belong to PATCH[02/11] :)
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 03/11] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 23 lines · Steven Price
The top bit of the configured IPA size is used as an attribute to control whether the address is protected or shared. Query the configuration from the RMM to assertain which bit this is.
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v4:
* MakePROT_NS_SHAREDcheckis_realm_world()to reduce impact on non-CCA systems.
Changes since v2:
* Drop unneeded extra brackets fromPROT_NS_SHARED.
* Drop the explicit alignment from 'config' as structrealm_confignow specifies the alignment.--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
[...]
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c line 12
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +2
-0@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@#include <linux/psci.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> +struct realm_config config; +
Nit: I think this variable is file-scoped since it has a generic name. In this case, 'static' is needed to match with the scope.
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +3
-0+unsigned long prot_ns_shared; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (prot_ns_shared); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (rsi_present);EXPORT_SYMBOL (rsi_present);
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c void __init arm64_rsi_init(void) · line 80
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +3
-0@@ -67,6 +72,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)return ;if (!rsi_version_matches ())return ; +if (WARN_ON (rsi_get_realm_config (&config))) +return ; + prot_ns_shared =BIT (config.ipa_bits -1 );arm64_rsi_setup_memory ();
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 03/11] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM
Quoted 27 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 23 lines · Steven Price
The top bit of the configured IPA size is used as an attribute to control whether the address is protected or shared. Query the configuration from the RMM to assertain which bit this is.
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
Changes since v4:
* MakePROT_NS_SHAREDcheckis_realm_world()to reduce impact on non-CCA systems.
Changes since v2:
* Drop unneeded extra brackets fromPROT_NS_SHARED.
* Drop the explicit alignment from 'config' as structrealm_confignow specifies the alignment.
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h| 4 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 8 ++++++++3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)[...]
Quoted 12 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c line 11
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +1
-0@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@ #include <linux/psci.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> +struct realm_config config; +Nit: I think this variable is file-scoped since it has a generic name. In this case, 'static' is needed to match with the scope.
Good spot - it should definitely be static.
Thanks,
Steve
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +3
-0+unsigned long prot_ns_shared; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (prot_ns_shared); + DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(rsi_present); EXPORT_SYMBOL(rsi_present); @@ -67,6 +72,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)Quoted 8 lines
return;
if (!rsi_version_matches())
return;
+ if (WARN_ON(rsi_get_realm_config(&config)))
+ return;
+prot_ns_shared=BIT(config.ipa_bits - 1);
arm64_rsi_setup_memory();Thanks,
Gavin
PATCH v6 4/11 arm64: rsi: Add support for checking whether an MMIO is protected
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
On Arm CCA, with RMM-v1.0, all MMIO regions are shared. However, in the future, an Arm CCA-v1.0 compliant guest may be run in a lesser privileged partition in the Realm World (with Arm CCA-v1.1 Planes feature). In this case, some of the MMIO regions may be emulated by a higher privileged component in the Realm world, i.e, protected.
Thus the guest must decide today, whether a given MMIO region is shared vs Protected and create the stage1 mapping accordingly. On Arm CCA, this detection is based on the "IPA State" (RIPAS == RIPAS_IO). Provide a helper to run this check on a given range of MMIO.
Also, provide a arm64 helper which may be hooked in by other solutions.
---
New patch for v5
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +8 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <asm/early_ioremap.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> /* * Generic IO read/write. These perform native-endian accesses.
@@ -318,4 +319,11 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags);#define arch_memremap_can_ram_remap arch_memremap_can_ram_remap +static inline bool arm64_is_mmio_private (phys_addr_t phys_addr,size_t size) +{ +if (unlikely (is_realm_world ())) +return arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr, size); +return false; +} +#endif /* __ASM_IO_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +2 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rsi_present);void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr_t base,size_t size); +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) {return static_branch_unlikely (&rsi_present);
arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h +21 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,27 @@ static inline unsigned long rsi_get_realm_config(struct realm_config *cfg)return res.a0; } +static inline unsigned long rsi_ipa_state_get (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas *state, +phys_addr_t *top) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GET , + start, end,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , + &res); + +if (res.a0 ==RSI_SUCCESS ) { +if (top) + *top = res.a1; +if (state) + *state = res.a2; + } + +return res.a0; +} + static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, enum ripas state,
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +26 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,32 @@ static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) } } +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr_t base,size_t size) +{ +enum ripas ripas; +phys_addr_t end, top; + +/* Overflow ? */ +if (WARN_ON (base + size <= base)) +return false; + + end =ALIGN (base + size,RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ); + base =ALIGN_DOWN (base,RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ); + +while (base < end) { +if (WARN_ON (rsi_ipa_state_get (base, end, &ripas, &top))) +break ; +if (WARN_ON (top <= base)) +break ; +if (ripas !=RSI_RIPAS_DEV ) +break ; + base = top; + } + +return base >= end; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ) {if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit () !=SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 04/11] arm64: rsi: Add support for checking whether an MMIO is protected
Quoted 18 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
On Arm CCA, with RMM-v1.0, all MMIO regions are shared. However, in the future, an Arm CCA-v1.0 compliant guest may be run in a lesser privileged partition in the Realm World (with Arm CCA-v1.1 Planes feature). In this case, some of the MMIO regions may be emulated by a higher privileged component in the Realm world, i.e, protected.
Thus the guest must decide today, whether a given MMIO region is shared vs Protected and create the stage1 mapping accordingly. On Arm CCA, this detection is based on the "IPA State" (RIPAS ==
RIPAS_IO). Provide a helper to run this check on a given range of MMIO.Also, provide a arm64 helper which may be hooked in by other solutions.
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
---
New patch for v5--- arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
With the following nitpick addressed:
Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <asm/early_ioremap.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> /* * Generic IO read/write. These perform native-endian accesses.
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, · line 328
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +7
-0@@ -318,4 +319,11 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags);#define arch_memremap_can_ram_remap arch_memremap_can_ram_remap +static inline bool arm64_is_mmio_private (phys_addr_t phys_addr,size_t size) +{ +if (unlikely (is_realm_world ())) +return arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr, size); +return false; +} +
The function names (arm64_is_{mmio_private, protected_mmio} are indicators to the MMIO region's state or property. arm64_is_mmio_private() indicates the MMIO region is 'private MMIO' while arm64_is_protected_mmio() indicates the MMIO region is 'protected MMIO'. They are equivalent and it may be worthy to unify the function names (indicators) as below.
option#1 option#2 -------- -------- arm64_is_private_mmio arm64_is_protected_mmio __arm64_is_private_mmio __arm64_is_protected_mmio
Quoted 70 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +0
-0#endif /* __ASM_IO_H */ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +2
-0@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rsi_present);void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ); +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr_t base,size_t size); +static inline bool is_realm_world (void ) {return static_branch_unlikely (&rsi_present);arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h +21
-0@@ -45,6 +45,27 @@ static inline unsigned long rsi_get_realm_config(struct realm_config *cfg)return res.a0; } +static inline unsigned long rsi_ipa_state_get (phys_addr_t start, +phys_addr_t end, +enum ripas *state, +phys_addr_t *top) +{ +struct arm_smccc_res res; + +arm_smccc_smc (SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GET , + start, end,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 , + &res); + +if (res.a0 ==RSI_SUCCESS ) { +if (top) + *top = res.a1; +if (state) + *state = res.a2; + } + +return res.a0; +} + static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, enum ripas state,arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +16
-0@@ -66,6 +66,32 @@ static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) } } +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys_addr_t base,size_t size) +{ +enum ripas ripas; +phys_addr_t end, top; + +/* Overflow ? */ +if (WARN_ON (base + size <= base)) +return false; + + end =ALIGN (base + size,RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ); + base =ALIGN_DOWN (base,RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ); + +while (base < end) { +if (WARN_ON (rsi_ipa_state_get (base, end, &ripas, &top))) +break ; +if (WARN_ON (top <= base))
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) · line 94
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +10
-0+break ; +if (ripas !=RSI_RIPAS_DEV ) +break ; + base = top; + } + +return base >= end; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +
The function may be worthy to be renamed to __arm64_is_private_mmio, as explained as above.
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) · line 97
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +0
-0void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ) {if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit () !=SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC )
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 04/11] arm64: rsi: Add support for checking whether an MMIO is protected
Quoted 67 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 18 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
On Arm CCA, with RMM-v1.0, all MMIO regions are shared. However, in the future, an Arm CCA-v1.0 compliant guest may be run in a lesser privileged partition in the Realm World (with Arm CCA-v1.1 Planes feature). In this case, some of the MMIO regions may be emulated by a higher privileged component in the Realm world, i.e, protected.
Thus the guest must decide today, whether a given MMIO region is shared vs Protected and create the stage1 mapping accordingly. On Arm CCA, this detection is based on the "IPA State" (RIPAS ==
RIPAS_IO). Provide a helper to run this check on a given range of MMIO.Also, provide a arm64 helper which may be hooked in by other solutions.
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Quoted 9 lines
---
New patch for v5
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h | 2 ++arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h| 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++4 files changed, 57 insertions(+)With the following nitpick addressed:
Reviewed-by Gavin Shan <[email protected]>Quoted 17 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +1
-0@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <asm/early_ioremap.h> #include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> /** Generic IO read/write. These perform native-endian accesses. @@ -318,4 +319,11 @@ extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, unsigned long flags); #define arch_memremap_can_ram_remap arch_memremap_can_ram_remap +static inline bool arm64_is_mmio_private(phys_addr_t phys_addr,
size_tsize)arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h extern bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t offset, size_t size, · line 328
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h +6
-0+{ + if (unlikely(is_realm_world())) + return arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr, size); + return false; +} +The function names (arm64_is_{mmio_private,
protected_mmio} are indicators to the
MMIO region's state or property.arm64_is_mmio_private()indicates the MMIO region
is 'private MMIO' whilearm64_is_protected_mmio()indicates the MMIO region is
'protected MMIO'. They are equivalent and it may be worthy to unify the function
names (indicators) as below.
Quoted 5 lines
option#1 option#2 -------- -------- arm64_is_private_mmio
arm64_is_protected_mmio__arm64_is_private_mmio__arm64_is_protected_mmio
Very valid point, I think I prefer option #2 here - "protected" is the architectural term in CCA.
Thanks,
Steve
Quoted 90 lines
Quoted 68 lines
#endif /*
__ASM_IO_H*/arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi.h +1
-0@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rsi_present); void __init arm64_rsi_init(void); +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size); + static inline bool is_realm_world(void) { return static_branch_unlikely(&rsi_present);arch/arm64/include/asm/rsi_cmds.h +20
-0@@ -45,6 +45,27 @@ static inline unsigned long rsi_get_realm_config(struct realm_config *cfg) return res.a0; } +static inline unsigned long rsi_ipa_state_get(phys_addr_t start, + phys_addr_t end, + enum ripas *state, + phys_addr_t *top) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + arm_smccc_smc(SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GET, + start, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, + &res); + + if (res.a0 == RSI_SUCCESS) { + if (top) + *top = res.a1; + if (state) + *state = res.a2; + } + + return res.a0; +} + static inline unsigned long rsi_set_addr_range_state(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end,enum ripas state,
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +15
-0@@ -66,6 +66,32 @@ static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) } } +bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) +{ + enum ripas ripas; + phys_addr_t end, top; + + /* Overflow ? */ + if (WARN_ON(base + size <= base)) + return false; + + end = ALIGN(base + size, RSI_GRANULE_SIZE); + base = ALIGN_DOWN(base, RSI_GRANULE_SIZE); + + while (base < end) { + if (WARN_ON(rsi_ipa_state_get(base, end, &ripas, &top))) + break; + if (WARN_ON(top <= base))arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) · line 93
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +10
-0+ break; + if (ripas != RSI_RIPAS_DEV) + break; + base = top; + } + + return base >= end; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +The function may be worthy to be renamed to
__arm64_is_private_mmio, as explained
as above.arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c static void __init arm64_rsi_setup_memory(void) · line 97
Quoted 3 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +0
-0void __init arm64_rsi_init(void) { if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() != SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC)Thanks,
Gavin
PATCH v6 5/11 arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Instead of marking every MMIO as shared, check if the given region is "Protected" and apply the permissions accordingly.
---
New patch for v5
--- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +15 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> + +#include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> struct realm_config config;
@@ -92,6 +94,16 @@ bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +static int realm_ioremap_hook (phys_addr_t phys,size_t size,pgprot_t *prot) +{ +if (arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys, size)) + *prot =pgprot_encrypted (*prot); +else + *prot =pgprot_decrypted (*prot); + +return 0 ; +} +void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ) {if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit () !=SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC )
@@ -102,6 +114,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)return ; prot_ns_shared =BIT (config.ipa_bits -1 ); +if (arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register (realm_ioremap_hook)) +return ; +arm64_rsi_setup_memory ();static_branch_enable (&rsi_present);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
Quoted 5 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Instead of marking every MMIO as shared, check if the given region is "Protected" and apply the permissions accordingly.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
New patch for v5--- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
With the following potential issue addressed:
Quoted 17 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +2
-0@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> + +#include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> struct realm_config config;@@ -92,6 +94,16 @@ bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio);
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) · line 106
Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +10
-0+static int realm_ioremap_hook (phys_addr_t phys,size_t size,pgprot_t *prot) +{ +if (arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys, size)) + *prot =pgprot_encrypted (*prot); +else + *prot =pgprot_decrypted (*prot); + +return 0 ; +} +
We probably need arm64_is_mmio_private() here, meaning arm64_is_protected_mmio() isn't sufficient to avoid invoking SMCCC call SMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GET in a regular guest where realm capability isn't present.
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c void __init arm64_rsi_init(void) · line 122
Quoted 13 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +3
-0void __init arm64_rsi_init (void ) {if (arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit () !=SMCCC_CONDUIT_SMC )@@ -102,6 +114,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)return ; prot_ns_shared =BIT (config.ipa_bits -1 ); +if (arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register (realm_ioremap_hook)) +return ; +arm64_rsi_setup_memory ();static_branch_enable (&rsi_present);
Thanks,
Gavin
Catalin Marinas
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
Quoted 22 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 21 lines · Steven Price
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +8
-0@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> + +#include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> struct realm_config config;@@ -92,6 +94,16 @@ bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +static int realm_ioremap_hook (phys_addr_t phys,size_t size,pgprot_t *prot) +{ +if (arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys, size)) + *prot =pgprot_encrypted (*prot); +else + *prot =pgprot_decrypted (*prot);
Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) · line 106
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +4
-0+ +return 0 ; +} +We probably need
arm64_is_mmio_private()here, meaningarm64_is_protected_mmio()isn't sufficient to avoid invoking SMCCC callSMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GETin a regular guest where realm capability isn't present.
I think we get away with this since the hook won't be registered in a normal guest (done from arm64_rsi_init()). So the additional check in arm64_is_mmio_private() is unnecessary.
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Re: [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
Quoted 32 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 22 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 21 lines · Steven Price
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +8
-0@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> + +#include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> struct realm_config config;@@ -92,6 +94,16 @@ bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_is_protected_mmio); +static int realm_ioremap_hook (phys_addr_t phys,size_t size,pgprot_t *prot) +{ +if (arm64_is_protected_mmio (phys, size)) + *prot =pgprot_encrypted (*prot); +else + *prot =pgprot_decrypted (*prot);Quoted 8 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c bool arm64_is_protected_mmio(phys_addr_t base, size_t size) · line 106
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +4
-0+ +return 0 ; +} +We probably need
arm64_is_mmio_private()here, meaningarm64_is_protected_mmio()isn't sufficient to avoid invoking SMCCC callSMC_RSI_IPA_STATE_GETin a regular guest where realm capability isn't present.
Quoted 4 lines
I think we get away with this since the hook won't be registered in a normal guest (done from
arm64_rsi_init()). So the additional check inarm64_is_mmio_private()is unnecessary.
Indeed. I missed the point that the hook won't be registered for a normal guest. So we're good and safe.
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 7 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Instead of marking every MMIO as shared, check if the given region is "Protected" and apply the permissions accordingly.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 6/11 efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Device mappings need to be emulated by the VMM so must be mapped shared with the host.
---
Changes since v4:
* Reworked to use arm64_is_iomem_private() to decide whether the memory needs to be decrypted or not.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c +10 -2
@@ -34,8 +34,16 @@ static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)u64 attr = md->attribute;u32 type = md->type; -if (type ==EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO ) -return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE; +if (type ==EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO ) { +pgprot_t prot =__pgprot (PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE); + +if (arm64_is_mmio_private (md->phys_addr, + md->num_pages <<EFI_PAGE_SHIFT )) + prot =pgprot_encrypted (prot); +else + prot =pgprot_decrypted (prot); +return pgprot_val (prot); + }if (region_is_misaligned (md)) {static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 06/11] efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared
Quoted 7 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Device mappings need to be emulated by the VMM so must be mapped shared with the host.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
---
Changes since v4:
* Reworked to usearm64_is_iomem_private()to decide whether the memory needs to be decrypted or not.--- arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Re: [PATCH v6 06/11] efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 7 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Device mappings need to be emulated by the VMM so must be mapped shared with the host.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
PATCH v6 7/11 arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA
In reply to Steven PriceWithin a realm guest it's not possible for a device emulated by the VMM to access arbitrary guest memory. So force the use of bounce buffers to ensure that the memory the emulated devices are accessing is in memory which is explicitly shared with the host.
This adds a call to swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() which calls set_memory_decrypted() to ensure the bounce buffer memory is shared with the host. For non-realm guests or hosts this is a no-op.
---
v3: Simplify mem_init() by using a 'flags' variable.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +1 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/rsi.h>
arch/arm64/mm/init.c +9 -1
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@#include <asm/kvm_host.h> #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/numa.h> +#include <asm/rsi.h> #include <asm/sections.h> #include <asm/setup.h> #include <linux/sizes.h>
@@ -366,8 +367,14 @@ void __init bootmem_init(void)*/ void __init mem_init (void ) { +unsigned int flags =SWIOTLB_VERBOSE ;bool swiotlb = max_pfn >PFN_DOWN (arm64_dma_phys_limit); +if (is_realm_world ()) { + swiotlb = true; + flags |=SWIOTLB_FORCE ; + } +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_DMA_BOUNCE_UNALIGNED_KMALLOC ) && !swiotlb) {/* * If no bouncing needed for ZONE_DMA, reduce the swiotlb
@@ -379,7 +386,8 @@ void __init mem_init(void) swiotlb = true; } -swiotlb_init (swiotlb,SWIOTLB_VERBOSE ); +swiotlb_init (swiotlb, flags); +swiotlb_update_mem_attributes ();/* this will put all unused low memory onto the freelists */ memblock_free_all ();
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 07/11] arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA
Quoted 13 lines · Steven Price
Within a realm guest it's not possible for a device emulated by the VMM to access arbitrary guest memory. So force the use of bounce buffers to ensure that the memory the emulated devices are accessing is in memory which is explicitly shared with the host.
This adds a call to
swiotlb_update_mem_attributes()which callsset_memory_decrypted()to ensure the bounce buffer memory is shared with the host. For non-realm guests or hosts this is a no-op.Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
---
v3: Simplifymem_init()by using a 'flags' variable.--- arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 1 + arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
PATCH v6 8/11 arm64: mm: Avoid TLBI when marking pages as valid
In reply to Steven PriceWhen __change_memory_common() is purely setting the valid bit on a PTE (e.g. via the set_memory_valid() call) there is no need for a TLBI as either the entry isn't changing (the valid bit was already set) or the entry was invalid and so should not have been cached in the TLB.
---
v4: New patch
--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +7 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,13 @@ static int __change_memory_common(unsigned long start, unsigned long size, ret =apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, start, size, change_page_range, &data); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, start + size); +/* +* If the memory is being made valid without changing any other bits +* then a TLBI isn't required as a non-valid entry cannot be cached in +* the TLB. +*/ +if (pgprot_val (set_mask) !=PTE_VALID ||pgprot_val (clear_mask)) +flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, start + size);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 08/11] arm64: mm: Avoid TLBI when marking pages as valid
Quoted 5 lines · Steven Price
When
__change_memory_common()is purely setting the valid bit on a PTE (e.g. via theset_memory_valid()call) there is no need for a TLBI as either the entry isn't changing (the valid bit was already set) or the entry was invalid and so should not have been cached in the TLB.
Quoted 8 lines
Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v4: New patch--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Re: [PATCH v6 08/11] arm64: mm: Avoid TLBI when marking pages as valid
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 7 lines · Steven Price
When
__change_memory_common()is purely setting the valid bit on a PTE (e.g. via theset_memory_valid()call) there is no need for a TLBI as either the entry isn't changing (the valid bit was already set) or the entry was invalid and so should not have been cached in the TLB.Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>
Quoted 25 lines
---
v4: New patch--- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +7
-1@@ -60,7 +60,13 @@ static int __change_memory_common(unsigned long start, unsigned long size, ret =apply_to_page_range (&init_mm, start, size, change_page_range, &data); -flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, start + size); +/* +* If the memory is being made valid without changing any other bits +* then a TLBI isn't required as a non-valid entry cannot be cached in +* the TLB. +*/ +if (pgprot_val (set_mask) !=PTE_VALID ||pgprot_val (clear_mask)) +flush_tlb_kernel_range (start, start + size);return ret; }
PATCH v6 9/11 arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Use the memory encryption APIs to trigger a RSI call to request a transition between protected memory and shared memory (or vice versa) and updating the kernel's linear map of modified pages to flip the top bit of the IPA. This requires that block mappings are not used in the direct map for realm guests.
---
Changes since v5:
* Added comments and a WARN() in realm_set_memory_{en,de}crypted() to explain that memory is leaked if the transition fails. This means the callers no longer need to provide their own WARN.
Changed since v4:
* Reworked to use the new dispatcher for the mem_encrypt API
Changes since v3:
* Provide pgprot_{de,en}crypted() macros
* Rename __set_memory_encrypted() to __set_memory_enc_dec() since it both encrypts and decrypts.
Changes since v2:
* Fix location of set_memory_{en,de}crypted() and export them.
* Break-before-make when changing the top bit of the IPA for transitioning to/from shared.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 9 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 16 +++++ arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +3 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK if PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2 select ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION if TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE select ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE + select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM select ARCH_HAS_CURRENT_STACK_POINTER select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE
@@ -44,6 +45,8 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT + select ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED select ARCH_STACKWALK select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
arch/arm64/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +9 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ #ifndef __ASM_MEM_ENCRYPT_H #define __ASM_MEM_ENCRYPT_H +#include <asm/rsi.h> + struct arm64_mem_crypt_ops { int (*encrypt)(unsigned long addr, int numpages); int (*decrypt)(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
@@ -12,4 +14,11 @@ int arm64_mem_crypt_ops_register(const struct arm64_mem_crypt_ops *ops);int set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages); +int realm_register_memory_enc_ops (void ); + +static inline bool force_dma_unencrypted (struct device *dev) +{ +return is_realm_world (); +} +#endif /* __ASM_MEM_ENCRYPT_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +5 -0
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ static inline void set_pud_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,#define pgprot_nx (prot) \ __pgprot_modify(prot, PTE_MAYBE_GP, PTE_PXN) +#define pgprot_decrypted (prot) \ + __pgprot_modify(prot, PROT_NS_SHARED, PROT_NS_SHARED) +#define pgprot_encrypted (prot) \ + __pgprot_modify(prot, PROT_NS_SHARED, 0) +/* * Mark the prot value as uncacheable and unbufferable. */
arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h +3 -0
@@ -15,4 +15,7 @@ int set_direct_map_invalid_noflush(struct page *page);int set_direct_map_default_noflush (struct page *page);bool kernel_page_present (struct page *page); +int set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages); +int set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages); +#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_SET_MEMORY_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c +16 -0
@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@#include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/psci.h> #include <linux/swiotlb.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <asm/io.h> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h> #include <asm/rsi.h> struct realm_config config;
@@ -19,6 +21,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prot_ns_shared);DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO (rsi_present);EXPORT_SYMBOL (rsi_present); +bool cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) +{ +switch (attr) { +case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT : +return is_realm_world (); +default : +return false; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cc_platform_has); +static bool rsi_version_matches (void ) {unsigned long ver_lower, ver_higher;
@@ -118,6 +131,9 @@ void __init arm64_rsi_init(void)if (arm64_ioremap_prot_hook_register (realm_ioremap_hook))return ; +if (realm_register_memory_enc_ops ()) +return ; +arm64_rsi_setup_memory ();static_branch_enable (&rsi_present);
arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +87 -3
117 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 09/11] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms
Quoted 27 lines · Steven Price
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
Use the memory encryption APIs to trigger a RSI call to request a transition between protected memory and shared memory (or vice versa) and updating the kernel's linear map of modified pages to flip the top bit of the IPA. This requires that block mappings are not used in the direct map for realm guests.
Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>---
Changes since v5:
* Added comments and aWARN()in realm_set_memory_{en,de}crypted() to explain that memory is leaked if the transition fails. This means the callers no longer need to provide their own WARN.
Changed since v4:
* Reworked to use the new dispatcher for themem_encryptAPI
Changes since v3:
* Provide pgprot_{de,en}crypted() macros
* Rename__set_memory_encrypted()to__set_memory_enc_dec()since it both encrypts and decrypts.
Changes since v2:
* Fix location of set_memory_{en,de}crypted() and export them.
* Break-before-make when changing the top bit of the IPA for transitioning to/from shared.
Quoted 9 lines
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 9 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/rsi.c | 16 +++++ arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
PATCH v6 10/11 virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
In reply to Steven PriceFrom: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none /sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $report
---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming of GRANULE_SIZE to RSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
--- drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig +2 -0
@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ source "drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig"
drivers/virt/coco/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret/ obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST) += pkvm-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sev-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += tdx-guest/ +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest/
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig new file +11 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +config ARM_CCA_GUEST + tristate "Arm CCA Guest driver" + depends on ARM64 + default m + select TSM_REPORTS + help + The driver provides userspace interface to request and + attestation report from the Realm Management Monitor(RMM). + + If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called + arm-cca-guest.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest.o
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +211 -0
211 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
Hi Steven,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on arm64/for-next/core]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.12-rc1 next-20241004] [cannot apply to efi/next]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Steven-Price/arm64-rsi-Add-RSI-definitions/20241004-225034 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git for-next/core patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241004144307.66199-11-steven.price%40arm.com patch subject: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms config: arm64-randconfig-004-20241005 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241005/[email protected]/config) compiler: aarch64-linux-gcc (GCC) 14.1.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241005/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c:27: warning: Excess struct member 'len' description in 'arm_cca_token_info'
vim +27 drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
15
16 /**
17 * struct arm_cca_token_info - a descriptor for the token buffer.
18 * @granule: PA of the page to which the token will be written
19 * @offset: Offset within granule to start of buffer in bytes
20 * @len: Number of bytes of token data that was retrieved
21 * @result: result of rsi_attestation_token_continue operation
22 */
23 struct arm_cca_token_info {
24 phys_addr_t granule;
25 unsigned long offset;
26 int result;
> 27 };
28 Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 95 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.--- drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.cdrivers/virt/coco/Kconfig +2
-0@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ source "drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig"drivers/virt/coco/Makefile +1
-0@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret/ obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST) += pkvm-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sev-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += tdx-guest/ +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig new file +11
-0@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +config ARM_CCA_GUEST + tristate "Arm CCA Guest driver" + depends on ARM64 + default m + select TSM_REPORTS + help + The driver provides userspace interface to request and + attestation report from the Realm Management Monitor(RMM). + + If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called + arm-cca-guest.drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest.odrivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 18
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/tsm.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include <asm/rsi.h> + +/** +* struct arm_cca_token_info - a descriptor for the token buffer. +* @granule: PA of the page to which the token will be written
^^^^^^^^
s/the page/the granule. They are same thing when we have 4KB page size, but there are conceptually different if I'm correct.
Quoted 20 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +20
-0+* @offset: Offset within granule to start of buffer in bytes +* @len: Number of bytes of token data that was retrieved +* @result: result of rsi_attestation_token_continue operation +*/ +struct arm_cca_token_info { +phys_addr_t granule; +unsigned long offset; +int result; +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_attestation_continue - Retrieve the attestation token data. +* +* @param: pointer to the arm_cca_token_info +* +* Attestation token generation is a long running operation and therefore +* the token data may not be retrieved in a single call. Moreover, the +* token retrieval operation must be requested on the same CPU on which the +* attestation token generation was initialised. +* This helper function is therefore scheduled on the same CPU multiple
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 48
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+* times until the entire token data is retrieved. +*/ +static void arm_cca_attestation_continue (void *param) +{ +unsigned long len; +unsigned long size; +struct arm_cca_token_info *info; + +if (!param) +return ;
This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 57
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +9
-0+ + info = (struct arm_cca_token_info *)param; + + size =RSI_GRANULE_SIZE - info->offset; + info->result =rsi_attestation_token_continue (info->granule, + info->offset, size, &len); + info->offset += len; +} +
As I suggested in another reply, the return value type of rsi_attestation_token_continue() needs to be 'unsigned long'. In that case, the type of struct arm_cca_token_info::result needs to be adjusted either.
Quoted 25 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +25
-0+/** +* arm_cca_report_new - Generate a new attestation token. +* +* @report: pointer to the TSM report context information. +* @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module. +* +* Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data +* passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token +* and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU +* on which the attestation token generation was initialised. +* +* The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If +* less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes. +* +* Return: +* * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully. +* * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid. +* * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory. +* * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s). +* * A negative status code as returned by smp_call_function_single(). +*/ +static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ +int ret; +int cpu;
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+long max_size; +unsigned long token_size; +struct arm_cca_token_info info; +void *buf; + u8 *token __free(kvfree) = NULL; +struct tsm_desc *desc = &report->desc; + +if (!report) +return -EINVAL ; +
This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 103
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +11
-0+if (desc->inblob_len <32 || desc->inblob_len >64 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* +* Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be +* scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. +*/ + cpu =get_cpu (); + max_size =rsi_attestation_token_init (desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len); +put_cpu (); +
It seems that put_cpu() is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before the subsequent call to arm_cca_attestation_continue() ?
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+if (max_size <=0 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Allocate outblob */ + token =kvzalloc (max_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!token) +return -ENOMEM ; + +/* +* Since the outblob may not be physically contiguous, use a page
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 123
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+* to bounce the buffer from RMM. +*/ + buf =alloc_pages_exact (RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!buf) +return -ENOMEM ; + +/* Get the PA of the memory page(s) that were allocated. */ + info.granule = (unsigned long )virt_to_phys (buf); + + token_size =0 ;
This initial assignment can be moved to where the variable is declared.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 124
Quoted 1 line
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +1
-0+/* Loop until the token is ready or there is an error. */
^^
Maybe it's the personal preference, I personally prefer to avoid the ending character '.' for the single line of comment.
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +9
-0+ do { + /* Retrieve one RSI_GRANULE_SIZE data per loop iteration. */ + info.offset = 0; + do { + /* + * Schedule a call to retrieve a sub-granule chunk + * of data per loop iteration. + */ + ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 143
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+ arm_cca_attestation_continue, + (void *)&info, true); +if (ret !=0 ) { + token_size =0 ; + goto exit_free_granule_page; + } + + ret = info.result; + }while ((ret ==RSI_INCOMPLETE ) && + (info.offset <RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ));
It may be clearer to use 'info.result' here. Besides, unnecessary () exists in the check.
} while (info.result == RSI_INCOMPLETE &&
info.offset < RSI_GRANULE_SIZE);Apart from that, we needn't to copy the token over when info.result isn't RSI_SUCCESS nor RSI_INCOMPLETE.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 155
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +12
-0+ +/* +* Copy the retrieved token data from the granule +* to the token buffer, ensuring that the RMM doesn't +* overflow the buffer. +*/ +if (WARN_ON (token_size + info.offset > max_size)) +break ; +memcpy (&token[token_size], buf, info.offset); + token_size += info.offset; + }while (ret ==RSI_INCOMPLETE ); +
As above, it may be clearer to use 'info.result' in the check.
} while (info.result == RSI_INCOMPLETE);
Quoted 33 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +33
-0+if (ret !=RSI_SUCCESS ) { + ret = -ENXIO ; + token_size =0 ; + goto exit_free_granule_page; + } + + report->outblob =no_free_ptr (token); +exit_free_granule_page: + report->outblob_len = token_size; +free_pages_exact (buf,RSI_GRANULE_SIZE ); +return ret; +} + +static const struct tsm_ops arm_cca_tsm_ops = { + .name =KBUILD_MODNAME , + .report_new = arm_cca_report_new, +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_guest_init - Register with the Trusted Security Module (TSM) +* interface. +* +* Return: +* * %0 - Registered successfully with the TSM interface. +* * %-ENODEV - The execution context is not an Arm Realm. +* * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid. +* * %-EBUSY - Already registered. +*/ +static int __init arm_cca_guest_init (void ) +{ +int ret; + +if (!is_realm_world ())
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 198
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+return -ENODEV ; + + ret =tsm_register (&arm_cca_tsm_ops,NULL ); +if (ret <0 ) +pr_err ("Failed to register with TSM.\n" ); + +return ret; +} +module_init (arm_cca_guest_init); +
It's probably a bit helpful to print the errno returned from tsm_register().
pr_err("Error %d registering with TSM\n", ret);The only errno that can be returned from tsm_register() is -EBUSY. So there is no way for arm_cca_guest_init() to return -EINVAL. The comments need correction by dropping the description relevant to -EINVAL.
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 211
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +13
-0+/** +* arm_cca_guest_exit - unregister with the Trusted Security Module (TSM) +* interface. +*/ +static void __exit arm_cca_guest_exit(void) +{ +tsm_unregister (&arm_cca_tsm_ops); +} +module_exit (arm_cca_guest_exit); + +MODULE_AUTHOR ("Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>" ); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Arm CCA Guest TSM Driver." ); +MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );
The ending character '.' for the module's description may not be needed and can be dropped.
Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 110 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 97 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
---
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.cdrivers/virt/coco/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ source "drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig"source "
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig"drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig +2
-0+ +source "drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig"drivers/virt/coco/Makefile +0
-0@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret/obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST) += pkvm-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sev-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += tdx-guest/
drivers/virt/coco/Makefile +1
-0+obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig new file +11
-0@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +config ARM_CCA_GUEST + tristate "Arm CCA Guest driver" + depends on ARM64 + default m + select TSM_REPORTS + help + The driver provides userspace interface to request and + attestation report from the Realm Management Monitor(RMM). + + If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called + arm-cca-guest.drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest.odrivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 18
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/tsm.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include <asm/rsi.h> + +/** +* struct arm_cca_token_info - a descriptor for the token buffer. +* @granule: PA of the page to which the token will be written ^^^^^^^^
Quoted 2 lines
s/the page/the granule. They are same thing when we have 4KB page size, but there are conceptually different if I'm correct.
Indeed they are different, the granule is always 4KB, the host (and guest) page size could be bigger (although that's not yet supported).
Here 'granule' does indeed point to a (host) page (because it's returned from alloc_pages_exact()), but that's just a confusing detail.
I'll update as you suggest.
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +16
-0+* @offset: Offset within granule to start of buffer in bytes +* @len: Number of bytes of token data that was retrieved +* @result: result of rsi_attestation_token_continue operation +*/ +struct arm_cca_token_info { + phys_addr_t granule; + unsigned long offset; + int result; +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_attestation_continue - Retrieve the attestation token data. +* +* @param: pointer to the arm_cca_token_info +* +* Attestation token generation is a long running operation and therefore
+ * the token data may not be retrieved in a single call. Moreover, the
+ * token retrieval operation must be requested on the same CPU on which the
+ * attestation token generation was initialised.
+ * This helper function is therefore scheduled on the same CPU multiple
+ * times until the entire token data is retrieved.
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +2
-0+static void arm_cca_attestation_continue (void *param) +{
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+ unsigned long len;
+ unsigned long size;
+ structarm_cca_token_info*info;
+
+ if (!param)
+ return;This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +7
-0+ + info = (struct arm_cca_token_info *)param; + + size = RSI_GRANULE_SIZE - info->offset; + info->result = rsi_attestation_token_continue(info->granule, + info->offset, size, &len); + info->offset += len;
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +2
-0+} +As I suggested in another reply, the return value type of
rsi_attestation_token_continue()
needs to be 'unsigned long'. In that case, the type of structarm_cca_token_info::result
needs to be adjusted either.
Ack
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ cpu =
get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
+ if (
max_size<= 0)
+ return-EINVAL;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +12
-0+ + /* Allocate outblob */ + token = kvzalloc(max_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * Since the outblob may not be physically contiguous, use a page + * to bounce the buffer from RMM. + */ + buf = alloc_pages_exact(RSI_GRANULE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf)
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 123
Quoted 6 lines
+ return
-ENOMEM;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +5
-0+ + /* Get the PA of the memory page(s) that were allocated. */ + info.granule = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(buf); + + token_size = 0;This initial assignment can be moved to where the variable is declared.
Ack
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ /* Loop until the token is ready or there is an error. */
^^
Maybe it's the personal preference, I personally prefer to avoid the ending character '.' for the single line of comment.
I agree, my preference is the same. I'll update this.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 11 lines
+ do {
+ /* Retrieve oneRSI_GRANULE_SIZEdata per loop iteration. */ + info.offset = 0;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Schedule a call to retrieve a sub-granule chunk + * of data per loop iteration.
+ */
+ ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,
+arm_cca_attestation_continue, + (void *)&info, true);Quoted 8 lines
+ if (ret != 0) {
+token_size= 0;
+ gotoexit_free_granule_page;
+ }
+
+ ret = info.result;
+ } while ((ret ==RSI_INCOMPLETE) &&
+ (info.offset <RSI_GRANULE_SIZE));
Quoted 5 lines
It may be clearer to use 'info.result' here. Besides, unnecessary () exists in the check.
} while (info.result ==
RSI_INCOMPLETE&& info.offset <RSI_GRANULE_SIZE);
Sure
Quoted 2 lines
Apart from that, we needn't to copy the token over when info.result isn't
RSI_SUCCESSnorRSI_INCOMPLETE.
I'll move the error case up to avoid the copy.
Quoted 15 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 155
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +12
-0+ + /* + * Copy the retrieved token data from the granule + * to the token buffer, ensuring that the RMM doesn't + * overflow the buffer. + */ + if (WARN_ON(token_size + info.offset > max_size)) + break; + memcpy(&token[token_size], buf, info.offset); + token_size += info.offset; + } while (ret == RSI_INCOMPLETE); +As above, it may be clearer to use 'info.result' in the check.
Quoted 1 line
} while (info.result ==
RSI_INCOMPLETE);
Ack
Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 33 lines
+ if (ret !=
RSI_SUCCESS) {
+ ret =-ENXIO;
+token_size= 0;
+ gotoexit_free_granule_page;
+ }drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +28
-0+ + report->outblob = no_free_ptr(token); +exit_free_granule_page: + report->outblob_len = token_size; + free_pages_exact(buf, RSI_GRANULE_SIZE); + return ret; +} + +static const struct tsm_ops arm_cca_tsm_ops = { + .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, + .report_new = arm_cca_report_new, +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_guest_init - Register with the Trusted Security Module (TSM) +* interface. +* +* Return: +* * %0 - Registered successfully with the TSM interface. +* * %-ENODEV - The execution context is not an Arm Realm. +* * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid. +* * %-EBUSY - Already registered. +*/ +static int __init arm_cca_guest_init (void ) +{ + int ret; + + if (!is_realm_world())drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 198
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+ return -ENODEV; + + ret = tsm_register(&arm_cca_tsm_ops, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("Failed to register with TSM.\n"); + + return ret; +} +module_init (arm_cca_guest_init); +It's probably a bit helpful to print the errno returned from
tsm_register().
Quoted 5 lines
pr_err("Error %d registering with TSM\n", ret);The only errno that can be returned from
tsm_register()is-EBUSY. So there is no way forarm_cca_guest_init()to return-EINVAL. The comments need correction by dropping the description relevant to-EINVAL.
Ack
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_guest_exit- unregister with the Trusted Security Module (TSM)
+ * interface.
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +5
-0+static void __exit arm_cca_guest_exit(void) +{ + tsm_unregister(&arm_cca_tsm_ops); +} +module_exit (arm_cca_guest_exit);
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 211
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ +MODULE_AUTHOR ("Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>" ); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Arm CCA Guest TSM Driver." ); +MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );The ending character '.' for the module's description may not be needed and can be
dropped.
Ack.
Thanks for the review!
Steve
Suzuki K Poulose
reviewerRe: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 235 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 110 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 97 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.--- drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.cdrivers/virt/coco/Kconfig +2
-0@@ -14,3 +14,5 @@ source "drivers/virt/coco/pkvm-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig" source "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-guest/Kconfig" + +source "drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig"drivers/virt/coco/Makefile +1
-0@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SECRET) += efi_secret/ obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_PKVM_GUEST) += pkvm-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_SEV_GUEST) += sev-guest/ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += tdx-guest/ +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest/drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig new file +11
-0@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +config ARM_CCA_GUEST + tristate "Arm CCA Guest driver" + depends on ARM64 + default m + select TSM_REPORTS + help + The driver provides userspace interface to request and + attestation report from the Realm Management Monitor(RMM). + + If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called + arm-cca-guest.drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile new file +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST) += arm-cca-guest.odrivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Copyright (C) 2023 ARM Ltd. +*/ + +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/cc_platform.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 18
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/smp.h> +#include <linux/tsm.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include <asm/rsi.h> + +/** +* struct arm_cca_token_info - a descriptor for the token buffer. +* @granule: PA of the page to which the token will be written ^^^^^^^^
Quoted 2 lines
s/the page/the granule. They are same thing when we have 4KB page size, but there are conceptually different if I'm correct.
Indeed they are different, the granule is always 4KB, the host (and guest) page size could be bigger (although that's not yet supported).
Here 'granule' does indeed point to a (host) page (because it's returned from
alloc_pages_exact()), but that's just a confusing detail.I'll update as you suggest.
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +16
-0+* @offset: Offset within granule to start of buffer in bytes +* @len: Number of bytes of token data that was retrieved +* @result: result of rsi_attestation_token_continue operation +*/ +struct arm_cca_token_info { + phys_addr_t granule; + unsigned long offset; + int result; +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_attestation_continue - Retrieve the attestation token data. +* +* @param: pointer to the arm_cca_token_info +* +* Attestation token generation is a long running operation and therefore
+ * the token data may not be retrieved in a single call. Moreover, the
+ * token retrieval operation must be requested on the same CPU on which the
+ * attestation token generation was initialised.
+ * This helper function is therefore scheduled on the same CPU multiple
+ * times until the entire token data is retrieved.
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +2
-0+static void arm_cca_attestation_continue (void *param) +{Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
+ unsigned long len;
+ unsigned long size;
+ structarm_cca_token_info*info;
+
+ if (!param)
+ return;This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +7
-0+ + info = (struct arm_cca_token_info *)param; + + size = RSI_GRANULE_SIZE - info->offset; + info->result = rsi_attestation_token_continue(info->granule, + info->offset, size, &len); + info->offset += len;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
Quoted 2 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +2
-0+} +As I suggested in another reply, the return value type of
rsi_attestation_token_continue()
needs to be 'unsigned long'. In that case, the type of structarm_cca_token_info::result
needs to be adjusted either.Ack
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ cpu =
get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.
Suzuki
Quoted 166 lines
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
+ if (
max_size<= 0)
+ return-EINVAL;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +12
-0+ + /* Allocate outblob */ + token = kvzalloc(max_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* + * Since the outblob may not be physically contiguous, use a page + * to bounce the buffer from RMM. + */ + buf = alloc_pages_exact(RSI_GRANULE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf)Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 123
Quoted 6 lines
+ return
-ENOMEM;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +5
-0+ + /* Get the PA of the memory page(s) that were allocated. */ + info.granule = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(buf); + + token_size = 0;This initial assignment can be moved to where the variable is declared.
Ack
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ /* Loop until the token is ready or there is an error. */
^^
Maybe it's the personal preference, I personally prefer to avoid the ending character '.' for the single line of comment.
I agree, my preference is the same. I'll update this.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 11 lines
+ do {
+ /* Retrieve oneRSI_GRANULE_SIZEdata per loop iteration. */ + info.offset = 0;
+ do {
+ /*
+ * Schedule a call to retrieve a sub-granule chunk + * of data per loop iteration.
+ */
+ ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,
+arm_cca_attestation_continue, + (void *)&info, true);Quoted 8 lines
+ if (ret != 0) {
+token_size= 0;
+ gotoexit_free_granule_page;
+ }
+
+ ret = info.result;
+ } while ((ret ==RSI_INCOMPLETE) &&
+ (info.offset <RSI_GRANULE_SIZE));Quoted 5 lines
It may be clearer to use 'info.result' here. Besides, unnecessary () exists in the check.
} while (info.result ==
RSI_INCOMPLETE&& info.offset <RSI_GRANULE_SIZE);Sure
Quoted 2 lines
Apart from that, we needn't to copy the token over when info.result isn't
RSI_SUCCESSnorRSI_INCOMPLETE.I'll move the error case up to avoid the copy.
Quoted 15 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 155
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +12
-0+ + /* + * Copy the retrieved token data from the granule + * to the token buffer, ensuring that the RMM doesn't + * overflow the buffer. + */ + if (WARN_ON(token_size + info.offset > max_size)) + break; + memcpy(&token[token_size], buf, info.offset); + token_size += info.offset; + } while (ret == RSI_INCOMPLETE); +As above, it may be clearer to use 'info.result' in the check.
Quoted 1 line
} while (info.result ==
RSI_INCOMPLETE);Ack
Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 33 lines
+ if (ret !=
RSI_SUCCESS) {
+ ret =-ENXIO;
+token_size= 0;
+ gotoexit_free_granule_page;
+ }drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +28
-0+ + report->outblob = no_free_ptr(token); +exit_free_granule_page: + report->outblob_len = token_size; + free_pages_exact(buf, RSI_GRANULE_SIZE); + return ret; +} + +static const struct tsm_ops arm_cca_tsm_ops = { + .name = KBUILD_MODNAME, + .report_new = arm_cca_report_new, +}; + +/** +* arm_cca_guest_init - Register with the Trusted Security Module (TSM) +* interface. +* +* Return: +* * %0 - Registered successfully with the TSM interface. +* * %-ENODEV - The execution context is not an Arm Realm. +* * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid. +* * %-EBUSY - Already registered. +*/ +static int __init arm_cca_guest_init (void ) +{ + int ret; + + if (!is_realm_world())drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 198
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +10
-0+ return -ENODEV; + + ret = tsm_register(&arm_cca_tsm_ops, NULL); + if (ret < 0) + pr_err("Failed to register with TSM.\n"); + + return ret; +} +module_init (arm_cca_guest_init); +It's probably a bit helpful to print the errno returned from
tsm_register().Quoted 5 lines
pr_err("Error %d registering with TSM\n", ret);The only errno that can be returned from
tsm_register()is-EBUSY. So there is no way forarm_cca_guest_init()to return-EINVAL. The comments need correction by dropping the description relevant to-EINVAL.Ack
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_guest_exit- unregister with the Trusted Security Module (TSM)
+ * interface.
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +5
-0+static void __exit arm_cca_guest_exit(void) +{ + tsm_unregister(&arm_cca_tsm_ops); +} +module_exit (arm_cca_guest_exit);Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 211
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ +MODULE_AUTHOR ("Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>" ); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("Arm CCA Guest TSM Driver." ); +MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );The ending character '.' for the module's description may not be needed and can be
dropped.Ack.
Thanks for the review!
Steve
Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 39 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 38 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 37 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 36 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
---
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c
[...]
Quoted 58 lines
Quoted 58 lines
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 31 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*Quoted 8 lines
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
+ cpu =get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "
smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.
Yes, It's fine to call put_cpu() early since we're tolerant to error introduced by CPU unplug. It's a bit confused that rsi_attestation_token_init() is called on the local CPU while arm_cca_attestation_continue() is called on same CPU with help of smp_call_function_single(). Does it make sense to unify so that both will be invoked with the help of smp_call_function_single() ?
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
/*
* The calling and target CPU can be different after the calling process
* is migrated to another different CPU. It's guaranteed the attestatation
* always happen on the target CPU with smp_call_function_single().
*/
ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu, rsi_attestation_token_init_wrapper,
(void *)&info, true);
if (ret) {
...
}Thanks,
Gavin
Suzuki K Poulose
reviewerRe: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 124 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 40 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 39 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 38 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 37 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
---
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++
++++++5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c[...]
Quoted 62 lines
Quoted 62 lines
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 35 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*Quoted 8 lines
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
+ cpu =get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "
smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.Yes, It's fine to call
put_cpu()early since we're tolerant to error introduced by CPU unplug. It's a bit confused thatrsi_attestation_token_init()is called on the local CPU whilearm_cca_attestation_continue()is called on same CPU with help ofsmp_call_function_single(). Does it make sense to unify so that both will be invoked with the help ofsmp_call_function_single()?int cpu =
smp_processor_id();
Quoted 10 lines
/*
* The calling and target CPU can be different after the calling
process
* is migrated to another different CPU. It's guaranteed the
attestatation
* always happen on the target CPU withsmp_call_function_single(). */
ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,rsi_attestation_token_init_wrapper,
(void *)&info, true);
Well, we want to allocate sufficient size buffer (size returned from token_init()) outside an atomic context (thus not in smp_call_function()).
May be we could make this "allocation" restriction in a comment to make it clear, why we do it this way.
Suzuki
Quoted 7 lines
if (ret) {
...
}Thanks,
Gavin
Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 141 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 129 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 40 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 39 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 38 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 37 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
---
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++ ++++++5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c[...]
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 35 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new (struct tsm_report *report,void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c line 92
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c new file +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*Quoted 8 lines
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
+ cpu =get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before
the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "
smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.Yes, It's fine to call
put_cpu()early since we're tolerant to error introduced
by CPU unplug. It's a bit confused thatrsi_attestation_token_init()is called
on the local CPU whilearm_cca_attestation_continue()is called on same CPU
with help ofsmp_call_function_single(). Does it make sense to unify so that
both will be invoked with the help ofsmp_call_function_single()?int cpu =
smp_processor_id();Quoted 10 lines
/*
* The calling and target CPU can be different after the calling process
* is migrated to another different CPU. It's guaranteed the attestatation
* always happen on the target CPU withsmp_call_function_single(). */
ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,rsi_attestation_token_init_wrapper,
(void *)&info, true);
Quoted 5 lines
Well, we want to allocate sufficient size buffer (size returned from token_init()) outside an atomic context (thus not in
smp_call_function()).May be we could make this "allocation" restriction in a comment to make it clear, why we do it this way.
So if I've followed this correctly the get_cpu() route doesn't work because of the need to allocate outblob. So using smp_call_function_single() for all calls seems to be the best approach, along with a comment explaining what's going on. So how about:
/* * The attestation token 'init' and 'continue' calls must be * performed on the same CPU. smp_call_function_single() is used * instead of simply calling get_cpu() because of the need to * allocate outblob based on the returned value from the 'init' * call and that cannot be done in an atomic context. */ cpu = smp_processor_id(); info.challenge = desc->inblob; info.challenge_size = desc->inblob_len; ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu, arm_cca_attestation_init, &info, true); if (ret) return ret; max_size = info.result;
(with appropriate updates to the 'info' struct and a new arm_cca_attestation_init() wrapper for rsi_attestation_token_init()).
Steve
Suzuki K Poulose
reviewerRe: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 171 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 141 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 129 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 40 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 39 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 38 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 37 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.--- drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++ ++++++ 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c[...]
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 35 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */(quoted diff) +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;(quoted diff) +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*Quoted 8 lines
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
+ cpu =get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before
the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "
smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.Yes, It's fine to call
put_cpu()early since we're tolerant to error introduced
by CPU unplug. It's a bit confused thatrsi_attestation_token_init()is called
on the local CPU whilearm_cca_attestation_continue()is called on same CPU
with help ofsmp_call_function_single(). Does it make sense to unify so that
both will be invoked with the help ofsmp_call_function_single()?int cpu =
smp_processor_id();Quoted 10 lines
/*
* The calling and target CPU can be different after the calling
process
* is migrated to another different CPU. It's guaranteed the
attestatation
* always happen on the target CPU withsmp_call_function_single(). */
ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,rsi_attestation_token_init_wrapper,
(void *)&info, true);Quoted 5 lines
Well, we want to allocate sufficient size buffer (size returned from token_init()) outside an atomic context (thus not in
smp_call_function()).May be we could make this "allocation" restriction in a comment to make it clear, why we do it this way.
So if I've followed this correctly the
get_cpu()route doesn't work because of the need to allocate outblob. So usingsmp_call_function_single()for all calls seems to be the best approach, along with a comment explaining what's going on. So how about:/* * The attestation token 'init' and 'continue' calls must be * performed on the same CPU. smp_call_function_single() is used * instead of simply calling get_cpu() because of the need to * allocate outblob based on the returned value from the 'init' * call and that cannot be done in an atomic context. */ cpu = smp_processor_id(); info.challenge = desc->inblob; info.challenge_size = desc->inblob_len; ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu, arm_cca_attestation_init, &info, true); if (ret) return ret; max_size = info.result;
Quoted 2 lines
(with appropriate updates to the 'info' struct and a new
arm_cca_attestation_init()wrapper forrsi_attestation_token_init()).
That sounds good to me.
Suzuki
Re: [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms
Quoted 172 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 171 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 141 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 129 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 40 lines · Suzuki K Poulose
Quoted 39 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 38 lines · Gavin Shan
Quoted 37 lines · Steven Price
From: Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>
Introduce an arm-cca-guest driver that registers with the configfs-tsm module to provide user interfaces for retrieving an attestation token.
When a new report is requested the arm-cca-guest driver invokes the appropriate RSI interfaces to query an attestation token.
The steps to retrieve an attestation token are as follows:
1. Mount the configfs filesystem if not already mounted mount -t configfs none/sys/kernel/config
2. Generate an attestation token report=/sys/kernel/config/tsm/report/report0 mkdir $report
dd if=/dev/urandom bs=64 count=1 > $report/inblob hexdump -C $report/outblob
rmdir $reportSigned-off-by Sami Mujawar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>---
v3: Minor improvements to comments and adapt to the renaming ofGRANULE_SIZEtoRSI_GRANULE_SIZE.
---
drivers/virt/coco/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/virt/coco/Makefile | 1 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefile | 2 + .../virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c | 211 ++++++++++++ ++++++5 files changed, 227 insertions(+)create mode 100644
drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Kconfigcreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/Makefilecreate mode 100644drivers/virt/coco/arm-cca-guest/arm-cca-guest.c[...]
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 35 lines
+/**
+ *arm_cca_report_new- Generate a new attestation token.
+ *
+ * @report: pointer to the TSM report context information.
+ * @data: pointer to the context specific data for this module.
+ *
+ * Initialise the attestation token generation using the challenge data
+ * passed in the TSM descriptor. Allocate memory for the attestation token
+ * and schedule calls to retrieve the attestation token on the same CPU
+ * on which the attestation token generation was initialised.
+ *
+ * The challenge data must be at least 32 bytes and no more than 64 bytes. If
+ * less than 64 bytes are provided it will be zero padded to 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * %0 - Attestation token generated successfully.
+ * * %-EINVAL - A parameter was not valid.
+ * * %-ENOMEM - Out of memory.
+ * * %-EFAULT - Failed to get IPA for memory page(s).
+ * * A negative status code as returned bysmp_call_function_single().
+ */(quoted diff) +8
-0+static int arm_cca_report_new(struct tsm_report *report, void *data) +{ + int ret; + int cpu; + long max_size; + unsigned long token_size; + struct arm_cca_token_info info; + void *buf;Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 6 lines
+ u8 *token
__free(kvfree)= NULL;
+ structtsm_desc*desc =&report->desc;(quoted diff) +4
-0+ + if (!report) + return -EINVAL; +This check seems unnecessary and can be dropped.
Ack
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+ if (
desc->inblob_len< 32 ||desc->inblob_len> 64) + return-EINVAL;
+
+ /*Quoted 8 lines
+ * Get a CPU on which the attestation token generation will be + * scheduled and initialise the attestation token generation. + */
+ cpu =get_cpu();
+max_size=rsi_attestation_token_init(desc->inblob, desc->inblob_len);
+put_cpu();
+It seems that
put_cpu()is called early, meaning the CPU can go away before
the subsequent call toarm_cca_attestation_continue()?Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Indeed, good spot. I'll move it to the end of the function and update the error paths below.
Actually this was on purpose, not to block the CPU hotplug. The attestation must be completed on the same CPU.
We can detect the failure from "
smp_call" further down and make sure we can safely complete the operation or restart it.Yes, It's fine to call
put_cpu()early since we're tolerant to error introduced
by CPU unplug. It's a bit confused thatrsi_attestation_token_init()is called
on the local CPU whilearm_cca_attestation_continue()is called on same CPU
with help ofsmp_call_function_single(). Does it make sense to unify so that
both will be invoked with the help ofsmp_call_function_single()?int cpu =
smp_processor_id();Quoted 10 lines
/*
* The calling and target CPU can be different after the calling process
* is migrated to another different CPU. It's guaranteed the attestatation
* always happen on the target CPU withsmp_call_function_single(). */
ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu,rsi_attestation_token_init_wrapper,
(void *)&info, true);Quoted 5 lines
Well, we want to allocate sufficient size buffer (size returned from token_init()) outside an atomic context (thus not in
smp_call_function()).May be we could make this "allocation" restriction in a comment to make it clear, why we do it this way.
So if I've followed this correctly the
get_cpu()route doesn't work because of the need to allocate outblob. So usingsmp_call_function_single()for all calls seems to be the best approach, along with a comment explaining what's going on. So how about:/*
* The attestation token 'init' and 'continue' calls must be
* performed on the same CPU.smp_call_function_single()is used
* instead of simply callingget_cpu()because of the need to
* allocate outblob based on the returned value from the 'init'
* call and that cannot be done in an atomic context. */
cpu =smp_processor_id();info.challenge =
desc->inblob;
info.challenge_size =desc->inblob_len;ret =
smp_call_function_single(cpu, arm_cca_attestation_init, &info, true);
if (ret)
return ret;
max_size = info.result;
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
(with appropriate updates to the 'info' struct and a new
arm_cca_attestation_init()wrapper forrsi_attestation_token_init()).That sounds good to me.
+1, it looks good to me as well.
Thanks,
Gavin
PATCH v6 11/11 arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
In reply to Steven PriceAdd some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux as a Realm guest. Also update booting.rst to describe the requirement for RIPAS RAM.
--- Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +67 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Arm Confidential Compute Architecture +===================================== + +Arm systems that support the Realm Management Extension (RME) contain +hardware to allow a VM guest to be run in a way which protects the code +and data of the guest from the hypervisor. It extends the older "two +world" model (Normal and Secure World) into four worlds: Normal, Secure, +Root and Realm. Linux can then also be run as a guest to a monitor +running in the Realm world. + +The monitor running in the Realm world is known as the Realm Management +Monitor (RMM) and implements the Realm Management Monitor +specification[1]. The monitor acts a bit like a hypervisor (e.g. it runs +in EL2 and manages the stage 2 page tables etc of the guests running in +Realm world), however much of the control is handled by a hypervisor +running in the Normal World. The Normal World hypervisor uses the Realm +Management Interface (RMI) defined by the RMM specification to request +the RMM to perform operations (e.g. mapping memory or executing a vCPU). + +The RMM defines an environment for guests where the address space (IPA) +is split into two. The lower half is protected - any memory that is +mapped in this half cannot be seen by the Normal World and the RMM +restricts what operations the Normal World can perform on this memory +(e.g. the Normal World cannot replace pages in this region without the +guest's cooperation). The upper half is shared, the Normal World is free +to make changes to the pages in this region, and is able to emulate MMIO +devices in this region too. + +A guest running in a Realm may also communicate with the RMM to request +changes in its environment or to perform attestation about its +environment. In particular it may request that areas of the protected +address space are transitioned between 'RAM' and 'EMPTY' (in either +direction). This allows a Realm guest to give up memory to be returned +to the Normal World, or to request new memory from the Normal World. +Without an explicit request from the Realm guest the RMM will otherwise +prevent the Normal World from making these changes. + +Linux as a Realm Guest +---------------------- + +To run Linux as a guest within a Realm, the following must be provided +either by the VMM or by a `boot loader` run in the Realm before Linux: + + * All protected RAM described to Linux (by DT or ACPI) must be marked + RIPAS RAM before handing over the Linux. + + * MMIO devices must be either unprotected (e.g. emulated by the Normal + World) or marked RIPAS DEV. + + * MMIO devices emulated by the Normal World and used very early in boot + (specifically earlycon) must be specified in the upper half of IPA. + For earlycon this can be done by specifying the address on the + command line, e.g.: ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000`` + + * Linux will use bounce buffers for communicating with unprotected + devices. It will transition some protected memory to RIPAS EMPTY and + expect to be able to access unprotected pages at the same IPA address + but with the highest valid IPA bit set. The expectation is that the + VMM will remove the physical pages from the protected mapping and + provide those pages as unprotected pages. + +References +---------- +[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/
Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst +3 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ to automatically locate and size all RAM, or it may use knowledge of the RAM in the machine, or any other method the boot loader designer sees fit.) +For Arm Confidential Compute Realms this includes ensuring that all +protected RAM has a Realm IPA state (RIPAS) of "RAM". + 2. Setup the device tree -------------------------
Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture acpi_object_usage amu arm-acpi + arm-cca asymmetric-32bit booting cpu-feature-registers
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
Quoted 4 lines · Steven Price
Add some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux as a Realm guest. Also update
booting.rstto describe the requirement for RIPAS RAM.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>--- Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+)create mode 100644
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst
Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
In reply to Steven PriceQuoted 47 lines · Steven Price
Add some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux as a Realm guest. Also update
booting.rstto describe the requirement for RIPAS RAM.Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>--- Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rstDocumentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +29
-0@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Arm Confidential Compute Architecture +===================================== + +Arm systems that support the Realm Management Extension (RME) contain +hardware to allow a VM guest to be run in a way which protects the code +and data of the guest from the hypervisor. It extends the older "two +world" model (Normal and Secure World) into four worlds: Normal, Secure, +Root and Realm. Linux can then also be run as a guest to a monitor +running in the Realm world. + +The monitor running in the Realm world is known as the Realm Management +Monitor (RMM) and implements the Realm Management Monitor +specification[1]. The monitor acts a bit like a hypervisor (e.g. it runs +in EL2 and manages the stage 2 page tables etc of the guests running in +Realm world), however much of the control is handled by a hypervisor +running in the Normal World. The Normal World hypervisor uses the Realm +Management Interface (RMI) defined by the RMM specification to request +the RMM to perform operations (e.g. mapping memory or executing a vCPU). + +The RMM defines an environment for guests where the address space (IPA) +is split into two. The lower half is protected - any memory that is +mapped in this half cannot be seen by the Normal World and the RMM +restricts what operations the Normal World can perform on this memory +(e.g. the Normal World cannot replace pages in this region without the +guest's cooperation). The upper half is shared, the Normal World is free +to make changes to the pages in this region, and is able to emulate MMIO
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 39
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +10
-0+devices in this region too. + +A guest running in a Realm may also communicate with the RMM to request +changes in its environment or to perform attestation about its +environment. In particular it may request that areas of the protected +address space are transitioned between 'RAM' and 'EMPTY' (in either +direction). This allows a Realm guest to give up memory to be returned +to the Normal World, or to request new memory from the Normal World. +Without an explicit request from the Realm guest the RMM will otherwise +prevent the Normal World from making these changes.
We could mention that this interface is "RSI", so readers know what to look for next
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 48
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +9
-0+ +Linux as a Realm Guest +---------------------- + +To run Linux as a guest within a Realm, the following must be provided +either by the VMM or by a `boot loader` run in the Realm before Linux: + + * All protected RAM described to Linux (by DT or ACPI) must be marked + RIPAS RAM before handing over the Linux.
"handing control over to Linux", or something like that?
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 56
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +8
-0+ + * MMIO devices must be either unprotected (e.g. emulated by the Normal + World) or marked RIPAS DEV. + + * MMIO devices emulated by the Normal World and used very early in boot + (specifically earlycon) must be specified in the upper half of IPA. + For earlycon this can be done by specifying the address on the + command line, e.g.: ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``
This is going to be needed frequently, so maybe we should explain in a little more detail how we come up with this value: "e.g. with an IPA size of 33 and the base address of the emulated UART at 0x1000000, ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``"
(Because the example IPA size is rather unintuitive and specific to the kvmtool memory map)
Thanks,
Jean
Quoted 41 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +11
-0+ + * Linux will use bounce buffers for communicating with unprotected + devices. It will transition some protected memory to RIPAS EMPTY and + expect to be able to access unprotected pages at the same IPA address + but with the highest valid IPA bit set. The expectation is that the + VMM will remove the physical pages from the protected mapping and + provide those pages as unprotected pages. + +References +---------- +[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst +3
-0@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ to automatically locate and size all RAM, or it may use knowledge of the RAM in the machine, or any other method the boot loader designer sees fit.) +For Arm Confidential Compute Realms this includes ensuring that all +protected RAM has a Realm IPA state (RIPAS) of "RAM". + 2. Setup the device tree -------------------------Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst +1
-0@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture acpi_object_usage amu arm-acpi + arm-cca asymmetric-32bit booting cpu-feature-registersSignature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
Quoted 53 lines · Jean-Philippe Brucker
Quoted 52 lines · Steven Price
Add some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux as a Realm guest. Also update
booting.rstto describe the requirement for RIPAS RAM.Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>--- Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rstDocumentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +34
-0@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Arm Confidential Compute Architecture +===================================== + +Arm systems that support the Realm Management Extension (RME) contain +hardware to allow a VM guest to be run in a way which protects the code +and data of the guest from the hypervisor. It extends the older "two +world" model (Normal and Secure World) into four worlds: Normal, Secure, +Root and Realm. Linux can then also be run as a guest to a monitor +running in the Realm world. + +The monitor running in the Realm world is known as the Realm Management +Monitor (RMM) and implements the Realm Management Monitor +specification[1]. The monitor acts a bit like a hypervisor (e.g. it runs +in EL2 and manages the stage 2 page tables etc of the guests running in +Realm world), however much of the control is handled by a hypervisor +running in the Normal World. The Normal World hypervisor uses the Realm +Management Interface (RMI) defined by the RMM specification to request +the RMM to perform operations (e.g. mapping memory or executing a vCPU). + +The RMM defines an environment for guests where the address space (IPA) +is split into two. The lower half is protected - any memory that is +mapped in this half cannot be seen by the Normal World and the RMM +restricts what operations the Normal World can perform on this memory +(e.g. the Normal World cannot replace pages in this region without the +guest's cooperation). The upper half is shared, the Normal World is free +to make changes to the pages in this region, and is able to emulate MMIO +devices in this region too. + +A guest running in a Realm may also communicate with the RMM to request +changes in its environment or to perform attestation about its +environment. In particular it may request that areas of the protected
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 39
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +5
-0+address space are transitioned between 'RAM' and 'EMPTY' (in either +direction). This allows a Realm guest to give up memory to be returned +to the Normal World, or to request new memory from the Normal World. +Without an explicit request from the Realm guest the RMM will otherwise +prevent the Normal World from making these changes.We could mention that this interface is "RSI", so readers know what to look for next
Good idea.
Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 48
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +9
-0+ +Linux as a Realm Guest +---------------------- + +To run Linux as a guest within a Realm, the following must be provided +either by the VMM or by a `boot loader` run in the Realm before Linux: + + * All protected RAM described to Linux (by DT or ACPI) must be marked + RIPAS RAM before handing over the Linux."handing control over to Linux", or something like that?
Indeed that actually makes grammatical sense! ;)
Quoted 14 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 56
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +8
-0+ + * MMIO devices must be either unprotected (e.g. emulated by the Normal + World) or marked RIPAS DEV. + + * MMIO devices emulated by the Normal World and used very early in boot + (specifically earlycon) must be specified in the upper half of IPA. + For earlycon this can be done by specifying the address on the + command line, e.g.: ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``This is going to be needed frequently, so maybe we should explain in a little more detail how we come up with this value: "e.g. with an IPA size of 33 and the base address of the emulated UART at
0x1000000, ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``"
Quoted 2 lines
(Because the example IPA size is rather unintuitive and specific to the kvmtool memory map)
Agreed.
Thanks,
Steve
Quoted 44 lines
Thanks,
JeanQuoted 41 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +11
-0+ + * Linux will use bounce buffers for communicating with unprotected + devices. It will transition some protected memory to RIPAS EMPTY and + expect to be able to access unprotected pages at the same IPA address + but with the highest valid IPA bit set. The expectation is that the + VMM will remove the physical pages from the protected mapping and + provide those pages as unprotected pages. + +References +---------- +[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0137/Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst +3
-0@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ to automatically locate and size all RAM, or it may use knowledge of the RAM in the machine, or any other method the boot loader designer sees fit.) +For Arm Confidential Compute Realms this includes ensuring that all +protected RAM has a Realm IPA state (RIPAS) of "RAM". + 2. Setup the device tree -------------------------Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst +1
-0@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ ARM64 Architecture acpi_object_usage amu arm-acpi + arm-cca asymmetric-32bit booting cpu-feature-registersSignature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
Quoted 77 lines · Steven Price
Quoted 53 lines · Jean-Philippe Brucker
Quoted 52 lines · Steven Price
Add some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux as a Realm guest. Also update
booting.rstto describe the requirement for RIPAS RAM.Signed-off-by Steven Price <[email protected]>--- Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++ Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 + 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+)create mode 100644
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rstDocumentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +34
-0@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +===================================== +Arm Confidential Compute Architecture +===================================== + +Arm systems that support the Realm Management Extension (RME) contain +hardware to allow a VM guest to be run in a way which protects the code +and data of the guest from the hypervisor. It extends the older "two +world" model (Normal and Secure World) into four worlds: Normal, Secure, +Root and Realm. Linux can then also be run as a guest to a monitor +running in the Realm world. + +The monitor running in the Realm world is known as the Realm Management +Monitor (RMM) and implements the Realm Management Monitor +specification[1]. The monitor acts a bit like a hypervisor (e.g. it runs +in EL2 and manages the stage 2 page tables etc of the guests running in +Realm world), however much of the control is handled by a hypervisor +running in the Normal World. The Normal World hypervisor uses the Realm +Management Interface (RMI) defined by the RMM specification to request +the RMM to perform operations (e.g. mapping memory or executing a vCPU). + +The RMM defines an environment for guests where the address space (IPA) +is split into two. The lower half is protected - any memory that is +mapped in this half cannot be seen by the Normal World and the RMM +restricts what operations the Normal World can perform on this memory +(e.g. the Normal World cannot replace pages in this region without the +guest's cooperation). The upper half is shared, the Normal World is free +to make changes to the pages in this region, and is able to emulate MMIO +devices in this region too. + +A guest running in a Realm may also communicate with the RMM to request +changes in its environment or to perform attestation about its +environment. In particular it may request that areas of the protectedQuoted 8 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 39
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +5
-0+address space are transitioned between 'RAM' and 'EMPTY' (in either +direction). This allows a Realm guest to give up memory to be returned +to the Normal World, or to request new memory from the Normal World. +Without an explicit request from the Realm guest the RMM will otherwise +prevent the Normal World from making these changes.We could mention that this interface is "RSI", so readers know what to look for next
Good idea.
Quoted 11 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 48
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +9
-0+ +Linux as a Realm Guest +---------------------- + +To run Linux as a guest within a Realm, the following must be provided +either by the VMM or by a `boot loader` run in the Realm before Linux: + + * All protected RAM described to Linux (by DT or ACPI) must be marked + RIPAS RAM before handing over the Linux."handing control over to Linux", or something like that?
Quoted 19 lines
Indeed that actually makes grammatical sense! ;)
Quoted 16 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst line 56
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst new file +8
-0+ + * MMIO devices must be either unprotected (e.g. emulated by the Normal + World) or marked RIPAS DEV. + + * MMIO devices emulated by the Normal World and used very early in boot + (specifically earlycon) must be specified in the upper half of IPA. + For earlycon this can be done by specifying the address on the + command line, e.g.: ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``This is going to be needed frequently, so maybe we should explain in a little more detail how we come up with this value: "e.g. with an IPA size of 33 and the base address of the emulated UART at
0x1000000, ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``"(Because the example IPA size is rather unintuitive and specific to the kvmtool memory map)
With the above addressed: