KVM: x86: Fix the initial value of mcg_cap
PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86: Fix the initial value of mcg_cap
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap represents the value of MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP. It's set via ioctl(KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE) from userspace when exposing and configuring MCE to guest.
It's wrong to leave the default value as KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +0 -1
@@ -11801,7 +11801,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);if (!vcpu->arch.mce_banks || !vcpu->arch.mci_ctl2_banks) goto fail_free_mce_banks; - vcpu->arch.mcg_cap =KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS ;if (!zalloc_cpumask_var (&vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask,GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT ))
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Xiaoyao Li
vcpu->arch.mcg_caprepresents the value ofMSR_IA32_MCG_CAP. It's set viaioctl(KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE)from userspace when exposing and configuring MCE to guest.It's wrong to leave the default value as
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS.
Why? I agree it's an odd default, but the whole MCE API is odd. Functionally, I don't see anything that's broken by allowing the guest to access the MCx_CTL MSRs by default.
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines · Xiaoyao Li
vcpu->arch.mcg_caprepresents the value ofMSR_IA32_MCG_CAP. It's set viaioctl(KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE)from userspace when exposing and configuring MCE to guest.It's wrong to leave the default value as
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS.Why? I agree it's an odd default, but the whole MCE API is odd. Functionally, I don't see anything that's broken by allowing the guest to access the
MCx_CTLMSRs by default.
Yes. Allowing the access doesn't cause any issue for a VM.
However, for the perspective of virtualization. It virtualizes a magic hardware that even CPUID.MCA/MCE is not advertised and MCE is not set up by userspace, guest is told there are 32 banks and all the banks can be accessed.
The patch doesn't fix any issue but try to make the code more reasonable.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 12 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines · Xiaoyao Li
vcpu->arch.mcg_caprepresents the value ofMSR_IA32_MCG_CAP. It's set viaioctl(KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE)from userspace when exposing and configuring MCE to guest.It's wrong to leave the default value as
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS.Why? I agree it's an odd default, but the whole MCE API is odd. Functionally, I don't see anything that's broken by allowing the guest to access the
MCx_CTLMSRs by default.
Quoted 6 lines
Yes. Allowing the access doesn't cause any issue for a VM.
However, for the perspective of virtualization. It virtualizes a magic hardware that even CPUID.MCA/MCE is not advertised and MCE is not set up by userspace, guest is told there are 32 banks and all the banks can be accessed.
'0' isn't necessarily better though, e.g. if userspace parrots back KVM's "supported" CPUID without invoking KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE, then it's equally odd that the guest will see no supported MCE MSRS.
Older versions of the SDM also state (or at least very strongly imply) that banks 0-3 are always available on P6.
Bank 0 is an especially weird case, as several of the MSRs are aliased to other MSRs that predate the machine check architecture.
Anyways, if this were newly introduced code I'd be all for defaulting to '0', but KVM has defaulted to KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS since KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE was added way back in 2009. Unless there's a bug that's fixed by this, I'm inclined to keep the current behavior even though it's weird, as hiding all MCE MSRs by default could theoretically cause a regression, e.g. by triggering #GP on MSRs that an older guest expects to always exist.
If we really want to clean up this code, I think the correct approach would be to inject #GP on all relevant MSRs if CPUID.MCA==0, e.g.
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +11 -0
@@ -3260,6 +3260,9 @@ static int set_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)u64 data = msr_info->data;u32 offset, last_msr; +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; +switch (msr) {case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : vcpu->arch.mcg_status = data;
@@ -3891,6 +3894,14 @@ static int get_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host)unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap &0xff ;u32 offset, last_msr; +if (msr ==MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR || msr ==MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE ) { + *pdata =0 ; +return 0 ; + } + +if (!host && !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; +switch (msr) {case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR :case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :
Or alternatively, this should work too:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9 -2
@@ -3774,6 +3774,9 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ;return set_msr_mce (vcpu, msr_info); case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:
@@ -4142,13 +4145,17 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control;break ; -case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR : -case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL :case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; + fallthrough; +case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR : +case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :return get_msr_mce (vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data, msr_info->host_initiated);case MSR_IA32_XSS :
Quoted 30 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 12 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines · Xiaoyao Li
vcpu->arch.mcg_caprepresents the value ofMSR_IA32_MCG_CAP. It's set viaioctl(KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE)from userspace when exposing and configuring MCE to guest.It's wrong to leave the default value as
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS.Why? I agree it's an odd default, but the whole MCE API is odd. Functionally, I don't see anything that's broken by allowing the guest to access the
MCx_CTLMSRs by default.Quoted 6 lines
Yes. Allowing the access doesn't cause any issue for a VM.
However, for the perspective of virtualization. It virtualizes a magic hardware that even CPUID.MCA/MCE is not advertised and MCE is not set up by userspace, guest is told there are 32 banks and all the banks can be accessed.
'0' isn't necessarily better though, e.g. if userspace parrots back KVM's "supported" CPUID without invoking
KVM_X86_SETUP_MCE, then it's equally odd that the guest will see no supported MCE MSRS.Older versions of the SDM also state (or at least very strongly imply) that banks 0-3 are always available on P6.
Bank 0 is an especially weird case, as several of the MSRs are aliased to other MSRs that predate the machine check architecture.
Quoted 6 lines
Anyways, if this were newly introduced code I'd be all for defaulting to '0', but KVM has defaulted to
KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKSsinceKVM_X86_SETUP_MCEwas added way back in 2009. Unless there's a bug that's fixed by this, I'm inclined to keep the current behavior even though it's weird, as hiding all MCE MSRs by default could theoretically cause a regression, e.g. by triggering #GP on MSRs that an older guest expects to always exist.
fair enough.
Quoted 2 lines
If we really want to clean up this code, I think the correct approach would be to inject #GP on all relevant MSRs if CPUID.MCA==0, e.g.
It's what I thought of as well. But I didn't find any statement in SDM of "Accessing Machine Check MSRs gets #GP if no CPUID.MCA"
Quoted 67 lines
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +11
-0@@ -3260,6 +3260,9 @@ static int set_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)u64 data = msr_info->data;u32 offset, last_msr; +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; +switch (msr) {case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : vcpu->arch.mcg_status = data;@@ -3891,6 +3894,14 @@ static int get_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata, bool host)unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap &0xff ;u32 offset, last_msr; +if (msr ==MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR || msr ==MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE ) { + *pdata =0 ; +return 0 ; + } + +if (!host && !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; +switch (msr) {case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR :case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :Or alternatively, this should work too:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +9
-2@@ -3774,6 +3774,9 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ;return set_msr_mce (vcpu, msr_info); case MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_K7_PERFCTR3:@@ -4142,13 +4145,17 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info) msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.msr_kvm_poll_control;break ; -case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR : -case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP :case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL :case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS : case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 ... MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS) - 1: +if (!msr_info->host_initiated && + !guest_cpuid_has (X86_FEATURE_MCA )) +return 1 ; + fallthrough; +case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR : +case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE :return get_msr_mce (vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data, msr_info->host_initiated);case MSR_IA32_XSS :
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
If we really want to clean up this code, I think the correct approach would be to inject #GP on all relevant MSRs if CPUID.MCA==0, e.g.
It's what I thought of as well. But I didn't find any statement in SDM of "Accessing Machine Check MSRs gets #GP if no CPUID.MCA"
Ugh, stupid SDM. Really old SDMs, e.g. circa 1997, explicity state in the CPUID.MCA entry that:
Processor supports the MCG_CAP MSR.
But, when Intel introduced the "Architectural MSRs" section (2001 or so), the wording was changed to be less explicit:
The Machine Check Architecture, which provides a compatible mechanism for error reporting in P6 family, Pentium 4, and Intel Xeon processors, and future processors, is supported. The MCG_CAP MSR contains feature bits describing how many banks of error reporting MSRs are supported.
and the entry in the MSR index just lists P6 as the dependency:
IA32_MCG_CAP (MCG_CAP) Global Machine Check Capability (R/O) 06_01H
So I think it's technically true that MCG_CAP is supposed to exist iff CPUID.MCA=1, but we'd probably need an SDM change to really be able to enforce that :-(
Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
If we really want to clean up this code, I think the correct approach would be to inject #GP on all relevant MSRs if CPUID.MCA==0, e.g.
It's what I thought of as well. But I didn't find any statement in SDM of "Accessing Machine Check MSRs gets #GP if no CPUID.MCA"
Ugh, stupid SDM. Really old SDMs, e.g. circa 1997, explicity state in the CPUID.MCA entry that:
Processor supports the
MCG_CAPMSR.But, when Intel introduced the "Architectural MSRs" section (2001 or so), the wording was changed to be less explicit:
The Machine Check Architecture, which provides a compatible mechanism for error reporting in P6 family, Pentium 4, and Intel Xeon processors, and future processors, is supported. The
MCG_CAPMSR contains feature bits describing how many banks of error reporting MSRs are supported.
Quoted 6 lines
and the entry in the MSR index just lists P6 as the dependency:
IA32_MCG_CAP(MCG_CAP) Global Machine Check Capability (R/O) 06_01HSo I think it's technically true that
MCG_CAPis supposed to exist iff CPUID.MCA=1, but we'd probably need an SDM change to really be able to enforce that :-(
I'll talk to Intel architects for this. :)
Quoted 22 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
If we really want to clean up this code, I think the correct approach would be to inject #GP on all relevant MSRs if CPUID.MCA==0, e.g.
It's what I thought of as well. But I didn't find any statement in SDM of "Accessing Machine Check MSRs gets #GP if no CPUID.MCA"
Ugh, stupid SDM. Really old SDMs, e.g. circa 1997, explicity state in the CPUID.MCA entry that:
Processor supports the
MCG_CAPMSR.But, when Intel introduced the "Architectural MSRs" section (2001 or so), the wording was changed to be less explicit:
The Machine Check Architecture, which provides a compatible mechanism for error reporting in P6 family, Pentium 4, and Intel Xeon processors, and future processors, is supported. The
MCG_CAPMSR contains feature bits describing how many banks of error reporting MSRs are supported.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
and the entry in the MSR index just lists P6 as the dependency:
IA32_MCG_CAP(MCG_CAP) Global Machine Check Capability (R/O) 06_01HSo I think it's technically true that
MCG_CAPis supposed to exist iff CPUID.MCA=1, but we'd probably need an SDM change to really be able to enforce that :-(I'll talk to Intel architects for this. :)
[I'm not a h/w architect ... but I do write/support the Linux machine check code]
Current edition of the SDM describes the MCA bit in CPUID(EAX=1).EDX in volume 2, Table 3-11:
Machine Check Architecture. A value of 1 indicates the Machine Check Architecture of reporting machine errors is supported. The MCG_CAP MSR contains feature bits describing how many banks of error reporting MSRs are supported
So a value of 0 would mean Machine check architecture is NOT supported.
The only rationale meaning for "Machine check architecture is supported" is you get everything in Vol3B chapter 15 if MCA is supported, and you don't get it if it isn't. The unsupported behaviour is not explicitly defined ... so if you want the do something other than #GP, you could do so ... but that sounds like s silly choice.
Ditto for accessing a machine check bank with number greater than that specified in IA32_MCG_CAP.count. SDM doesn't say that this must #GP, but #GP would be a sane and reasonble response. You could also read as all zero and drop writes.
-Tony