local root exploit confirmed in 2.6.10: Linux 2.6 Kernel Capability LSM Module Local Privilege Elevation
Frank Barknecht pointed this out on linux-audio-dev, it's a horrible bug, I confirmed it in 2.6.10, and have not seen it mentioned on the list.
Executive summary:
run "vim" as normal user. Do ":r /etc/shadow". Permission denied.
do "modprobe capability" as root in another terminal
Do ":r /etc/shadow" again in the same vim. You will be able to read and write /etc/shadow as normal user.
http://www.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/securityfocus/bugtraq/2004-12/0390.html
Lee
Quoted 2 lines · Lee Revell
http://www.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/securityfocus/bugtraq/2004-12/0390.html
Followup: this was discussed on the LSM list. Patch is available.
http://mithra.immunix.com/pipermail/linux-security-module/2004-December/index.html
Lee
Quoted 3 lines · Lee Revell
Frank Barknecht pointed this out on linux-audio-dev, it's a horrible bug, I confirmed it in 2.6.10, and have not seen it mentioned on the list.
Although this sucks, it should be pointed out that it only grants root to users able to force the loading of a certain module, aka 'root'.
Modules have always been free to give root capabilities to all users. We don't usually ship these though :-)
Signature · 2 lines
http://www.PowerDNS.com Open source, database driven DNS Software http://lartc.org Linux Advanced Routing & Traffic Control HOWTO
Quoted 7 lines · bert hubert
Quoted 3 lines · Lee Revell
Frank Barknecht pointed this out on linux-audio-dev, it's a horrible bug, I confirmed it in 2.6.10, and have not seen it mentioned on the list.
Although this sucks, it should be pointed out that it only grants root to users able to force the loading of a certain module, aka 'root'.
Not force the loading of a certain module, but predict when it will be loaded. Still, not easy to exploit.
Lee
Quoted 6 lines · Lee Revell
Quoted 5 lines · bert hubert
Quoted 3 lines · Lee Revell
Frank Barknecht pointed this out on linux-audio-dev, it's a horrible bug, I confirmed it in 2.6.10, and have not seen it mentioned on the list.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Although this sucks, it should be pointed out that it only grants root to users able to force the loading of a certain module, aka 'root'.
Not force the loading of a certain module, but predict when it will be loaded. Still, not easy to exploit.
Lee
Right, this means it is unsafe to have capabilities compiled as a module, or at least loaded after any untrusted processes start.
The attached patch, which is a simple port of a fix by Chris Wright (sent out a year ago), fixes this problem by having the dummy module track capabilities.
-serge
security/dummy.c +10 -5
@@ -74,12 +74,10 @@ static int dummy_acct (struct file *filestatic int dummy_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) { -if (cap_is_fs_cap (cap) ? tsk->fsuid ==0 : tsk->euid ==0 ) -/* capability granted */ +if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))return 0 ; - -/* capability denied */ -return -EPERM ; +else +return -EPERM ; }static int dummy_sysctl (ctl_table * table,int op)
@@ -199,6 +197,10 @@ static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (stru current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid; current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid; + +dummy_capget (current, ¤t->cap_effective, + ¤t->cap_inheritable, + ¤t->cap_permitted); }static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -563,6 +565,9 @@ static int dummy_task_setuid (uid_t id0,static int dummy_task_post_setuid (uid_t id0,uid_t id1,uid_t id2,int flags) { +dummy_capget (current, ¤t->cap_effective, + ¤t->cap_inheritable, + ¤t->cap_permitted);return 0 ; }