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uprobe: uretprobe speed up

PATCH Superseded Jiri Olsa 9 participants 35 messages May 7, 2024 – May 21, 2024

Subsystems (12)
x86 Kselftest BPF perf events +8 more subsystems

v5 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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Jiri Olsa

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

v5 cover uprobe: uretprobe speed up

hi,
as part of the effort on speeding up the uprobes [0] coming with return uprobe optimization by using syscall instead of the trap on the uretprobe trampoline.

The speed up depends on instruction type that uprobe is installed and depends on specific HW type, please check patch 1 for details.

Patches 1-7 are based on bpf-next/master, but path 1 and 2 are apply-able on linux-trace.git tree probes/for-next branch. Patch 8 is based on man-pages master.

v5 changes:
- added shadow stack support for uretprobe [peterz]
- reworded man page + typos [Alejandro Colom]
- added pipe ASSERT_OK [Andrii]
- added acks [Andrii]
- removed compat test for now before ci is fixed

Also available at:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jolsa/perf.git
uretprobe_syscall

thanks,
jirka

Notes to check list items in Documentation/process/adding-syscalls.rst:

- System Call Alternatives
New syscall seems like the best way in here, because we need just to quickly enter kernel with no extra arguments processing, which we'd need to do if we decided to use another syscall.

- Designing the API: Planning for Extension
The uretprobe syscall is very specific and most likely won't be extended in the future.

At the moment it does not take any arguments and even if it does in future, it's allowed to be called only from trampoline prepared by kernel, so there'll be no broken user.

- Designing the API: Other Considerations
N/A because uretprobe syscall does not return reference to kernel object.

- Proposing the API
Wiring up of the uretprobe system call is in separate change, selftests and man page changes are part of the patchset.

- Generic System Call Implementation
There's no CONFIG option for the new functionality because it keeps the same behaviour from the user POV.

- x86 System Call Implementation
It's 64-bit syscall only.

- Compatibility System Calls (Generic)
N/A uretprobe syscall has no arguments and is not supported for compat processes.

- Compatibility System Calls (x86)
N/A uretprobe syscall is not supported for compat processes.

- System Calls Returning Elsewhere
N/A.

- Other Details
N/A.

- Testing
Adding new bpf selftests and ran ltp on top of this change.

- Man Page
Attached.

- Do not call System Calls in the Kernel
N/A.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZeCXHKJ--iYYbmLj@krava/
---
Jiri Olsa (7):
uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call
uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support
selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test

 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl                      |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h                                |   4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c                                     |  29 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c                                   | 127 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/syscalls.h                                    |   2 +
 include/linux/uprobes.h                                     |   3 +
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h                           |   5 +-
 kernel/events/uprobes.c                                     |  24 +++++--
 kernel/sys_ni.c                                             |   2 +
 tools/include/linux/compiler.h                              |   4 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c       | 123 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c     | 325 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c          |  15 +++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c |  17 +++++
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c             | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 15 files changed, 813 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c

Jiri Olsa (1):
man2: Add uretprobe syscall page

 man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 man2/uretprobe.2
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/8 uprobe: Wire up uretprobe system call

Wiring up uretprobe system call, which comes in following changes. We need to do the wiring before, because the uretprobe implementation needs the syscall number.

Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native 64-bit process.

---
 arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 +
 include/linux/syscalls.h               | 2 ++
 include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      | 5 ++++-
 kernel/sys_ni.c                        | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
index 7e8d46f4147f..af0a33ab06ee 100644
@@ -383,6 +383,7 @@
 459	common	lsm_get_self_attr	sys_lsm_get_self_attr
 460	common	lsm_set_self_attr	sys_lsm_set_self_attr
 461	common	lsm_list_modules	sys_lsm_list_modules
+462	64	uretprobe		sys_uretprobe
 
 #
 # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
include/linux/syscalls.h +2 -0
index e619ac10cd23..5318e0e76799 100644
@@ -972,6 +972,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_lsm_list_modules(u64 *ids, u32 *size, u32 flags);
 /* x86 */
 asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int on);
 
+asmlinkage long sys_uretprobe(void);
+
 /* pciconfig: alpha, arm, arm64, ia64, sparc */
 asmlinkage long sys_pciconfig_read(unsigned long bus, unsigned long dfn,
 				unsigned long off, unsigned long len,
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +4 -1
index 75f00965ab15..8a747cd1d735 100644
@@ -842,8 +842,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_set_self_attr, sys_lsm_set_self_attr)
 #define __NR_lsm_list_modules 461
 __SYSCALL(__NR_lsm_list_modules, sys_lsm_list_modules)
 
+#define __NR_uretprobe 462
+__SYSCALL(__NR_uretprobe, sys_uretprobe)
+
 #undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 462
+#define __NR_syscalls 463
 
 /*
  * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
kernel/sys_ni.c +2 -0
index faad00cce269..be6195e0d078 100644
@@ -391,3 +391,5 @@ COND_SYSCALL(setuid16);
 
 /* restartable sequence */
 COND_SYSCALL(rseq);
+
+COND_SYSCALL(uretprobe);
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author reviewer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/8 uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding uretprobe syscall instead of trap to speed up return probe.

At the moment the uretprobe setup/path is:

- install entry uprobe

- when the uprobe is hit, it overwrites probed function's return address on stack with address of the trampoline that contains breakpoint instruction

- the breakpoint trap code handles the uretprobe consumers execution and jumps back to original return address

This patch replaces the above trampoline's breakpoint instruction with new ureprobe syscall call. This syscall does exactly the same job as the trap with some more extra work:

- syscall trampoline must save original value for rax/r11/rcx registers on stack - rax is set to syscall number and r11/rcx are changed and used by syscall instruction

- the syscall code reads the original values of those registers and restore those values in task's pt_regs area

- only caller from trampoline exposed in '[uprobes]' is allowed, the process will receive SIGILL signal otherwise

Even with some extra work, using the uretprobes syscall shows speed improvement (compared to using standard breakpoint):

On Intel (11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1165G7 @ 2.80GHz)

current:

    uretprobe-nop  :    1.498 ± 0.000M/s
    uretprobe-push :    1.448 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.816 ± 0.001M/s

with the fix:

    uretprobe-nop  :    1.969 ± 0.002M/s  < 31% speed up
    uretprobe-push :    1.910 ± 0.000M/s  < 31% speed up
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.934 ± 0.000M/s  < 14% speed up

On Amd (AMD Ryzen 7 5700U)

current:

    uretprobe-nop  :    0.778 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-push :    0.744 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.540 ± 0.001M/s

with the fix:

    uretprobe-nop  :    0.860 ± 0.001M/s  < 10% speed up
    uretprobe-push :    0.818 ± 0.001M/s  < 10% speed up
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.578 ± 0.000M/s  <  7% speed up

The performance test spawns a thread that runs loop which triggers uprobe with attached bpf program that increments the counter that gets printed in results above.

The uprobe (and uretprobe) kind is determined by which instruction is being patched with breakpoint instruction. That's also important for uretprobes, because uprobe is installed for each uretprobe.

The performance test is part of bpf selftests:
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/run_bench_uprobes.sh

Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native 64-bit process, compat process still uses standard breakpoint.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/uprobes.h   |   3 +
 kernel/events/uprobes.c   |  24 +++++---
 3 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +115 -0
index 6c07f6daaa22..81e6ee95784d 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/uprobes.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
 
 #include <linux/kdebug.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -308,6 +309,120 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn, bool
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+
+asm (
+	".pushsection .rodata\n"
+	".global uretprobe_syscall_entry\n"
+	"uretprobe_syscall_entry:\n"
+	"pushq %rax\n"
+	"pushq %rcx\n"
+	"pushq %r11\n"
+	"movq $" __stringify(__NR_uretprobe) ", %rax\n"
+	"syscall\n"
+	".global uretprobe_syscall_check\n"
+	"uretprobe_syscall_check:\n"
+	"popq %r11\n"
+	"popq %rcx\n"
+
+	/* The uretprobe syscall replaces stored %rax value with final
+	 * return address, so we don't restore %rax in here and just
+	 * call ret.
+	 */
+	"retq\n"
+	".global uretprobe_syscall_end\n"
+	"uretprobe_syscall_end:\n"
+	".popsection\n"
+);
+
+extern u8 uretprobe_syscall_entry[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_syscall_check[];
+extern u8 uretprobe_syscall_end[];
+
+void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+	static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+
+	/*
+	 * At the moment the uretprobe syscall trampoline is supported
+	 * only for native 64-bit process, the compat process still uses
+	 * standard breakpoint.
+	 */
+	if (user_64bit_mode(regs)) {
+		*psize = uretprobe_syscall_end - uretprobe_syscall_entry;
+		return uretprobe_syscall_entry;
+	}
+
+	*psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+	return &insn;
+}
+
+static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(void)
+{
+	unsigned long tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
+
+	return tramp + (uretprobe_syscall_check - uretprobe_syscall_entry);
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
+{
+	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+	unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
+
+	if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip())
+		goto sigill;
+
+	err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user *)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+	if (err)
+		goto sigill;
+
+	/* expose the "right" values of r11/cx/ax/sp to uprobe_consumer/s */
+	regs->r11 = r11_cx_ax[0];
+	regs->cx  = r11_cx_ax[1];
+	regs->ax  = r11_cx_ax[2];
+	regs->sp += sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+	regs->orig_ax = -1;
+
+	ip = regs->ip;
+	sp = regs->sp;
+
+	uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
+
+	/*
+	 * uprobe_consumer has changed sp, we can do nothing,
+	 * just return via iret
+	 */
+	if (regs->sp != sp)
+		return regs->ax;
+	regs->sp -= sizeof(r11_cx_ax);
+
+	/* for the case uprobe_consumer has changed r11/cx */
+	r11_cx_ax[0] = regs->r11;
+	r11_cx_ax[1] = regs->cx;
+
+	/*
+	 * ax register is passed through as return value, so we can use
+	 * its space on stack for ip value and jump to it through the
+	 * trampoline's ret instruction
+	 */
+	r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+	regs->ip = ip;
+
+	err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, r11_cx_ax, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
+	if (err)
+		goto sigill;
+
+	/* ensure sysret, see do_syscall_64() */
+	regs->r11 = regs->flags;
+	regs->cx  = regs->ip;
+
+	return regs->ax;
+
+sigill:
+	force_sig(SIGILL);
+	return -1;
+}
+
 /*
  * If arch_uprobe->insn doesn't use rip-relative addressing, return
  * immediately.  Otherwise, rewrite the instruction so that it accesses
include/linux/uprobes.h +3 -0
index f46e0ca0169c..b503fafb7fb3 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c
 extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
 					 void *src, unsigned long len);
+extern void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize);
+extern unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void);
 #else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */
 struct uprobes_state {
 };
kernel/events/uprobes.c +17 -7
index e4834d23e1d1..c550449d66be 100644
@@ -1474,11 +1474,20 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+void * __weak arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+	static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+
+	*psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+	return &insn;
+}
+
 static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+	unsigned long insns_size;
 	struct xol_area *area;
+	void *insns;
 
 	area = kmalloc(sizeof(*area), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(!area))
@@ -1502,7 +1511,8 @@ static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
 	/* Reserve the 1st slot for get_trampoline_vaddr() */
 	set_bit(0, area->bitmap);
 	atomic_set(&area->slot_count, 1);
-	arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, &insn, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE);
+	insns = arch_uprobe_trampoline(&insns_size);
+	arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, insns, insns_size);
 
 	if (!xol_add_vma(mm, area))
 		return area;
@@ -1827,7 +1837,7 @@ void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
  *
  * Returns -1 in case the xol_area is not allocated.
  */
-static unsigned long get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
+unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
 {
 	struct xol_area *area;
 	unsigned long trampoline_vaddr = -1;
@@ -1878,7 +1888,7 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (!ri)
 		return;
 
-	trampoline_vaddr = get_trampoline_vaddr();
+	trampoline_vaddr = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
 	orig_ret_vaddr = arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(trampoline_vaddr, regs);
 	if (orig_ret_vaddr == -1)
 		goto fail;
@@ -2123,7 +2133,7 @@ static struct return_instance *find_next_ret_chain(struct return_instance *ri)
 	return ri;
 }
 
-static void handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct uprobe_task *utask;
 	struct return_instance *ri, *next;
@@ -2187,8 +2197,8 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	int is_swbp;
 
 	bp_vaddr = uprobe_get_swbp_addr(regs);
-	if (bp_vaddr == get_trampoline_vaddr())
-		return handle_trampoline(regs);
+	if (bp_vaddr == uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr())
+		return uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
 
 	uprobe = find_active_uprobe(bp_vaddr, &is_swbp);
 	if (!uprobe) {
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author reviewer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/8 selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs integrity

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Add uretprobe syscall test that compares register values before and after the uretprobe is hit. It also compares the register values seen from attached bpf program.

---
 tools/include/linux/compiler.h                |   4 +
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 163 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c      |  15 ++
 3 files changed, 182 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c
tools/include/linux/compiler.h +4 -0
index 8a63a9913495..6f7f22ac9da5 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
 #define __nocf_check __attribute__((nocf_check))
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __naked
+#define __naked __attribute__((__naked__))
+#endif
+
 /* Are two types/vars the same type (ignoring qualifiers)? */
 #ifndef __same_type
 # define __same_type(a, b) __builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(a), typeof(b))
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c new file +163 -0

163 lines not on this page · raw message

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall.c new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a4fa6c7ef59
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct pt_regs regs;
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+SEC("uretprobe//proc/self/exe:uretprobe_regs_trigger")
+int uretprobe(struct pt_regs *ctx)
+{
+	__builtin_memcpy(&regs, ctx, sizeof(regs));
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author reviewer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v5 4/8 selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall test for regs changes

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding test that creates uprobe consumer on uretprobe which changes some of the registers. Making sure the changed registers are propagated to the user space when the ureptobe syscall trampoline is used on x86_64.

To be able to do this, adding support to bpf_testmod to create uprobe via new attribute file:
/sys/kernel/bpf_testmod_uprobe

This file is expecting file offset and creates related uprobe on current process exe file and removes existing uprobe if offset is 0. The can be only single uprobe at any time.

The uprobe has specific consumer that changes registers used in ureprobe syscall trampoline and which are later checked in the test.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c   | 123 +++++++++++++++++-
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c |  67 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_testmod/bpf_testmod.c +122 -1
index e93013fc7bf4..6c43d68fa323 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
 #include "bpf_testmod.h"
 #include "bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
 
@@ -355,6 +356,119 @@ static struct bin_attribute bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file __ro_after_init = {
 	.write = bpf_testmod_test_write,
 };
 
+/* bpf_testmod_uprobe sysfs attribute is so far enabled for x86_64 only,
+ * please see test_uretprobe_regs_change test
+ */
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+
+static int
+uprobe_ret_handler(struct uprobe_consumer *self, unsigned long func,
+		   struct pt_regs *regs)
+
+{
+	regs->ax  = 0x12345678deadbeef;
+	regs->cx  = 0x87654321feebdaed;
+	regs->r11 = (u64) -1;
+	return true;
+}
+
+struct testmod_uprobe {
+	struct path path;
+	loff_t offset;
+	struct uprobe_consumer consumer;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+static struct testmod_uprobe uprobe = {
+	.consumer.ret_handler = uprobe_ret_handler,
+};
+
+static int testmod_register_uprobe(loff_t offset)
+{
+	int err = -EBUSY;
+
+	if (uprobe.offset)
+		return -EBUSY;
+
+	mutex_lock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+	if (uprobe.offset)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = kern_path("/proc/self/exe", LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &uprobe.path);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = uprobe_register_refctr(d_real_inode(uprobe.path.dentry),
+				     offset, 0, &uprobe.consumer);
+	if (err)
+		path_put(&uprobe.path);
+	else
+		uprobe.offset = offset;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void testmod_unregister_uprobe(void)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+
+	if (uprobe.offset) {
+		uprobe_unregister(d_real_inode(uprobe.path.dentry),
+				  uprobe.offset, &uprobe.consumer);
+		uprobe.offset = 0;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&testmod_uprobe_mutex);
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+bpf_testmod_uprobe_write(struct file *file, struct kobject *kobj,
+			 struct bin_attribute *bin_attr,
+			 char *buf, loff_t off, size_t len)
+{
+	unsigned long offset;
+	int err;
+
+	if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &offset))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (offset)
+		err = testmod_register_uprobe(offset);
+	else
+		testmod_unregister_uprobe();
+
+	return err ?: strlen(buf);
+}
+
+static struct bin_attribute bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file __ro_after_init = {
+	.attr = { .name = "bpf_testmod_uprobe", .mode = 0666, },
+	.write = bpf_testmod_uprobe_write,
+};
+
+static int register_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+	return sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file);
+}
+
+static void unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+	testmod_unregister_uprobe();
+	sysfs_remove_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_uprobe_file);
+}
+
+#else
+static int register_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe(void) { }
+#endif
+
 BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_testmod_common_kfunc_ids)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_testmod_seq_new, KF_ITER_NEW)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL)
@@ -909,7 +1023,13 @@ static int bpf_testmod_init(void)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	sock = NULL;
 	mutex_init(&sock_lock);
-	return sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+	ret = sysfs_create_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = register_bpf_testmod_uprobe();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void bpf_testmod_exit(void)
@@ -924,6 +1044,7 @@ static void bpf_testmod_exit(void)
 
 	bpf_kfunc_close_sock();
 	sysfs_remove_bin_file(kernel_kobj, &bin_attr_bpf_testmod_file);
+	unregister_bpf_testmod_uprobe();
 }
 
 module_init(bpf_testmod_init);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c +67 -0

82 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
author reviewer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v5 5/8 selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding test to verify that when called from outside of the trampoline provided by kernel, the uretprobe syscall will cause calling process to receive SIGILL signal and the attached bpf program is not executed.

---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c       | 17 ++++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c +95 -0
index 1a50cd35205d..3ef324c2db50 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 #include "uprobe_syscall.skel.h"
+#include "uprobe_syscall_executed.skel.h"
 
 __naked unsigned long uretprobe_regs_trigger(void)
 {
@@ -209,6 +212,91 @@ static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifndef __NR_uretprobe
+#define __NR_uretprobe 462
+#endif
+
+__naked unsigned long uretprobe_syscall_call_1(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Pretend we are uretprobe trampoline to trigger the return
+	 * probe invocation in order to verify we get SIGILL.
+	 */
+	asm volatile (
+		"pushq %rax\n"
+		"pushq %rcx\n"
+		"pushq %r11\n"
+		"movq $" __stringify(__NR_uretprobe) ", %rax\n"
+		"syscall\n"
+		"popq %r11\n"
+		"popq %rcx\n"
+		"retq\n"
+	);
+}
+
+__naked unsigned long uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+	asm volatile (
+		"call uretprobe_syscall_call_1\n"
+		"retq\n"
+	);
+}
+
+static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_uprobe_multi_opts, opts,
+		.retprobe = true,
+	);
+	struct uprobe_syscall_executed *skel;
+	int pid, status, err, go[2], c;
+
+	if (ASSERT_OK(pipe(go), "pipe"))
+		return;
+
+	skel = uprobe_syscall_executed__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "uprobe_syscall_executed__open_and_load"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (!ASSERT_GE(pid, 0, "fork"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	/* child */
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		close(go[1]);
+
+		/* wait for parent's kick */
+		err = read(go[0], &c, 1);
+		if (err != 1)
+			exit(-1);
+
+		uretprobe_syscall_call();
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	skel->links.test = bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi(skel->progs.test, pid,
+							    "/proc/self/exe",
+							    "uretprobe_syscall_call", &opts);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel->links.test, "bpf_program__attach_uprobe_multi"))
+		goto cleanup;
+
+	/* kick the child */
+	write(go[1], &c, 1);
+	err = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(err, pid, "waitpid");
+
+	/* verify the child got killed with SIGILL */
+	ASSERT_EQ(WIFSIGNALED(status), 1, "WIFSIGNALED");
+	ASSERT_EQ(WTERMSIG(status), SIGILL, "WTERMSIG");
+
+	/* verify the uretprobe program wasn't called */
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->executed, 0, "executed");
+
+cleanup:
+	uprobe_syscall_executed__destroy(skel);
+	close(go[1]);
+	close(go[0]);
+}
 #else
 static void test_uretprobe_regs_equal(void)
 {
@@ -219,6 +307,11 @@ static void test_uretprobe_regs_change(void)
 {
 	test__skip();
 }
+
+static void test_uretprobe_syscall_call(void)
+{
+	test__skip();
+}
 #endif
 
 void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
@@ -227,4 +320,6 @@ void test_uprobe_syscall(void)
 		test_uretprobe_regs_equal();
 	if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_regs_change"))
 		test_uretprobe_regs_change();
+	if (test__start_subtest("uretprobe_syscall_call"))
+		test_uretprobe_syscall_call();
 }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c new file +17 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0d7f1a7db2e2
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct pt_regs regs;
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+int executed = 0;
+
+SEC("uretprobe.multi")
+int test(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	executed = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Acked-by on v5 5/8
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: Add uretprobe syscall call from user space test

Quoted 6 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding test to verify that when called from outside of the trampoline provided by kernel, the uretprobe syscall will cause calling process to receive SIGILL signal and the attached bpf program is not executed.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c | 95 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c       | 17 ++++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/uprobe_syscall_executed.c
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/uprobe_syscall.c +3 -0
index 1a50cd35205d..3ef324c2db50 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
 #include "uprobe_syscall.skel.h"
+#include "uprobe_syscall_executed.skel.h"
 

[...]

author reviewer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v5 6/8 x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding return uprobe support to work with enabled shadow stack.

Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update shadow stack accordingly.

Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe changes to user stack.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c      | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c    | 12 +++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +4 -0
index 42fee8959df7..2e1ddcf98242 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clon
 void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
 int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
+int shstk_push_frame(unsigned long val);
 #else
 static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 			       unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -31,6 +33,8 @@ static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p,
 static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
 static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
+static inline int shstk_push_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +29 -0
index 59e15dd8d0f8..66434dfde52e 100644
@@ -577,3 +577,32 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
 		return wrss_control(true);
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
+
+int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
+{
+	unsigned long ssp;
+
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
+}
+
+int shstk_push_frame(unsigned long val)
+{
+	unsigned long ssp;
+
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+	if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+	return 0;
+}
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +11 -1
index 81e6ee95784d..ae6c3458a675 100644
@@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
 	 * trampoline's ret instruction
 	 */
 	r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+
+	/* make the shadow stack follow that */
+	if (shstk_push_frame(regs->ip))
+		goto sigill;
+
 	regs->ip = ip;
 
 	err = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, r11_cx_ax, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
@@ -1191,8 +1196,13 @@ arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(unsigned long trampoline_vaddr, struct pt_regs
 		return orig_ret_vaddr;
 
 	nleft = copy_to_user((void __user *)regs->sp, &trampoline_vaddr, rasize);
-	if (likely(!nleft))
+	if (likely(!nleft)) {
+		if (shstk_update_last_frame(trampoline_vaddr)) {
+			force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+			return -1;
+		}
 		return orig_ret_vaddr;
+	}
 
 	if (nleft != rasize) {
 		pr_err("return address clobbered: pid=%d, %%sp=%#lx, %%ip=%#lx\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 14 lines · Jiri Olsa
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +5 -0
index 81e6ee95784d..ae6c3458a675 100644
@@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
          * trampoline's ret instruction
          */
         r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+
+       /* make the shadow stack follow that */
+       if (shstk_push_frame(regs->ip))
+               goto sigill;
+
         regs->ip = ip;
Quoted 1 line

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use, which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or is it strictly a debug-time thing?

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 13 lines · Rick P
Quoted 12 lines · Jiri Olsa
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +4 -0
index 81e6ee95784d..ae6c3458a675 100644
@@ -406,6 +406,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
          * trampoline's ret instruction
          */
         r11_cx_ax[2] = regs->ip;
+
+       /* make the shadow stack follow that */
+       if (shstk_push_frame(regs->ip))
+               goto sigill;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +1 -0
+
         regs->ip = ip;

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use, which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or is it strictly a debug-time thing?

sorry, I don't have that level of detail, but we do have customers that use uprobes in general or want to use it and complain about the speed

there are several tools in bcc [1] that use uretprobes in scripts, like:
memleak, sslsniff, trace, bashreadline, gethostlatency, argdist, funclatency

jirka

[1] https://github.com/iovisor/bcc

#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 7 lines

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use,
which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are
uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or
is it strictly a debug-time thing?

Quoted 8 lines

sorry, I don't have that level of detail, but we do have customers that use uprobes in general or want to use it and complain about the speed

there are several tools in bcc [1] that use uretprobes in scripts, like:
  memleak, sslsniff, trace, bashreadline, gethostlatency, argdist, funclatency

Is it possible to have shadow stack only use the non-syscall solution? It seems it exposes a more limited compatibility in that it only allows writing the specific trampoline address. (IIRC) Then shadow stack users could still use uretprobes, but just not the new optimized solution. There are already operations that are slower with shadow stack, like longjmp(), so this could be ok maybe.

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 18 lines · Rick P
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 7 lines

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use,
which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are
uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or
is it strictly a debug-time thing?

Quoted 8 lines

sorry, I don't have that level of detail, but we do have customers that use uprobes in general or want to use it and complain about the speed

there are several tools in bcc [1] that use uretprobes in scripts, like:
  memleak, sslsniff, trace, bashreadline, gethostlatency, argdist, funclatency

Quoted 6 lines

Is it possible to have shadow stack only use the non-syscall solution? It seems it exposes a more limited compatibility in that it only allows writing the specific trampoline address. (IIRC) Then shadow stack users could still use uretprobes, but just not the new optimized solution. There are already operations that are slower with shadow stack, like longjmp(), so this could be ok maybe.

I guess it's doable, we'd need to keep both trampolines around, because shadow stack is enabled by app dynamically and use one based on the state of shadow stack when uretprobe is installed

so you're worried the optimized syscall path could be somehow exploited to add data on shadow stack?

jirka

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 26 lines · On Sat, 11 May 2024 15:09:48 -0600 Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 18 lines · Rick P
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 7 lines

Per the earlier discussion, this cannot be reached unless uretprobes are in use,
which cannot happen without something with privileges taking an action. But are
uretprobes ever used for monitoring applications where security is important? Or
is it strictly a debug-time thing?

Quoted 8 lines

sorry, I don't have that level of detail, but we do have customers that use uprobes in general or want to use it and complain about the speed

there are several tools in bcc [1] that use uretprobes in scripts, like:
  memleak, sslsniff, trace, bashreadline, gethostlatency, argdist, funclatency

Quoted 6 lines

Is it possible to have shadow stack only use the non-syscall solution? It seems it exposes a more limited compatibility in that it only allows writing the specific trampoline address. (IIRC) Then shadow stack users could still use uretprobes, but just not the new optimized solution. There are already operations that are slower with shadow stack, like longjmp(), so this could be ok maybe.

Quoted 6 lines

I guess it's doable, we'd need to keep both trampolines around, because shadow stack is enabled by app dynamically and use one based on the state of shadow stack when uretprobe is installed

so you're worried the optimized syscall path could be somehow exploited to add data on shadow stack?

Good point. For the security concerning (e.g. leaking sensitive information from secure process which uses shadow stack), we need another limitation which prohibits probing such process even for debugging. But I think that needs another series of patches. We also need to discuss when it should be prohibited and how (e.g. audit interface? SELinux?).
But I think this series is just optimizing currently available uprobes with a new syscall. I don't think it changes such security concerning.

Thank you,

Quoted 2 lines

jirka

Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 6 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 6 lines

I guess it's doable, we'd need to keep both trampolines around, because shadow stack is enabled by app dynamically and use one based on the state of shadow stack when uretprobe is installed

so you're worried the optimized syscall path could be somehow exploited to add data on shadow stack?

Shadow stack allows for modification to the shadow stack only through a few limited ways (call, ret, etc). The kernel has the ability to write through shadow stack protections (for example when pushing and popping signal frames), but the ways in which it does this are limited in order to try to prevent providing extra capabilities to attackers wanting to craft their own shadow stacks.

But the HW features have optional abilities to allow extra patterns of shadow stack modification for userspace as well. This can facilitate unusual patterns of stack modification (like in this series). For, x86 there is the ability to allow an instruction (called WRSS) such that userspace can also write arbitrary data to the shadow stack. Arm has something likes that, plus an instruction to push to the shadow stack.

There was some debate about whether to use these features, as glibc could not perfectly match compatibility for features that play with the stack like longjmp(). As in, without using those extra HW capabilities, some apps would require modifications to work with shadow stack.

There has been a lot of design tension between security, performance and compatibility in figuring out how to fit this feature into existing software. In the end the consensus was to not use these extra HW capabilities, and lean towards security in the implementation. To try to summarize the debate, this was because we could get pretty close to compatibility without enabling these extra features.

So since this solution does something like enabling these extra capabilities in software that were purposely disabled in HW, it raises eyebrows. Glibc has some operations that now have extra steps because of shadow stack. So if we could do something that was still functional, but slower and more secure, then it seems roughly in line with the tradeoffs we have gone with so far.

But shadow stack is not in widespread use yet, so whether we have the final tradeoffs settled is still open I think. For example, other libcs have expressed interest in using WRSS.

I'm also not clear on the typical use of uretprobes (debugging vs production). And whether shadow stack + debugging + production will happen seems pretty unknown.

Quoted 8 lines

Good point. For the security concerning (e.g. leaking sensitive information from secure process which uses shadow stack), we need another limitation which prohibits probing such process even for debugging. But I think that needs another series of patches. We also need to discuss when it should be prohibited and how (e.g. audit interface? SELinux?).
But I think this series is just optimizing currently available uprobes with a new syscall. I don't think it changes such security concerning.

Patch 6 adds support for shadow stack for uretprobes. Currently there is no support.

Peterz had asked that the new solution consider shadow stack support, so I think that is how this series grew kind of two goals: new faster uretprobes and initial shadow stack support.

#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 34 lines · Rick P
Quoted 6 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 6 lines

I guess it's doable, we'd need to keep both trampolines around, because shadow stack is enabled by app dynamically and use one based on the state of shadow stack when uretprobe is installed

so you're worried the optimized syscall path could be somehow exploited to add data on shadow stack?

Shadow stack allows for modification to the shadow stack only through a few limited ways (call, ret, etc). The kernel has the ability to write through shadow stack protections (for example when pushing and popping signal frames), but the ways in which it does this are limited in order to try to prevent providing extra capabilities to attackers wanting to craft their own shadow stacks.

But the HW features have optional abilities to allow extra patterns of shadow stack modification for userspace as well. This can facilitate unusual patterns of stack modification (like in this series). For, x86 there is the ability to allow an instruction (called WRSS) such that userspace can also write arbitrary data to the shadow stack. Arm has something likes that, plus an instruction to push to the shadow stack.

There was some debate about whether to use these features, as glibc could not perfectly match compatibility for features that play with the stack like longjmp(). As in, without using those extra HW capabilities, some apps would require modifications to work with shadow stack.

There has been a lot of design tension between security, performance and compatibility in figuring out how to fit this feature into existing software. In the end the consensus was to not use these extra HW capabilities, and lean towards security in the implementation. To try to summarize the debate, this was because we could get pretty close to compatibility without enabling these extra features.

Quoted 5 lines

So since this solution does something like enabling these extra capabilities in software that were purposely disabled in HW, it raises eyebrows. Glibc has some operations that now have extra steps because of shadow stack. So if we could do something that was still functional, but slower and more secure, then it seems roughly in line with the tradeoffs we have gone with so far.

so at the moment the patch 6 changes shadow stack for

1) current uretprobe which are not working at the moment and we change the top value of shadow stack with shstk_push_frame
2) optimized uretprobe which needs to push new frame on shadow stack with shstk_update_last_frame

I think we should do 1) and have current uretprobe working with shadow stack, which is broken at the moment

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

would this work for you?

thanks,
jirka

Quoted 26 lines

But shadow stack is not in widespread use yet, so whether we have the final tradeoffs settled is still open I think. For example, other libcs have expressed interest in using WRSS.

I'm also not clear on the typical use of uretprobes (debugging vs production). And whether shadow stack + debugging + production will happen seems pretty unknown.

Quoted 8 lines

Good point. For the security concerning (e.g. leaking sensitive information from secure process which uses shadow stack), we need another limitation which prohibits probing such process even for debugging. But I think that needs another series of patches. We also need to discuss when it should be prohibited and how (e.g. audit interface? SELinux?).
But I think this series is just optimizing currently available uprobes with a new syscall. I don't think it changes such security concerning.

Patch 6 adds support for shadow stack for uretprobes. Currently there is no support.

Peterz had asked that the new solution consider shadow stack support, so I think that is how this series grew kind of two goals: new faster uretprobes and initial shadow stack support.

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Olsa

so at the moment the patch 6 changes shadow stack for

1) current uretprobe which are not working at the moment and we change the top value of shadow stack with shstk_push_frame
2) optimized uretprobe which needs to push new frame on shadow stack with shstk_update_last_frame

Quoted 7 lines

I think we should do 1) and have current uretprobe working with shadow stack, which is broken at the moment

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

would this work for you?

Sorry for the delay. It seems reasonable to me due to 1 being at a fixed address where 2 was arbitrary address. But Peterz might have felt the opposite earlier. Not sure.

I'd also love to get some second opinions from broonie (arm shadow stack) and Deepak (riscv shadow stack).

Deepak, even if riscv has a special instruction that pushes to the shadow stack, will it be ok if there is a callable operation that does the same thing? Like, aren't you relying on endbranches or the compiler or something such that arbitrary data can't be pushed via that instruction?

BTW Jiri, thanks for considering shadow stack in your work.

#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 20 lines · Rick P
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Olsa

so at the moment the patch 6 changes shadow stack for

1) current uretprobe which are not working at the moment and we change the top value of shadow stack with shstk_push_frame
2) optimized uretprobe which needs to push new frame on shadow stack with shstk_update_last_frame

Quoted 7 lines

I think we should do 1) and have current uretprobe working with shadow stack, which is broken at the moment

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

would this work for you?

Sorry for the delay. It seems reasonable to me due to 1 being at a fixed address where 2 was arbitrary address. But Peterz might have felt the opposite earlier. Not sure.

Quoted 7 lines

I'd also love to get some second opinions from broonie (arm shadow stack) and Deepak (riscv shadow stack).

Deepak, even if riscv has a special instruction that pushes to the shadow stack, will it be ok if there is a callable operation that does the same thing? Like, aren't you relying on endbranches or the compiler or something such that arbitrary data can't be pushed via that instruction?

Instruction is sspush x1/ra. It pushes contents of register return address (ra also called x1) onto shadow stack. ra is like arm's equivalent of link register. Prologue of function is supposed to have sspush x1 to save it away.
ISA doesn't allow encodings with register in risc-v GPRs (except register x5
because some embedded riscv space toolchains have used x5 as ra too).

On question of callable operation, I think still need to fully understand who manages the probe and forward progress.

Question,

Is it kernel who is maintaining all return probes, meaning original return addresses are saved in kernel data structures on per task basis. Once uretprobe did its job then its kernel who is ensuring return to original return address ?

Quoted 2 lines

BTW Jiri, thanks for considering shadow stack in your work.

maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Sorry for the late reply, I was on PTO.

Quoted 5 lines · Deepak Gupta

Question,

Is it kernel who is maintaining all return probes, meaning original return addresses are saved in kernel data structures on per task basis.

Yes. task_struct->utask->return_instances

See prepare_uretprobe() which inserts the new return_instance with ->orig_ret_vaddr = original return addresses
when the tracee enters the ret-probed function.

Quoted 2 lines

Once uretprobe did its job then
its kernel who is ensuring return to original return address ?

Yes. See instruction_pointer_set(regs, ri->orig_ret_vaddr) in handle_trampoline().

I know absolutely nothing about the shadow stacks, trying to read Documentation/arch/x86/shstk.rst but it doesn't tell me too much... Where can I find more documentation? I didn't try to google yet.

Upon function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. If the two differ, the processor raises a control-protection fault.

grep-grep-grep... exc_control_protection I guess.

Let me ask a couple of really stupid questions. What if the shadow stack is "shorter" than the normal stack? I mean,

	enable_shstk()
	{
		prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
	}

what happens when enable_shstk() returns?

And what is the purpose of fpregs_lock_and_load() ? Why do we need to fpregs_restore_userregs() in shstk_setup() and other places?

Oleg.

#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 36 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Sorry for the late reply, I was on PTO.

Quoted 5 lines · Deepak Gupta

Question,

Is it kernel who is maintaining all return probes, meaning original return addresses are saved in kernel data structures on per task basis.

Yes. task_struct->utask->return_instances

See prepare_uretprobe() which inserts the new return_instance with ->orig_ret_vaddr = original return addresses
when the tracee enters the ret-probed function.

Quoted 2 lines

Once uretprobe did its job then
its kernel who is ensuring return to original return address ?

Yes. See instruction_pointer_set(regs, ri->orig_ret_vaddr) in handle_trampoline().

I know absolutely nothing about the shadow stacks, trying to read Documentation/arch/x86/shstk.rst but it doesn't tell me too much... Where can I find more documentation? I didn't try to google yet.

Upon function return, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. If the two differ, the processor raises a control-protection fault.

grep-grep-grep... exc_control_protection I guess.

Let me ask a couple of really stupid questions. What if the shadow stack is "shorter" than the normal stack? I mean,

Quoted 6 lines
	enable_shstk()
	{
		prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
	}

what happens when enable_shstk() returns?

I think it will crash, there's explanation in the comment in tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c test

that's why ARCH_PRCTL is using syscall instruction directly and not calling syscall function

jirka

Quoted 5 lines

And what is the purpose of fpregs_lock_and_load() ? Why do we need to fpregs_restore_userregs() in shstk_setup() and other places?

Oleg.

#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 3 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 3 lines

Let me ask a couple of really stupid questions. What if the shadow stack is "shorter" than the normal stack? I mean,

The shadow stack could overflow if it is not big enough. However since the normal stack has return addresses and data, and shadow stack has the smaller amount data of only return addresses, we can mostly avoid this by picking a large size for the shadow stack.

For underflow, you can't return from the point where you enable shadow stack. Almost all uses will enable it very early. Glibc loader does it before main is reached, for example. The shadow stack selftest is not a typical usage in this respect.

maintainer
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

In reply to Jiri Olsa
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 6 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Let me ask a couple of really stupid questions. What if the shadow stack is "shorter" than the normal stack? I mean,

	enable_shstk()
	{
		prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);

I meant ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, of course

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
	}

what happens when enable_shstk() returns?

I think it will crash, there's explanation in the comment in tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c test

OK, thanks...

But test_shadow_stack.c doesn't do ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE) if all the tests succeed ? Confused but nevermind.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines

And what is the purpose of fpregs_lock_and_load() ? Why do we need to fpregs_restore_userregs() in shstk_setup() and other places?

Oleg.

#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 7 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 2 lines

I think it will crash, there's explanation in the comment in tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c test

OK, thanks...

But test_shadow_stack.c doesn't do ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE) if all the tests succeed ? Confused but nevermind.

The last test disables shadow stack as part of the test. So if it succeeds it doesn't need to disable the shadow stack to prevent underflow.

maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Let me repeat I know nothing about shadow stacks, only tried to read Documentation/arch/x86/shstk.rst few minutes ago ;)

Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa

1) current uretprobe which are not working at the moment and we change the top value of shadow stack with shstk_push_frame
2) optimized uretprobe which needs to push new frame on shadow stack with shstk_update_last_frame

I think we should do 1) and have current uretprobe working with shadow stack, which is broken at the moment

Agreed,

Quoted 2 lines

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

But how can we detect it? Again, suppose userspace does

	enable_shstk()
	{
		prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
	}

what if enable_shstk() is ret-probed ?

Oleg.

#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 13 lines · Oleg Nesterov

Let me repeat I know nothing about shadow stacks, only tried to read Documentation/arch/x86/shstk.rst few minutes ago ;)

Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa

1) current uretprobe which are not working at the moment and we change the top value of shadow stack with shstk_push_frame
2) optimized uretprobe which needs to push new frame on shadow stack with shstk_update_last_frame

I think we should do 1) and have current uretprobe working with shadow stack, which is broken at the moment

Quoted 6 lines

Agreed,

Quoted 2 lines

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

But how can we detect it? Again, suppose userspace does

the rdssp instruction returns the value of the shadow stack pointer. On non- shadow stack it is a nop. So you could check if the SSP is non-zero to find if shadow stack is enabled. This would catch most cases, but I guess there is the possibility of it getting enabled in a signal that hit between checking and the rest of operation. Is this uretprobe stuff signal safe in general?

maintainer
#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 11 lines · Rick P
Quoted 5 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 3 lines

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

But how can we detect it? Again, suppose userspace does

the rdssp instruction returns the value of the shadow stack pointer. On non- shadow stack it is a nop. So you could check if the SSP is non-zero to find if shadow stack is enabled.

But again, the ret-probed function can enable it before it returns? And we need to check if it is enabled on the function entry if we want to avoid sys_uretprobe() in this case. Although I don't understand why we want to avoid it.

Quoted 3 lines

This would catch most cases, but I guess there is the
possibility of it getting enabled in a signal that hit between checking and the rest of operation.

Or from signal handler.

Quoted 1 line

Is this uretprobe stuff signal safe in general?

In what sense?

I forgot everything about this code but I can't recall any problem with signals.

Except it doesn't support sigaltstack() + siglongjmp().

Oleg.

#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 9 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 8 lines · Rick P
Quoted 5 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 3 lines

I'm ok with not using optimized uretprobe when shadow stack is detected as enabled and we go with current uretprobe in that case

But how can we detect it? Again, suppose userspace does

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

the rdssp instruction returns the value of the shadow stack pointer. On non- shadow stack it is a nop. So you could check if the SSP is non-zero to find if shadow stack is enabled.

But again, the ret-probed function can enable it before it returns? And we need to check if it is enabled on the function entry if we want to avoid sys_uretprobe() in this case.

yea, that's another complexity

Quoted 2 lines

Although I don't understand why we want to
avoid it.

AFAIU the problem is that by using uretprobe syscall we make the kernel to push data on shadow stack [1], which adds another way to modify shadow stack as pointed out by Rick in here [2]:

Quoted 6 lines

Shadow stack allows for modification to the shadow stack only through a few limited ways (call, ret, etc). The kernel has the ability to write through shadow stack protections (for example when pushing and popping signal frames), but the ways in which it does this are limited in order to try to prevent providing extra capabilities to attackers wanting to craft their own shadow stacks.

anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized trampoline, but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected (as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).

we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care

basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):

	if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
		return regs->ax;

I'm testing patch below and it looks good so far, I'll add test code to run existing tests on top of shadow stack as well (when detected).

I'll send new version with that

jirka

---

arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +2 -0
index 896909f306e3..4cb77e004615 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
 int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig);
 int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void);
 int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val);
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void);
 #else
 static inline long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
 			       unsigned long arg2) { return -EINVAL; }
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig) { return 0; }
 static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void) { return 0; }
 static inline int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val) { return 0; }
+static inline bool shstk_is_enabled(void) { return false; }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +5 -0
index 9797d4cdb78a..059685612362 100644
@@ -588,3 +588,8 @@ int shstk_update_last_frame(unsigned long val)
 	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
 	return write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)val);
 }
+
+bool shstk_is_enabled(void)
+{
+	return features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+}
arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +117 -0

129 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/uprobes.h +3 -0
index f46e0ca0169c..b503fafb7fb3 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c
 extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr,
 					 void *src, unsigned long len);
+extern void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs);
+extern void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize);
+extern unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void);
 #else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */
 struct uprobes_state {
 };
kernel/events/uprobes.c +17 -7
index 2c83ba776fc7..2816e65729ac 100644
@@ -1474,11 +1474,20 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+void * __weak arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
+{
+	static uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+
+	*psize = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE;
+	return &insn;
+}
+
 static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	uprobe_opcode_t insn = UPROBE_SWBP_INSN;
+	unsigned long insns_size;
 	struct xol_area *area;
+	void *insns;
 
 	area = kmalloc(sizeof(*area), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (unlikely(!area))
@@ -1502,7 +1511,8 @@ static struct xol_area *__create_xol_area(unsigned long vaddr)
 	/* Reserve the 1st slot for get_trampoline_vaddr() */
 	set_bit(0, area->bitmap);
 	atomic_set(&area->slot_count, 1);
-	arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, &insn, UPROBE_SWBP_INSN_SIZE);
+	insns = arch_uprobe_trampoline(&insns_size);
+	arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(area->pages[0], 0, insns, insns_size);
 
 	if (!xol_add_vma(mm, area))
 		return area;
@@ -1827,7 +1837,7 @@ void uprobe_copy_process(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long flags)
  *
  * Returns -1 in case the xol_area is not allocated.
  */
-static unsigned long get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
+unsigned long uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr(void)
 {
 	struct xol_area *area;
 	unsigned long trampoline_vaddr = -1;
@@ -1878,7 +1888,7 @@ static void prepare_uretprobe(struct uprobe *uprobe, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (!ri)
 		return;
 
-	trampoline_vaddr = get_trampoline_vaddr();
+	trampoline_vaddr = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
 	orig_ret_vaddr = arch_uretprobe_hijack_return_addr(trampoline_vaddr, regs);
 	if (orig_ret_vaddr == -1)
 		goto fail;
@@ -2123,7 +2133,7 @@ static struct return_instance *find_next_ret_chain(struct return_instance *ri)
 	return ri;
 }
 
-static void handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
+void uprobe_handle_trampoline(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct uprobe_task *utask;
 	struct return_instance *ri, *next;
@@ -2187,8 +2197,8 @@ static void handle_swbp(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	int is_swbp;
 
 	bp_vaddr = uprobe_get_swbp_addr(regs);
-	if (bp_vaddr == get_trampoline_vaddr())
-		return handle_trampoline(regs);
+	if (bp_vaddr == uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr())
+		return uprobe_handle_trampoline(regs);
 
 	uprobe = find_active_uprobe(bp_vaddr, &is_swbp);
 	if (!uprobe) {
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Olsa

anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized trampoline,
but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected (as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).

we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care

Quoted 5 lines

basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):

        if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
                return regs->ax;

On the surface it sounds reasonable. Thanks.

And then I guess if tradeoffs are seen differently in the future, and we want to enable the fast path for shadow stack we can go with your other solution. So this just simply fixes things functionally without much code.

#27 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 6/8] x86/shstk: Add return uprobe support

Quoted 13 lines · Rick P
Quoted 12 lines · Jiri Olsa

anyway I think we can fix that in another way by using the optimized trampoline,
but returning to the user space through iret when shadow stack is detected (as I did in the first version, before you adjusted it to the sysret path).

we need to update the return address on stack only when returning through the trampoline, but we can jump to original return address directly from syscall through iret.. which is slower, but with shadow stack we don't care

basically the only change is adding the shstk_is_enabled check to the following condition in SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe):

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

        if (regs->sp != sp || shstk_is_enabled())
                return regs->ax;

On the surface it sounds reasonable. Thanks.

And then I guess if tradeoffs are seen differently in the future, and we want to enable the fast path for shadow stack we can go with your other solution. So this just simply fixes things functionally without much code.

yes, if we want to enable the fast path for shadow stack in future we'll need to remove that shstk_is_enabled and push extra frame on shadow stack

jirka

author reviewer
#28 lore raw

PATCH v5 7/8 selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding return uprobe test for shadow stack and making sure it's working properly. Borrowed some of the code from bpf selftests.

---
 .../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c +142 -0
index 757e6527f67e..1b919baa999b 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include <sys/signal.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
 
 /*
  * Define the ABI defines if needed, so people can run the tests
@@ -681,6 +682,141 @@ int test_32bit(void)
 	return !segv_triggered;
 }
 
+static int parse_uint_from_file(const char *file, const char *fmt)
+{
+	int err, ret;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen(file, "re");
+	if (!f) {
+		err = -errno;
+		printf("failed to open '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+	err = fscanf(f, fmt, &ret);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		err = err == EOF ? -EIO : -errno;
+		printf("failed to parse '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		fclose(f);
+		return err;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_perf_type(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/type";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "%d\n");
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/format/retprobe";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "config:%d\n");
+}
+
+static ssize_t get_uprobe_offset(const void *addr)
+{
+	size_t start, end, base;
+	char buf[256];
+	bool found = false;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return -errno;
+
+	while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%zx %s %zx %*[^\n]\n", &start, &end, buf, &base) == 4) {
+		if (buf[2] == 'x' && (uintptr_t)addr >= start && (uintptr_t)addr < end) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+
+	if (!found)
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	return (uintptr_t)addr - start + base;
+}
+
+static __attribute__((noinline)) void uretprobe_trigger(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test setups return uprobe, which is sensitive to shadow stack
+ * (crashes without extra fix). After executing the uretprobe we fail
+ * the test if we receive SIGSEGV, no crash means we're good.
+ *
+ * Helper functions above borrowed from bpf selftests.
+ */
+static int test_uretprobe(void)
+{
+	const size_t attr_sz = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr);
+	const char *file = "/proc/self/exe";
+	int bit, fd = 0, type, err = 1;
+	struct perf_event_attr attr;
+	struct sigaction sa = {};
+	ssize_t offset;
+
+	type = determine_uprobe_perf_type();
+	if (type < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	offset = get_uprobe_offset(uretprobe_trigger);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	bit = determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit();
+	if (bit < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	sa.sa_sigaction = segv_gp_handler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+	if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Setup return uprobe through perf event interface. */
+	memset(&attr, 0, attr_sz);
+	attr.size = attr_sz;
+	attr.type = type;
+	attr.config = 1 << bit;
+	attr.config1 = (__u64) (unsigned long) file;
+	attr.config2 = offset;
+
+	fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0 /* pid */, -1 /* cpu */,
+		     -1 /* group_fd */, PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmp_buffer, 1))
+		goto out;
+
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+
+	/*
+	 * This either segfaults and goes through sigsetjmp above
+	 * or succeeds and we're good.
+	 */
+	uretprobe_trigger();
+
+	printf("[OK]\tUretprobe test\n");
+	err = 0;
+
+out:
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+	signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+	if (fd)
+		close(fd);
+	return err;
+}
+
 void segv_handler_ptrace(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
 {
 	/* The SSP adjustment caused a segfault. */
@@ -867,6 +1003,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (test_uretprobe()) {
+		ret = 1;
+		printf("[FAIL]\turetprobe test\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 7/8] selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test

Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, 7 May 2024 12:53:20 +0200 Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> wrote:

Adding return uprobe test for shadow stack and making sure it's working properly. Borrowed some of the code from bpf selftests.

Hi Jiri,

I can not find "SKIP" result in this change. If CONFIG_UPROBES=n, this should skip uprobe test.

Thank you,

Quoted 176 lines
---
 .../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c +142 -0
index 757e6527f67e..1b919baa999b 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include <sys/signal.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
 
 /*
  * Define the ABI defines if needed, so people can run the tests
@@ -681,6 +682,141 @@ int test_32bit(void)
 	return !segv_triggered;
 }
 
+static int parse_uint_from_file(const char *file, const char *fmt)
+{
+	int err, ret;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen(file, "re");
+	if (!f) {
+		err = -errno;
+		printf("failed to open '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+	err = fscanf(f, fmt, &ret);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		err = err == EOF ? -EIO : -errno;
+		printf("failed to parse '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		fclose(f);
+		return err;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_perf_type(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/type";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "%d\n");
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/format/retprobe";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "config:%d\n");
+}
+
+static ssize_t get_uprobe_offset(const void *addr)
+{
+	size_t start, end, base;
+	char buf[256];
+	bool found = false;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return -errno;
+
+	while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%zx %s %zx %*[^\n]\n", &start, &end, buf, &base) == 4) {
+		if (buf[2] == 'x' && (uintptr_t)addr >= start && (uintptr_t)addr < end) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+
+	if (!found)
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	return (uintptr_t)addr - start + base;
+}
+
+static __attribute__((noinline)) void uretprobe_trigger(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test setups return uprobe, which is sensitive to shadow stack
+ * (crashes without extra fix). After executing the uretprobe we fail
+ * the test if we receive SIGSEGV, no crash means we're good.
+ *
+ * Helper functions above borrowed from bpf selftests.
+ */
+static int test_uretprobe(void)
+{
+	const size_t attr_sz = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr);
+	const char *file = "/proc/self/exe";
+	int bit, fd = 0, type, err = 1;
+	struct perf_event_attr attr;
+	struct sigaction sa = {};
+	ssize_t offset;
+
+	type = determine_uprobe_perf_type();
+	if (type < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	offset = get_uprobe_offset(uretprobe_trigger);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	bit = determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit();
+	if (bit < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	sa.sa_sigaction = segv_gp_handler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+	if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Setup return uprobe through perf event interface. */
+	memset(&attr, 0, attr_sz);
+	attr.size = attr_sz;
+	attr.type = type;
+	attr.config = 1 << bit;
+	attr.config1 = (__u64) (unsigned long) file;
+	attr.config2 = offset;
+
+	fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0 /* pid */, -1 /* cpu */,
+		     -1 /* group_fd */, PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmp_buffer, 1))
+		goto out;
+
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+
+	/*
+	 * This either segfaults and goes through sigsetjmp above
+	 * or succeeds and we're good.
+	 */
+	uretprobe_trigger();
+
+	printf("[OK]\tUretprobe test\n");
+	err = 0;
+
+out:
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+	signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+	if (fd)
+		close(fd);
+	return err;
+}
+
 void segv_handler_ptrace(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
 {
 	/* The SSP adjustment caused a segfault. */
@@ -867,6 +1003,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (test_uretprobe()) {
+		ret = 1;
+		printf("[FAIL]\turetprobe test\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 bpf-next 7/8] selftests/x86: Add return uprobe shadow stack test

Quoted 10 lines · Masami Hiramatsu
Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, 7 May 2024 12:53:20 +0200 Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> wrote:

Adding return uprobe test for shadow stack and making sure it's working properly. Borrowed some of the code from bpf selftests.

Hi Jiri,

I can not find "SKIP" result in this change. If CONFIG_UPROBES=n, this should skip uprobe test.

ah it should be detected by parse_uint_from_file returning ENOENT or something like that.. will add that

thanks,
jirka

Quoted 183 lines

Thank you,

Quoted 176 lines
---
 .../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c +142 -0
index 757e6527f67e..1b919baa999b 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <sys/ptrace.h>
 #include <sys/signal.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
 
 /*
  * Define the ABI defines if needed, so people can run the tests
@@ -681,6 +682,141 @@ int test_32bit(void)
 	return !segv_triggered;
 }
 
+static int parse_uint_from_file(const char *file, const char *fmt)
+{
+	int err, ret;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen(file, "re");
+	if (!f) {
+		err = -errno;
+		printf("failed to open '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+	err = fscanf(f, fmt, &ret);
+	if (err != 1) {
+		err = err == EOF ? -EIO : -errno;
+		printf("failed to parse '%s': %d\n", file, err);
+		fclose(f);
+		return err;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_perf_type(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/type";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "%d\n");
+}
+
+static int determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit(void)
+{
+	const char *file = "/sys/bus/event_source/devices/uprobe/format/retprobe";
+
+	return parse_uint_from_file(file, "config:%d\n");
+}
+
+static ssize_t get_uprobe_offset(const void *addr)
+{
+	size_t start, end, base;
+	char buf[256];
+	bool found = false;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return -errno;
+
+	while (fscanf(f, "%zx-%zx %s %zx %*[^\n]\n", &start, &end, buf, &base) == 4) {
+		if (buf[2] == 'x' && (uintptr_t)addr >= start && (uintptr_t)addr < end) {
+			found = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+
+	if (!found)
+		return -ESRCH;
+
+	return (uintptr_t)addr - start + base;
+}
+
+static __attribute__((noinline)) void uretprobe_trigger(void)
+{
+	asm volatile ("");
+}
+
+/*
+ * This test setups return uprobe, which is sensitive to shadow stack
+ * (crashes without extra fix). After executing the uretprobe we fail
+ * the test if we receive SIGSEGV, no crash means we're good.
+ *
+ * Helper functions above borrowed from bpf selftests.
+ */
+static int test_uretprobe(void)
+{
+	const size_t attr_sz = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr);
+	const char *file = "/proc/self/exe";
+	int bit, fd = 0, type, err = 1;
+	struct perf_event_attr attr;
+	struct sigaction sa = {};
+	ssize_t offset;
+
+	type = determine_uprobe_perf_type();
+	if (type < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	offset = get_uprobe_offset(uretprobe_trigger);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	bit = determine_uprobe_retprobe_bit();
+	if (bit < 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	sa.sa_sigaction = segv_gp_handler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+	if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL))
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Setup return uprobe through perf event interface. */
+	memset(&attr, 0, attr_sz);
+	attr.size = attr_sz;
+	attr.type = type;
+	attr.config = 1 << bit;
+	attr.config1 = (__u64) (unsigned long) file;
+	attr.config2 = offset;
+
+	fd = syscall(__NR_perf_event_open, &attr, 0 /* pid */, -1 /* cpu */,
+		     -1 /* group_fd */, PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmp_buffer, 1))
+		goto out;
+
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+
+	/*
+	 * This either segfaults and goes through sigsetjmp above
+	 * or succeeds and we're good.
+	 */
+	uretprobe_trigger();
+
+	printf("[OK]\tUretprobe test\n");
+	err = 0;
+
+out:
+	ARCH_PRCTL(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+	signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+	if (fd)
+		close(fd);
+	return err;
+}
+
 void segv_handler_ptrace(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc)
 {
 	/* The SSP adjustment caused a segfault. */
@@ -867,6 +1003,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 		goto out;
 	}
 
+	if (test_uretprobe()) {
+		ret = 1;
+		printf("[FAIL]\turetprobe test\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	return ret;
 
 out:
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
Signature · 1 line
Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>
author reviewer
#31 lore raw

PATCH v5 8/8 man2: Add uretprobe syscall page

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.

---
 man2/uretprobe.2 | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 man2/uretprobe.2
man2/uretprobe.2 new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..690fe3b1a44f
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+.\" Copyright (C) 2024, Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
+.\"
+.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: Linux-man-pages-copyleft
+.\"
+.TH uretprobe 2 (date) "Linux man-pages (unreleased)"
+.SH NAME
+uretprobe \- execute pending return uprobes
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.nf
+.B int uretprobe(void)
+.fi
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall is an alternative to breakpoint instructions for
+triggering return uprobe consumers.
+.P
+Calls to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.
+Calls from any other place result in a
+.BR SIGILL .
+
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall return value is architecture-specific.
+
+.SH VERSIONS
+This syscall is not specified in POSIX,
+and details of its behavior vary across systems.
+.SH STANDARDS
+None.
+.SH HISTORY
+TBD
+.SH NOTES
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall was initially introduced for the x86_64 architecture where it was shown
+to be faster than breakpoint traps. It might be extended to other architectures.
+.P
+The
+.BR uretprobe ()
+syscall exists only to allow the invocation of return uprobe consumers.
+It should
+.B never
+be called directly.
+Details of the arguments (if any) passed to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+and the return value are architecture-specific.
Signature · 1 line
2.44.0
#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 8/8] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page

Quoted 1 line · Jiri Olsa

Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.

[...]

man2/uretprobe.2 line 20

Quoted 4 lines

+.P

man2/uretprobe.2 new file +3 -0
+Calls to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.

typo: suscall

Signature · 1 line
ldv
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 8/8] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page

Quoted 9 lines · Dmitry V. Levin
Quoted 1 line · Jiri Olsa

Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.

[...]

man2/uretprobe.2 line 20

Quoted 4 lines

+.P

man2/uretprobe.2 new file +3 -0
+Calls to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.

typo: suscall

ugh, thanks, there'll be at least one other version to fill in the kernel version in HISTORY section, I'll fix that

jirka

Quoted 4 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- 
ldv
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv5 8/8] man2: Add uretprobe syscall page

Quoted 10 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 9 lines · Dmitry V. Levin
Quoted 1 line · Jiri Olsa

Adding man page for new uretprobe syscall.

[...]

man2/uretprobe.2 line 20

Quoted 4 lines

+.P

man2/uretprobe.2 new file +3 -0
+Calls to
+.BR uretprobe ()
+suscall are only made from the user-space trampoline provided by the kernel.

typo: suscall

Thanks!

Quoted 2 lines

ugh, thanks, there'll be at least one other version to fill in the kernel version in HISTORY section, I'll fix that

Oh, and we spell it as system call, not syscall. :)

Have a lovely day!
Alex

Signature · 1 line
<https://www.alejandro-colomar.es/>