SAL PCI config space
ia64_sal_pci_config_read() and ia64_sal_pci_config_write() use SAL_CALL(). This takes an IRQ-safe spinlock, but SAL 3.2 says that SAL_PCI_CONFIG_READ and SAL_PCI_CONFIG_WRITE are both MP-safe and reentrant. So is there any reason we shouldn't use SAL_CALL_REENTRANT?
(at the moment, we're protected by pci_lock so it wouldn't matter, but I'm just about to submit a patch to do away with that)
Signature · 6 lines
"Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception." -- Mark Twain
Quoted 5 lines · Matthew Wilcox
ia64_sal_pci_config_read()andia64_sal_pci_config_write()useSAL_CALL(). This takes an IRQ-safe spinlock, but SAL 3.2 says thatSAL_PCI_CONFIG_READandSAL_PCI_CONFIG_WRITEare both MP-safe and reentrant. So is there any reason we shouldn't useSAL_CALL_REENTRANT?
I thought there was going to be further clarification on this, but
I'm not sure what SAL rev it would be in. On HP boxes, we can't preform multiple config accesses to the same root bus at the same time. So far, the SAL_CALL lock has protected us from needing to worry about it. I'd suspect other boxes might have similar restrictions.
Alex
Quoted 2 lines
(at the moment, we're protected by
pci_lockso it wouldn't matter, but I'm just about to submit a patch to do away with that)
Quoted 4 lines
ia64_sal_pci_config_read()andia64_sal_pci_config_write()useSAL_CALL(). This takes an IRQ-safe spinlock, but SAL 3.2 says thatSAL_PCI_CONFIG_READandSAL_PCI_CONFIG_WRITEare both MP-safe and reentrant. So is there any reason we shouldn't useSAL_CALL_REENTRANT?
Theoretically there might be older SAL implementations where these aren't re-entrant ... so to be really safe, you'd have to check that the SAL version is >= 3.2 before using the SAL_CALL_REENTRANT form.
-Tony
Quoted 8 lines · Tony
Quoted 4 lines
ia64_sal_pci_config_read()andia64_sal_pci_config_write()useSAL_CALL(). This takes an IRQ-safe spinlock, but SAL 3.2 says thatSAL_PCI_CONFIG_READandSAL_PCI_CONFIG_WRITEare both MP-safe and reentrant. So is there any reason we shouldn't useSAL_CALL_REENTRANT?Theoretically there might be older SAL implementations where these aren't re-entrant ... so to be really safe, you'd have to check that the SAL version is >= 3.2 before using the
SAL_CALL_REENTRANTform.
Gack. I went and dug up some older SAL specs.
SAL 3.1 is ambiguous. On page 9-4, it says "Yes" under "Re-entrancy requirement" for these calls, but then on 9-18 and 9-19, it says, "Good programming practices dictate that indexed accesses to the configuration space be serialized in order to be MP-safe."
(this seems rather looney to me. how can you have something that's reentrant but not MP-safe? I think it's an unintended carry-over from SAL 3.0)
SAL 3.0 states "SAL procedures are not re-entrant with respect to any runtime service (including itself)."
So what's actually shipping in systems? David's against runtime checks due to some of the buggy firmware hp's managed to ship. I agree with him that it would have been much more sensible had the SAL spec specifid new calls rather than changing the semantics of existing calls.
Signature · 6 lines
"Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception." -- Mark Twain
Quoted 4 lines
So what's actually shipping in systems? David's against runtime checks due to some of the buggy firmware hp's managed to ship. I agree with him that it would have been much more sensible had the SAL spec specifid new calls rather than changing the semantics of existing
calls.
It's not whats shipping that's the big problem ... it's the people still running BigSur, Lion and other prototype systems that will never have their firmware upgraded to SAL3.2 spec.
Apart from general cleanliness of not having functions that are re-entrant and MP safe uselessly spin on a lock to serialize, do you see any tangible benefits from switching these to use the SAL_CALL_REENTRANT method? Surely config space accesses aren't in anyone's critical path?
-Tony
Most of the SAL calls except the pure reading ones w/o affecting any state have to be reentrant and MP safe, don't they? Multiple OSs/executables on different Soft partitions do not share others' lock variables, unless otherwise all SAL calls of soft partitions are redirected to one hosting OS, which sounds not reasonable.
So, SAL_CALL_REENTRANT could be a solution for the kernel itself, but not for partitioned platforms.
Thanks,
John
-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Luck, Tony
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: RE: SAL PCI config space
Quoted 4 lines
So what's actually shipping in systems? David's against runtime checks due to some of the buggy firmware hp's managed to ship. I agree with him that it would have been much more sensible had the SAL spec specifid new calls rather than changing the semantics of existing
calls.
It's not whats shipping that's the big problem ... it's the people still running BigSur, Lion and other prototype systems that will never have their firmware upgraded to SAL3.2 spec.
Apart from general cleanliness of not having functions that are re-entrant and MP safe uselessly spin on a lock to serialize, do you see any tangible benefits from switching these to use the SAL_CALL_REENTRANT method? Surely config space accesses aren't in anyone's critical path?
-Tony
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Quoted 6 lines · John Lee
Most of the SAL calls except the pure reading ones w/o affecting any state have to be reentrant and MP safe, don't they? Multiple OSs/executables on different Soft partitions do not share others' lock variables, unless otherwise all SAL calls of soft partitions are redirected to one hosting OS, which sounds not reasonable.
Yes. I think that's why the SAL spec changed because all the vendors want to support virtual machines.
But that doesn't help the older boxes which do not implement the newer SAL spec or have "non-compliant" implementations.
Quoted 2 lines
So,
SAL_CALL_REENTRANTcould be a solution for the kernel itself, but not for partitioned platforms.
Sorry - this statement doesn't make sense to me. You meant s/SAL_CALL_REENTRANT/spinlocks/ above maybe?
grant
Quoted 40 lines
Thanks,
John-----Original Message-----
From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Luck, Tony
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 1:09 PM
To: Matthew Wilcox
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: RE: SAL PCI config spaceQuoted 4 lines
So what's actually shipping in systems? David's against runtime checks due to some of the buggy firmware hp's managed to ship. I agree with him that it would have been much more sensible had the SAL spec specifid new calls rather than changing the semantics of existing
calls.
It's not whats shipping that's the big problem ... it's the people still running BigSur, Lion and other prototype systems that will never have their firmware upgraded to SAL3.2 spec.
Apart from general cleanliness of not having functions that are re-entrant and MP safe uselessly spin on a lock to serialize, do you see any tangible benefits from switching these to use the
SAL_CALL_REENTRANTmethod? Surely config space accesses aren't in anyone's critical path?(quoted diff) +0
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Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Multiple OSs/executables on different Soft partitions do not share others' lock variables, unless otherwise all SAL calls of soft partitions are redirected to one hosting OS, which sounds not reasonable.
Yes. I think that's why the SAL spec changed because all the vendors want to support virtual machines.
But that doesn't help the older boxes which do not implement the newer SAL spec or have "non-compliant" implementations.
There would be other issues besides whether some SAL calls are re-entrant to running multiple OS in soft partitions. E.g. MCA
-Tony
Quoted 16 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Grant Grundler [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 2:46 PM
To: John Lee
Cc: Luck, Tony; Matthew Wilcox; [email protected]
Subject: Re: SAL PCI config spaceQuoted 6 lines · John Lee
Most of the SAL calls except the pure reading ones w/o affecting any state have to be reentrant and MP safe, don't they? Multiple OSs/executables on different Soft partitions do not share others' lock variables, unless otherwise all SAL calls of soft partitions are redirected to one hosting OS, which sounds not reasonable.
Quoted 2 lines
Yes. I think that's why the SAL spec changed because all the vendors want to support virtual machines.
Right. So it's SAL implementers' responsibility to make them mp-safe.
Quoted 11 lines
But that doesn't help the older boxes which do not implement the newer SAL spec or have "non-compliant" implementations.
Quoted 1 line
So,
SAL_CALL_REENTRANTcould be a solution for the kernelitself, but
Quoted 1 line
not for partitioned platforms.
Sorry - this statement doesn't make sense to me. You meant s/SAL_CALL_REENTRANT/spinlocks/ above maybe?
grant
For Linux's own backward compatibility with older machines, I'm with Tony - SAL_CALL_REENTRANT -, until we all agree not to worry about them.
Thanks,
John
Quoted 13 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Luck, Tony [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 2:59 PM
To: Grant Grundler; John Lee
Cc: Matthew Wilcox; [email protected]
Subject: RE: SAL PCI config spaceQuoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Multiple OSs/executables on different Soft partitions do not share others' lock variables, unless otherwise all SAL calls of soft partitions are redirected to one hosting OS, which sounds not reasonable.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes. I think that's why the SAL spec changed because all the vendors want to support virtual machines.
But that doesn't help the older boxes which do not implement the newer SAL spec or have "non-compliant" implementations.There would be other issues besides whether some SAL calls are re-entrant to running multiple OS in soft partitions. E.g. MCA
I'm already there. RAS for soft partitions ;)
Any forum or discussion on that front would be helpful if you could invite us.
Thanks,
John Lee