Isolate service privileges
Summary: This presents a requirement to isolate service functions and a use case where the administrator does not have service privileges. The motivation for a new service representative role is presented along with extensions to the Redfish privilege model. Additional changes needed to make this work are described.
Motivation
A service representative is a person authorized to perform service on a computer system, typically a high-end system, serviced by an independent organization, and working under a service agreement. An example service call is to power off a PCIe slot, physically replace a defective FRU device, then use BMC functions to update FRU data like serial number or MAC address, mark error logs entries as handled, etc. The service rep needs access to enhanced service tools that allow deeper diagnostics and repair procedures.
Why do we need to lock out the administrator from sensitive service functions? Updating FRU data can cause incorrect operations when done improperly. Marking error log entries as "handled" without following repair procedures can cause incorrect diagnosis, unnecessary repair actions, and cost more time. These are examples of BMC functions that the service rep must perform, and BMC admins must not be allowed to perform.
To be clear, by default, the administrator will have full privileges including service privileges. There will be a new option (like an image feature) to remove service privileges from the administrator role and achieve the effect described in this note.
The main pieces are:
- Create a new ServiceRep role and service privilege. These would be available in the base implementation.
- Require the service privilege to perform sensitive service operations. This affects the Redfish operation-to-privilege mapping and its implementation in BMCWeb.
- Have a build-time option to either allow the admin to perform service operations or lock them out.
When the Administrator is locked out of service privileges:
- The admin maintains control of user management, for example, disabling service rep accounts.
- The admin must not be allowed to escalate to the ServiceRep role. For example, they could create a ServiceRep account for themselves and then try to use it to perform service operations. Examples of how the system can prevent this escalation:
+ The admin must not be allowed to create or change any account to have the ServiceRep role, or
+ Using the service privilege must require additional authentication.
- The admin must not be allowed to access the command shell as the root user. For example, the admin account must not be root, and if SSH is available, the admin user must not have sudo authority or su credentials. Root can subvert access controls and perform service functions.
Next steps
1. I will propose a new ServiceRep Role and related PerformService privilege in a followup email.
2. The mechanism to authenticate a service rep in a way an admin cannot use is outside the scope of this design. We had discussed a certificate-based approach in the security working group. I believe the other items in this email have merit even without this piece.
3. To prevent the admin from escalating to the service account, we can have a new image feature to restrict use of the ServiceRep role (so the admin cannot create or change existing accounts with this role) and then pre-create the "service" account.
4. As a prerequisite, I would like to move the project away from the default "root" login to a new "admin" account. The Administrator accounts would then be able to use the sudo command to become root. A new image feature could disallow the admin from sudo access.
All of these taken together will achieve the goal of isolating BMC service functions. I plan to start with the ServiceRep piece, first gathering comments from the OpenBMC community, then presenting it to Redfish. Next priority is creating an admin account and disallowing root logins. I plan to send details for each piece as I go, and welcome your participation.
- Joseph