Allows renegotiation only to start if session is fully established
PATCH 1/3 Allows renegotiation only to start if session is fully established
This change makes the state machine more strict in terms of transation that are allowed. The benefit of this change are two:
- allows any option that might be pushed to affect renegotiation consistently This is a prerequisite for the upcoming secure renegotiation patch set
- avoids corner cases of a peer (or an attacker) trying to renegotiate the session while the original session is not fully setup. Currently there there are no problems known with this but it is better to avoid the corner case in the first time.
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +5 -3
@@ -3011,7 +3011,7 @@ tls_process(struct tls_multi *multi,ASSERT (session_id_defined (&session->session_id));/* Should we trigger a soft reset? -- new key, keeps old key for a while */ - if (ks->state >= S_ACTIVE + if (ks->state >= S_GENERATED_KEYS && ((session->opt->renegotiate_seconds && now >= ks->established + session->opt->renegotiate_seconds) || (session->opt->renegotiate_bytes > 0
@@ -3733,9 +3733,11 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, }/* -* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation +* Remote is requesting a key renegotiation. We only allow renegotiation +* when the previous session is fully established to avoid weird corner +* cases. */ -if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 &&TLS_AUTHENTICATED (multi, ks)) +if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) {if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, session->opt))
Signature · 1 line
2.32.1 (Apple Git-133)
PATCH 2/3 Use buffer to prepare protocol-flags push-reply
The current approach of checking a string buffer is a bit clunky and also not very extensible. Refactor this by collecting the flags in a buffer.
--- src/openvpn/push.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/push.c +11 -3
@@ -647,14 +647,18 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc, } } +struct buffer proto_flags =alloc_buf_gc (128 , gc); +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY ) { -const char *ekm ="" ; +buf_printf (&proto_flags," cc-exit" ); + +/* if the cc exit flag is supported, pushing tls-ekm via protocol-flags +* is also supported */ if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ) { - ekm =" tls-ekm" ; +buf_printf (&proto_flags," tls-ekm" ); } -push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags cc-exit%s" , ekm); }else if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ) {
@@ -662,6 +666,10 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc, } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) + { +push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags)); + }return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.32.1 (Apple Git-133)
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/3] Use buffer to prepare protocol-flags push-reply
Hi,
Quoted 3 lines · Arne Schwabe
The current approach of checking a string buffer is a bit clunky and also not very extensible. Refactor this by collecting the flags in a buffer.
I think that this one is obsolete, aka, already included in
commit 179b3728b71013413885e453e477997f5a396f78
Author: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...> Date: Wed Sep 14 18:50:41 2022 +0200
Implement exit notification via control channel
Patch v4: rebase, use a buffer for the code that prepares the push reply
can you confirm?
thanks,
gert
Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you
feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted
it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/3] Use buffer to prepare protocol-flags push-reply
Am 05.10.2022 um 22:19 schrieb Gert Doering:
Quoted 9 lines
Hi,
Quoted 3 lines · Arne Schwabe
The current approach of checking a string buffer is a bit clunky and also not very extensible. Refactor this by collecting the flags in a buffer.
I think that this one is obsolete, aka, already included in
commit
179b3728b71013413885e453e477997f5a396f78
Quoted 8 lines
Author: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...> Date: Wed Sep 14 18:50:41 2022 +0200Implement exit notification via control channel
Patch v4: rebase, use a buffer for the code that prepares the push reply
can you confirm?
Yes. You are right. During the rebase of cc exit, I included it there.
Arne
PATCH 3/3 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purpose is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotians. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. If the SOFT_RESET_V1 came from a replay or a was faked (no tls-auth/tls-crypt), the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client. Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here block any SOFT_RESET_V1 as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption are discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimiate client.
The issue was initially reported by Fabio Streun <[email protected]...>
--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 2 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl.c | 30 ++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 6 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 21 +++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 19 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 18 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1121,7 +1121,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1149,6 +1150,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2783,7 +2783,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2823,13 +2823,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2847,6 +2849,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3147,6 +3150,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +2 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt preserved to xored into the tls_crypt renog key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8553,6 +8553,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-renog")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +4 -0
@@ -665,6 +665,10 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," secure-renog" ); + }if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {
src/openvpn/ssl.c +23 -7
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ calc_control_channel_frame_overhead(const struct tls_session *session)/* Message packet id */ overhead +=sizeof (packet_id_type); -if (session->tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) +if (session->tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT || session->tls_wrap_renog.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) { overhead +=tls_crypt_buf_overhead (); }
@@ -1146,6 +1146,7 @@ tls_session_init(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) session->tls_wrap = session->opt->tls_wrap; session->tls_wrap.work =alloc_buf (BUF_SIZE (&session->opt->frame)); +/* initialize packet ID replay window for --tls-auth */ packet_id_init(&session->tls_wrap.opt.packet_id, session->opt->replay_window,
@@ -1191,6 +1192,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_renog);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1708,6 +1710,7 @@ cleanup:return ret; } + bool tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session,
@@ -1755,6 +1758,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +/* If the secure renegotiation has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for following +* renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_secure_renegotition_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2062,6 +2076,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3225,6 +3240,7 @@ tls_multi_process(struct tls_multi *multi, }else { +/* TODO: secure negotiation fix? */ reset_session (multi, session); } }
@@ -3674,7 +3690,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session) {
@@ -3684,7 +3700,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3739,8 +3755,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3761,8 +3777,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renogiations with TLS-EKM dervied tls-crypt key */ +#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -472,6 +476,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_SECURE_RENOG_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-secure-renegotiation"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +6 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; +/**< original key data to be xored in to the key for secure renegotiation */ };/*
@@ -466,6 +468,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_renog.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_renog; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -453,6 +453,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +21 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,27 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_renog.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_renog; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
144 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +17 -2
@@ -110,12 +110,24 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS Crypt to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotition_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data, that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -183,7 +193,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -195,7 +206,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.32.1 (Apple Git-133)
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
src/openvpn/multi.c multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) · line 1806
Quoted 7 lines · On Freitag, 9. September 2022 21:59:02 CEST Arne Schwabe wrote:
src/openvpn/multi.c +1
-0@@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENOG )
I think any occurrence of "renog" (i.e. short for renegotiation[s]) should be changed to "reneg" throughout this patch. See --reneg-x options. Could be just me, so a more opinions would be welcome.
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 8556
Quoted 7 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0@@ -8553,6 +8553,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-renog"))
Should be rewritten to use --protocol-flags instead.
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char · line 81
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +6
-1@@ -71,9 +71,77 @@ tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char *key_file,msg (M_FATAL ,"ERROR: --tls-crypt not supported" ); }crypto_read_openvpn_key (&kt, key, key_file, key_inline, key_direction, -"Control Channel Encryption" ,"tls-crypt" ); +"Control Channel Encryption" ,"tls-crypt" , keydata); } +/** +* Will produce dest = dest XOR data +*/ +static void +xor_key2_key (struct key2 *dest,const struct key2 *data)
I wonder if this would be more readable as xor_key(struct key2 *key, const struct key2 *mask)
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char · line 84
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +3
-0+bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotition_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session)
typo renegotiation_key
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_init_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, const char · line 85
Quoted 1 line
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0+struct key2 rengokeys;
typo renogkeys (renegkeys, IMHO)
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, · line 357
Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-1@@ -285,7 +354,7 @@ tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key(struct key_ctx_bi *key, struct buffer *wkc_buf, }tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (key, &key2, false); -secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); + *original_key = key2;
We should do the zeroing in tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key() shortly after we used it to XOR then. And maybe only delay it if we need to XOR anyways, could use original_key == NULL as indication.
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf, · line 659
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-2@@ -587,8 +655,8 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf, ctx->cleanup_key_ctx = true; ctx->opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ;memset (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi,0 ,sizeof (ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi)); -tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, &client_key, true); -secure_memzero (&client_key,sizeof (client_key)); +tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, + &ctx->original_tlscrypt_keydata, true);
Same as above for the server side. Could zero here immediately if original_tlscrypt_keydata == NULL
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 3/3] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 11 lines
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 8556
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-0@@ -8553,6 +8553,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-renog"))Should be rewritten to use --protocol-flags instead.
It is already using protocol-flags. That is in the middle of protocol-flags in options.c
Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 8558
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +1
-1tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (key, &key2, false); -secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); + *original_key = key2;We should do the zeroing in
tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key()shortly after we used it to XOR then. And maybe only delay it if we need to XOR anyways, could useoriginal_key== NULL as indication.
We cannot do that. The reason is that a client might reconnect to the same session (using the TM_UNTRUSTED session slot) or if we have a simple reconnect. And after the reconnect we need to calculate a new key. And anyway the data is memory anyway just implicit in the OpenSSL data structure (tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi) that holds the HMAC/encryption key for the session just not explicitly.
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/options.c tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf, · line 659
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +2
-2@@ -587,8 +655,8 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf, ctx->cleanup_key_ctx = true; ctx->opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ;memset (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi,0 ,sizeof (ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi)); -tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, &client_key, true); -secure_memzero (&client_key,sizeof (client_key)); +tls_crypt_v2_load_client_key (&ctx->opt.key_ctx_bi, + &ctx->original_tlscrypt_keydata, true);Same as above for the server side. Could zero here immediately if
original_tlscrypt_keydata== NULL
If we zero the key here, it will not be available when we want to calculate the secure renegotiation key with xor.
Arne
Quoted 1 line · On Freitag, 9. September 2022 21:59:00 CEST Arne Schwabe wrote:
This change makes the state machine more strict in terms of transation
*transitions
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
For those who wonder what this is/does, my take on it: basically shields the calls to key_state_soft_reset() on both the sending and receiving side, and ensures both ends have completed the control channel negotiation fully (i.e. are in state S_GENERATED_KEYS). At that time pushed options are guaranteed to be processed/active, which was the main motivation for this change, as I understand it.
PATCH v2 3/3 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purpose is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotians. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. If the SOFT_RESET_V1 came from a replay or a was faked (no tls-auth/tls-crypt), the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client. Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here block any SOFT_RESET_V1 as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption are discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimiate client.
The issue was initially reported by Fabio Streun <[email protected]...>
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
--- src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 2 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 6 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 21 +++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 19 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 19 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegoiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1121,7 +1121,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1149,6 +1150,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2783,7 +2783,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2823,13 +2823,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2847,6 +2849,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3149,6 +3152,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +2 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt preserved to xored into the tls_crypt renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8554,6 +8554,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-reneg")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," secure-reneg" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1153,6 +1153,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1717,6 +1718,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +/* If the secure renegotiation has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for following +* renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2021,6 +2033,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3532,7 +3545,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session) {
@@ -3542,7 +3555,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3595,8 +3608,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 &&TLS_AUTHENTICATED (multi, ks)) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3617,8 +3630,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renegoiations with TLS-EKM dervied tls-crypt key */ +#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_SECURE_RENEG_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-secure-renegotiation"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +6 -0
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; +/**< original key data to be xored in to the key for secure renegotiation */ };/*
@@ -467,6 +469,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +21 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,27 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
144 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +17 -2
@@ -110,12 +110,24 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS Crypt to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data, that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -183,7 +193,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -195,7 +206,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.37.0 (Apple Git-136)
As discussed on IRC, I have adjusted the commit message to make *me* understand what this is about, so maybe other readers find it easier too :-)
Tested on the server test bench, with pre-NCP p2p client and regular p2mp clients, and renegotiating often (auth-token test bench). No issues observed. (So, technically, I have not tested "the behavioural change", just verified that nothing breaks in - borderline - normal environments)
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit f786e8a41cde31b437f20a17cb3fd122b489d6b3
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Sep 9 21:59:00 2022 +0200
Allows renegotiation only to start if session is fully established
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Heiko Hund <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg25162.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
PATCH v3 1/1 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purpose is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotians. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. If the SOFT_RESET_V1 came from a replay or a was faked (no tls-auth/tls-crypt), the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client. Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here block any SOFT_RESET_V1 as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption are discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimiate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. Since need to be able to generate the secure renegotiation key, deleting the key after generating a secure renegotiation key is not an option. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not a good as the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a secure renegotiation key. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number the keys is in memory would be reduced.
The issue was initially reported by Fabio Streun <[email protected]...> and has been assigned CVE-2021-3568.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 2 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 ++++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 21 +++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 19 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@ Inline auth username and password missing OpenVPN will prompt for input via stdin. This applies to inline'd http-proxy-user-pass too. +Secure renegotiation + When both peer are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will use secure renegotiation + using a dynamically created tls-crypt key. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. This also closes CVE-2021-3568. + Deprecated features -------------------
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegoiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1121,7 +1121,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1149,6 +1150,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2783,7 +2783,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2823,13 +2823,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2847,6 +2849,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3149,6 +3152,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +2 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt preserved to xored into the tls_crypt renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8554,6 +8554,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-reneg")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," secure-reneg" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1153,6 +1153,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1717,6 +1718,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +/* If the secure renegotiation has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for following +* renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2021,6 +2033,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3532,7 +3545,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session) {
@@ -3542,7 +3555,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3597,8 +3610,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3619,8 +3632,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renegoiations with TLS-EKM dervied tls-crypt key */ +#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_SECURE_RENEG_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-secure-renegotiation"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -274,6 +274,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for secure renegotiation. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the secure renegotiation has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; };/*
@@ -467,6 +476,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +21 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,27 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
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src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +17 -2
@@ -110,12 +110,24 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS Crypt to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data, that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -183,7 +193,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -195,7 +206,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.37.0 (Apple Git-136)
PATCH v4 1/1 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotians. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayed SOFT_RESET_V1 and firste packet containing the TLS client hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here block any SOFT_RESET_V1 (and following packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption are discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimiate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. Since need to be able to generate the secure renegotiation key, deleting the key after generating a secure renegotiation key is not an option. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not a good as the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a secure renegotiation key. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number the keys is in memory would be reduced.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message, Changes.rst
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 2 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 ++++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 21 +++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 19 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Secure renegotiation + When both peer are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will use secure renegotiation + using a dynamically created tls-crypt key. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegoiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1151,6 +1152,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2807,7 +2807,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2847,13 +2847,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2871,6 +2873,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3188,6 +3191,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1803,6 +1803,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +2 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt preserved to xored into the tls_crypt renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8611,6 +8611,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-reneg")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," secure-reneg" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1767,6 +1768,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +/* If the secure renegotiation has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for following +* renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2074,6 +2086,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3693,7 +3706,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session) {
@@ -3703,7 +3716,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3758,8 +3771,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3780,8 +3793,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renegoiations with TLS-EKM dervied tls-crypt key */ +#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_SECURE_RENEG_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-secure-renegotiation"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for secure renegotiation. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the secure renegotiation has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; };/*
@@ -468,6 +477,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +21 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,27 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
144 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +17 -2
@@ -110,12 +110,24 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS Crypt to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data, that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -191,7 +201,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -203,7 +214,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v4] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 6 lines · Arne Schwabe
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key
"peers"
Quoted 2 lines
material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for
General question about this feature:
We trigger using this key on key_id > 0, so if I understand the code correctly, it will be used first when we want to renegotiate. But will it then continued to be used? What exactly is the state after the successful renegotiation?
Quoted 9 lines
renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We
"if A or if B" is I think easier to read instead "if (A or B)" (in natural language), so I would recommend "if TLS EKM".
Quoted 7 lines
ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the
TM_ACTIVEsession for renegotians. When a
"renegotiations"
Quoted 3 lines
SOFT_RESET_V1packet is received, the active TLS session is moved fromKS_PRIMARYtoKS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayedSOFT_RESET_V1and firste packet containing the TLS client
"first"
Quoted 4 lines
hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here block any
SOFT_RESET_V1(and following
"blocks"
Quoted 2 lines
packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption are discarded.
"and will be discarded" ?
Quoted 5 lines
HARD_RESETpackets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimiate client.
"legitimate"
Quoted 3 lines
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to
tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. Since need
"we need"
Quoted 4 lines
to be able to generate the secure renegotiation key, deleting the key after generating a secure renegotiation key is not an option. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not a good as the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode
"a good option" ?
"as the" -> "since when the"
Quoted 4 lines
with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a secure renegotiation key. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the
tls_wrapstructure, so only the number the keys is in memory would
"only the number of times the key" ?
Quoted 1 line
be reduced.
[...]
Changes.rst Tun MTU can be pushed · line 115
Quoted 10 lines
Changes.rst +2
-0@@ -111,6 +111,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Secure renegotiation + When both peer are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will use secure renegotiation
"peers"
Quoted 12 lines
Changes.rst +4
-0+ using a dynamically created tls-crypt key. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.src/openvpn/auth_token.h +0
-0
src/openvpn/auth_token.h line 46
Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1
-1@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegoiation timeout)
"renegotiation"
Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +0
-0* * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
[...]
src/openvpn/openvpn.h struct key_schedule · line 68
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +1
-0@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt preserved to xored into the tls_crypt renegotiation key */
"original tls-crypt key" ?
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +1
-0+struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
[...]
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.h +1
-0@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
src/openvpn/ssl.h line 107
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.h +1
-0@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renegoiations with TLS-EKM dervied tls-crypt key */
"renegotiations"
"derived"
Quoted 13 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.h +3
-0+#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
[...]
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h packet_opcode_name(int op) · line 278
Quoted 11 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +3
-0@@ -273,6 +273,27 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it
Since this seems to be where the actual magic happens, maybe we could have a slightly more verbose comment here for people not as familiar with the OpenVPN state machine?
Will the renegotiation key be refreshed as part of the renegotiation or do all future renegotiations the same key?
Quoted 21 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +18
-0+* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +1
-0@@ -110,12 +110,24 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h line 122
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +5
-2* otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS Crypt to be used in the secure renegotiation using the
"TLS Crypt key" ?
Quoted 12 lines
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +8
-0+* TLS EKM exporter function. +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt, · line 186
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +1
-0@@ -171,6 +183,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data, that has been used to
I think there should be no comma here.
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt, · line 200
Quoted 12 lines
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +2
-0+* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed. @@ -180,6 +194,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
[...]
Regards,
Signature · 1 line
Frank Lichtenheld
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v4] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Am 09.01.23 um 16:01 schrieb Frank Lichtenheld:
Quoted 10 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 6 lines
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key
"peers"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for
General question about this feature:
We trigger using this key onkey_id> 0, so if I understand the code correctly, it will be used first when we want to renegotiate. But will it then continued to be used? What exactly is the state after the successful renegotiation?
That is one of this hidden logic things of OpenVPN again. We ensure that the keyid will go to 1 instead 0 on key rollover, so only initial keyids are 0. So key-ids for renegotiations will be 1 to 7 and then rollover to 1 instead of 0.
/*
* key_id increments to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back to 1.
* This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key.
*/
++session->key_id;
session->key_id &= P_KEY_ID_MASK;
if (!session->key_id)
{
session->key_id = 1;
}Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
+/**
+ * Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap
+ * struct instead the normal one and returns itSince this seems to be where the actual magic happens, maybe we could have a slightly more verbose comment here for people not as familiar with the OpenVPN state machine?
Will the renegotiation key be refreshed as part of the renegotiation or do all future renegotiations the same key?
Same key. The idea is to have a tls-crypt key that is only known between the two peers and not by anyone else. Rotating it here gives no benfit, so we keep the same keep to simplify the code.
I added the fact that we only one key in the description of thetls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key .
Arne
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v4] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 26 lines · Arne Schwabe
Am 09.01.23 um 16:01 schrieb Frank Lichtenheld:
Quoted 10 lines · Arne Schwabe
Quoted 6 lines
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key
"peers"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for
General question about this feature:
We trigger using this key onkey_id> 0, so if I understand the code correctly, it will be used first when we want to renegotiate. But will it then continued to be used? What exactly is the state after the successful renegotiation?That is one of this hidden logic things of OpenVPN again. We ensure that the keyid will go to 1 instead 0 on key rollover, so only initial keyids are 0. So key-ids for renegotiations will be 1 to 7 and then rollover to 1 instead of 0.
Quoted 10 lines
/*
* key_id increments to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back to 1.
* This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key.
*/
++session->key_id;
session->key_id &= P_KEY_ID_MASK;
if (!session->key_id)
{
session->key_id = 1;
}Okay, so it does roughly what I assumed it does. But strictly speaking this is not a renegotiation key then. Once the first renegotiation happens the key will be used for ALL control channel packets, is that correct?
So how does that avoid the replay attack? I mean it obviously avoids it for the first renegotiation, but could you replay the first renegotiation afterwards? Or does that not work due to increasing key_id/packet_id?
Regards,
Signature · 1 line
Frank Lichtenheld
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v4] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
/* * key_id increments to KEY_ID_MASK then recycles back to 1. * This way you know that if key_id is 0, it is the first key. */ ++session->key_id; session->key_id &= P_KEY_ID_MASK; if (!session->key_id) { session->key_id = 1; }
Quoted 7 lines
Okay, so it does roughly what I assumed it does. But strictly speaking this is not a renegotiation key then. Once the first renegotiation happens the key will be used for ALL control channel packets, is that correct?
So how does that avoid the replay attack? I mean it obviously avoids it for the first renegotiation, but could you replay the first renegotiation afterwards? Or does that not work due to increasing key_id/packet_id?
We do initialise the replay protection on the tls-crypt keys. So an attacker can only replay packets that are already known to both peer and they will drop them. While you can get the same level of protection with tls-crypt (without dynamic key) using --replay-persist option, I don't think I have seen this option ever being used.
Arne
PATCH 1/1 Improve debug logging of DCO on Linux
In reply to Arne Schwabe--- src/openvpn/dco.c | 7 ++++--- src/openvpn/dco_linux.c | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/dco.c +4 -3
@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ dco_install_key(struct tls_multi *multi, struct key_state *ks, const char *ciphername) { -msg (D_DCO_DEBUG ,"%s: peer_id=%d keyid=%d" , __func__, multi->dco_peer_id, - ks->key_id); +msg (D_DCO_DEBUG ,"%s: peer_id=%d keyid=%d, currently installed %d" , + __func__, multi->dco_peer_id, ks->key_id, multi->dco_keys_installed);/* Install a key in the PRIMARY slot only when no other key exist. * From that moment on, any new key will be installed in the SECONDARY
@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ dco_update_keys(dco_context_t *dco, struct tls_multi *multi)*/ if (primary->dco_status ==DCO_INSTALLED_SECONDARY ) { -msg (D_DCO_DEBUG ,"Swapping primary and secondary keys, now: id1=%d id2=%d" , +msg (D_DCO_DEBUG ,"Swapping primary and secondary keys, pre swap: " +"key-id1=%d key-id2=%d" , primary->key_id, secondary ? secondary->key_id :-1 );int ret =dco_swap_keys (dco, multi->dco_peer_id);
src/openvpn/dco_linux.c +8 -2
@@ -216,9 +216,15 @@ dco_new_peer(dco_context_t *dco, unsigned int peerid, int sd, struct sockaddr *localaddr, struct sockaddr *remoteaddr, struct in_addr *remote_in4, struct in6_addr *remote_in6) { - msg(D_DCO_DEBUG, "%s: peer-id %d, fd %d", __func__, peerid, sd); - struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); +const char *remotestr ="[undefined]" ; +if (remoteaddr) + { + remotestr =print_sockaddr (remoteaddr, &gc); + } +msg (D_DCO_DEBUG ,"%s: peer-id %d, fd %d, remote addr: %s" , __func__, + peerid, sd, remotestr); +struct nl_msg *nl_msg =ovpn_dco_nlmsg_create (dco,OVPN_CMD_NEW_PEER );struct nlattr *attr =nla_nest_start (nl_msg,OVPN_ATTR_NEW_PEER );int ret = -EMSGSIZE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
PATCH v5 1/1 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotiations. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayed SOFT_RESET_V1 and first packet containing the TLS client hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here blocks any SOFT_RESET_V1 (and following packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption and will be discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimitate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. Since we need to be able to generate the secure renegotiation key, deleting the key after generating a secure renegotiation key is not an option. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not a good option since when the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a secure renegotiation key. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number of times the keys is in memory would be reduced.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message, Changes.rst
Patch v5: fix spelling/grammar mistakes. Add more comments.
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 3 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 ++++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 26 +++++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 22 +++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Secure renegotiation + When both peers are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will use secure renegotiation + using a dynamically created tls-crypt key. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegotiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1151,6 +1152,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2871,7 +2871,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2911,13 +2911,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2935,6 +2937,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3253,6 +3256,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1807,6 +1807,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +3 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt key preserved to xored into the tls_crypt +* renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8629,6 +8629,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "secure-reneg")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," secure-reneg" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1763,6 +1764,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) + { +/* If the secure renegotiation has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for following +* renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2070,6 +2082,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3648,7 +3661,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) {
@@ -3659,7 +3672,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3729,8 +3742,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3751,8 +3764,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to secure renegotiation with TLS-EKM derived tls-crypt key */ +#define IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_SECURE_RENEG_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-secure-renegotiation"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for secure renegotiation. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the secure renegotiation has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; };/*
@@ -468,6 +477,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_SECURE_RENEG ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +26 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,32 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it. +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +/* OpenVPN has the hardcoded assumption in its protocol that +* key-id 0 is always first session and renegotiations use key-id +* 1 to 7 and wrap around to 1 after that. So key-id > 0 is equivalent +* to "this is a renegotiation" +*/ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
144 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +20 -2
@@ -108,12 +108,27 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS-Crypt key to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* +* All renegotiations of a session use the same generated dynamic key. +* +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_secure_renegotiation_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -169,6 +184,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -178,6 +195,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -191,7 +201,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -203,7 +214,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v5] Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 5 lines · Arne Schwabe
Currently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this
"peers"
Quoted 8 lines
feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Stared at code, read documentation, stared more at code. Looks like it does what it should. Ran master+patch t_client tests against a master+patch server. Log messages look sensible. Also tried running a connection with --reneg-sec 15 just to prove that renegotiations still work.
I can't prove/judge whether it actually uses a different key and whether the crypto claims from the commit message are actually true.
Regards,
Signature · 1 line
Frank Lichtenheld
PATCH v6 1/1 Introduce dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotiations. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayed SOFT_RESET_V1 and first packet containing the TLS client hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here blocks any SOFT_RESET_V1 (and following packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption and will be discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimitate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. To be able to generate the dynamic tls-cryptn key, we need the original key, so deleting the key is not an option if we need it later again to generate another key. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not an option since when the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a dynamic tls-crypt key again. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number of times the keys is in memory would be reduced.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message, Changes.rst
Patch v5: fix spelling/grammar mistakes. Add more comments. Patch v6: consistently calld this feature dynamic tls-crypt crypt. Note
this changes the export label and makes it incompatible with previous patches.
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 8 +- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 3 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 ++++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 26 +++++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 22 +++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 ++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Dynamic TLS Crypt + When both peers are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will dynamically create + a tls-crypt key that is used for renegotiation. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegotiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1151,6 +1152,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +6 -2
@@ -2888,7 +2888,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2928,13 +2928,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + NULL); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2952,6 +2954,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3268,6 +3271,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; + to.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_tlscrypt_keydata;if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1817,6 +1817,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +3 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt key preserved to xored into the tls_crypt +* renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8643,6 +8643,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "dyn-tls-crypt")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," dyn-tls-crypt" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1763,6 +1764,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +/* If dynamic tls-crypt has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for the +* following renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2070,6 +2082,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3647,7 +3660,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) {
@@ -3658,7 +3671,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3728,8 +3741,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3750,8 +3763,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to dynamic tls-crypt (renegotiation with TLS-EKM derived tls-crypt key) */ +#define IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_tlscrypt_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-dynamic-tls-crypt"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for dynamic tls-crypt. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the dynamic tls-crypt has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_tlscrypt_keydata; };/*
@@ -468,6 +477,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +26 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,32 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it. +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +/* OpenVPN has the hardcoded assumption in its protocol that +* key-id 0 is always first session and renegotiations use key-id +* 1 to 7 and wrap around to 1 after that. So key-id > 0 is equivalent +* to "this is a renegotiation" +*/ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +81 -12
144 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +20 -2
@@ -108,12 +108,27 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS-Crypt key to be used in the secure renegotiation using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* +* All renegotiations of a session use the same generated dynamic key. +* +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -169,6 +184,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -178,6 +195,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -191,7 +201,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -203,7 +214,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_tlscrypt_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
PATCH v7 1/1 Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotiations. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayed SOFT_RESET_V1 and first packet containing the TLS client hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here blocks any SOFT_RESET_V1 (and following packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption and will be discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimitate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. To be able to generate the dynamic tls-cryptn key, we need the original key, so deleting the key is not an option if we need it later again to generate another key. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not an option since when the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a dynamic tls-crypt key again. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number of times the keys is in memory would be reduced.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message, Changes.rst
Patch v5: fix spelling/grammar mistakes. Add more comments. Patch v6: consistently calld this feature dynamic tls-crypt crypt. Note
this changes the export label and makes it incompatible with previous patches.
Patch v7: also xor tls-auth key data into the dynamic tls-crypt key like
tls-crypt key data
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 22 +++--- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 3 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 ++++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 26 +++++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 22 +++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 +++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Dynamic TLS Crypt + When both peers are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will dynamically create + a tls-crypt key that is used for renegotiation. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegotiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1151,6 +1152,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +12 -10
@@ -2888,7 +2888,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -2928,13 +2928,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -2952,6 +2954,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3255,9 +3258,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)if (options->ce.tls_auth_file) { to.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_AUTH ; - to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; - to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; - to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; }/* TLS handshake encryption (--tls-crypt) */
@@ -3265,19 +3265,21 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) || (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file && options->tls_client)) { to.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; + } + +if (to.tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_AUTH || to.tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; - -if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) - { - to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_wkc = &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc; - } + to.tls_wrap.original_wrap_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata; }if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) { to.tls_crypt_v2 = true; + to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_wkc = &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc; +if (options->tls_server) { to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_server_key = c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_server_key;
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1817,6 +1817,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +3 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt key preserved to xored into the tls_crypt +* renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_wrap_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8643,6 +8643,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "dyn-tls-crypt")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," dyn-tls-crypt" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1763,6 +1764,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +/* If dynamic tls-crypt has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for the +* following renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2070,6 +2082,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3647,7 +3660,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) {
@@ -3658,7 +3671,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3728,8 +3741,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3750,8 +3763,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to dynamic tls-crypt (renegotiation with TLS-EKM derived tls-crypt key) */ +#define IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_wrap_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_wrap_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-dynamic-tls-crypt"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for dynamic tls-crypt. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the dynamic tls-crypt has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_wrap_keydata; };/*
@@ -468,6 +477,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +26 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,32 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it. +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +/* OpenVPN has the hardcoded assumption in its protocol that +* key-id 0 is always first session and renegotiations use key-id +* 1 to 7 and wrap around to 1 after that. So key-id > 0 is equivalent +* to "this is a renegotiation" +*/ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +82 -12
145 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +20 -2
@@ -108,12 +108,27 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS-Crypt key to be used with dynamic tls-crypt using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* +* All renegotiations of a session use the same generated dynamic key. +* +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -169,6 +184,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -178,6 +195,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -191,7 +201,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -203,7 +214,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_wrap_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
109 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v7] Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Quoted 2 lines · On Dienstag, 31. Januar 2023 14:52:48 CET Arne Schwabe wrote:
Patch v7: also xor tls-auth key data into the dynamic tls-crypt key like
tls-crypt key data
I've tested this with the openvpn3 implementation thoroughly in combination with --tls-auth, --tls-crypt and without any wrapping of the control channel and found everything working as intended, hence:
Only this last little quirk:
Changes.rst Tun MTU can be pushed · line 126
Quoted 2 lines
Changes.rst +2
-0+Dynamic TLS Crypt + When both peers are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will dynamically create
maybe can be changed during merge to 2.6.1+ or whatever will fit.
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v7] Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeHi,
Quoted 10 lines · Arne Schwabe
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment tooriginal_tlscrypt_keydataand commit message,
addChanges.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message,Changes.rst
Patch v5: fix spelling/grammar mistakes. Add more comments. Patch v6: consistently calld this feature dynamic tls-crypt crypt. Note
this changes the export label and makes it incompatible with previous patches.
Patch v7: also xor tls-auth key data into the dynamic tls-crypt key like
tls-crypt key data
I'm a bit late to the party, apologies for this.
I did not look at the code ("Heiko has given it an ACK") but threw it into the server test framework, where the new code "should" not have made any difference (automated connections are not lasting long enough to hit renegotiation at all).
Unfortunately, v7 on top of current master (commit c333a0c05f9d454ef) fully breaks --tls-crypt-v2 connections, *if* the new code runs both on client and server end
...
2023-03-06 10:20:03 PUSH: Received control message: 'PUSH_REPLY,route 10.204.0.0 255.255.0.0,route-ipv6 fd00:abcd:204::/48,tun-ipv6,ping 10,ping-restart 30,route-ipv6 fd00:dead:beef::2001/128,echo,route-ipv6 fd00:dead:beef::2002/128,route-ipv6 fd00:dead:beef::1/128,ifconfig-ipv6 fd00:abcd:204:5::2/124 fd00:abcd:204:5::1,peer-id 1,cipher AES-256-GCM,protocol-flags cc-exit tls-ekm dyn-tls-crypt,tun-mtu 1500'
(so the server wants dyn-tls-crypt)
...
2023-03-06 10:20:04 add_route_ipv6(fd00:dead:beef::1/128 -> fd00:abcd:204:5::1 metric -1) dev tun0 2023-03-06 10:20:04 /sbin/route add -inet6 fd00:dead:beef::1/128 -iface tun0
add host fd00:dead:beef::1/128: gateway tun0
(ifconfig + route installation is done)
2023-03-06 10:20:04 Assertion failed at tls_crypt.c:83 (key->n == 2 && other->n == 2) 2023-03-06 10:20:04 Exiting due to fatal error
*boom*
gert
Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you
feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted
it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v7] Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Hi,
Quoted 1 line · Gert Doering
2023-03-06 10:20:04 Assertion failed at tls_crypt.c:83 (key->n == 2 && other->n == 2)
Splitting these into two ASSERT()s, it says key->n is fine, while other->n is not
2023-03-06 11:24:00 Assertion failed at tls_crypt.c:84 (other->n == 2)
adding some more msg() it seems that "other" is undefined here
2023-03-06 11:25:44 xor_key2(): key=0x7fffffffd258, key->n=2 2023-03-06 11:25:44 xor_key2(): other=0x80122062c, other->n=3009016
gert
Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you
feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted
it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...PATCH v8 1/1 Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
In reply to Arne SchwabeCurrently we have only one slot for renegotiation of the session/keys. If a replayed/faked packet is inserted by a malicous attacker, the legimate peer cannot renegotiate anymore.
This commit introduces dynamic tls-crypt. When both peer support this feature, both peer create a dynamic tls-crypt key using TLS EKM (export key material) and will enforce using that key and tls-crypt for all renegotiations. This also add an additional protection layer for renegotiations to be taken over by an illegimate client, binding the renegotiations tightly to the original session. Especially when 2FA, webauth or similar authentication is used, many third party setup ignore the need to secure renegotiation with an auth-token.
Since one of tls-crypt/tls-crypt-v2 purposes is to provide poor man's post quantum crypto guarantees, we have to ensure that the dynamic key tls-crypt key that replace the original tls-crypt key is as strong as the orginal key to avoid problems if there is a weak RNG or TLS EKM produces weak keys. We ensure this but XORing the original key with the key from TLS EKM. If tls-crypt/tls-cryptv2 is not active, we use just the key generated by TLS EKM. We also do not use hashing or anything else on the original key before XOR to avoid any potential of a structure in the key or something else that might weaken post-quantum use cases.
OpenVPN 2.x reserves the TM_ACTIVE session for renegotiations. When a SOFT_RESET_V1 packet is received, the active TLS session is moved from KS_PRIMARY to KS_SECONDARY. Here an attacker could theorectically send a faked/replayed SOFT_RESET_V1 and first packet containing the TLS client hello. If this happens, the session is blocked until the TLS renegotiation attempt times out, blocking the legimitate client.
Using a dynamic tls-crypt key here blocks any SOFT_RESET_V1 (and following packets) as replay and fake packets will not have a matching authentication/encryption and will be discarded.
HARD_RESET packets that are from a reconnecting peer are instead put in the TM_UNTRUSTED/KS_PRIMARY slot until they are sufficiently verified, so the dyanmic tls-crypt key is not used here. Replay/fake packets also do not block the legimitate client.
This commit delays the purging of the original tls-crypt key data from directly after passing it to crypto library to tls_wrap_free. We do this to allow us mixing the new exported key with the original key. To be able to generate the dynamic tls-cryptn key, we need the original key, so deleting the key is not an option if we need it later again to generate another key. Even when the client does not support secure renegotiation, deleting the key is not an option since when the reconnecting client or (especially in p2p mode with float) another client does the reconnect, we might need to generate a dynamic tls-crypt key again. Delaying the deletion of the key has also little effect as the key is still present in the OpenSSL/mbed TLS structures in the tls_wrap structure, so only the number of times the keys is in memory would be reduced.
Patch v2: fix spellings of reneg and renegotiations.
Patch v3: expand comment to original_tlscrypt_keydata and commit message,
add Changes.rst
Patch v4: improve commit message, Changes.rst
Patch v5: fix spelling/grammar mistakes. Add more comments. Patch v6: consistently calld this feature dynamic tls-crypt crypt. Note
this changes the export label and makes it incompatible with previous patches.
Patch v7: also xor tls-auth key data into the dynamic tls-crypt key like
tls-crypt key data
Patch v8: Avoid triggering ASSERT added in v7 by properly setting keys.n = 2
when loading tls crypt v2 client keys. Add dyn-tls-crypt to protocol options printout.
--- Changes.rst | 6 ++ src/openvpn/auth_token.h | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 7 +- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 16 +++- src/openvpn/init.c | 26 +++--- src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 + src/openvpn/openvpn.h | 3 + src/openvpn/options.c | 4 + src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl.c | 25 ++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 5 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 1 + src/openvpn/ssl_common.h | 13 +++ src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 4 + src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c | 2 +- src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h | 26 ++++++ src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h | 22 +++++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c | 17 +++- tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++ 20 files changed, 331 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +6 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,12 @@ Tun MTU can be pushed directive ``--tun-mtu-max`` has been introduced to increase the maximum pushable MTU size (defaults to 1600). +Dynamic TLS Crypt + When both peers are OpenVPN 2.6.0+, OpenVPN will dynamically create + a tls-crypt key that is used for renegotiation. This ensure that only the + previously authenticated peer can do trigger renegotiation and complete + renegotiations. + Improved control channel packet size control (``max-packet-size``) The size of control channel is no longer tied to ``--link-mtu``/``--tun-mtu`` and can be set using ``--max-packet-size``.
src/openvpn/auth_token.h +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@* * The second timestamp is the time the token was renewed/regenerated and is used * to determine if this token has been renewed in the acceptable time range -* (2 * renogiation timeout) +* (2 * renegotiation timeout) * * The session id is a random string of 12 byte (or 16 in base64) that is not * used by OpenVPN itself but kept intact so that external logging/management
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -1
@@ -1123,7 +1123,8 @@ void crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type, struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, bool key_inline, const int key_direction, - const char *key_name, const char *opt_name) + const char *key_name, const char *opt_name, + struct key2 *keydata) { struct key2 key2;struct key_direction_state kds;
@@ -1151,6 +1152,10 @@ crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,/* initialize key in both directions */ init_key_ctx_bi (ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name); +if (keydata) + { + *keydata = key2; + }secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2)); }
src/openvpn/crypto.h +14 -2
@@ -234,7 +234,14 @@ struct crypto_options* both sending and receiving * directions. */ struct packet_id packet_id;/**< Current packet ID state for both -* sending and receiving directions. */ +* sending and receiving directions. +* +* This contains the packet id that is +* used for replay protection. +* +* The packet id also used as the IV +* for AEAD/OFB/CFG ciphers. +* */ struct packet_id_persist *pid_persist;/**< Persistent packet ID state for * keeping state between successive
@@ -268,6 +275,10 @@ struct crypto_options/**< Bit-flag indicating that explicit exit notifies should be * sent via the control channel instead of using an OCC message */ +#define CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT (1<<7) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that renegotiations are using tls-crypt +* with a TLS-EKM derived key. +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */
@@ -530,7 +541,8 @@ void key2_print(const struct key2 *k,void crypto_read_openvpn_key (const struct key_type *key_type,struct key_ctx_bi *ctx,const char *key_file,bool key_inline,const int key_direction, -const char *key_name,const char *opt_name); +const char *key_name,const char *opt_name, +struct key2 *keydata);/* * Inline functions
src/openvpn/init.c +16 -10
@@ -2342,6 +2342,10 @@ tls_print_deferred_options_results(struct context *c) {buf_printf (&out," tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +buf_printf (&out," dyn-tls-crypt" ); + } }if (buf_len (&out) >strlen (header))
@@ -3032,7 +3036,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) options->shared_secret_file, options->shared_secret_file_inline, options->key_direction,"Static Key Encryption" , - "secret"); + "secret", NULL); }else {
@@ -3072,13 +3076,15 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c) options->ce.tls_auth_file, options->ce.tls_auth_file_inline, options->ce.key_direction, - "Control Channel Authentication", "tls-auth"); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata); }/* TLS handshake encryption+authentication (--tls-crypt) */ if (options->ce.tls_crypt_file) {tls_crypt_init_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata, options->ce.tls_crypt_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_file_inline, options->tls_server);
@@ -3096,6 +3102,7 @@ do_init_tls_wrap_key(struct context *c)else {tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (&c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key, + &c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata, &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file, options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file_inline);
@@ -3399,9 +3406,6 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)if (options->ce.tls_auth_file) { to.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_AUTH ; - to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; - to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; - to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; }/* TLS handshake encryption (--tls-crypt) */
@@ -3409,19 +3413,21 @@ do_init_crypto_tls(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) || (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file && options->tls_client)) { to.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; + } + +if (to.tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_AUTH || to.tls_wrap.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { to.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi = c->c1.ks.tls_wrap_key; to.tls_wrap.opt.pid_persist = &c->c1.pid_persist; to.tls_wrap.opt.flags |=CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ; - -if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) - { - to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_wkc = &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc; - } + to.tls_wrap.original_wrap_keydata = c->c1.ks.original_wrap_keydata; }if (options->ce.tls_crypt_v2_file) { to.tls_crypt_v2 = true; + to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_wkc = &c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_wkc; +if (options->tls_server) { to.tls_wrap.tls_crypt_v2_server_key = c->c1.ks.tls_crypt_v2_server_key;
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1817,6 +1817,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) { o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } +if (proto &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + o->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif if (proto &IV_PROTO_CC_EXIT_NOTIFY )
src/openvpn/openvpn.h +3 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct key_schedule/* optional TLS control channel wrapping */ struct key_type tls_auth_key_type;struct key_ctx_bi tls_wrap_key; +/** original tls-crypt key preserved to xored into the tls_crypt +* renegotiation key */ +struct key2 original_wrap_keydata;struct key_ctx tls_crypt_v2_server_key;struct buffer tls_crypt_v2_wkc;/**< Wrapped client key */ struct key_ctx auth_token_key;
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -8657,6 +8657,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options, { options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT ; } + else if (streq(p[j], "dyn-tls-crypt")) + { + options->imported_protocol_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif else {
src/openvpn/push.c +5 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc,push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); } +if (o->imported_protocol_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +buf_printf (&proto_flags," dyn-tls-crypt" ); + } +if (buf_len (&proto_flags) >0 ) {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"protocol-flags%s" ,buf_str (&proto_flags));
src/openvpn/ssl.c +19 -6
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static void tls_session_free(struct tls_session *session, bool clear) {tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap); +tls_wrap_free (&session->tls_wrap_reneg);for (size_t i =0 ; i <KS_SIZE ; ++i) {
@@ -1758,6 +1759,17 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params_do_work(struct tls_multi *multi,frame_print (frame_fragment,D_MTU_INFO ,"Fragmentation MTU parms" ); } +if (session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].key_id ==0 + && session->opt->crypto_flags &CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ) + { +/* If dynamic tls-crypt has been negotiated, and we are on the +* first session (key_id = 0), generate a tls-crypt key for the +* following renegotiations */ +if (!tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (multi, session)) + { +return false; + } + }return tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys (multi, session); }
@@ -2065,6 +2077,7 @@ push_peer_info(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_session *session)#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ; + iv_proto |=IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ;#endif buf_printf (&out,"IV_PROTO=%d\n" , iv_proto);
@@ -3642,7 +3655,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,/* * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request -* unless it the first packet of the session. +* unless it is the first packet of the session. */ if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions) {
@@ -3653,7 +3666,7 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, goto error; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), from, session->opt)) { goto error;
@@ -3723,8 +3736,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,*/ if (op ==P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 && ks->state >=S_GENERATED_KEYS ) { -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
@@ -3745,8 +3758,8 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi, do_burst = true; } -if (!read_control_auth (buf, &session->tls_wrap, from, - session->opt)) +if (!read_control_auth (buf,tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, key_id), + from, session->opt)) { goto error; }
src/openvpn/ssl.h +5 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@#include "ssl_common.h" #include "ssl_backend.h" #include "ssl_pkt.h" +#include "tls_crypt.h" /* Used in the TLS PRF function */ #define KEY_EXPANSION_ID "OpenVPN"
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@/** Support for AUTH_FAIL,TEMP messages */ #define IV_PROTO_AUTH_FAIL_TEMP (1<<8) +/** Support to dynamic tls-crypt (renegotiation with TLS-EKM derived tls-crypt key) */ +#define IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT (1<<9) +/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
@@ -476,6 +480,7 @@ tls_wrap_free(struct tls_wrap_ctx *tls_wrap)free_buf (&tls_wrap->tls_crypt_v2_metadata);free_buf (&tls_wrap->work); +secure_memzero (&tls_wrap->original_wrap_keydata,sizeof (tls_wrap->original_wrap_keydata)); } static inline bool
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1 -0
@@ -391,6 +391,7 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys"#define EXPORT_P2P_PEERID_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-p2p-peerid" +#define EXPORT_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-dynamic-tls-crypt"/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +13 -0
@@ -275,6 +275,15 @@ struct tls_wrap_ctxstruct buffer tls_crypt_v2_metadata;/**< Received from client */ bool cleanup_key_ctx;/**< opt.key_ctx_bi is owned by * this context */ +/** original key data to be xored in to the key for dynamic tls-crypt. +* +* We keep the original key data to ensure that the newly generated key +* for the dynamic tls-crypt has the same level of quality by using +* xor with the original key. This gives us the same same entropy/randomness +* as the original tls-crypt key to ensure the post-quantum use case of +* tls-crypt still holds true +* */ +struct key2 original_wrap_keydata; };/*
@@ -468,6 +477,10 @@ struct tls_session/* authenticate control packets */ struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap; +/* Specific tls-crypt for renegotiations, if this is valid, +* tls_wrap_reneg.mode is TLS_WRAP_CRYPT, otherwise ignore it */ +struct tls_wrap_ctx tls_wrap_reneg; +int initial_opcode;/* our initial P_ opcode */ struct session_id session_id;/* our random session ID */
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c +4 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,10 @@ p2p_ncp_set_options(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) } } +if (iv_proto_peer &IV_PROTO_DYN_TLS_CRYPT ) + { + session->opt->crypto_flags |=CO_USE_DYNAMIC_TLS_CRYPT ; + }#endif /* if defined(HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL) */ }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +1 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ write_control_auth(struct tls_session *session,msg (D_TLS_DEBUG ,"%s(): %s" , __func__,packet_opcode_name (opcode)); -tls_wrap_control (&session->tls_wrap, header, buf, &session->session_id); +tls_wrap_control (tls_session_get_tls_wrap (session, ks->key_id), header, buf, &session->session_id); *to_link_addr = &ks->remote_addr; }
src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +26 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,32 @@ packet_opcode_name(int op) } } +/** +* Determines if the current session should use the renegotiation tls wrap +* struct instead the normal one and returns it. +* +* @param session +* @param key_id key_id of the received/or to be send packet +* @return +*/ +static inline struct tls_wrap_ctx * +tls_session_get_tls_wrap (struct tls_session *session,int key_id) +{ +/* OpenVPN has the hardcoded assumption in its protocol that +* key-id 0 is always first session and renegotiations use key-id +* 1 to 7 and wrap around to 1 after that. So key-id > 0 is equivalent +* to "this is a renegotiation" +*/ +if (key_id >0 && session->tls_wrap_reneg.mode ==TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ) + { +return &session->tls_wrap_reneg; + } +else + { +return &session->tls_wrap; + } +} +/* initial packet id (instead of 0) that indicates that the peer supports * early protocol negotiation. This will make the packet id turn a bit faster * but the network time part of the packet id takes care of that. And
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +83 -13
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src/openvpn/tls_crypt.h +20 -2
@@ -108,12 +108,27 @@* @param key The key context to initialize * @param key_file The file to read the key from or the key itself if * key_inline is true. +* @param keydata The keydata used to create key will be written here. * @param key_inline True if key_file contains an inline key, False * otherwise. * @param tls_server Must be set to true is this is a TLS server instance. */ -void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,const char *key_file, -bool key_inline,bool tls_server); +void tls_crypt_init_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key,struct key2 *keydata, +const char *key_file,bool key_inline,bool tls_server); + +/** +* Generates a TLS-Crypt key to be used with dynamic tls-crypt using the +* TLS EKM exporter function. +* +* All renegotiations of a session use the same generated dynamic key. +* +* @param multi multi session struct +* @param session session that will be used for the TLS EKM exporter +* @return true iff generating the key was successful +*/ +bool +tls_session_generate_dynamic_tls_crypt_key (struct tls_multi *multi, +struct tls_session *session);/** * Returns the maximum overhead (in bytes) added to the destination buffer by
@@ -169,6 +184,8 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* * @param key Key structure to be initialized with the client * key. +* @param original_key contains the key data that has been used to +* initialise the key parameter * @param wrapped_key_buf Returns buffer containing the wrapped key that will * be sent to the server when connecting. Caller must * free this buffer when no longer needed.
@@ -178,6 +195,7 @@ void tls_crypt_v2_init_server_key(struct key_ctx *key_ctx, bool encrypt,* otherwise. */ void tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +struct key2 *original_key,struct buffer *wrapped_key_buf,const char *key_file,bool key_inline);
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +15 -2
@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ parse_line(const char *line, char **p, const int n, const char *file,return 0 ; } +/* Define this function here as dummy since including the ssl_*.c files +* leads to having to include even more unrelated code */ +bool +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char *label,size_t label_size, +void *ekm,size_t ekm_size) +{ +ASSERT (0 ); +} +const char *print_link_socket_actual (const struct link_socket_actual *act,struct gc_arena *gc) {
@@ -191,7 +201,8 @@ init_tas_auth(int key_direction)crypto_read_openvpn_key (&tls_crypt_kt, &tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, key_direction, -"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" ); +"Control Channel Authentication" ,"tls-auth" , +NULL );return tas; }
@@ -203,7 +214,9 @@ init_tas_crypt(bool server) tas.tls_wrap.mode =TLS_WRAP_CRYPT ; tas.tls_wrap.opt.flags |= (CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID |CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM ); -tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, static_key, true, server); +tls_crypt_init_key (&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi, + &tas.tls_wrap.original_wrap_keydata, static_key, + true, server);return tas; }
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_tls_crypt.c +85 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
The diff between v7 and v8 is minimal (printing protocol-options and initializing key2.n=2 in tls_crypt_v2_init_client_key()), so taking Heiko's ACK on v7.
I have not really looked hard at the code, relying on Heiko's tests and compatibility work with OpenVPN 3. Basic stare-at-code for stuff like memory sanity etc. looks good. Also, it has a unit test :-)
What I have done is subject this to the client/server torture testbed, with a master+v8 client and master+v8 server (= using dynamic tls-crypt, and not crashing) and both sides also talking to 2.3/2.4/2.5 peers, with tls-auth, tls-crypt, tls-crypt-v2 (where supported) - since this all works now, I'm not worried about breaking compatibility.
In addition, I've tried the auth-token renegotiation / reconnect setup that excercises renegotiations heavily, and that also succeeds (reneg-sec 90, token expiry at 300, so quite a bit of successful/failing renegotiations, having to fall back to reconnect)
In Changes.rst I have adjusted "2.6.0+" to "2.6.1+" (master) and have moved this to a new "changes in 2.6.1" section (release/2.6).
Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.6 branch.
commit 6a05768a71ede7a8654fc6f3104f7449509efee0 (master) commit 202a934fc32673ef865b5cbcb23ad6057ceb2e0b (release/2.6)
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Tue Mar 7 16:02:33 2023 +0100
Dynamic tls-crypt for secure soft_reset/session renegotiation
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Heiko Hund <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg26341.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering