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ARM Spectre variant 2 fixes

PATCH Superseded Russell King - ARM Linux 6 participants 29 messages May 16, 2018 – May 22, 2018

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v1 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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Russell King - ARM Linux

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#0 lore raw

cover ARM Spectre variant 2 fixes

This series addresses the Spectre variant 2 issues on ARM Cortex and Broadcom Brahma B15 CPUs. Due to the complexity of the bug, it is not possible to verify that this series fixes any of the bugs, since it has not been able to reproduce these exact scenarios using test programs.

I believe that this covers the entire extent of the Spectre variant 2 issues, with the exception of Cortex A53 and Cortex A72 processors as these require a substantially more complex solution (except where the workaround is implemented in PSCI firmware.)

Spectre variant 1 is not covered by this series.

The patch series is based partly on Marc Zyngier's work from February - two of the KVM patches are from Marc's work.

The main differences are:
- Inclusion of more processors as per current ARM Ltd security update documentation.
- Extension of "bugs" infrastructure to detect Cortex A8 and Cortex A15 CPUs missing out on the IBE bit being set on (re-)entry to the kernel through all paths.
- Handle all suspect userspace-touching-kernelspace aborts irrespective of mapping type.

The first patch will trivially conflict with the Broadcom Brahma updates already in arm-soc - it has been necessary to independently add the ID definitions for the B15 CPU.

Having worked through this series, I'm of the opinion that the define_processor_functions macro in proc-v7 are probably more hassle than they're worth - here, we don't need the global equivalent symbols, because we never refer to them from the kernel code for any V7 processor (MULTI_CPU is always defined.)

This series is currently in my "spectre" branch (along with some Spectre variant 1 patches.)

Please carefully review.

 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h        |   6 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |   3 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h     |   5 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  14 +++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  23 +++++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h    |   4 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |   8 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c             |  18 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c              |   4 +
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c          |   2 +
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S       | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                |  23 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |   3 +
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S          |   3 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S       |   6 --
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 20 files changed, 471 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/14 ARM: add CPU part numbers for Cortex A73, A75 and Brahma B15

Add CPU part numbers for the above mentioned CPUs

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h +5 -0
index cb546425da8a..adc4a3eef815 100644
@@ -77,8 +77,13 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12		0x4100c0d0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17		0x4100c0e0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15		0x4100c0f0
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0x4100d090
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0x4100d0a0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_MASK		0xff00fff0
 
+/* Broadcom cores */
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15		0x420000f0
+
 /* DEC implemented cores */
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_SA1100		0x4400a110
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Acked-by on v1 1/14
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 01/14] ARM: add CPU part numbers for Cortex A73, A75 and Brahma B15

Quoted 12 lines · Russell King

Add CPU part numbers for the above mentioned CPUs

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h +0 -0
index cb546425da8a..adc4a3eef815 100644

arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h line 85

Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h +4 -0
@@ -77,8 +77,13 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12		0x4100c0d0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17		0x4100c0e0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15		0x4100c0f0
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0x4100d090
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0x4100d0a0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_MASK		0xff00fff0
 
+/* Broadcom cores */
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15		0x420000f0

For B15:

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h +1 -0
+
 /* DEC implemented cores */
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_SA1100		0x4400a110
 
Signature · 1 line
Florian
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/14 ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Prepare the processor bug infrastructure so that it can be expanded to check for per-processor bugs.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile    | 1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +2 -2
index a97f1ea708d1..ed122d294f3f 100644
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
 #define __ASM_BUGS_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
-#define check_bugs() check_writebuffer_bugs()
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+extern void check_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index b59ac4bf82b8..8cad59465af3 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ else
 obj-y		+= entry-armv.o
 endif
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)		+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_IDLE)		+= cpuidle.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API)	+= dma.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_FIQ)		+= fiq.o fiqasm.o
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..88024028bb70
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+
+void __init check_bugs(void)
+{
+	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/14 ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Check for CPU bugs when secondary processors are being brought online, and also when CPUs are resuming from a low power mode. This gives an opportunity to check that processor specific bug workarounds are correctly enabled for all paths that a CPU re-enters the kernel.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 5 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c       | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c   | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +2 -0
index ed122d294f3f..73a99c72a930 100644
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_bugs(void);
+extern void check_other_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
+#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +5 -0
index 88024028bb70..16e7ba2a9cc4 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 
+void check_other_bugs(void)
+{
+}
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+	check_other_bugs();
 }
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +4 -0
index 2da087926ebe..5ad0b67b9e33 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();
+
 	complete(&cpu_running);
 
 	local_irq_enable();
arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c +2 -0
index a40ebb7c0896..d08099269e35 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/idmap.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
 		cpu_switch_mm(mm->pgd, mm);
 		local_flush_bp_all();
 		local_flush_tlb_all();
+		check_other_bugs();
 	}
 
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Reviewed-by on v1 3/14
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 03/14] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths

Quoted 6 lines · Russell King

Check for CPU bugs when secondary processors are being brought online, and also when CPUs are resuming from a low power mode. This gives an opportunity to check that processor specific bug workarounds are correctly enabled for all paths that a CPU re-enters the kernel.

Quoted 52 lines
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 5 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c       | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c   | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +2 -0
index ed122d294f3f..73a99c72a930 100644
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_bugs(void);
+extern void check_other_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
+#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +5 -0
index 88024028bb70..16e7ba2a9cc4 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 
+void check_other_bugs(void)
+{
+}
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+	check_other_bugs();
 }
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +1 -0
index 2da087926ebe..5ad0b67b9e33 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>

arch/arm/kernel/smp.c asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void) · line 410

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +2 -0
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();

Given what is currently implemented, I don't think the location of check_other_bugs() matters too much, but we might have to move this after the local_irq_enable() at some point if we need to check for e.g:
a bogus local timer or whatever?

Signature · 1 line
Florian
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 03/14] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths

Quoted 8 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 7 lines · Russell King
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +0 -0
index 2da087926ebe..5ad0b67b9e33 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
Quoted 16 lines

arch/arm/kernel/smp.c asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void) · line 410

Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +3 -0
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -405,6 +406,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();

Given what is currently implemented, I don't think the location of check_other_bugs() matters too much, but we might have to move this after the local_irq_enable() at some point if we need to check for e.g:
a bogus local timer or whatever?

We could move it later if we need to.

Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 8.8Mbps down 630kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 8.21Mbps down 510kbps up
#8 lore raw

PATCH 4/14 ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Add support for per-processor bug checking - each processor function descriptor gains a function pointer for this check, which must not be an __init function. If non-NULL, this will be called whenever a CPU enters the kernel via which ever path (boot CPU, secondary CPU startup, CPU resuming, etc.)

This allows processor specific bug checks to validate that workaround bits are properly enabled by firmware via all entry paths to the kernel.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c          | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S       | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h +4 -0
index f2e1af45bd6f..e25f4392e1b2 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ extern struct processor {
 	 */
 	void (*_proc_init)(void);
 	/*
+	 * Check for processor bugs
+	 */
+	void (*check_bugs)(void);
+	/*
 	 * Disable any processor specifics
 	 */
 	void (*_proc_fin)(void);
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +4 -0
index 16e7ba2a9cc4..7be511310191 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
 
 void check_other_bugs(void)
 {
+#ifdef MULTI_CPU
+	if (processor.check_bugs)
+		processor.check_bugs();
+#endif
 }
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S +2 -1
index f10e31d0730a..81d0efb055c6 100644
@@ -273,13 +273,14 @@
 	mcr	p15, 0, ip, c7, c10, 4		@ data write barrier
 	.endm
 
-.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0
+.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0, bugs=0
 	.type	\name\()_processor_functions, #object
 	.align 2
 ENTRY(\name\()_processor_functions)
 	.word	\dabort
 	.word	\pabort
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_init
+	.word	\bugs
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_fin
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_reset
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_do_idle
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Reviewed-by on v1 4/14
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 04/14] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking

Quoted 10 lines · Russell King

Add support for per-processor bug checking - each processor function descriptor gains a function pointer for this check, which must not be an __init function. If non-NULL, this will be called whenever a CPU enters the kernel via which ever path (boot CPU, secondary CPU startup, CPU resuming, etc.)

This allows processor specific bug checks to validate that workaround bits are properly enabled by firmware via all entry paths to the kernel.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#10 lore raw

PATCH 5/14 ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Add a Kconfig symbol for CPUs which are vulnerable to the Spectre attacks.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +4 -0
index 7f14acf67caf..8a5a1bb415c4 100644
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ config CPU_V7
 	select CPU_CP15_MPU if !MMU
 	select CPU_HAS_ASID if MMU
 	select CPU_PABRT_V7
+	select CPU_SPECTRE
 	select CPU_THUMB_CAPABLE
 	select CPU_TLB_V7 if MMU
 
@@ -826,6 +827,9 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 	help
 	  Say Y here to disable branch prediction.  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CPU_SPECTRE
+	bool
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#12 lore raw

PATCH 6/14 ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Harden the branch predictor against Spectre v2 attacks on context switches for ARMv7 and later CPUs. We do this by:

Cortex A9, A12, A17, A73, A75, R7, R8: invalidating the BTB. Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidating the instruction cache.

Cortex A57 and Cortex A72 are not addressed in this patch.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig          |  19 +++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S |   6 --
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S        | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +19 -0
index 8a5a1bb415c4..faede0401d2e 100644
@@ -830,6 +830,25 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 config CPU_SPECTRE
 	bool
 
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+	default y
+	help
+	   Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
+	   on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim
+	   context by executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.
+	   Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing
+	   internal branch predictor state and limiting the prediction
+	   logic in some situations.
+
+	   This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden
+	   the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
+	   specific instruction sequences or control bits being set by
+	   the system firmware.
+
+	   If unsure, say Y.
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S +0 -6
index c6141a5435c3..f8d45ad2a515 100644
@@ -41,11 +41,6 @@
  *	even on Cortex-A8 revisions not affected by 430973.
  *	If IBE is not set, the flush BTAC/BTB won't do anything.
  */
-ENTRY(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-	mov	r2, #0
-	mcr	p15, 0, r2, c7, c5, 6		@ flush BTAC/BTB
-#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	mmid	r1, r1				@ get mm->context.id
@@ -66,7 +61,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #endif
 	bx	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
-ENDPROC(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
 
 /*
  *	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext(ptep, pte)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +98 -31

189 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 06/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches

Quoted 9 lines · Russell King

__v7_cr7mp_proc_info:

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +1 -1
 	.long	0x410fc170
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_cr7mp_proc_info, __v7_cr7mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_cr7mp_proc_info, __v7_cr7mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
 	.size	__v7_cr7mp_proc_info, . - __v7_cr7mp_proc_info
 
 	/*

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S ENDPROC(__v7_setup) · line 704

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +1 -1
@@ -649,7 +700,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 __v7_cr8mp_proc_info:
 	.long	0x410fc180
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_cr8mp_proc_info, __v7_cr8mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_cr8mp_proc_info, __v7_cr8mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
 	.size	__v7_cr8mp_proc_info, . - __v7_cr8mp_proc_info

For R-class cores, the mitigation doesn't make much sense since we do not enforce user/kernel isolation anyway. I believe the same also applies to A-class cores built with !MMU, so you might want to guard CPU_SPECTRE with MMU in PATCH 05/14.

Cheers
Vladimir

#14 lore raw

PATCH 7/14 ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
arch/arm/mm/Makefile +1 -1
index 9dbb84923e12..a0c40610210c 100644
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_MOHAWK)	+= proc-mohawk.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON)	+= proc-feroceon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6)		+= proc-v6.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K)		+= proc-v6.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o proc-v7-bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7M)		+= proc-v7m.o
 
 AFLAGS_proc-v6.o	:=-Wa,-march=armv6
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +29 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a32ce13479d9
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(u32 mask, const char *msg)
+{
+	u32 aux_cr;
+
+	asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
+
+	if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask)
+		pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);
+}
+
+static void check_spectre_auxcr(u32 bit)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+		cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bit, "Spectre v2: firmware did not set auxiliary control register IBE bit, system vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(6));
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(BIT(0));
+}
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +2 -2
index 9c3d4c24f720..5cfed34fd1af 100644
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca8_ibe
 
 	@ Cortex-A9 - needs more registers preserved across suspend/resume
 	@ and bpiall switch_mm for hardening
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
-	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca15_ibe
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B
 	define_processor_functions pj4b, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Reviewed-by on v1 7/14
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

Quoted 8 lines · Russell King

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

I would be keen on updating arch/arm/kernel/head.S to to attempt setting ACTRL[0]=1 on A15/B15, if the kernel executes at the appropriate privilege level, this will succeed, if not, this should result in an ignored write. What do you think?

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Reviewed-by on v1 7/14
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

In reply to Russell King
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

In reply to Russell King

Hi Russell,

Quoted 8 lines · Russell King

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

Thanks for your patch!

Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +2 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c line 12

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +10 -0
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(u32 mask, const char *msg)
+{
+       u32 aux_cr;
+
+       asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
+
+       if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask)
+               pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);

pr_alert(), to match the patch description.

Gr{oetje,eeting}s,

Geert

Signature · 5 lines
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]

In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
                                -- Linus Torvalds
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 07/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

Quoted 24 lines · Geert Uytterhoeven

Hi Russell,

Quoted 8 lines · Russell King

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

Thanks for your patch!

Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(u32 mask, const char *msg)
+{
Quoted 8 lines

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c line 12

Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +6 -0
+       u32 aux_cr;
+
+       asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
+
+       if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask)
+               pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);

pr_alert(), to match the patch description.

It was alert, but I've lowered it because I don't think it warrants alert status. Maybe critical would be better? Shrug, this stuff is rather subjective.

Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 8.8Mbps down 630kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 8.21Mbps down 510kbps up
#19 lore raw

PATCH 8/14 ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor, invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user task limit:

Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |  3 +++
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |  8 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |  3 +++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              |  8 +++---
 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h +3 -0
index 4c9fa72b59f5..07e27f212dc7 100644
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
 #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t)	asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
 #define write_sysreg(v, ...)		__write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+#define BPIALL				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
+#define ICIALLU				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
+
 extern unsigned long cr_alignment;	/* defined in entry-armv.S */
 
 static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)
arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h +8 -0
index 78f6db114faf..3cfe010c5734 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
 extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
 extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+extern void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
+#define harden_branch_predictor() \
+	do { if (harden_branch_predictor) harden_branch_predictor(); } while (0)
+#else
+#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 #define UDBG_UNDEFINED	(1 << 0)
 #define UDBG_SYSCALL	(1 << 1)
 #define UDBG_BADABORT	(1 << 2)
arch/arm/mm/fault.c +3 -0
index b75eada23d0a..3b1ba003c4f9 100644
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
 {
 	struct siginfo si;
 
+	if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
+		harden_branch_predictor();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
 	if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
 	    ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS)  && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +51 -0

66 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +5 -3
index 5cfed34fd1af..989864676f8b 100644
@@ -533,8 +533,10 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 
 	__INITDATA
 
+	.weak cpu_v7_bugs_init
+
 	@ define struct processor (see <asm/proc-fns.h> and proc-macros.S)
-	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	@ generic v7 bpiall on context switch
@@ -549,7 +551,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #define HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS v7_bpiall_processor_functions
 #else
@@ -585,7 +587,7 @@ ENDPROC(__v7_setup)
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
 #endif
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
-	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 #endif
 
 	@ Cortex-A15 - needs iciallu switch_mm for hardening
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Reviewed-by on v1 8/14
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 08/14] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space

Quoted 9 lines · Russell King

In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor, invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user task limit:

Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#21 lore raw

PATCH 9/14 ARM: spectre-v2: add PSCI based hardening

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Add PSCI based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +50 -0
index 65a9b8141f86..81de4a8e74c6 100644
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
 void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+
 static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
 {
 	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
@@ -49,6 +55,18 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
 	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+static void call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
 void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
@@ -73,6 +91,38 @@ void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
 		break;
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	if (psci_ops.smccc_version != SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+				break;
+			harden_branch_predictor = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor PSCI";
+			break;
+
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+				break;
+			harden_branch_predictor = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "firmware PSCI";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			spectre_v2_method);
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +21 -0
index 989864676f8b..7e6719a0eada 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  *
  *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
  */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
@@ -93,6 +94,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	.arch_extension sec
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	smc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	.arch_extension virt
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	hvc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
 	mov	r3, #0
 	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
Acked-by on v1 9/14
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 09/14] ARM: spectre-v2: add PSCI based hardening

[updating Christoffer's email address]

Quoted 63 lines · Russell King

Add PSCI based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +22 -0
index 65a9b8141f86..81de4a8e74c6 100644
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
 void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void);
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 void (*harden_branch_predictor)(void);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+
 static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
 {
 	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
@@ -49,6 +55,18 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
 	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+static void call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
 void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
@@ -73,6 +91,38 @@ void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
 		break;
 	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	if (psci_ops.smccc_version != SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void) · line 107

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +10 -0
+
+		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+				break;
+			harden_branch_predictor = call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor PSCI";

nit: strictly speaking, this is not provided by PSCI, but by ARCH_WORKAROUND_1. We just use the same conduit as PSCI to discover it.

Quoted 51 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +18 -0
+			break;
+
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 < 0)
+				break;
+			harden_branch_predictor = call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "firmware PSCI";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			spectre_v2_method);
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +14 -0
index 989864676f8b..7e6719a0eada 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  *
  *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
  */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
@@ -93,6 +94,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	.arch_extension sec
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	smc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	.arch_extension virt
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area) · line 119

Quoted 10 lines
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +7 -0
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	hvc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
 	mov	r3, #0
 	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
	M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
#23 lore raw

PATCH 10/14 ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit. This is made complicated by the fact that we cannot take a branch before invalidating the BTB.

We only apply this to A12 and A17, which are the only two ARM cores on which this useful.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  2 --
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 17 +++++++++-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +0 -2
index 36dd2962a42d..df24ed48977d 100644
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu;
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init[];
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init_end[];
 
-extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
-
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm *kvm);
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +16 -1
index de1b919404e4..d08ce9c41df4 100644
@@ -297,7 +297,22 @@ static inline unsigned int kvm_get_vmid_bits(void)
 
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
-	return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
+	}
+
+#endif
+	default:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	}
+	}
 }
 
 static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +69 -2

89 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#24 lore raw

PATCH 11/14 ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor on Cortex-A15, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit, which can only be done by invalidating the icache (with ACTLR[0] being set).

We use the same hack as for A12/A17 to perform the vector decoding.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  5 +++++
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +5 -0
index d08ce9c41df4..48edb1f4ced4 100644
@@ -306,6 +306,11 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv);
+	}
 #endif
 	default:
 	{
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +24 -0
index e789f52a5129..918a05dd2d63 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,28 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0	/* ICIALLU */
+	isb
+
+	b	decode_vectors
+
+	.align 5
 __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
 	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
 
@@ -92,6 +114,8 @@
 	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
 	isb
 
+decode_vectors:
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
 	/*
 	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#25 lore raw

PATCH 12/14 ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Include Brahma B15 in the Spectre v2 KVM workarounds.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +1 -0
index 48edb1f4ced4..fea770f78144 100644
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	{
 		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#27 lore raw

PATCH 13/14 ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest.

---
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +12 -1
index 918a05dd2d63..67de45685e29 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  * Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA.
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ ENDPROC(__hyp_do_panic)
 	lsr     r2, r2, #16
 	and     r2, r2, #0xff
 	cmp     r2, #0
-	bne	guest_trap		@ Guest called HVC
+	bne	guest_hvc_trap		@ Guest called HVC
 
 	/*
 	 * Getting here means host called HVC, we shift parameters and branch
@@ -253,6 +254,16 @@ THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
 	pop	{r2, lr}
 	eret
 
+guest_hvc_trap:
+	movw	ip, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	ip, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	ldr	r0, [sp]		@ Guest's r0
+	teq	r0, ip
+	bne	guest_trap
+	pop	{r0, r1, r2}
+	mov	r0, #0
+	eret
+
 guest_trap:
 	load_vcpu r0			@ Load VCPU pointer to r0
 
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4
#28 lore raw

PATCH 14/14 ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux

Report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to KVM guests for affected CPUs.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h +12 -2
index 248b930563e5..11f91744ffb0 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/kvm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@@ -311,8 +312,17 @@ static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void) {}
 
 static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
 {
-	/* No way to detect it yet, pretend it is not there. */
-	return false;
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+		return true;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 #endif /* __ARM_KVM_HOST_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.7.4