cryptsetup with native PKCS#11 support
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Hi guys
Im new here. The purpose of this email is PKCS#11 support in cryptsetup Im working on.
In short: I need to encrypt disk with LUKS and store key on PKCS#11 compatible device. I now there is a lot of example how to do this using gnupgp or openssl. The goal is to have key only on token, retrieve upon 'luksOpen' operation based on PIN only.
What is working now is:
- key generation (as pass-phrase ) using smartcard/token hardware RNG
- encrypt a backup of the key using certificate from token upon 'luksFormat'
- decrypt key from file using privatekey from token upon 'luksOpen'
- all above extansions are build in into cryptsetup command (few new switches)
- dependencies are minimal - only pkcs11 library file for token is required (no libp11 or pkcs11-helper)
Later I will add storage of keyfile on token as data object.
As this job is for private use only, the code is a little messy and unclean.
So I want to open a discussion : is a native PKCS#11 support in cryptsetup needed? If yes, please give me any possible hint can help. Or suggestion what or how to implement to make it secure.
Regards
Krzysztof Rutecki
Quoted 12 lines · Krzysztof Rutecki
Hi guys
I
m new here. The purpose of this email is PKCS#11 support in cryptsetup Im working on.In short: I need to encrypt disk with LUKS and store key on PKCS#11 compatible device. I now
there is a lot of example how to do this using gnupgp or openssl. The goal is to have key only on token,
retrieve upon 'luksOpen' operation based on PIN only.
i want to add the same functionality in my project hosted at:
http://code.google.com/p/zulucrypt/ but i dont have the hardware to implement it on.
are you making a proprietary or a FOSS solution?,if FOSS,where do you host your sources?
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Hi
Since today all modifications to cryptsetup are my own usage only. I will clean a code and open repo somewhere (GitHub probably ). And yes, it will be open source. I have few crypto cards (CyrptoTech, ACS and Gemalto) and two readers. At beginning its ok. Soon I will get few tokens (USB devices, in operation it looks like reader and card all-in-one). As my modification are only extensions I plan to release it in to versions: integrated with latest version of cryptsetup and patch only. We will see...
What is more user friendly Google Code or GitHub?
Regards
Krzysztof Rutecki
On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 3:02 PM, Krzysztof Rutecki < [email protected] > wrote:
Hi guys
Im new here. The purpose of this email is PKCS#11 support in cryptsetup Im working on.
In short: I need to encrypt disk with LUKS and store key on PKCS#11 compatible device. I now there is a lot of example how to do this using gnupgp or openssl. The goal is to have key only on token, retrieve upon 'luksOpen' operation based on PIN only.
i want to add the same functionality in my project hosted at: http://code.google.com/p/zulucrypt/ but i dont have the hardware to implement it on.
are you making a proprietary or a FOSS solution?,if FOSS,where do you host your sources?
Quoted 3 lines
What is more user friendly Google Code or GitHub?
code.google.com look more professional,serious and cleaner to me.To add to its sense of seriousness,you get a dedicated download page where you have more visible and official releases.
on the downside,it lacks "social integration",it seem to be designed with only one project in mind and the project lives independent of everything else.
github on the other hand,it seem hacky to me and a place where you throw some random bits though people do serious work there.You can have one account with multiple subprojects,you can have your repos and people can collaborate with you from their repositories,you get to see who contributes what,where,how much,you know, the whole social thing.If you are into that kind of thing then github will be a place to be.If you plan to have multiple subprojects,related or otherwise then github is a place to be too.
Which one you will like may come down to personal preference.I have project in both and i use them equally.
Those in authority will give you an authoritative answer so take what i am about to say as merely toothless speculations.I think the answer you will get to your request to patch cryptsetup to add functionality you seek is "NO" and the reason given will be that the kind functionality you are seeking lives above cryptsetup and the best way to go about it is to get the key somehow independent of cryptsetup and then just pass it to cryptsetup.for it to unlock the volume.
Hi
The reason I`m doing it is to have a solution where passphrase never leave host or better, never leave cryptsetup tool. My company is working on NAS solutions with maximum security lever.
Imagine you have servers with 24 bays and few root administrators . What is a chance of disk leakage e.g. where drive is being replace for new one under warranty condition? With MooseFS (btw an excellent tool), LUKS, passprase on crypto card/token and cryptsetup supporting pkcs11 you can format disk using token as storage and two-factor authentication device. Am I thinking correctly? For backup you can add second key (the same way or classic, just for backup) and sys admins never see key(s). Using now available methods (gnupgp or pkcs11-data) you can easlly modify scripts to dump passphrase or keyfile. I want to minimize it.
Of course I`m not expecting that maintainers of official cryptsetup will integrate it. Maybe some day. Those I was thinking about GitHub. I can make a fork of official cryptsetup, then fork from it to my version. Community can see what cams from and how.
Anyway lots of job to be done before code will be ready to place on public repo.It will be, maybe in next 2-3 weeks. If you are interested, good and help full source of smartcards is SmartCardsFocus . Thanks guys for help with ACOS5-64 cards! RSA4096 is finally working well under PKCS#11. Good job.
Regards
Krzysztof Rutecki
Quoted 13 lines
Imagine you have servers with 24 bays and few root administrators. What is a chance of disk leakage e.g. where drive is being replace for new one under warranty
condition? With MooseFS (btw an excellent tool), LUKS, passprase on crypto card/token and cryptsetup supporting pkcs11 you can format disk using token as storage and two-factor
authentication device. Am I thinking correctly? For backup you can add second key (the same way or classic, just for backup) and sys admins never see key(s). Using now available
methods (gnupgp or pkcs11-data) you can easlly modify scripts to dump passphrase or keyfile. I want to minimize it.
I do not think its possible to hide anything from a user who has logged in with root's credentials.If they can modify scripts,they can replace your binary solution.As users with root privileges,they are effectively GODS and there is nothing technically you can do to stop them,the best you can do is have some policies and making sure and hope they adhere to them.
You can use libraries if you worry about leakage from loose boundaries btw different binaries and scripts.
cryptsetup ships with a library you can interface with[1],the two binaries you have mentioned also have libraries you can interface with, most tokens ships with libraries that talks to the hardware too or generic ones exists.Why not use cryptsetup library and the library provided by the hardware and add some logic btw them in your binary or library.
The library interface should be enough,have you looked at it and determined its not adequate? how is it not adequate if you have?
Quoted 3 lines · .. ink ..
Quoted 3 lines
Imagine you have servers with 24 bays and few root administrators. What is a chance of disk leakage e.g. where drive is being replace for new one under warranty condition?
If one of the root-people is corrupt, then high. There really is not way around that except changing the crypto-architecture, see below.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
With MooseFS (btw an excellent tool),
LUKS, passprase on crypto card/token and cryptsetup supporting pkcs11 you can format disk using token as storage and two-factor authentication device. Am I thinking correctly?
Almost. The problem is that with LUKS the key has to go into the kernel. Hence it is exposed to root users.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For backup you can add second key
(the same way or classic, just for backup) and sys admins never see key(s). Using now available methods (gnupgp or pkcs11-data) you can easlly modify scripts to dump passphrase or keyfile. I want to minimize it.
You cannot really. A competent administrator with root is somebody that is trusted, i.e. that can break your security. I do understand the desire though, a lot of our customers have the problem that they fear attacks by system administrators too.
The only solution for disk encryption I see is to use raw storage and encrypt in a dedicated HSM that the admins cannot get into. Something like this:
------->|filesystem front-end|---------->|HSM|--->|Raw/NFS storage|
clients NFS or
network block dev.
That is 2 systems and one HSM, and a HSM that can encrypt disk traffic in real-time will be something like 50'000 EUR/USD and up. It will protect your data against the administrators though, unless they steal the HSM. But that would be obvious. So the security comes from the fact that the HSM cannot be cloned.
Of course, that is not strictly true for most HSMs either, as there are operational requirements in case one fails. What I have seen (and think is a good solution) is that the HSM is initialized with a set of chip-cards and an k-out-of-n scheme. For example, there are 5 chipcards, and 3 are needed to initialize a new HSM (i.e. also to clone the existing one). Then 3 people have to collude to attack this. (It is not n-of-n, as chipcards can get lost, be defective, etc...).
So, while I applaud your initiative, you cannot allow root-users on the system the encrytption is done. This is not a LUKS limitation, it is more fundamental. In my example above, it would be perfectly fine for the HSM to use LUKS internally.
Quoted 2 lines
I do not think its possible to hide anything from a user who has logged in with root's credentials.
It is possible to hide the passphrase, but that does not help much, as it is fundamentally impossible to hide the master-key from root. Also refer to FAQ item 6.10 in
http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
where it is described how to get the master key from a mapped container.
Quoted 4 lines
If they can modify scripts,they can replace your
binary solution.As users with root privileges,they are effectively GODS and there is nothing technically you can do to stop them,the best you can do is have some policies and making sure and hope they adhere to them.
Indeed.
Quoted 8 lines
You can use libraries if you worry about leakage from loose boundaries btw different binaries and scripts.
cryptsetup ships with a library you can interface with[1],the two binaries you have mentioned also have libraries you can interface with, most tokens ships with libraries that talks to the hardware too or generic ones exists.Why not use cryptsetup library and the library provided by the hardware and add some logic btw them in your binary or library.
I think doing a crypto-token interface on top of the libraries would be a good idea. That way it is only loosely coupled. The library should have a pretty stable interface and is reasonably easy to use from my limited experience with implementing the key-slot checker tool.
Quoted 4 lines
The library interface should be enough,have you looked at it and determined its not adequate? how is it not adequate if you have?
I think you shgould try for this. Far easier than maintainoing a patch-set.
Arno
Signature · 7 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare
Hi guys
Nice to see anybody involved. Under all of yours thoughts I have to say yes, yes, yes. Root sys admin is the person we have to trust most. But still...
The idea behind it is to make using of crypto cards (HSM) easier and more natural. We where thinking that token/card will be required only during disk initialization but still, we can clone master key of mounted disk. So no future security enhance can be added to LUKS?
And last thing - we extend cryptsetup as it is more easy. We still have the same tool (under different
name: cryptsetup-pkcs11) and yes, we study library as well (cryptsetup.c is an interface between cli and library).
Anyway, out job is quite advanced and will be finished. I will open source it and we will see. If anybody have any suggestion related with dm-crypt and crypto cards/token over PKCS11 comments are welcome. Maybe something interested can be added :)
Or maybe all the tasks here are just wasting our time :)
Regards
Krzysztof Rutecki
----- Oryginalna wiadomość -----
Od: "Arno Wagner" <[email protected]>
Do: [email protected]
Wysłane: poniedziałek, 20 maj 2013 14:48:42
Temat: Re: [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with native PKCS#11 support
Quoted 3 lines · .. ink ..
Quoted 3 lines
Imagine you have servers with 24 bays and few root administrators. What is a chance of disk leakage e.g. where drive is being replace for new one under warranty condition?
If one of the root-people is corrupt, then high. There really is not way around that except changing the crypto-architecture, see below.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
With MooseFS (btw an excellent tool),
LUKS, passprase on crypto card/token and cryptsetup supporting pkcs11 you can format disk using token as storage and two-factor authentication device. Am I thinking correctly?
Almost. The problem is that with LUKS the key has to go into the kernel. Hence it is exposed to root users.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For backup you can add second key
(the same way or classic, just for backup) and sys admins never see key(s). Using now available methods (gnupgp or pkcs11-data) you can easlly modify scripts to dump passphrase or keyfile. I want to minimize it.
You cannot really. A competent administrator with root is somebody that is trusted, i.e. that can break your security. I do understand the desire though, a lot of our customers have the problem that they fear attacks by system administrators too.
The only solution for disk encryption I see is to use raw storage and encrypt in a dedicated HSM that the admins cannot get into. Something like this:
------->|filesystem front-end|---------->|HSM|--->|Raw/NFS storage|
clients NFS or
network block dev.
That is 2 systems and one HSM, and a HSM that can encrypt disk traffic in real-time will be something like 50'000 EUR/USD and up. It will protect your data against the administrators though, unless they steal the HSM. But that would be obvious. So the security comes from the fact that the HSM cannot be cloned.
Of course, that is not strictly true for most HSMs either, as there are operational requirements in case one fails. What I have seen (and think is a good solution) is that the HSM is initialized with a set of chip-cards and an k-out-of-n scheme. For example, there are 5 chipcards, and 3 are needed to initialize a new HSM (i.e. also to clone the existing one). Then 3 people have to collude to attack this. (It is not n-of-n, as chipcards can get lost, be defective, etc...).
So, while I applaud your initiative, you cannot allow root-users on the system the encrytption is done. This is not a LUKS limitation, it is more fundamental. In my example above, it would be perfectly fine for the HSM to use LUKS internally.
Quoted 2 lines
I do not think its possible to hide anything from a user who has logged in with root's credentials.
It is possible to hide the passphrase, but that does not help much, as it is fundamentally impossible to hide the master-key from root. Also refer to FAQ item 6.10 in
http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
where it is described how to get the master key from a mapped container.
Quoted 4 lines
If they can modify scripts,they can replace your
binary solution.As users with root privileges,they are effectively GODS and there is nothing technically you can do to stop them,the best you can do is have some policies and making sure and hope they adhere to them.
Indeed.
Quoted 8 lines
You can use libraries if you worry about leakage from loose boundaries btw different binaries and scripts.
cryptsetup ships with a library you can interface with[1],the two binaries you have mentioned also have libraries you can interface with, most tokens ships with libraries that talks to the hardware too or generic ones exists.Why not use cryptsetup library and the library provided by the hardware and add some logic btw them in your binary or library.
I think doing a crypto-token interface on top of the libraries would be a good idea. That way it is only loosely coupled. The library should have a pretty stable interface and is reasonably easy to use from my limited experience with implementing the key-slot checker tool.
Quoted 4 lines
The library interface should be enough,have you looked at it and determined its not adequate? how is it not adequate if you have?
I think you shgould try for this. Far easier than maintainoing a patch-set.
Arno
Signature · 11 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list [email protected] http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
Quoted 10 lines · Krzysztof Rutecki
Hi guys
Nice to see anybody involved. Under all of yours thoughts I have to say yes, yes, yes. Root sys admin is the person we have to trust most. But still...
The idea behind it is to make using of crypto cards (HSM) easier and more natural. We where thinking that token/card will be required only during disk initialization but still, we can clone master key of mounted disk. So no future security enhance can be added to LUKS?
No, because it does not fit the architecture and security model. LUKS is software encryption and there you allways have to trust root users, no way around that. What you want to do is something conceptionally different.
And no, a crypto card is a security token, but not an HSM, unless you let it do the encryption itself and it has keyboard and display for passphrases. For most applications, cards will be far too slow, even though some with keyboard and display exists. Cards can hold keys with some (not very high) level of seurity, but that is basically it.
A HSM is something far more massive. It includes phycial proection, (sensors, battery, always-on monitoring, effective self-destruct,...), secure RNGs, encryption engines, etc. Think of it as something that uses 1-3 19" HEs and costs more than a new car.
Yes, I know that some people have started to call crypto-cards "HSMs", but that is just marketing nonsense and dishonest.
Quoted 3 lines
And last thing - we extend cryptsetup as it is more easy. We still have the same tool (under different name: cryptsetup-pkcs11) and yes, we study library as well (
cryptsetup.cis an interface between cli and library).
Initially maybe. As soon as cryptsetup changes, likely not anymore.
Arno
Quoted 131 lines
Anyway, out job is quite advanced and will be finished. I will open source it and we will see. If anybody have any suggestion related with dm-crypt and crypto cards/token over PKCS11 comments are welcome. Maybe something interested can be added :)
Or maybe all the tasks here are just wasting our time :)
Regards
Krzysztof Rutecki----- Oryginalna wiadomość -----
Od: "Arno Wagner" <[email protected]>
Do: [email protected]
Wysłane: poniedziałek, 20 maj 2013 14:48:42
Temat: Re: [dm-crypt] cryptsetup with native PKCS#11 supportQuoted 3 lines · .. ink ..
Quoted 3 lines
Imagine you have servers with 24 bays and few root administrators. What is a chance of disk leakage e.g. where drive is being replace for new one under warranty condition?
If one of the root-people is corrupt, then high. There really is not way around that except changing the crypto-architecture, see below.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
With MooseFS (btw an excellent tool),
LUKS, passprase on crypto card/token and cryptsetup supporting pkcs11 you can format disk using token as storage and two-factor authentication device. Am I thinking correctly?Almost. The problem is that with LUKS the key has to go into the kernel. Hence it is exposed to root users.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For backup you can add second key
(the same way or classic, just for backup) and sys admins never see key(s). Using now available methods (gnupgp or pkcs11-data) you can easlly modify scripts to dump passphrase or keyfile. I want to minimize it.You cannot really. A competent administrator with root is somebody that is trusted, i.e. that can break your security. I do understand the desire though, a lot of our customers have the problem that they fear attacks by system administrators too.
The only solution for disk encryption I see is to use raw storage and encrypt in a dedicated HSM that the admins cannot get into. Something like this:
------->|filesystem front-end|---------->|HSM|--->|Raw/NFS storage|
clients NFS or
network block dev.That is 2 systems and one HSM, and a HSM that can encrypt disk traffic in real-time will be something like 50'000 EUR/USD and up. It will protect your data against the administrators though, unless they steal the HSM. But that would be obvious. So the security comes from the fact that the HSM cannot be cloned.
Of course, that is not strictly true for most HSMs either, as there are operational requirements in case one fails. What I have seen (and think is a good solution) is that the HSM is initialized with a set of chip-cards and an k-out-of-n scheme. For example, there are 5 chipcards, and 3 are needed to initialize a new HSM (i.e. also to clone the existing one). Then 3 people have to collude to attack this. (It is not n-of-n, as chipcards can get lost, be defective, etc...).
So, while I applaud your initiative, you cannot allow root-users on the system the encrytption is done. This is not a LUKS limitation, it is more fundamental. In my example above, it would be perfectly fine for the HSM to use LUKS internally.
Quoted 2 lines
I do not think its possible to hide anything from a user who has logged in with root's credentials.
It is possible to hide the passphrase, but that does not help much, as it is fundamentally impossible to hide the master-key from root. Also refer to FAQ item 6.10 in
http://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/FrequentlyAskedQuestions
where it is described how to get the master key from a mapped container.Quoted 4 lines
If they can modify scripts,they can replace your
binary solution.As users with root privileges,they are effectively GODS and there is nothing technically you can do to stop them,the best you can do is have some policies and making sure and hope they adhere to them.Indeed.
Quoted 8 lines
You can use libraries if you worry about leakage from loose boundaries btw different binaries and scripts.
cryptsetup ships with a library you can interface with[1],the two binaries you have mentioned also have libraries you can interface with, most tokens ships with libraries that talks to the hardware too or generic ones exists.Why not use cryptsetup library and the library provided by the hardware and add some logic btw them in your binary or library.
I think doing a crypto-token interface on top of the libraries would be a good idea. That way it is only loosely coupled. The library should have a pretty stable interface and is reasonably easy to use from my limited experience with implementing the key-slot checker tool.
Quoted 4 lines
The library interface should be enough,have you looked at it and determined its not adequate? how is it not adequate if you have?
I think you shgould try for this. Far easier than maintainoing a patch-set.
Arno
Signature · 15 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list [email protected] http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list [email protected] http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
Signature · 7 lines
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: [email protected] GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718 ---- There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies, and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies. The first method is far more difficult. --Tony Hoare
Hi,
just few notes (I think most of the arguments were already mentioned).
Quoted 2 lines · Krzysztof Rutecki
Nice to see anybody involved. Under all of yours thoughts I have to say yes, yes, yes. Root sys admin is the person we have to trust most. But still...
Once you run encryption on main processor, you must trust superuser.
It is nice we can limit sone attack vectors but the key will be always somewhere in memory (in dmcrypt case it is part of config ioctl structure.)
Note, dmcrypt is not military technology with robust hw tamper resistant design, and it has some limits.
Yes, we have kernel keyring, we can limit key transfer (and I agree that sending key in dm-ioctl message is stupid) but the problem is still there even if key is in some special keyring.
Quoted 3 lines
The idea behind it is to make using of crypto cards (HSM) easier and more natural. We where thinking that token/card will be required only during disk initialization but still, we can clone master key of mounted disk. So no future security enhance can be added to LUKS?
I would like to have "LUKS2" where keyslots can be of different types - it can be handle to kernel keyring, it can be handle to some token.
(IOW the key will be initialized not through dm-ioctl but through some other interface dependent of keyslot type.)
But in the end, there will be still key somewhere in main CPU which run encryption.
So yes, there will be some development which could help your project.
Quoted 3 lines
And last thing - we extend cryptsetup as it is more easy. We still have the same tool (under different
name: cryptsetup-pkcs11) and yes, we study library as well (cryptsetup.cis an interface between cli and library).
Better do not do that. I will not accept such patches upstream, it is against design architecture.
libcryptsetup is much more powerful than cryptsetup (see e.g. cryptsetup-reencrypt tool). (and cryptsetup is VERY limited by backward CLI compatibility)
If there is any function missing in libcryptsetup, let me know, I can help to provide that. And patches, as always, are welcome.
But please try to not extend cryptsetup command with upstream incompatible extensions.
Some more notes (Also see PAM PKCS11 login extensions etc)
Quoted 2 lines
What is working now is:
- key generation (as pass-phrase) using smartcard/token hardware RNG
- you can already provide pre-generated key to cryp_format API call, what missing here?
Quoted 1 line
- encrypt a backup of the key using certificate from token upon 'luksFormat'
Do you know volume_key project? It seems to me that this is better place for key escrow functionality. https://fedorahosted.org/volume_key/
(You can ask author, he will be for sure interested in this.)
Quoted 1 line
- decrypt key from file using privatekey from token upon 'luksOpen'
So this is the core problem, for now, I would use some wrapper or simple tool based on libcryptsetup. Later it can be specific handler for new LUKS2 keyslot type.
Quoted 3 lines
Anyway, out job is quite advanced and will be finished. I will open source it and we will see. If anybody have any suggestion related with dm-crypt and crypto cards/token over PKCS11 comments are welcome. Maybe something interested can be added :)
You approach is good for prototyping but for long term it would be nice to have some supportable code. I would definitely not recommend use such modified tool in production phase.
(And if you will distrbute modified tool, you have to provide source code
in all cases, it is GPL code. If it is github or Googlecode is cosmetic detail,
it is just a tool :-)
Milan