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allow process or user to listen on priviledged ports?

DISCUSSION Sven Köhler 7 participants 9 messages Dec 24, 2003 – Dec 25, 2003

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

don't blame me for asking such a question in the LKML, but i already asked it in other linux-newsgroups. i haven't got any real answer yet.

my problem is, that i want an application to listen on a priviledged port (e.g. port 80) and to run as a "normal" unpriviledged user (e.g. wwwrun). Well - how? The application is not a C/C++-application, so i cannot ask the author (myself) to implement a mechanism to switch the userid (e.g. like apache does it).

So is there any machanism to bind that permission (to listen on a priviledged tcp-port) to a specific user or a specific process?

The application is written in Java. Of course Java could implement userid-switching, but the linux could also have an ACL for that. So please don't answer with "go and ask Sun for that feature". I already considered that.

Thx
Sven

#1 lore raw

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Quoted 1 line · Sven Köhler

Hi,

Hi Sven,

Quoted 2 lines

So is there any machanism to bind that permission (to listen on a priviledged tcp-port) to a specific user or a specific process?

I think (AFAIK) either grsec or selinux (or both) have the ability to make the kernel accepting binds to those privileged ports as normal user.

Quoted 3 lines

Thx
Sven

- --
Regards Michael Buesch [ http://www.tuxsoft.de.vu ]

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#2 lore raw
In reply to Sven Köhler
Quoted 5 lines · Sven Köhler

my problem is, that i want an application to listen on a priviledged port (e.g. port 80) and to run as a "normal" unpriviledged user

So is there any machanism to bind that permission (to listen on a priviledged tcp-port) to a specific user or a specific process?

Of course, there is :-)
<http://www.olafdietsche.de/linux/accessfs/>

Regards, Olaf.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Sven Köhler
Quoted 2 lines · Sven Köhler

So is there any machanism to bind that permission (to listen on a priviledged tcp-port) to a specific user or a specific process?

Even if you can't find a way to do this, you can cheat: use an iptables DNAT rule to translate connections to the desired port into connections to a non-privileged port upon which your daemon is actually listening. Something like:

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 80 -j DNAT --to 1.2.3.4:8080

Signature · 1 line
Adam Sampson <[email protected]>                        <http://offog.org/>
#4 lore raw

I used this approach for some time but unfortunately IPv6 has only inherited the privileged ports problem but not the iptables solution.

Regards
Tom

Signature · 5 lines
  T h o m a s   Z e h e t b a u e r   ( TZ251 )
  PGP encrypted mail preferred - KeyID 96FFCB89
       mail [email protected]

If there is a god, you are an authorized representative.
#5 lore raw
In reply to Adam Sampson
Quoted 10 lines · Adam Sampson
Quoted 2 lines · Sven Köhler

So is there any machanism to bind that permission (to listen on a priviledged tcp-port) to a specific user or a specific process?

Even if you can't find a way to do this, you can cheat: use an iptables DNAT rule to translate connections to the desired port into connections to a non-privileged port upon which your daemon is actually listening. Something like:

iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 80 -j DNAT --to 1.2.3.4:8080

Not to be too picky, but I think the redirect target is better suited for
this. I haven't seen the source, but I assume it will be more efficient because it knows the destination is the local machine. iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 80 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 22
-------------------------
Eric Bambach
Eric at cisu dot net
-------------------------

#6 lore raw
In reply to Sven Köhler
Quoted 2 lines · Sven K?hler

my problem is, that i want an application to listen on a priviledged port (e.g. port 80) and to run as a "normal" unpriviledged user

I would give your application this capability (from #include "linux/capability.h")

/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */ /* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */

  #define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10

You do this with a setuid wrapper which drops all capabilities but that one and then runs your application.

One day there will be a way of doing this in the filing system, so instead of doing a chmod u+s you do a chmod +CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or something! Until then use a setuid wrapper....

Here is a FAQ

http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt

Actually the FAQ mentions sucap which seems to be a fairly standard program (its in Debian anyway!). You could use this too...

Signature · 2 lines
Nick Craig-Wood
[email protected]
#7 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines

I would give your application this capability (from #include "linux/capability.h")

/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */ /* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */

  #define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10

You do this with a setuid wrapper which drops all capabilities but that one and then runs your application.

Thx for the answer! That's exactly what i search for.

I will try to write such a program. It seems that sucap keeps all capabilities and drops none. Depending on the other capabilities, that could be a bad idea.

Thx
Sven

#8 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 9 lines

I would give your application this capability (from #include "linux/capability.h")

/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */ /* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */

  #define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10

You do this with a setuid wrapper which drops all capabilities but that one and then runs your application.

Thx for the answer! That's exactly what i search for.

Unfortunatly my gladness didn't last long. The FAQ at
http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt states that CAP_SETPCAP is disabled, but it doesn't say why it is disapled. That capability is needed by sucap to work.

So why is CAP_SETPCAP disabled by default?