Various perf patches
Subsystems (2)
cover Various perf patches
Some perf patches fixing things reported by Andi.
PATCH 1/3 perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Errata BV98 states that all MEM_*_RETIRED events corrupt the counter value of the SMT sibling's counters. Blacklist these events
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +9 -4
@@ -128,10 +128,15 @@ static struct event_constraint intel_ivbINTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08a3 ,0x4 ),/* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.CYCLES_L1D_PENDING */ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0ca3 ,0x4 ),/* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_L1D_PENDING */ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd2 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd3 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_MISS_RETIRED.* */ +/* +* Errata BV98 -- MEM_*_RETIRED events can leak between counters of SMT +* siblings; disable these events because they can corrupt unrelated +* counters. +*/ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd2 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd3 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_MISS_RETIRED.* */ EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END };
Re: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Errata BV98 states that all MEM_*_RETIRED events corrupt the counter value of the SMT sibling's counters. Blacklist these events
I disagree with this patch. This is just overkill and not needed at all.
-Andi
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 6 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Errata BV98 states that all MEM_*_RETIRED events corrupt the counter value of the SMT sibling's counters. Blacklist these events
I disagree with this patch. This is just overkill and not needed at all.
Then give me a patch that both completely describes the problem and ensures isolation so that no counters get corrupted (and isn't too invasive).
So far you've failed on both counts.
Re: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Hi,
Based on our testing, it appears the corruption occurs only when the MEM_* events are used and only on the sibling counter. In other words, if HT0 has MEM_* in cntr0, then HT1 cntr0 cannot be used, otherwise whatever is there may get corrupted. So I think we could enhance Andi's initial patch to handle this case instead of blacklist those events. They are very important events.
Quoted 14 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 6 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Errata BV98 states that all MEM_*_RETIRED events corrupt the counter value of the SMT sibling's counters. Blacklist these events
I disagree with this patch. This is just overkill and not needed at all.
Then give me a patch that both completely describes the problem and ensures isolation so that no counters get corrupted (and isn't too invasive).
So far you've failed on both counts.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 7 lines · Stephane Eranian
Hi,
Based on our testing, it appears the corruption occurs only when the MEM_* events are used and only on the sibling counter. In other words, if HT0 has MEM_* in cntr0, then HT1 cntr0 cannot be used, otherwise whatever is there may get corrupted.
Ah, great. That is the least horrid case :-)
Quoted 3 lines
So I think we could enhance Andi's initial patch
to handle this case instead of blacklist those events. They are very important events.
Will you take a stab at it? I suppose you'll have to make each counter have a shared resource and have the mem_*_retired events mark the resource taken.
Also, did you test what happens when you turn SMT off in the BIOS so you get double the amount of counters; do we then leak into CNTn+4 or is all well again?
Re: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 7 lines · Stephane Eranian
Hi,
Based on our testing, it appears the corruption occurs only when the MEM_* events are used and only on the sibling counter. In other words, if HT0 has MEM_* in cntr0, then HT1 cntr0 cannot be used, otherwise whatever is there may get corrupted.
Ah, great. That is the least horrid case :-)
Yeah.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
So I think we could enhance Andi's initial patch
to handle this case instead of blacklist those events. They are very important events.Will you take a stab at it? I suppose you'll have to make each counter have a shared resource and have the mem_*_retired events mark the resource taken.
Yes, I will try to come up with a patch to force multiplexing when those events are used.
The difficulty is that we cannot use the shared_regs infrastructure because the constraint is quite different. Here we need to say that if a mem event uses cnt0 on one thread, then nothing can be using cnt0 on the other thread. The current shared_regs infrastructure does not work on the counter level. So we need to invent something else. It cannot even be extended. We need to schedule the mem event, then look at the assignment and exclude all the counters used by the mem event from the other thread. Alternatively, we can only schedule mem event on counters which are not currently used by the sibling thread. We need to peek at the used counters cross HT threads. Not so easy to do.
Quoted 4 lines
Also, did you test what happens when you turn SMT off in the BIOS so you get double the amount of counters; do we then leak into CNTn+4 or is all well again?
I have not tried that yet. Hopefully, it won't exhibit the problem.
Re: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 5 lines
The difficulty is that we cannot use the
shared_regsinfrastructure because the constraint is quite different. Here we need to say that if a mem event uses cnt0 on one thread, then nothing can be using cnt0 on the other thread. The currentshared_regsinfrastructure does not work on the counter level. So we need to invent something else. It cannot even be extended.
Just need a extra reg per counter, that is only triggered with that event.
-Andi
Re: [PATCH 1/3] perf, x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for IVB
Quoted 8 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 5 lines
The difficulty is that we cannot use the
shared_regsinfrastructure because the constraint is quite different. Here we need to say that if a mem event uses cnt0 on one thread, then nothing can be using cnt0 on the other thread. The currentshared_regsinfrastructure does not work on the counter level. So we need to invent something else. It cannot even be extended.Just need a extra reg per counter, that is only triggered with that event.
Yes, it would be per counter and not per-event. But the check has to happen after the assignment and each time we release the counter.
Quoted 1 line
-Andi
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for Ivy Bridge
In reply to Peter Zijlstraperf/x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for Ivy Bridge
Commit-ID: 741a698f420c34c458294a6accecfbad702a7c52 Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/741a698f420c34c458294a6accecfbad702a7c52 Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 3 May 2013 14:11:23 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 4 May 2013 08:37:46 +0200
perf/x86: Blacklist all MEM_*_RETIRED events for Ivy Bridge
Errata BV98 states that all MEM_*_RETIRED events corrupt the counter value of the SMT sibling's counters. Blacklist these events
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel.c +9 -4
@@ -125,10 +125,15 @@ static struct event_constraint intel_ivb_event_constraints[] __read_mostly =INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x08a3 ,0x4 ),/* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.CYCLES_L1D_PENDING */ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x0ca3 ,0x4 ),/* CYCLE_ACTIVITY.STALLS_L1D_PENDING */ INTEL_UEVENT_CONSTRAINT (0x01c0 ,0x2 ),/* INST_RETIRED.PREC_DIST */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0xf ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd2 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */ -INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd3 ,0xf ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_MISS_RETIRED.* */ +/* +* Errata BV98 -- MEM_*_RETIRED events can leak between counters of SMT +* siblings; disable these events because they can corrupt unrelated +* counters. +*/ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd0 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd1 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd2 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_HIT_RETIRED.* */ +INTEL_EVENT_CONSTRAINT (0xd3 ,0x0 ),/* MEM_LOAD_UOPS_LLC_MISS_RETIRED.* */ EVENT_CONSTRAINT_END };
PATCH 2/3 perf, x86, lbr: Fix LBR filter
In reply to Peter ZijlstraThe LBR 'from' adddress is under full userspace control; ensure we validate it before reading from it.
Note: is_module_text_address() can potentially be quite expensive;
for those running into that either stop using modules as all sane people do or optimize it using an RCU backed rb-tree.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +12 -2
@@ -442,8 +442,18 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long froreturn X86_BR_NONE ; addr = buf; - }else - addr = (void *)from; + }else { +/* +* The LBR logs any address in the IP, even if the IP just +* faulted. This means userspace can control the from address. +* Ensure we don't blindy read any address by validating it is +* a known text address. +*/ +if (kernel_text_address (from)) + addr = (void *)from; +else +return X86_BR_NONE ; + }/* * decoder needs to know the ABI especially
Re: [PATCH 2/3] perf, x86, lbr: Fix LBR filter
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static int branch_type(unsigned long fro · line 452
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +8
-0+ }else { +/* +* The LBR logs any address in the IP, even if the IP just +* faulted. This means userspace can control the from address. +* Ensure we don't blindy read any address by validating it is +* a known text address. +*/ +if (kernel_text_address (from))
Sorry doing it this way is just incredible expensive and dumb.
After all the tool is called "perf" and not "non perf"
-Andi
Re: [PATCH 2/3] perf, x86, lbr: Fix LBR filter
Quoted 10 lines · Andi Kleen
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static int branch_type(unsigned long fro · line 452
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +8
-0+ }else { +/* +* The LBR logs any address in the IP, even if the IP just +* faulted. This means userspace can control the from address. +* Ensure we don't blindy read any address by validating it is +* a known text address. +*/ +if (kernel_text_address (from))Sorry doing it this way is just incredible expensive and dumb.
If anyone using this feature notices the __module_address() overhead then a 'module addresses RCU rbtree' could be added, which should solve the overhead impact.
In any case Peter's patch fixes the bug without regressing the feature as it is implemented today. Do you have a better solution that does not break the ABI? The solution you proposed before regresses existing functionality.
Thanks,
Ingo
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix LBR filter
In reply to Peter Zijlstraperf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix LBR filter
Commit-ID: 6e15eb3ba6c0249c9e8c783517d131b47db995ca Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/6e15eb3ba6c0249c9e8c783517d131b47db995ca Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 3 May 2013 14:11:24 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 4 May 2013 08:37:47 +0200
perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix LBR filter
The LBR 'from' adddress is under full userspace control; ensure we validate it before reading from it.
Note: is_module_text_address() can potentially be quite expensive; for those running into that with high overhead in modules optimize it using an RCU backed rb-tree.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +12 -2
@@ -442,8 +442,18 @@ static int branch_type(unsigned long from, unsigned long to)return X86_BR_NONE ; addr = buf; - }else - addr = (void *)from; + }else { +/* +* The LBR logs any address in the IP, even if the IP just +* faulted. This means userspace can control the from address. +* Ensure we don't blindy read any address by validating it is +* a known text address. +*/ +if (kernel_text_address (from)) + addr = (void *)from; +else +return X86_BR_NONE ; + }/* * decoder needs to know the ABI especially
PATCH 3/3 perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter ZijlstraWe should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4 -1
@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }/* we ignore BRANCH_HV here */
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 3 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }/* we ignore BRANCH_HV here */
Signature · 1 line
[email protected] -- Speaking for myself only
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter Zijlstraperf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Commit-ID: 0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 3 May 2013 14:11:25 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 4 May 2013 08:37:48 +0200
perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4 -1
@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event)if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }/* we ignore BRANCH_HV here */
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 28 lines · tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
Commit-ID: 0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 3 May 2013 14:11:25 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 4 May 2013 08:37:48 +0200perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNELWe should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event) · line 323
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +3
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event)if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ;
It is probably not too late to amend this patch and remove the "-EACCES":
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c: In function ‘intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter’:arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c:323:4: warning: ‘return’ with a value, in function returning void [enabled by default]
Signature · 5 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Sent from a fat crate under my desk. Formatting is fine.
--Re: [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 39 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 28 lines · tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
Commit-ID: 0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/0f5c78b5f33ce940034743e5f9485fc81ad75b0f Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 3 May 2013 14:11:25 +0200 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Sat, 4 May 2013 08:37:48 +0200perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNELWe should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc <[email protected]>Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event) · line 323
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +3
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event)if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ;It is probably not too late to amend this patch and remove the "
-EACCES":
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c: In function ???intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter???:arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c:323:4: warning: ???return??? with a value, in function returning void [enabled by default]
Well, the better fix is to propagate that error condition down instead of ignoring it.
Since it was the head commit for a tree others don't typically pull and base development work off I amended it.
Thanks,
Ingo
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 11 lines
Review static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event) · line 323
Quoted 8 lines
(quoted diff) +3
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event) if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER) mask |= X86_BR_USER; - if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL) + if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL) { + if (perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES;It is probably not too late to amend this patch and remove the "
-EACCES":
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c: In function ‘intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter’:arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c:323:4: warning: ‘return’ with a value, in function returning void [enabled by default]
Oh urgh, looks like I forgot a refresh before posting..
This one actually compiles a defconfig bzImage.
---
Subject: perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Date: Fri May 03 14:07:49 CEST 2013
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +11 -4
@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ void intel_pmu_lbr_read(void)* - in case there is no HW filter * - in case the HW filter has errata or limitations */ -static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) +static int intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) {u64 br_type = event->attr.branch_sample_type;int mask =0 ;
@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }/* we ignore BRANCH_HV here */
@@ -339,6 +342,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte* be used by fixup code for some CPU */ event->hw.branch_reg.reg = mask; + +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -375,7 +380,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_hw_lbr_filterint intel_pmu_setup_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret;/* * no LBR on this PMU
@@ -386,7 +391,9 @@ int intel_pmu_setup_lbr_filter(struct pe/* * setup SW LBR filter */ -intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (event); + ret =intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (event); +if (ret) +return ret;/* * setup HW LBR filter, if any
Re: [tip:perf/urgent] perf/x86/intel/lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 76 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event) · line 323
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +3
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter(struct perf_event *event)if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ;It is probably not too late to amend this patch and remove the "
-EACCES":Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c: In function ???intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter???:arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c:323:4: warning: ???return??? with a value, in function returning void [enabled by default]Oh urgh, looks like I forgot a refresh before posting..
This one actually compiles a defconfig bzImage.
---
Subject: perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges forPERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Date: Fri May 03 14:07:49 CEST 2013We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +8
-3@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ void intel_pmu_lbr_read(void)* - in case there is no HW filter * - in case the HW filter has errata or limitations */ -static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) +static int intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) {u64 br_type = event->attr.branch_sample_type;int mask =0 ;@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }/* we ignore BRANCH_HV here */ @@ -339,6 +342,8 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte* be used by fixup code for some CPU */ event->hw.branch_reg.reg = mask; + +return 0 ; }/* @@ -375,7 +380,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_hw_lbr_filterint intel_pmu_setup_lbr_filter (struct perf_event *event) { -int ret =0 ; +int ret;/* * no LBR on this PMU
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c int intel_pmu_setup_lbr_filter(struct pe · line 399
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +3
-1@@ -386,7 +391,9 @@ int intel_pmu_setup_lbr_filter(struct pe/* * setup SW LBR filter */ -intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (event); + ret =intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter (event); +if (ret) +return ret;/* * setup HW LBR filter, if any
That looks pretty close to what I did as well.
Thanks,
Ingo
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }
This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the sw_filter.
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
Ah, indeed. I'll try and whip up a patch.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Stephane EranianQuoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 12 +++++++++--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 10 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +9 -3
@@ -585,17 +585,23 @@ intel_pmu_lbr_filter(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc)/* if type does not correspond, then discard */ if (type ==X86_BR_NONE || (br_sel & type) != type) { - cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =0 ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete =1 ; compress = true; } + +/* hide kernel addresses if we're not privileged */ +if (!(br_sel &X86_BR_KERNEL ) &&kernel_ip (from)) { + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =-1L ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].invalid_from =1 ; + } }if (!compress)return ; -/* remove all entries with from=0 */ +/* remove all entries with __delete */ for (i =0 ; i < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr; ) { -if (!cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from) { +if (cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete) { j = i;while (++j < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr) cpuc->lbr_entries[j-1 ] = cpuc->lbr_entries[j];
include/linux/perf_event.h +7 -3
@@ -77,9 +77,13 @@ struct perf_raw_record {struct perf_branch_entry {__u64 from;__u64 to; -__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ - predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ - reserved:62 ; +__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ + predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ + invalid_to:1 ,/* @to isn't to be trusted */ + invalid_from:1 ,/* @from isn't to be trusted */ + reserved:59 , + __delete:1 ;/* Implementation; userspace should +always see a 0 */ };/*
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 2 lines · Peter Zijlstra
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
The asymmetry is unfortunate, but I think its more useful to have the from kernel branch target than it is not to have it. This way you at least know there was a kernel entry/exit and where you've continued.
Without either branch to kernel and branch from kernel entries you'd be wondering WTF happend to your control flow.
Quoted 58 lines
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 12 +++++++++--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 10 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +9
-3@@ -585,17 +585,23 @@ intel_pmu_lbr_filter(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc)/* if type does not correspond, then discard */ if (type ==X86_BR_NONE || (br_sel & type) != type) { - cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =0 ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete =1 ; compress = true; } + +/* hide kernel addresses if we're not privileged */ +if (!(br_sel &X86_BR_KERNEL ) &&kernel_ip (from)) { + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =-1L ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].invalid_from =1 ; + } }if (!compress)return ; -/* remove all entries with from=0 */ +/* remove all entries with __delete */ for (i =0 ; i < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr; ) { -if (!cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from) { +if (cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete) { j = i;while (++j < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr) cpuc->lbr_entries[j-1 ] = cpuc->lbr_entries[j];include/linux/perf_event.h +7
-3@@ -77,9 +77,13 @@ struct perf_raw_record {struct perf_branch_entry {__u64 from;__u64 to; -__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ - predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ - reserved:62 ; +__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ + predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ + invalid_to:1 ,/* @to isn't to be trusted */ + invalid_from:1 ,/* @from isn't to be trusted */ + reserved:59 , + __delete:1 ;/* Implementation; userspace should +always see a 0 */ };/*
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 77 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 12 +++++++++--- include/linux/perf_event.h | 10 +++++++--- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +9
-3@@ -585,17 +585,23 @@ intel_pmu_lbr_filter(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc)/* if type does not correspond, then discard */ if (type ==X86_BR_NONE || (br_sel & type) != type) { - cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =0 ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete =1 ; compress = true; } + +/* hide kernel addresses if we're not privileged */ +if (!(br_sel &X86_BR_KERNEL ) &&kernel_ip (from)) { + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from =-1L ; + cpuc->lbr_entries[i].invalid_from =1 ; + } }if (!compress)return ; -/* remove all entries with from=0 */ +/* remove all entries with __delete */ for (i =0 ; i < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr; ) { -if (!cpuc->lbr_entries[i].from) { +if (cpuc->lbr_entries[i].__delete) { j = i;while (++j < cpuc->lbr_stack.nr) cpuc->lbr_entries[j-1 ] = cpuc->lbr_entries[j];include/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0
include/linux/perf_event.h struct perf_raw_record { · line 83
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/perf_event.h +4
-3@@ -77,9 +77,13 @@ struct perf_raw_record {struct perf_branch_entry {__u64 from;__u64 to; -__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ - predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ - reserved:62 ; +__u64 mispred:1 ,/* target mispredicted */ + predicted:1 ,/* target predicted */ + invalid_to:1 ,/* @to isn't to be trusted */ + invalid_from:1, /* @from isn't to be trusted */
Thanks Peter. One possible issue...
When the kernel has to read the branch from memory, there is no way for it to know that it's the same one that the HW actually executed. Hence there's a possibility that the to address is invalid but we can't tell for sure.
I'm happy to just ignore that and mark calculated to address as valid, unless you think it would be worthwhile extra information to pass onto the user?
If we wanted this extra fidelity we could add a possibly_invalid_to:1 flag to your patch but I'm not sure it's worth it to be honest.
mikey
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 30 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Mikey
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +2 -1
@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ +PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL =1U <<7 ,/* conditional branches */ - PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), +BRANCH_OPT ("cnd" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ), BRANCH_END };
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
I don't see an immediate problem with that except that we on x86 need to implement that in the software filter. Stephane do you see any fundamental issue with that?
Quoted 28 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ +PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL =1U <<7 ,/* conditional branches */ - PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), +BRANCH_OPT ("cnd" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ), BRANCH_END };
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
I don't see an immediate problem with that except that we on x86 need to implement that in the software filter. Stephane do you see any fundamental issue with that?
On X86, the LBR cannot filter on conditional in HW. Thus as Peter said, it would have to be done in SW. I did not add that because I think those branches are not necessarily useful for tools.
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 28 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +2
-1@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ +PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL =1U <<7 ,/* conditional branches */ - PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), +BRANCH_OPT ("cnd" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ), BRANCH_END };
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 8 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't see an immediate problem with that except that we on x86 need to implement that in the software filter. Stephane do you see any fundamental issue with that?
On X86, the LBR cannot filter on conditional in HW. Thus as Peter said, it would have to be done in SW. I did not add that because I think those branches are not necessarily useful for tools.
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
Also, it looks like its trivial to add to x86, you seem to have already done all the hard work by having X86_BR_JCC.
The only missing piece would be:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filterif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ) mask |=X86_BR_IND_CALL ; + +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ) + mask |=X86_BR_JCC ; +/* * stash actual user request into reg, it may * be used by fixup code for some CPU
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 12 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
I don't see an immediate problem with that except that we on x86 need to implement that in the software filter. Stephane do you see any fundamental issue with that?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
On X86, the LBR cannot filter on conditional in HW. Thus as Peter said, it would have to be done in SW. I did not add that because I think those branches are not necessarily useful for tools.
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
You could mispredict the target address of a computed goto. You'd know it was taken but not know target address until later in the pipeline.
On this, the POWER8 branch history buffer tells us two things about the prediction status.
1) if the branch was predicted taken/not taken correctly
2) if the target address was predicted correctly or not (for computed gotos only)
So we'd actually like more prediction bits too :-D
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
I don't think we can mispredict a non-conditional non-computed but I'll have to check with the HW folks.
Mikey
Quoted 20 lines
Also, it looks like its trivial to add to x86, you seem to have already done all the hard work by having
X86_BR_JCC.The only missing piece would be:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-0@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filterif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ) mask |=X86_BR_IND_CALL ; + +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ) + mask |=X86_BR_JCC ; +/* * stash actual user request into reg, it may * be used by fixup code for some CPU
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
You could mispredict the target address of a computed goto. You'd know it was taken but not know target address until later in the pipeline.
Oh right, computed targets could indeed be mis predicted. I was more thinking about jumps with immediate values.
Quoted 6 lines
On this, the POWER8 branch history buffer tells us two things about the prediction status.
1) if the branch was predicted taken/not taken correctly
2) if the target address was predicted correctly or not (for computed gotos only)
So we'd actually like more prediction bits too :-D
So if I understand this right, 1) maps to the predicted flags we have; 2) would be new stuff?
We don't really have anything like that on x86, but I suppose if you make the thing optional and present a 'useful' use-case implemented in userspace code we could take it :-)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
I don't think we can mispredict a non-conditional non-computed but I'll have to check with the HW folks.
I was mostly wondering about the use-case for the conditional filter. Stephane didn't think it useful, clearly your hardware guys thought different :-)
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 32 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
You could mispredict the target address of a computed goto. You'd know it was taken but not know target address until later in the pipeline.
Oh right, computed targets could indeed be mis predicted. I was more thinking about jumps with immediate values.
Quoted 6 lines
On this, the POWER8 branch history buffer tells us two things about the prediction status.
1) if the branch was predicted taken/not taken correctly
2) if the target address was predicted correctly or not (for computed gotos only)
So we'd actually like more prediction bits too :-DSo if I understand this right, 1) maps to the predicted flags we have; 2) would be new stuff?
We don't really have anything like that on x86, but I suppose if you make the thing optional and present a 'useful' use-case implemented in userspace code we could take it :-)
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I don't think we can mispredict a non-conditional non-computed but I'll have to check with the HW folks.
I was mostly wondering about the use-case for the conditional filter. Stephane didn't think it useful, clearly your hardware guys thought different :-)
From my experience talking with compiler people, they care about ALL
the branches
and not the conditional so much. They use LBR to do basic block profiling.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 36 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 35 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
You could mispredict the target address of a computed goto. You'd know it was taken but not know target address until later in the pipeline.
Oh right, computed targets could indeed be mis predicted. I was more thinking about jumps with immediate values.
Quoted 6 lines
On this, the POWER8 branch history buffer tells us two things about the prediction status.
1) if the branch was predicted taken/not taken correctly
2) if the target address was predicted correctly or not (for computed gotos only)
So we'd actually like more prediction bits too :-DSo if I understand this right, 1) maps to the predicted flags we have; 2) would be new stuff?
We don't really have anything like that on x86, but I suppose if you make the thing optional and present a 'useful' use-case implemented in userspace code we could take it :-)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
I don't think we can mispredict a non-conditional non-computed but I'll have to check with the HW folks.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I was mostly wondering about the use-case for the conditional filter. Stephane didn't think it useful, clearly your hardware guys thought different :-)
From my experience talking with compiler people, they care about ALL the branches and not the conditional so much. They use LBR to do basic block profiling.
OK. I don't have a good handle on what's useful for compilers or JITs right now. I'm just plumbing through what's possible.
Mikey
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 41 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 39 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 37 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
You could mispredict the target address of a computed goto. You'd know it was taken but not know target address until later in the pipeline.
Oh right, computed targets could indeed be mis predicted. I was more thinking about jumps with immediate values.
Quoted 6 lines
On this, the POWER8 branch history buffer tells us two things about the prediction status.
1) if the branch was predicted taken/not taken correctly
2) if the target address was predicted correctly or not (for computed gotos only)
So we'd actually like more prediction bits too :-DSo if I understand this right, 1) maps to the predicted flags we have; 2) would be new stuff?
We don't really have anything like that on x86, but I suppose if you make the thing optional and present a 'useful' use-case implemented in userspace code we could take it :-)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
I don't think we can mispredict a non-conditional non-computed but I'll have to check with the HW folks.
I was mostly wondering about the use-case for the conditional filter. Stephane didn't think it useful, clearly your hardware guys thought different :-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
From my experience talking with compiler people, they care about ALL the branches and not the conditional so much. They use LBR to do basic block profiling.
OK. I don't have a good handle on what's useful for compilers or JITs right now. I'm just plumbing through what's possible.
I understand. It is okay to extend the interface.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 22 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 8 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't see an immediate problem with that except that we on x86 need to implement that in the software filter. Stephane do you see any fundamental issue with that?
On X86, the LBR cannot filter on conditional in HW. Thus as Peter said, it would have to be done in SW. I did not add that because I think those branches are not necessarily useful for tools.
Wouldn't it be mostly conditional branches that are the primary control flow and can get predicted wrong? I mean, I'm sure someone will miss-predict an unconditional branch but its not like we care about people with such afflictions do we?
Quoted 8 lines
Anyway, since PPC people thought it worth baking into hardware, presumably they have a compelling use case. Mikey could you see if you can retrieve that from someone in the know? It might be interesting.
Also, it looks like its trivial to add to x86, you seem to have already done all the hard work by having
X86_BR_JCC.The only missing piece would be:
Peter,
Can we add your signed-off-by on this?
We are cleaning up our series for conditional branches and would like to add this as part of the post.
Mikey
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-0@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filterif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ) mask |=X86_BR_IND_CALL ; + +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL ) + mask |=X86_BR_JCC ; +/* * stash actual user request into reg, it may * be used by fixup code for some CPU
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Can we add your signed-off-by on this?
We are cleaning up our series for conditional branches and would like to add this as part of the post.
Sure, but its completely untested.. I was hoping Stephane would say somnething about it since he wrote all that magic ;-)
But yeah, feel free to add my SoB.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 6 lines · Michael Neuling
Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> wrote:
Can we add your signed-off-by on this?
We are cleaning up our series for conditional branches and would like to add this as part of the post.
Sure, but its completely untested.. I was hoping Stephane would say somnething about it since he wrote all that magic ;-)
Let me take a look at it.
Quoted 1 line
But yeah, feel free to add my SoB.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
In reply to Michael NeulingQuoted 50 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 30 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Mikey
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h enum perf_branch_sample_type { · line 161
Quoted 5 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-0@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */
I would use PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND here.
Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1- PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0
tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 679
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), + BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),
use "cond"
tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 682
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0BRANCH_END };
And if you do this, you also need to update the x86 perf_event_intel_lbr.c mapping
tables to fill out the entries for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND:
[PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND] = LBR_JCC,
And you also need to update intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter() to handle the conversion to x86 instructions:
if (br_type & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND)
mask |= X86_BR_JCC;
You also need to update the perf-record.txt documentation to list cond as a possible
branch filter.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 88 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 50 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 30 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Mikey
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h enum perf_branch_sample_type { · line 161
Quoted 5 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-0@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */I would use
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDhere.Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1- PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 679
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), + BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),use "cond"
tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 682
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0BRANCH_END };And if you do this, you also need to update the x86
perf_event_intel_lbr.cmapping
tables to fill out the entries forPERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND:[
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND] =LBR_JCC,And you also need to update
intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter()to handle the conversion to x86 instructions:
Quoted 7 lines
if (
br_type&PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND)
mask |=X86_BR_JCC;You also need to update the perf-record.txt documentation to list cond as a possible
branch filter.
Hey Stephane,
I have incorporated all the review comments into the patch series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/22/51.
Regards
Anshuman
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Hi,
Quoted 93 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 92 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 50 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 30 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Mikey
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h enum perf_branch_sample_type { · line 161
Quoted 5 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-0@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */I would use
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDhere.Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1- PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 679
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), + BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),use "cond"
tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 682
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0BRANCH_END };And if you do this, you also need to update the x86
perf_event_intel_lbr.cmapping
tables to fill out the entries forPERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND:[
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND] =LBR_JCC,And you also need to update
intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter()to handle the conversion to x86 instructions:if (
br_type&PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND)
mask |=X86_BR_JCC;
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
You also need to update the perf-record.txt documentation to list cond as a possible
branch filter.Hey Stephane,
I have incorporated all the review comments into the patch series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/22/51.
I don't see how you can compile Patch 3/5:
+ BRANCH_OPT("cond", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),
Needs to be PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND.
Re: [PATCH 3/3] perf, x86, lbr: Demand proper privileges for PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL
Quoted 105 lines · Stephane Eranian
Hi,
Quoted 99 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 88 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 50 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 30 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 29 lines · Stephane Eranian
Quoted 13 lines · Peter Zijlstra
We should always have proper privileges when requesting kernel data.
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filte · line 326
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_lbr.c +4
-1@@ -318,8 +318,11 @@ static void intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filteif (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER ) mask |=X86_BR_USER ; -if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) +if (br_type &PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL ) { +if (perf_paranoid_kernel () && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EACCES ; mask |=X86_BR_KERNEL ; + }This will prevent regular users from capturing kernel -> kernel branches. But it won't prevent users from getting kernel -> user branches. Thus some kernel address will still be captured. I guess they could be eliminated by the
sw_filter.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
When using LBR priv level filtering, the filter applies to the branch target only.
How about something like the below? It also adds the branch flags Mikey wanted for PowerPC.
Peter,
BTW PowerPC also has the ability to filter on conditional branches. Any chance we could add something like the follow to perf also?
Mikey
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +0
-0include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h enum perf_branch_sample_type { · line 161
Quoted 5 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-0@@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ enum perf_branch_sample_type {PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL =1U <<4 ,/* any call branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN =1U <<5 ,/* any return branch */ PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL =1U <<6 ,/* indirect calls */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL = 1U << 7, /* conditional branches */I would use
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDhere.Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h +1
-1- PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 7, /* non-ABI */ + PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_MAX = 1U << 8, /* non-ABI */ };#define PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PLM_ALL \tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 679
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1
-0@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = {BRANCH_OPT ("any_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_CALL ),BRANCH_OPT ("any_ret" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_ANY_RETURN ),BRANCH_OPT ("ind_call" ,PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_IND_CALL ), + BRANCH_OPT("cnd", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),use "cond"
tools/perf/builtin-record.c static const struct branch_mode branch_modes[] = { · line 682
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +0
-0BRANCH_END };And if you do this, you also need to update the x86
perf_event_intel_lbr.cmapping
tables to fill out the entries forPERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND:[
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND] =LBR_JCC,And you also need to update
intel_pmu_setup_sw_lbr_filter()to handle the conversion to x86 instructions:Quoted 7 lines
if (
br_type&PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND)
mask |=X86_BR_JCC;You also need to update the perf-record.txt documentation to list cond as a possible
branch filter.Hey Stephane,
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I have incorporated all the review comments into the patch series
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/5/22/51.I don't see how you can compile Patch 3/5:
+
BRANCH_OPT("cond", PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_CONDITIONAL),Needs to be
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_COND.
Ahh, sorry missed it, will fix it.