ax25 check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/4 ax25 check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Check the return value on memcpy_fromiovec().
===== net/ax25/af_ax25.c 1.33 vs edited =====
net/ax25/af_ax25.c +6 -1
@@ -1534,7 +1534,12 @@SOCK_DEBUG (sk,"AX.25: Appending user data\n" );/* User data follows immediately after the AX.25 data */ -memcpy_fromiovec (skb_put (skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len); +if (memcpy_fromiovec (skb_put (skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) { + err = -EFAULT ; +kfree_skb (skb); + goto out; + } + skb->nh.raw = skb->data;/* Add the PID if one is not supplied by the user in the skb */
PATCH 2/4 irda check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Check the return value on memcpy_fromiovec().
===== net/irda/af_irda.c 1.47 vs edited =====
net/irda/af_irda.c +15 -3
@@ -1307,7 +1307,11 @@skb_reserve (skb, self->max_header_size +16 ); asmptr = skb->h.raw =skb_put (skb, len); -memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); + err =memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); +if (err) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return err; + }/* * Just send the message to TinyTP, and let it deal with possible
@@ -1549,7 +1553,11 @@IRDA_DEBUG (4 ,"%s(), appending user data\n" , __FUNCTION__); asmptr = skb->h.raw =skb_put (skb, len); -memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); + err =memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); +if (err) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return err; + }/* * Just send the message to TinyTP, and let it deal with possible
@@ -1612,7 +1620,11 @@IRDA_DEBUG (4 ,"%s(), appending user data\n" , __FUNCTION__); asmptr = skb->h.raw =skb_put (skb, len); -memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); + err =memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); +if (err) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return err; + } err =irlmp_connless_data_request (self->lsap, skb);if (err) {
PATCH 3/4 netrom check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Check the return value on memcpy_fromiovec().
===== net/netrom/af_netrom.c 1.40 vs edited =====
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +6 -1
@@ -1094,7 +1094,12 @@SOCK_DEBUG (sk,"NET/ROM: Appending user data\n" );/* User data follows immediately after the NET/ROM transport header */ -memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); +if (memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len)) { +kfree_skb (skb); + err = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + } +SOCK_DEBUG (sk,"NET/ROM: Transmitting buffer\n" );if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED ) {
PATCH 4/4 rose check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Check the return value on memcpy_fromiovec().
===== net/rose/af_rose.c 1.33 vs edited =====
net/rose/af_rose.c +5 -1
@@ -1079,7 +1079,11 @@ asmptr = skb->h.raw =skb_put (skb, len); -memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); + err =memcpy_fromiovec (asmptr, msg->msg_iov, len); +if (err) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return err; + }/* * If the Q BIT Include socket option is in force, the first
Quoted 1 line · On Mon, 8 Dec 2003 20:23:02 -0800 Chris Wright <[email protected]> wrote:
Check the return value on
memcpy_fromiovec().
I'm fine with all of these patches, but since these problems are not super-critical can you resend these for 2.6.1 perhaps?
Quoted 2 lines · * David S. Miller ([email protected]) wrote:
I'm fine with all of these patches, but since these problems are not super-critical can you resend these for 2.6.1 perhaps?
Sure, no problem.
thanks,
-chris
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PATCH 1/5 tun check error on memcpy_fromiovec
In reply to Chris Wrighthey chris,
after applying your 4 patches on top of linux-2.6.0
+ experimental net,
found 2 last unchecked memcpy_fromiovec in tun.c patch bellow fixes the second call,
the first is beyond me, please complete this patch :) compile tested
thx max
drivers/net/tun.c +4 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,10 @@ }skb_reserve (skb,2 ); -memcpy_fromiovec (skb_put (skb, len), iv, len); +if (memcpy_fromiovec (skb_put (skb, len), iv, len)) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return -EFAULT ; + } skb->dev = tun->dev;switch (tun->flags &TUN_TYPE_MASK ) {
Re: [PATCH 1/5] tun check error on memcpy_fromiovec
I'll take a look at merging this...
Re: [PATCH 1/5] tun check error on memcpy_fromiovec
In reply to maximilian attemsQuoted 8 lines · * maximilian attems ([email protected]) wrote:
hey chris,
after applying your 4 patches on top of linux-2.6.0
+ experimental net,
found 2 last uncheckedmemcpy_fromiovecintun.cpatch bellow fixes the second call,
the first is beyond me, please complete this patch :) compile tested
I specifically left those alone. They have a semi-bogus verify_area() call that is trying to insure the memcpy_fromiovec won't EFAULT. I'd prefer to remove them and simply do memcpy checking.
thanks,
-chris
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Re: [PATCH 1/5] tun check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Quoted 10 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 8 lines · * maximilian attems ([email protected]) wrote:
hey chris,
after applying your 4 patches on top of linux-2.6.0
+ experimental net,
found 2 last uncheckedmemcpy_fromiovecintun.cpatch bellow fixes the second call,
the first is beyond me, please complete this patch :) compile tested
Quoted 3 lines
I specifically left those alone. They have a semi-bogus
verify_area()call that is trying to insure thememcpy_fromiovecwon't EFAULT. I'd prefer to remove them and simply do memcpy checking.
Folks,
Please don't add extra unneeded checks or fix stuff that does not need to be fixed. Verify area is not bogus. We need to know total length of the iovec so we might as well check it in the same loop and not bother with checking later.
Thanks
Max
Re: [PATCH 1/5] tun check error on memcpy_fromiovec
Quoted 9 lines · * Max Krasnyansky ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · Chris Wright
I specifically left those alone. They have a semi-bogus
verify_area()call that is trying to insure thememcpy_fromiovecwon't EFAULT. I'd prefer to remove them and simply do memcpy checking.Please don't add extra unneeded checks or fix stuff that does not need to be fixed. Verify area is not bogus. We need to know total length of the iovec so we might as well check it in the same loop and not bother with checking later.
Yes, I realize it's used to collect total length. But it does not protect from userspace controlled buffer whose contents can change. Continuing when a fault is possible means the skb->data could be zero'd. However, since this is intended to be 0700 root owned device, and the user could supply same such data directly, it's of fairly low priority to patch.
thanks,
-chris
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